Russell v. State , 188 Ga. App. 167 ( 1988 )

Deen, Presiding Judge.

The events of the instant case dramatically illustrate the stark truth underlying the poetic adage, “. . . Hell [has no] fury like a woman scorned.” Appellant Carol Star Russell, who admittedly believed that “diamonds are a girl’s best friend” if and only if they are bought at Tiffany or Maier & Berkele, was rejected by her almost-fiance, David Roberson, after she had expressed in explicit terms her disdain for the engagement and wedding rings which he had proposed buying for her at Kay Jewelers. Roberson then met and subsequently married another young lady, Tammy, whose taste in jewelry was apparently not so elevated.

Approximately six weeks after her marriage to David, Tammy received, while on the job at a Gainesville, Ga., restaurant, a telephone call from appellant, who stated that she was at Tammy’s residence in bed with David; she also allegedly threatened to kill Tammy. Knowing that her work telephone number was not listed in the telephone directory but was written down in her personal address book, which she kept at home, Tammy called the police and reported the likelihood that an intruder had entered her house. Police officers investigated and then summoned Tammy to the scene. As she approached the house, Tammy spotted Carol’s car and alerted the police, who followed Carol and subsequently took her into custody. When Tammy entered the house she found the premises in considerable disarray: a light fixture had been broken; the bedspread had been cut to pieces; the waterbed was slashed in several places; broken pieces of wedding-crystal floated on the water which had poured forth from the now eminently unseaworthy waterbed; and the bedroom carpet was soaked. She discovered that her address book, her wedding pictures, and the receipts for her wedding and engagement rings were missing.¹ The police officer who apprehended appellant found in her possession not only Tammy’s address book but also a bag containing a hammer, a pair of scissors, a knife, a pair of gloves, and two Bibles. The record is silent as to the ownership of the latter two items.

David Roberson testified, and proved by a canceled check, that he had paid $1,900 for the waterbed some sixteen months previously; he further testified that he had paid $500 for the carpeting. Both he and his wife testified that none of the damaged items had any value in their present conditions. At the close of the State’s evidence defendant/appellant moved for a directed verdict of acquittal on the grounds that the State had not proven the ownership or the value of the damaged property; the motion was denied.

A Hall County jury convicted Russell of criminal damage to property in the second degree. She was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment, with ten days to serve and the balance on probation, together with payment of $1,000 in restitution and mandatory participation in a mental health program. Russell appeals, enumerating as error the denial of her motion for directed verdict of acquittal on the basis of the alleged insufficiency of the evidence of ownership and the State’s alleged failure to prove the value of the property. Held:

1. OCGA § 16-7-23 states in pertinent part: “(a) A person commits the offense of criminal damage to property in the second degree when he: (1) Intentionally damages any property of another person without his consent and the damage thereto exceeds $500.00.” The victim’s husband stated that he had purchased the waterbed and carpet and testified to the amount he had paid. He produced a canceled check for $1,900, with which he had paid for the waterbed. He further testified that the items were useless after Carol’s depredations. This evidence established not only the ownership but the present value of the items, within the contemplation of the statute, which requires that they be worth more than $500 to warrant conviction. Cf. Johnson v. State, 156 Ga. App. 411 (274 SE2d 778) (1980), cert. denied, 451 U. S. 989 (101 SC 2327, 68 LE2d 848) (1981), in which this court reversed a conviction for criminal damage to property because the owner of the damaged property offered only an opinion as to its value, unsupported by any documentation.

2. Examination of the transcript and the remainder of the record reveals that the evidence was more than sufficient to authorize a jury to find appellant guilty of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). Appellant’s enumeration of error is without merit.

Judgment affirmed.

Carley and Sognier, JJ., concur specially.

1 The record does not reveal whether Tammy’s rings were purchased from the purveyors expressly preferred by appellant or were of a less prestigious provenance.