Hansen v. White , 190 Ga. App. 596 ( 1989 )

Carley, Chief Judge.

Appellant-plaintiff brought suit against appellee-defendant, seeking damages for personal injuries she allegedly sustained in an automobile collision. The case was tried before a jury and a verdict in favor of appellee was returned. Appellant appeals from the judgment entered by the trial court on the jury’s verdict.

1. Appellant enumerates as error the trial court’s denial of her motion for new trial on the general grounds.

“ ‘The jury verdict has the approval of the trial judge, and after verdict the evidence is to be construed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and every presumption and inference is in favor of sustaining the verdict. [Cit.] And, if there is any evidence to sustain the verdict of the jury, an appellate court will not disturb it. [Cit.]’ [Cit.]” Nolen v. Murray Indus., 165 Ga. App. 785, 786 (1) (302 SE2d 689) (1983). See also Houston v. Hughes, 172 Ga. App. 638 (324 SE2d 206) (1984). By its return of a general verdict in favor of appellee, the jury necessarily concluded either that appellee was not negligent or that, if he was, appellant did not sustain a serious injury as the result of that negligence. Assuming without deciding that the evidence would demand a finding that appellee was negligent, a review of the trial transcript reveals evidence from which the jury was authorized to find that appellant suffered no recoverable damage as the result of the collision.

There was conflicting testimony with regard to the cause of all of appellant’s alleged injuries except one. Appellant testified that she had “suffered an acute cervical strain” in the collision and this testimony was not directly contradicted. However, appellant’s credibility was drawn into question when, during the trial, she admitted that her earlier answers to interrogatories and responses on oral deposition with regard to her prior medical history were incorrect. “[D]ue to the conflicts in plaintiff’s evidence and the possible impeachment of the plaintiff by the proof of prior conflicting statements and by disproof of essential facts testified to by the plaintiff, the jury was authorized to disregard plaintiff’s testimony. Furthermore, while we are reluctant to speculate as to what inference was drawn from the evidence by the jury, we must note that the evidence authorized conclusions other than those advocated by plaintiff.” McBryde v. Roberts, 160 Ga. App. 416, 417 (287 SE2d 349) (1981). “ ‘Conceding, but without deciding, that the evidence demanded a finding that the defendant was negligent and that this negligence was the proximate cause of the automobile collision, the evidence authorized but did not demand a finding that plaintiff had suffered any [serious] injury attributable to the collision. The jury is the judge of the veracity of parties and witnesses; under the evidence in this record they were authorized to disbelieve plaintiff’s claim of injury as a result of the collision. Accordingly, the judgment for defendant, based upon the verdict of the jury, will not be disturbed.’ [Cits.]” Hiter v. Shelp, 134 Ga. App. 814 (216 SE2d 666) (1975). See also King v. Loyd, 170 Ga. App. 638, 639 (1) (317 SE2d 879) (1984).

Cochran v. Lynch, 126 Ga. App. 866 (192 SE2d 165) (1972) is distinguishable and does not compel a contrary result. “The distinction lies in the fact that in Cochran only the plaintiff and her doctor testified as to the extent of her injuries and their testimony was contradicted by neither testimony nor circumstances. In other words, the evidence there demanded a finding that the plaintiff was injured to some extent; if she was injured the causal chain was unbroken. Here the plaintiff is indeed injured but the question is whether she was injured by the collision. Opposing medical testimony and the intervening time support the negative inferences which the jury must have drawn from the evidence, and this alone is enough to preclude this court from reversing.” (Emphasis in original.) Davis v. McCray, 127 Ga. App. 281, 282 (193 SE2d 200) (1972).

Moreover, Cochran is otherwise inapplicable because it “was decided prior to enactment of the Georgia Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act. . . .” Hughes v. Newell, 152 Ga. App. 618, 622 (2) (263 SE2d 505) (1979). Because the evidence clearly authorized the jury to find that the “serious injury” threshold of OCGA § 33-34-9 had not been met, the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion for new trial on the general grounds. See Nolen v. Murray Indus., supra; Houston v. Hughes, supra.

2. Appellant enumerates as error the trial court’s refusal “to allow evidence that [a]ppellee had forfeited bond on the traffic charges which arose from the accident in question.”

The record reveals that, for the reasons discussed in Townsend v. Brantley, 163 Ga. App. 899-900 (1) (296 SE2d 186) (1982), the evidentiary ruling of the trial court was not erroneous.

Judgment affirmed.

Birdsong, Sognier, Pope and Beasley, JJ., concur. Deen, P. J., McMurray, P. J., Banke, P. J., and Benham, J., dissent.