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SWANSTROM, Judge, specially concurring.
I concur in the foregoing opinion, but would add an additional observation.
The twelve-year sentence pronounced here would be unreasonable if it required that Young be incarcerated for twelve years or even six years solely because of the crime committed. If, however, the sentence is administered the way unified sentences are intended, the sentence is reasonable.
Assuming that Young has genuine contrition, shows her ability to avoid the mistakes of the past, and conducts herself appropriately in prison, she should be entitled to parole at the end of the minimum term of the sentence. The indeterminate part of the sentence, nine and one-half years, then becomes a reasonable “control” period during which Young can be released on parole with appropriate supervision. This is the primary value of such a sentence. It recognizes the potential for rehabilitation by affording Young a second chance after an appropriate period of incarceration. It provides continuing motivation for good conduct and it gives society a reasonable level of protection while Young is integrated back into society. I believe this is what the district judge intended when pronouncing this sentence. Otherwise, what is the purpose of a judge setting a minimum period of confinement, as he is required to do under the Unified Sentencing Act?
The sentencing judge and the reviewing appellate court should be able to presume that the minimum sentence fixed by the judge as appropriate for the case will not be enhanced arbitrarily by prison authorities because the crime falls within a certain class of crimes. To do so will obscure the “truth in sentencing” which underlies the Unified Sentencing Act. On the other hand, I clearly recognize the unique discretion of the Commission of Pardons and Parole to determine, on an individual basis, when a prisoner may safely be released on parole. I.C. § 20-223. Because we must presume — until shown otherwise — that the Commission of Pardons and Parole is administering unified sentences as intended in the Act, I view the sentence in this case as reasonable.
SILAK, J., concurs.
Document Info
Docket Number: 18750
Citation Numbers: 808 P.2d 429, 119 Idaho 510, 1991 Ida. App. LEXIS 65
Judges: Walters, Swanstrom, Silak
Filed Date: 3/26/1991
Precedential Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/8/2024