University of Utah Hospital Ex Rel. Harris v. Pence , 104 Idaho 172 ( 1982 )

BAKES, Chief Justice,

dissenting:

The majority is applying I.C. § 31-3504, as amended July 1, 1976, retroactively in direct contravention to the Idaho statute that no law should be retroactively applied unless the legislature so declares. I.C. § 73-101; see Lincoln Cty. v. Fidelity & Dep. Co. of Md., 102 Idaho 489, 632 P.2d 678 (1981); In re Pahlke, 56 Idaho 338, 53 P.2d 1177 (1936). A law is retroactive when it operates upon rights which have been acquired. See Arnold v. Woolley, 95 Idaho 604, 514 P.2d 599 (1973). Under I.C. § 31-3504, as it existed prior to the effective date of the 1976 amendment, the Harrises acquired the right to file for medical indigent benefits within one year from February 25,1976, the date of release from the hospital. Therefore, to apply I.C. § 31-3504, as amended July 1, 1976, to limit the Harrises’ filing period to forty-five days from the effective date of the amendment, affects their previously acquired right to file for benefits within one year from the date of discharge from the hospital.

In retroactively applying the 1976 amendment to I.C. § 31-3504, the majority also retroactively overrules Cook v. Massey, 38 Idaho 264, 220 P. 1088 (1923). When the plaintiffs filed this action for medical indigent benefits, they were entitled to and did act consistently with the law as set forth in Cook v. Massey, supra. Weighing the factors to be considered in determining whether to apply that opinion prospectively or retrospectively, i.e., the purpose of the new rule, reliance on prior decisions and the effect of the new rule on the administration of justice, see Jones v. Watson, 98 Idaho 608, 570 P.2d 284, 286 (1977), quoting People v. McDaniel, 16 Cal.3d 156, 127 Cal.Rptr. 467, 545 P.2d 843, 848 (1976); Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Co., 97 Idaho 14, 539 P.2d 566 (1975), I can only conclude that to deprive the Harrises of their right to file for benefits by overruling retroactively the decision in Cook v. Massey, supra, ignores their right to rely on existing law and causes them undue hardship.

Finally, the majority relies primarily on a rule adopted in other jurisdictions which, as I understand it, is as follows: When a statutory period of limitation is amended to reduce the limitation period, the new limitation period will be applied as of the effective date of the amendment even to those actions which accrue before the effective date of the amendment. The majority fails, however, to address two recent cases that contain language which is expressly inconsistent with the above stated rule. In Stoner v. Carr, 97 Idaho 641, 550 P.2d 259 (1976), this Court stated that “[t]he statute of limitation m effect when the right of action is deemed to accrue defines that statutory period unless the legislature provides otherwise.” Id. at 643, 550 P.2d at 261. Similarly, in Martin v. Clements, 98 Idaho 906, 575 P.2d 885 (1978), this Court stated that “if the cause of action accrued before [the effective date of the amendment], then the statute of limitation effective on that date of accrual would be the applicable statute of limitation.” Id. at 908, 575 P.2d at 887. Thus, the majority opinion has the effect of overruling not one, but three cases, to the extent that they are inconsistent: Cook v. Massey, supra, is expressly overruled, and Stoner v. Carr, supra, and Martin v. Clements, supra, are overruled by implication.

My concern over both the retroactive application of I.C. § 31-3504, and the wide-sweeping implications of overruling the relevant portions of the above named cases, compels me to dissent.

BISTLINE, Justice, concurring with BAKES, Chief Justice.

I am in complete agreement with Chief Justice Bakes’ position that I.C. § 73-101 precludes retroactive application of the amended version of I.C. § 31-3504. This result is reinforced by I.C. § 73-106, which provides: “Accrued rights and pending actions not affected. — No action or proceeding commenced before the compiled laws take effect, and no right accrued, is affected by their provisions, but the proceedings therein must conform to the requirements of the compiled laws as far as applicable.” (Emphasis added.) No one questions that the appellants’ right to file for medical indigency benefits accrued on February 25, 1976 — the date of discharge of their child, Sara Harris, from the medical facility in Utah, and that, at the time of its accrual, that right extended for one full year. The majority, however, confuses the concept of retroactivity as applied to an accrued right. Quoting Holt v. Morgan, 128 Cal.App.2d 113, 274 P.2d 915 (1954) for the proposition that retroactivity is a misunderstood legal concept, the majority itself misinterprets the Holt opinion as evidenced by a subsequent statement made by that court: “There could only be retroactive application where prior to the enactment ... some right... [had] been obtained.” 274 P.2d at 918 (emphasis added). In this manner the Holt court realized application of a statute is retroactive if it affects accrued rights.