Tingley v. Harrison , 125 Idaho 86 ( 1994 )

JOHNSON, Justice,

concurring and dissenting.

I concur in part I of the Court’s opinion, but must respectfully dissent from part II. In my view, the Court has incorrectly applied I.R.C.P. 17(a) in affirming the trial court’s summary judgment.

The Court first concludes that Tingley’s delay of one year in joining the trustee as the real party in interest was not “reasonable.” No rationale is given for the conclusion that one year was an unreasonable period of time. I can only wonder what standard the trial courts and members of the bar will glean from a reading of this opinion and that of our Court of Appeals in Conda Partnership v. Const. Co., 115 Idaho 902, 771 P.2d 920 (Ct. App.1989), where the Court of Appeals concluded that two years was not an unreasonable time in which to add a real party in interest pursuant to I.R.C.P. 17(a). In Conda, the Court of Appeals focused on the lack of prejudice to the party raising the real party in interest objection. Id. at 904, 771 P.2d at 922. In this case, the Court makes no reference to prejudice to Harrison, nor is there any evidence of prejudice.

Next, the Court focuses on the lack of a mistake in naming the original party. Nowhere in I.R.C.P. 17(a) is reference made to mistake as a prerequisite to the application of the relation back of the naming of a real party in interest. I could understand the reference to mistake, if we were dealing with the relation back of a claim against a defendant who had been incorrectly identified in the complaint. I.R.C.P. 15(c) refers to mistake in the context of an amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted. In my view, the application of I.R.C.P. 17(a) is not governed by the same requirement of mistake. Apparently, the Court has rewritten I.R.C.P. 17(a) to require a mistake in naming a plaintiff who is not the real party in interest before there can be a relation back of an amendment naming the real party in interest.

The third premise of the Court’s ruling in part II of the opinion is that I.R.C.P. 17(a) only applies when the original complaint is not time barred. This ignores the unique circumstances in this case. By virtue of 11 U.S.C. § 108(A), the trustee had a viable claim at the time Tingley filed the complaint, although Tingley did not. Obviously Harrison knew the trustee was the real party in interest when Tingley filed the complaint, because Harrison alleged in the answer that Tingley was not the real party in interest. Under these unique circumstances, the application of the rule cited by the Court is erroneous.