State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Industrial Accident Commission ( 1950 )

WARD, J.

This petition for a writ of review was filed by the State Compensation Insurance Fund and Pickering Lumber Company, a corporation, for the purpose of having this court examine and determine the legality of the findings and award of the Industrial Accident Commission in favor of two minors, Joyce Cecilee Hudson and Carol Marie Hudson, in the sum of $7,500 (maximum death benefit under the Workmen’s Compensation Act) and payable to their mother, Marie Hudson Bellah, as guardian ad litem and trustee.

On November 17, 1948, John C. Hudson sustained a fatal injury arising out of and occurring in the course of his employment as a timber faller with the Pickering Lumber Company, which resulted in his death the following day. The insurance carrier for the lumber company was the State Compensation Insurance Fund, and both the employer and employee were subject to the provisions of the workmen’s compensation laws of the state. The deceased was the sole support of his two minor daughters who lived with him and they were his only dependents, though he lived with a woman not his wife, who was the mother of three children. He and his wife had been living apart for four years and by mutual oral agreement he was not contributing anything to her support. She married her present husband, Mr. Bellah, a month after the death of Hudson.

On May 5,1949, the commission issued its findings and made a death award in the amount of $7,500, payable at the rate of $30 a week to the mother of the two minors, as guardian ad litem and trustee, for the support of the minors and not the “surviving widow.” The award was based upon maximum wages within the meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as provided in section 4702 of the Labor Code (Lab. Code, 1947 Supp., p. 60). The pertinent part of the section reads as follows: “. . . the death benefit . . . shall not exceed . . . the sum of six thousand dollars ($6,000), except in the case of a surviving widow with one or more dependent minor children, in which case the death benefit shall not exceed seven thousand five hundred dollars ($7,500) . . .” (Subd. (b).) Under the section the amount of the death benefit for total dependency is computed as allowable up to a total of four times the average annual earnings of the deceased employee, which in the present case would be an amount in excess of $6,000; but the section provides that the award may be increased to a maximum of $7,500 only under the specified exception of “the case of a surviving widow with one or more dependent minor children ...”

The real question presented on this petition is the amount of the award. It is contended that the award should have been $6,000 instead of $7,500, and that by reason of the award of the additional sum of $1,500 the insurance carrier and the employer to that extent were deprived of property without due process of law. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 13; U. S. Const., art. XIY.) Petitioners argue that the legislative intent was to pay death benefits only for dependents of the deceased, and cite cases holding that the intention of the Legislature is to be followed if possible (Dickey v. Raisin Proration Zone No. 1, 24 Cal.2d 796 [151 P.2d 505, 157 A.L.R. 324]) and that the Legislature is without power to require payment for the benefit of those who are not either injured employees or their dependents (Commercial Gas. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 211 Cal. 210 [295 P. 11]). The legislative intent, however, is carried out in this case, as the award was made for the benefit of the dependent minor children though made payable to the surviving widow, who was appointed by the commission as their guardian ad litem and trustee.

Under the Workmen’s Compensation Act awards are made only for the benefit of surviving dependents. Where there are no dependents no benefit should be awarded. The award here is made for the dependent children and there is no award for the “surviving widow.” In the present case the wife is not a dependent. She could not be classified as such in view of an oral agreement that she should live separate from her husband, with no reservation as to support (Civ. Code, § 175).

At the time of Hudson’s death the wife was the surviving widow. That is all that the statute refers to, namely, “a surviving widow.” Prior to Hudson’s death the minors were in fact solely dependent upon the father. Upon his death the minors became dependent upon the “surviving widow,” who had previously worked to support herself. The liability which fell upon the surviving widow not only to support the two children but to devote to them the care of a mother and guardian not only reduces the ability of the “surviving widow” to support herself but accordingly reduces her ability to supplement the $6,000 and thereby lengthens the readjustment period. Hence the commission deemed that a necessity had arisen to award the children, not the mother, the additional amount that may be awarded under section 4702. It appears that the language used in section 4702 was selected advisedly. The term “surviving widow” includes a nondependent widow, likewise a dependent widow. If the statute provided only for a dependent widow the commission could not have granted the increased amount to the children. It is not necessary to decide in this case that the mother of the children, whether married or not, is, in the eyes of the law, the surviving widow of the marriage union resulting in the birth of the two children now dependent upon her. The facts of this case show that on the date of the father’s death the mother of the children was in fact and in law the surviving widow of the deceased father. The fact that the mother subsequently married her present husband is of no consequence in determining her status on the date of the death of her husband. A court may interpret only where there is an ambiguity. Where the language is clear, certain and unambiguous there is no room for interpretation. That is the case here. When the Legislature wanted to limit awards to dependents it knew how to do so. When it omitted the term “dependent” in section 4702 it must be held that the omission was intentional. Any other rule would mean that this court, even where the Legislature has indicated that when it wanted to limit the power of the commission it knew how to do so, and did so in other parts of this very chapter and section, could determine that because the Legislature should have limited the section here involved it in fact did so. It is sufficient if a court finds a provision in a statute and passes upon the construction of the phrases or words used by the Legislature and not upon a provision that a court may feel should have been inserted. There is no intent herein to hold that a readjustment period is longer for children with a mother than for motherless children. The motherless children problem will be passed upon when presented in a ease raising that question upon the facts. The language used in section 4702 fits perfectly the facts of this case.

The writ is discharged and the award of the Industrial Accident Commission is affirmed.

Peters, P. J., concurred.