In the Interest of J. L. G. , 209 Ga. App. 565 ( 1993 )

Smith, Judge.

After appellant’s motion to suppress 92 individually wrapped rocks of crack cocaine was denied, he was adjudicated delinquent and committed to the custody of the Youth Detention Center. He appeals from the denial of his motion to suppress the cocaine and the adjudication of delinquency and disposition of commitment entered by the juvenile court.

In his motion to suppress, appellant contended that his warrant-less arrest was illegal because the police lacked probable cause to believe that he had committed any crime. The denial of this motion is appellant’s sole enumeration of error.

Only the arresting officer testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress. He and his partner received a radio dispatch that an unidentified caller reported two suspicious black males at a specified block in Covington, Georgia, near a residential apartment complex. One was identified as wearing pants but no shirt, the other as being on a bicycle and possibly being in possession of a small handgun. Within minutes of the dispatch, the officers arrived at the named location and saw appellant, wearing pants but no shirt, standing alone by the street. When appellant saw the police car, he stuck his hand in his pocket, turned away from the officers, and crossed the street in front of their vehicle. When the officers began exiting the vehicle, appellant broke into a run, refusing the command to halt. Appellant was tackled and while he was being subdued, numerous small packages of cocaine were discovered on the ground where he had fallen.

“[T]he trial court’s decision on questions of fact and credibility at a suppression hearing must be accepted unless clearly erroneous. [Cits.]” Woodruff v. State, 233 Ga. 840, 844 (3) (213 SE2d 689) (1975). “Where there is evidence to support the decision of a trial judge on motion to suppress evidence, that decision will not be disturbed on appeal. [Cits.]” (Emphasis supplied.) Orkin v. State, 236 Ga. 176, 189 (3) (223 SE2d 61) (1976).

Contrary to appellant’s arguments, the police did not need probable cause to arrest in order to approach and question him. “ ‘[N]ot all seizures of the person must be justified by probable cause to arrest for a crime. . . . (C)ertain seizures are justifiable under the Fourth Amendment if there is articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime. . . . [Reasonable suspicion of criminal activity warrants a temporary seizure for the purpose of questioning limited to the purpose of the stop.’ [Cits.]” (Emphasis omitted.) Jones v. State, 187 Ga. App. 421, 423 (370 SE2d 784) (1988). No evidence was presented that any person but appellant matched the description of a black male wearing pants but no shirt at that exact block at that time.

When appellant turned and appeared to hide something upon first seeing the police, the officers were reasonably authorized to believe that it might be appellant who possessed the gun warned of in the anonymous tip. As soon as the police began to leave their vehicle, appellant began to run. “This attempt to leave . . . was assessable as flight, which being evidence of consciousness of guilt ([cit.]) in the circumstances gave rise to an ‘articulable suspicion’ that [appellant] was engaged in criminal activity and authorized police to stop [appellant] briefly for investigation. Flight in connection with other circumstances may be sufficient probable cause to uphold a warrantless arrest or search ([cit.]). . . . The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause for arrest simply to shrug his shoulders and allow a criminal to escape.” State v. Smalls, 203 Ga. App. 283, 286 (2) (416 SE2d 531) (1992). “ ‘(A) reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, (is permitted) where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent [officer] in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.’ [Cit.]” (Emphasis supplied.) Smith v. State, 139 Ga. App. 129, 131 (2) (227 SE2d 911) (1976).

Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, we do not hold that either an anonymous tip alone or flight alone warrants a forcible stop. Rather, we apply the well-established principle that “[f] light in connection with other circumstances may be sufficient probable cause.” State v. Smalls, supra at 286. In this case, the anonymous tip mentioned the presence of a handgun and already had proven accurate in several respects; appellant fled in apparent direct response to the police leaving their patrol car; and the appellant placed his hand in his pocket, after noticing the arrival of the police, giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that he might have been reaching for a firearm. The police had a valid basis to detain appellant briefly for the limited purpose of determining whether he was carrying a gun. See State v. Ball, 207 Ga. App. 729 (429 SE2d 258) (1993). Compare Johnson v. State, 197 Ga. App. 538 (398 SE2d 826) (1990) (initial stop invalid because based upon anonymous tip alone). When, during that brief detention, the police observed the cocaine on the ground at the point where appellant had been subdued, the police clearly had probable cause to arrest him for illegal possession of drugs. The juvenile court correctly denied appellant’s motion to suppress.

Judgment affirmed.

Pope, C. J., McMurray, P. J., Birdsong, P. J., Beasley, P. J., Cooper and Andrews, JJ., concur. Blackburn, J., dissents. Johnson, J., not participating.