Matter of Troy P. , 114 N.M. 525 ( 1992 )

PICKARD, Judge

(specially concurring).

I concur in Judge Black’s opinion because I agree that (1) the admission of the little girl’s hearsay statements to the social worker violated Respondent’s federal right of confrontation as explained in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990), and (2) the admission into evidence of the little girl’s hearsay statement to her mother could be viewed as proper. I write separately because I believe the first issue could have been more easily decided under well-established New Mexico evidentiary law. Moreover, because courts are to avoid reaching constitutional issues when not necessary to a disposition, JMB Retail Properties Co. v. Eastburn, 114 N.M. 115, 835 P.2d 831 (1992); Huey v. Lente, 85 N.M. 597, 514 P.2d 1093 (1973); see also State v. Self, 88 N.M. 37, 40, 536 P.2d 1093, 1096 (Ct.App.1975), I believe this case should have been decided under state evidentiary law.

We have a long history in New Mexico, beginning at least with Self and continuing through State v. Barela, 97 N.M. 723, 643 P.2d 287 (Ct.App.1982); State v. Taylor, 103 N.M. 189, 704 P.2d 443 (Ct.App.1985); and State v. Pacheco, 110 N.M. 599, 798 P.2d 200 (Ct.App.1990), of recognizing the crucial importance of cross-examination to the truth-seeking function of a criminal trial. Accordingly, these cases have jealously guarded the hearsay exceptions and applied them sparingly. Contrary to the Idaho experience discussed in Wright, analysis under our state hearsay rules is very similar to federal constitutional confrontation analysis. We require similar circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness before admitting hearsay under our residual exceptions. State v. Pacheco; see State v. Self. For the reasons stated in the majority opinion, the hearsay statements of the little girl to the social worker do not have the requisite guarantees. Accordingly, they do not qualify for admission under SCRA 1986, 11-804(B)(6).