Phears v. Doyne ( 1996 )

Beasley, Chief Judge,

concurring specially.

I concur because we are compelled to do so by Gust v. Flint, 257 Ga. 129 (356 SE2d 513) (1987). However, I would agree with the dissent in that case, which would allow a liberal interpretation of Georgia’s Long Arm Statute. This would be in harmony with the judicially articulated lodestar of the statute, which is that it “ ‘contemplates that jurisdiction shall be exercised over nonresident parties to the maximum extent permitted by procedural due process.’ ” Clarkson Power Flow v. Thompson, 244 Ga. 300 (260 SE2d 9) (1979), quoting Coe & Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp., 230 Ga. 58, 60 (195 SE2d 399) (1973).

Here there are minimum contacts with Georgia. Defendant invited Georgia residents to do business with him with respect to the sale and restoration of his Jaguar. His communications, directed to Georgia and intended to be acted upon here, were received and action was initiated. The anguish, which plaintiff alleged in conjunction with his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, was suffered by plaintiff primarily in Georgia. The injury occasioned by fraud, if any, was also inflicted in Georgia. Defendant’s actions prompted the expenditure by plaintiff of substantial funds in Georgia. If these and other contact points present in this case meet the minimum threshold to assure that suit against the Florida defendant in Georgia would be consistent with “ ‘ “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” ’ [Cit.]” Clarkson Power Flow, supra at 301, then the statute should apply. Unfortunately, Gust says they do not.

Whether the Supreme Court’s construction of the statute is correct or not, it is still open for the legislature to address the issue and assure the maximum recourse to Georgia courts for Georgia citizens to resolve disputes with foreign persons or entities. See Gust, supra at 130 (Gregory, J., concurring specially).

Decided January 25, 1996 Reconsideration denied March 11, 1996 Phears & Moldovan, Jenny E. Jenson, Wendy A. Jacobs, for appellant. Kicklighter & Mayer, Raymond C. Mayer, for appellee.