Goettl v. State , 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 174 ( 1992 )

THOMAS, Justice.

The only question presented in this case is whether law enforcement officers had probable cause to stop Edward E. Goettl (Goettl) and then to arrest him for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and conspiracy to commit that offense. Relying upon Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990), the trial court ruled that the requisite probable cause was present. Goettl argues a collateral and alternative issue with respect to the denial of a motion to suppress all evidence obtained after the stop on the ground the stop was not supported by sufficient probable cause. We agree with the decision of the trial court that this record establishes adequate probable cause to justify the action of the law enforcement officers in stopping Goettl and then arresting him for the offenses with which he was charged. The resolution of that question also determines the question arising out of the motion to suppress because that motion assumed the absence of the requisite probable cause. The judgment and sentence entered by the trial court is affirmed.

In the Brief of Appellant, Goettl submits his statement of the issues as follows:

I. Whether the court below erred when it found that the anonymous tip furnished the necessary indicia of reliability to justify a forcible stop of the Appellant’s vehicle.

II. Whether the court below erred by denying the motion to suppress all evidence obtained after the arrest of the Appellant when the arrest was made without probable cause.

In its Brief of Appellee, the State of Wyoming sets forth the issues in this way:

I. Did the information furnished by the anonymous informant, as corroborated by law enforcement officers, exhibit sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the investigatory stop of Appellant’s automobile?

II. Was Appellant unlawfully arrested, so as to require suppression of his subsequent confession?

The record demonstrates the following facts that are material to the disposition of this case. At about 3:45 P.M. on Saturday, April 28, 1990, the dispatcher for the Johnson County Sheriff’s office at Buffalo received a telephone call from an anonymous informant who claimed knowledge of illegal drug activity. The informant told the dispatcher that Don Goettl, the appellant’s brother, had “a lot of acid” and that Don Goettl and Goettl were going to Sheridan to sell it. Apparently, Goettl had come from Colorado to visit his brother and had brought the LSD to Wyoming with him. The informant advised the dispatcher that the Goettl brothers planned to transport the drugs in Goettl’s silver Volvo automobile, bearing Colorado license UKB 606. The informant stated that the vehicle was parked at 178 Western Avenue in Buffalo, which was Don Goettl’s address. In addition, the informant told the dispatcher the Goettl brothers were going along with others; they were getting ready to leave; and they would be leaving soon.

The dispatcher then contacted an officer of the Buffalo Police Department and asked the officer to come to the station. After the officer arrived, the dispatcher related the content of the anonymous phone call. About 4:00 P.M., the officer went by Don Goettl’s residence at 178 Western Avenue to attempt to verify the information the anonymous informant had furnished. The officer saw a silver Volvo bearing Colorado license plate UKB 606 parked in the driveway of Don Goettl’s residence with the passenger door open. The make of car, the license number, and its location all matched the information given by the informant. The officer then left the neighborhood where the residence was situated and drove to the north exit on the route from Buffalo leading to Sheridan. In about twenty minutes, the officer saw the same silver Volvo traveling north on Highway 87 toward the interstate. He could see at least four people in the Volvo. At the time he saw the car with the people in it, the officer was at a pay telephone talking to an agent of the drug task force. That agent then contacted Kevin Hughes, the supervisor of the Northeast Drug Enforcement Team, at about 4:15 P.M. and reported the information he had received from the Buffalo police officer. The information given to Agent Hughes consisted of the substance of what the informant had told the dispatcher, including a description of the vehicle, together with the observations of the Buffalo police officer.

Agent Hughes then left Sheridan and traveled toward Buffalo after using his radio to arrange with officers of the Sheridan Police Department to watch for the silver Volvo in case Hughes missed it. After traveling about five miles south toward Buffalo, Hughes saw the Volvo traveling toward Sheridan. He turned around and followed the Volvo, but missed the Coffeen exit at Sheridan which the Volvo had taken. After Goettl’s Volvo turned off the interstate, an officer of the Sheridan Police Department stopped it because of Agent Hughes’ earlier request. There were five people in the car: Goettl, Don Goettl, Laura Goettl, Shalom Waltenbaugh and Matthew Demary.

Goettl was driving the Volvo when the Sheridan police officer pulled the vehicle over. Goettl presented a Wyoming driver’s license to the officer who made a radio check and learned from the Wyoming Highway Patrol that Goettl’s Wyoming driver’s license had been suspended. At that time, the Sheridan police officer arrested Goettl for driving while his license was suspended.

Agent Hughes arrived at the Volvo some three or four minutes after it was stopped by the Sheridan police officer. Agent Hughes advised Goettl of his constitutional rights in accordance with the decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974, reh’g denied, 385 U.S. 890, 87 S.Ct. 11, 17 L.Ed.2d 121 (1966). Goettl then gave permission to Agent Hughes to search both his person and the vehicle he was driving. That search did not disclose any contraband on Goettl’s person. Agent Hughes then requested, and received, consent to search one of the passengers, Matthew De-mary. That search revealed a quantity of LSD in the pocket of Demary’s trousers. Demary then was placed under arrest by Agent Hughes-, and he was advised of his constitutional rights in accordance with the Miranda decision. Thereafter, the other occupants of the car, except for Laura Goettl, consented to a search of their persons, but no other contraband was disclosed. All five people were then taken to the police station in Sheridan where they were questioned by Agent Hughes and another Sheridan police officer. In the course of the interrogation that evening, Goettl made statements to Agent Hughes. Those statements were not recorded, but the contents of the statements were related by Agent Hughes in the course of his testimony at Goettl’s trial.

Goettl was charged with possessing a controlled substance, lysergic acid diethyla-mide (LSD), as defined in Schedule I, Wyo. Stat. § 35-7-1014(d)(xii) (1988), with intent to deliver and with conspiring to deliver that controlled substance, in violation of Wyo. Stat. §§ 35-7-1031(a) and 6-1-303 (1988), respectively.¹ A hearing was held on two different days in July addressing a defense motion to suppress the statements made by Goettl to Agent Hughes while he was under arrest. That motion was denied. At his trial in August, Goettl was convicted of both charges. He then was sentenced to the state penitentiary for a term of not less than three nor more than five years on the charge of possessing the controlled substance with intent to deliver, and he was sentenced to not less than two nor more than five years on the conspiracy charge. Credit was given for 161 days for presen-tence confinement against Count I, possessing a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Goettl’s terms of imprisonment were imposed to run consecutively, but the court ordered that the conspiracy sentence was to be reduced to probation if Goettl successfully completed his sentence on the count of possession with intent to deliver. Goettl appeals from the judgment and sentence.

In Neilson v. State, 599 P.2d 1326, 1333 (Wyo.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1079, 100 S.Ct. 1031, 62 L.Ed.2d 763 (1980), this court stated:

A peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant if, at the moment the arrest is made, he has probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed by the person to be arrested, or he has reasonable grounds to believe that a crime is being committed in his presence by the person to be arrested. Stated another way, the determination of probable cause to arrest without a warrant depends upon whether the facts and circumstances within the peace officer’s knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a reasonably cautious or prudent man to believe that the person arrested has committed or is committing an offense. The constitutional standard governing probable cause is grounded upon reasonableness. Thus, an appellate court’s inquiry into whether or not an arrest is legal in a given case is restricted to an objective consideration of the evidence in the record. (Citations omitted.)

In accordance with Neilson, our review is premised upon an objective consideration of the evidence set forth in the record that relates to the issues on appeal.

Goettl’s initial contention is that the informant’s tip, in the case of White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 2412, was more specific than the one provided in this case. Goettl then contends that in White, the officers corroborated more of the predictions of future activity than in this case; the officers found less of the informant’s tips to be false than in this case; the trial court in White had necessary indicia of reliability that is not present here; and, finally, the trial court in this case applied the law from White to the facts in a manner that produced a result outside the boundaries established by the court in White. Our consideration of Goettl’s arguments in light of the record persuades us that the trial court correctly ruled that there was probable cause to stop Goettl and correctly applied White to reach its decision.

At the time the trial court addressed the issues in this case, White was a very recent precedent. Applying the totality of the circumstances test, the United States Supreme Court held that an anonymous tip encompassing predictions of future activity, the details of which were corroborated by independent police investigation, demonstrated sufficient indicia of reliability to justify an investigatory stop of White’s vehicle. The facts in the White case, and those in this case, are strikingly similar. In the White case, an anonymous individual called the Montgomery Police Department and stated that “Vanessa White would be leaving 235-C Lynwood Terrace Apartments at a particular time in a brown Plymouth station wagon with the right taillight lens broken, that she would be going to Dobey’s Motel, and that she would be in possession of about an ounce of cocaine inside a brown attache’ case.” White, 496 U.S. at 327, 110 S.Ct. at 2414. The police officers corroborated the information by observing a woman who did leave the 235 Lynwood Terrace Apartments building and enter a brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken taillight lens. These events occurred within the time frame indicated by the informant, and the woman then took the most direct route to Dobey’s Motel. She was stopped by the investigative officers just short of reaching Dobey’s Motel. The investigative officers found a locked brown attaché case in the vehicle and, after White provided the combination to the lock on the case, marijuana was discovered. Subsequently, at the police station, the officers discovered a quantity of cocaine in White’s purse.

The Supreme Court of the United States, in White, acknowledged the fact that the information from the anonymous caller, without more, would not have offered sufficient indicia of reliability to justify this type of investigatory stop. However, when the information furnished to the police by the anonymous informant was combined with the corroboration of that information, including predictions of future activity, the Court held that the degree of reliability did warrant the investigatory stop and further investigation by the police officers. Other federal cases are consistent. See United States v. Gonzales, 897 F.2d 504 (10th Cir.1990) (information conveyed by a confidential informant held to encompass sufficient indicia of reliability to justify an investigatory stop of the vehicle); United States v. Alvarez, 899 F.2d 833 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 671, 112 L.Ed.2d 663 (1991) (anonymous tip sufficiently corroborated by police observations so as to furnish the officers with reasonable suspicion necessary for an investigatory stop).

In Goettl's case, a number of facts corroborative of the anonymous tip were verified by the police officers. The Buffalo officer did see several people leaving Buffalo in the silver Volvo automobile bearing Colorado license plate UKB 606, which was owned by Goettl and had been parked at 178 Western Avenue, the home of Don Goettl, within the time frame indicated by the informant. The vehicle was taking the most direct route to Sheridan and, in fact, it was driven to, and arrived at, Sheridan. The information that could not be corroborated consisted of the identity of the persons in the silver Volvo; the presence of “acid” in the vehicle; and the purpose of the occupants of the vehicle to sell the “acid” in Sheridan.

As in White, there was a degree of particularity in the facts furnished by the anonymous informant, and there also was a prediction of the future actions of third parties. The description of the brown Plymouth station wagon in White and the description of the silver Volvo parked at the residence of Don Goettl in this case are examples of facts anyone readily could obtain. The accurate prediction by the informant, however, of future behavior is not something ordinarily, readily, or easily obtained, and that prediction, when corroborated by observation of the police officers, demonstrates inside information or a specific familiarity with the affairs of the persons who are the subject of the tip. When these more specific future events are pre-dieted, and significant aspects of that prediction are verified, it becomes reasonable for police officers to believe that the informant has furnished reliable information regarding illegal activities of the subjects of the tip. White.

White is consistent with prior decisions of the United States Supreme Court and fits with cases from this court. In a series of cases that began with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the United States Supreme Court has recognized that police officers may, without infringing upon the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, briefly stop a moving automobile to investigate their reasonable suspicion that the occupants are involved in illegal activity. After effecting what has come to be known as the “Terry stop,” the officers also are permitted to frisk the person upon a reasonable belief that the person may be armed. Terry. The test there adopted was whether a reasonably prudent person in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or the safety of others could be endangered. This reasonable concern for his own safety justified the officer in stopping and frisking the suspect for a weapon even though there did not exist probable cause for an arrest. Terry.

About five years later, in Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972), the Supreme Court of the United States upheld a “Terry stop” and a frisk undertaken on the basis of a tip received from a previously known informant who had given reliable information in the past. That tip was not verified, but the Court concluded that, even though the information would not have been sufficient to support either an arrest or a search warrant, the information did carry sufficient indicia of reliability to justify a forcible stop. Adams.

The standard for analyzing the justification in relying upon an informant’s tip has culminated in the “totality of the circumstances” test adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, reh’g denied, 463 U.S. 1237, 104 S.Ct. 33, 77 L.Ed.2d 1453 (1983). In that case, the Court's analysis articulated a requirement that there be a balanced assessment of the relative weights of all the various indicia of reliability, as well as the indicia of unreliability, of the anonymous informant’s tip. The Supreme Court of the United States pointed out that it consistently has recognized the value of corroboration of the details of an informant’s tip by independent police investigation. Pursuant to Gates, the test of the “totality of the circumstances” in the case of a tip by an informant can be summarized as encompassing: (1) the sufficiency of the information set forth in the informant’s tip; (2) the prediction of future activity or events by the informant; and (3) some corroboration of the current and predicted future events by the police officers.

In prior cases, this court has recognized the validity of a “Terry stop” and also has adopted the “totality of the circumstances” test. See Keehn v. Town of Torrington, 834 P.2d 112 (Wyo.1992). In Lopez v. State, 643 P.2d 682 (Wyo.1982), a police officer's independent observations of an automobile and a suspect driving the car which matched descriptions by eyewitnesses were held to be adequate probable cause for an investigatory stop. In Cook v. State, 631 P.2d 5 (Wyo.1981), the circumstances that occurred following a robbery, together with reasonable inferences made by an experienced police officer, furnished adequate grounds for an investigatory stop. In Parkhurst v. State, 628 P.2d 1369 (Wyo.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 899, 102 S.Ct. 402, 70 L.Ed.2d 216 (1981), the police officers were given a description of a car used by two individuals to flee from the scene of the murder, and they also were told the direction the car was traveling. The court held the officers were justified in making an investigatory stop when a car fitting that description was spotted. In the course of developing our state precedent, we consistently have held that something less than probable cause will suffice for an investigatory or “Terry stop.” Simmons v. State, 712 P.2d 887 (Wyo.1986); Olson v. State, 698 P.2d 107 (Wyo.1985); Lopez; Cook. “A policeman is not required to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur merely because he lacks the necessary information required for probable cause to arrest. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). He may make an investigatory stop.” Olson, 698 P.2d at 109-10.

Examining the “totality of the circumstances” as disclosed by the record in this case, in the light of the decision in White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 2412, we conclude that sufficient probable cause was present to justify the investigatory stop of Goettl’s car. We hold that the informant’s tip, particularly the prediction of future events, the details of which were verified by the observation of the law enforcement officers, furnished more than adequate probable cause to stop the Goettl vehicle. The subsequent events, including the consensual searches, then justified the arrest of Goettl and the others in the vehicle.

Turning to Goettl’s contention it was prejudicial error to admit into evidence those things that were seized or statements that were made after the arrest because the arrest occurred without probable cause, we again are in accord with the trial court that there was probable cause to arrest Goettl. The information in the hands of the police officers, following the stop and the consensual searches, constituted probable cause to believe Goettl had committed the offense of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and that he had conspired to commit that offense. The motion to suppress all of the evidence obtained following that arrest properly was denied.

The authority for warrantless arrests in Wyoming is found in Wyo.Stat. § 7-2-103 (1987), which provides, in pertinent part:

(a) A peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant and detain that person until, a legal warrant can be obtained when:

(i) Any criminal offense is being committed in his presence by the person to be arrested;

(ii) He has probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed and that the person to be arrested has committed it; or

(iii)He has probable cause to believe that a misdemeanor has been committed, that the person to be arrested has committed it and that the person, unless immediately arrested:

(A) Will not be apprehended;

(B) May cause injury to himself or others or damage to property; or

(C) May destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the misdemeanor.

The focus of the record inquiry in this case is whether the arresting officer had probable cause to believe that a felony had been committed and that Goettl had committed it to fit the arrest within § 7-2-103(a)(ii).

The question that must be resolved is what information will suffice to establish probable cause in the context of a warrant-less arrest. The test adopted by this court is that the determination of probable cause to arrest without a warrant depends upon whether the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the arresting officer and those facts and circumstances about which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to justify a reasonably cautious or prudent man in the belief that the person arrested has committed, or is committing, an offense. Neilson, 599 P.2d 1326. In Neilson, the court relied upon Bñnegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879, reh’g denied, 338 U.S. 839, 70 S.Ct. 31, 94 L.Ed. 513 (1949), and Beck v. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). In this regard, the following cases from Wyoming also have pertinence. See Jandro v. State, 781 P.2d 512 (Wyo.1989); Ostrowski v. State, 665 P.2d 471 (Wyo.1983); Baigosa v. State, 562 P.2d 1009 (Wyo.1977); Ro-darte v. City of Riverton, 552 P.2d 1245 (Wyo.1976).

According to the record in this case, most of the information the police officers had at the time of Goettl’s arrest came from the telephone call by the anonymous informant. The content of that information was corroborated in several respects by those police officers prior to arresting Goettl. In Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S.Ct. 1081, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971), the United States Supreme Court held that an arresting officer may use information he gathers to bolster a tip by an informant to the point that there exists probable cause for arrest, if the information gathered by the officer is corroborative of the informant’s tip. That principle can be applied in this case. The anonymous informant telephoned law enforcement officers at about 3:45 P.M. and stated that Goettl’s brother was in possession of “a lot of acid” in Buffalo. The informant said that Goettl and his brother, together with other people, were preparing to leave Buffalo soon to transport the LSD to Sheridan where they expected to sell it. The informant also said that the party would travel in Goettl’s silver Volvo, with Colorado license UKB 606, then parked at 178 Western Avenue in Buffalo, the residence of Goettl’s brother. Within an hour and a half of the phone call, the law enforcement officers had corroborated the presence of the silver Volvo parked at 178 Western Avenue; the fact that 178 Western Avenue was the residence of Goettl’s brother; the Volvo was registered to Goettl; and the Volvo left Buffalo soon afterward with at least four occupants. The officers also established the Volvo was traveling north toward Sheridan and that it was driven on the highway toward Sheridan, leaving the interstate at the Coffeen Avenue exit at Sheridan.

The stop having been justified by the corroboration of the anonymous informant’s information, the arresting officers learned, prior to the arrest, that two of the individuals in the vehicle were Goettl and his brother; one of the passengers was Shalom Waltenbaugh; and, after a consensual search of another passenger, Matthew Demary, approximately 165 tablets of LSD were found in Demary’s pocket. Additionally, one of the police officers recognized Shalom Waltenbaugh who then was on probation for a violation of the controlled substances laws and was a suspect with respect to selling LSD.

Based upon the information that had come to them from the anonymous informant; the further corroboration of that information by the law enforcement officers both prior to and after the investigatory stop; and the other information gained at that time, we are satisfied the police officers had the requisite probable cause for a warrantless arrest in accordance with § 7-2-103. This holding is consistent with our ruling in Cook, 631 P.2d 5, in which we held that, after police officers have stopped a vehicle for investigatory purposes, they may obtain additional information about the suspects that leads to adequate probable cause for an arrest. That sequential development is what occurred in this case. Goettl’s vehicle was stopped, the identities of the passengers and the driver were ascertained, and a controlled substance was found on one of the passengers in the vehicle.

Goettl relies on Rodarte, 552 P.2d 1245, to argue that simply being a passenger in a vehicle in which a controlled substance is found is insufficient to establish probable cause for a warrantless arrest. In Ro-darte, Susan Rodarte and a friend accepted a ride with two men who were in a pickup. Later the pickup was stopped by the police, and the driver was arrested based upon a warrant that previously had been issued charging him with the sale of narcotics. The police had been looking for him to execute the warrant. After two bags of marijuana were discovered on the floor of the pickup, the driver was arrested, along with the other three occupants. This court held that there was insufficient probable cause to arrest Susan Rodarte. Several facts distinguish Rodarte from this case. First, Rodarte was a civil case in which the appellant claimed a wrongful arrest. Goettl’s case is a criminal prosecution in which he alleges that there was insufficient probable cause to stop him and insufficient probable cause to arrest him. In Rodarte, the police officers stopped the vehicle because they had a warrant previously issued for the arrest of the driver. They had been looking for him, and. it also is true that Susan Rodarte never was arrested for any specific crime.

What distinguishes Goettl’s case is that an anonymous informant had given information concerning illegal drug activities. The primary factor that is not present in Rodarte is the informant’s tip with respect to the implementation of a plan to sell LSD. In this case, the probable cause requisite for a warrantless arrest was established by the information provided by the anonymous informer, the corroboration by the law enforcement officers, both before and after the investigatory stop, and the additional information discovered after the stop. No statement by the anonymous informant was contradicted or found to be in any way inconsistent with the facts the officers developed.

We hold there was probable cause to arrest Goettl for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver it and for conspiracy to commit that offense. The facts and circumstances that were within the knowledge of the peace officers at the time of the arrest, including the information provided by the anonymous informant, furnished adequate probable cause to justify the arrest in this case.

The resolution of the first issue argued by Goettl also leads to the resolution of his second issue. We have held probable cause did exist to stop Goettl and then to arrest him for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver it and for conspiracy to commit that offense. The motion to suppress the evidence obtained after the stop was properly denied since the arrest was lawful. The statements that Goettl made while being interrogated by the police officers at a subsequent time at the police station properly were admitted into evidence.

Goettl, in his brief and in his oral arguments before this court, encouraged us to offer greater protection under the Constitution of the State of Wyoming than the protection that has been provided pursuant to the Constitution of the United States. The provisions of the constitutional proclamations are substantially identical. In the Constitution of the State of Wyoming, the following appears:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describing the place to be searched or the person or thing to be seized.

Wyo. Const, art. 1, § 4.

The language found in the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States is:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall' not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

The only difference in these two provisions is that, under the Constitution of the State of Wyoming, an affidavit is required to support the issuance of a search warrant. Neither U.S. Const. amend. IV nor Wyo. Const, art. 1, § 4 prohibits all war-rantless searches and seizures. Only those that are unreasonable are proscribed. Neilson, 599 P.2d 1326. This court previously has adopted the standard of reasonableness, which is the federal constitutional standard for searches and seizures. See Ostrowski, 665 P.2d 471; DeHerrera v. State, 589 P.2d 845 (Wyo.1979); Raigosa, 562 P.2d 1009. In addition, this court has adopted the federal test justifying an investigatory stop, which is something less than the information necessary to establish probable cause. Lopez, 643 P.2d 682; Vrooman v. State, 642 P.2d 782 (Wyo.1982); Cook, 631 P.2d 5; DeHerrera.

We are not persuaded in this instance by Goettl’s argument that we should expand the rights protected by the Constitution of the State of Wyoming beyond the protection furnished according to the Constitution of the United States. In light of precedent which heretofore has adopted the federal standards, we are satisfied that adopting the argument of Goettl in this regard would simply create an area of the law in which law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and trial courts would be left without a standard. There would be no way to predict what would, or would not, suffice to establish grounds for an investigatory stop or probable cause to justify a warrantless arrest. We are satisfied that it would be a disservice to structure a situation within the criminal law of the state of Wyoming leading to an ad hoc approach in every future instance.

The judgment and sentence is affirmed.

1 . Wyo.Stat. § 35-7-1031 (1988) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

(a) Except as authorized by this act, it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance. Any person who violates this subsection with respect to: ******

(ii) Any other controlled substance classified in Schedule I, II or III, is guilty of a crime and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than ten (10) years, fined not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both; * * *.

Wyo.Stat. § 6-1-303 (1988) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

(a) A person is guilty of conspiracy to commit a crime if he agrees with one (1) or more persons that they or one (1) or more of them will commit a crime and one (1) or more of them does an overt act to effect the objective of the agreement.