Hicks v. Reis , 21 Cal. 2d 654 ( 1943 )

CARTER, J.,

Concurring and dissenting. — I concur in the judgment of affirmance as I am of the opinion that the evidence is sufficient to justify the inference that John Reis was using and operating the automobile involved in the accident with the permission and consent of defendant Gray at the time of the accident.

I do not, however, agree with that portion of the majority opinion which places reliance upon the rule announced in the majority opinion in the case of Blank v. Coffin, 20 Cal.2d 457 [126 P.2d 868], with reference to when an inference may be rebutted as a matter of law, and I adhere to the views which I expressed in my concurring opinion in the case of Blank v. Coffin, supra, which, when applied to the facts of this case justify the conclusion reached by the trial court.

To my mind there is no basis in reason, logic or common sense for the statement in the majority opinion that “when the rebutting testimony is of such a nature that the minds of reasonable men cannot differ on the subject, then the trier of facts cannot, and should not be permitted to, indulge in the inference.” The import of this statement is that if the trial judge or the jury draws an inference from certain proven facts notwithstanding rebutting evidence which an appellate court considers sufficient to rebut the inference, then, the trial judge and the members of the jury do not have reasonable minds; in other words, the inevitable effect of such a rule is that in every case in which an appellate court thinks that an inference has been overcome by rebutting evidence and reverses a finding of a trial judge or a judgment based upon the verdict of a jury, both the trial judge and the jury are placed in the category of persons not possessing reasonable minds. Such a theory is not the product of sound reasoning and disregards the basic concept of the finality of determination of issues of fact by the trial forum. A trial judge and a jury hear the witnesses testify, observe their demeanor on the witness stand, scrutinize the exhibits, and in many cases make ocular observation of the subject matter of the action. They are in a much better position to determine the weight and effect of an inference than any appellate court justice could possibly be. If, as the majority opinion concedes, the trier of fact is the exclusive judge as to the weight and effect of evidence, then it must necessarily follow that when evidence is presented from which the trier of fact is justified in drawing an inference, if he sees fit to give such inference greater weight than any evidence offered in rebuttal, it should not lie in the province of an appellate court to say that because he accorded to the inference greater weight than the evidence opposed to it, he did not possess a reasonable mind. The trial judge and the jury are presumed to have reasonable minds, the majority opinion to the contrary notwithstanding. If we indulge in the presumption that appellate and Supreme Court justices have reasonable minds, we have a situation in every case where it is contended that an inference was rebutted, in which there may be reasonable minds on both sides of the issue. To then apply the rule announced in the majority opinion would in. every case result in an affirmance of the judgment based upon inferences drawn from proven facts if a logical course of reasoning is pursued. In a trial by jury where all twelve jurors agree upon the verdict and the trial judge denies a motion for a new trial we have a situation where there are thirteen minds concurring in the same conelusion. Should they all determine that an inference should prevail over rebutting evidence to the contrary, and three justices on an appellate court should arrive at a contrary conclusion, we would have the anomalous situation of three justices who did not hear the witnesses testify, observe their demeanor on the stand or have any personal contact with the subject matter of the action declaring that none of the thirteen persons constituting the trial forum possessed reasonable minds. The absurdity of this type of metaphysical legalism should be so apparent that no reasonable mind should venture to promulgate it much less announce it as a principle of jurisprudence.