Debey v. State , 192 Ga. App. 512 ( 1989 )

Carley, Chief Judge.

Appellants were found guilty of possession of cocaine and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. They appeal from the judgments of conviction and sentences that were entered on the guilty verdicts.

In their sole enumeration, appellants urge that their motion tc suppress was erroneously denied by the trial court. The evidence which appellants sought to suppress had been seized pursuant to e search warrant. The affidavit upon which the search warrant was issued recited the following: “On 9/10/87 4:30 p.m. [affiant] received information from C.R.I. who stated that their [sic] was a large amount of marijuana being stored and sold at [an] above describee location. Informant stated that w/m goes by the name Tim and w/i goes by the name Anita or Junaita [Juanita], both subjects will sale [sic] marijuana. Investigation conduct [sic] by Sgt. T. Jones of Easl Point Police Department reveals that [appellant] Timothy Debej lives at the above described address. Informant is familiar with the appearance of marijuana in its growing and dried stages. East Poinl and College Park Police have been conducting and [sic] investigatior on this suspect for four months. This officer feels there is enougl probable cause for issuance of a search warrant of the above describee premises.” Appellants urge that, under the applicable “totality of the circumstances” standard of Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 (103 SC 2317, 76 LE2d 527) (1983), this affidavit was not sufficient to provide the magistrate with probable cause for issuance of the warrant.

The affidavit may or may not be sufficient under the “totality of the circumstances” standard of Illinois v. Gates, supra. However, even assuming that appellants are correct and that probable cause was not shown by the affidavit, a reversal of the denial of their motion to suppress would not necessarily be mandated. There is the remaining issue of whether the exclusionary rule would or would not be an appropriate sanction to vindicate any purported violation of appellants’ Fourth Amendment rights.

Because the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of issuing magistrates, it has been “ ‘modified so as not to bar the admission of evidence seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance [by an officer] on a search warrant that is subsequently held to be defective.’ ” United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 905 (I) (104 SC 3405, 82 LE2d 677) (1984). “[T]he marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion.” United States v. Leon, supra at 922 (III C). “It is ,the magistrate’s responsibility to determine whether the officer’s allegations establish probable cause and, if so, to issue a warrant comporting in form with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. In the ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate’s probable-cause determination or his judgment that the form of the warrant is technically sufficient. ‘(0]nce the warrant issues, there is literally nothing more the policeman can do in seeking to comply with the law.’ [Cit.] Penalizing the officer for the magistrate’s error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.” United States v. Leon, supra at 921 (III B). Accordingly, in those cases wherein a search warrant has been sought and issued, the ultimate question of whether evidence should be suppressed is not dependent upon the magistrate’s erroneous determination that the warrant should have issued, but upon the officer’s objective good-faith reliance upon the magistrate’s determination, erroneous though that determination might have been. See Adams v. State, 191 Ga. App. 916 (383 SE2d 378) (1989).

The Supreme Court has enumerated four instances where an officer cannot be said to have had reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant was properly issued and where, therefore, suppression does remain an appropriate remedy. See United States v. Leon, supra at 923 (III C). Of those four enumerated instances, the record shows that only one is relevant to the disposition of the present case. At the outset of the hearing on the motion to suppress, appellants’ counsel eliminated three grounds for possible suppression by stipulating to the truthfulness of what was said in the affidavit, the neutral detachment of the issuing magistrate, and the facial sufficiency of the warrant. Accordingly, suppression would be appropriate in this case only if the officer’s supporting affidavit was “ ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render [his] official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.’ [Cits.]” United States v. Leon, supra at 923 (III C). The text of the affidavit of the officer is set forth above and need not be quoted again here. If appellants are correct and probable cause was not sufficiently shown, the affidavit is nevertheless no so deficient as to render the officer’s belief in the existence of probable cause entirely unreasonable. There is simply no basis for holding that the officer, who presumably is neither a lawyer nor a constitutional scholar, failed to act in objective good faith when he relied upon the magistrate’s determination that probable cause was sufficiently shown by the affidavit. The affidavit is certainly no less deficient in its indicia of probable cause than was the affidavit in Adams v. State, supra.

In denying appellants’ motion to suppress, the trial court did not specifically state whether it found probable cause to be shown or whether it found the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule to be applicable. Thus, the trial court may have based its ruling upon Illinois v. Gates, supra, rather than upon United States v. Leon, supra. Regardless of the trial court’s reasoning, however, its denial of appellant’s motion to suppress should be affirmed. As previously noted, the circumstances and the evidence in this case were such that the only possible rationale for not applying the Leon good-faith exception is that the affidavit of the officer was so inadequate as to render his belief in the existence of probable cause entirely unreasonable. Thus, it is only the affidavit itself, and no other evidence, which would be relevant in determining whether the burden of demonstrating the applicability of the Leon good-faith exception was met by the State. See United States v. Gant, 759 F2d 484, 487-488 (II B) (5th Cir. 1985). The four corners of the affidavit show, as a matter of law, that it was not so lacking in its indicia of probable cause as to render the officer’s belief in the existence of probable cause entirely unreasonable. Accordingly, a finding of the applicability of the Leon good-faith exception would be demanded under the existing circumstances and evidence. It follows that a denial of appellants’ motion was the only correct ruling and that, even if the trial court based its ruling on an erroneous finding of the existence of probable cause, an affirmance would nevertheless be mandated. “When a ruling of the trial court is legally correct, it will be upheld regardless of the reason assigned. [Cits.]” Phillips v. State, 185 Ga. App. 54, 56 (4) (363 SE2d 283) (1987). Accordingly, the denial of appellants’ motion to suppress is affirmed under the Leon good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

Judgment affirmed.

Deen, P. J., McMurray, P. J., Banke, P. J., Birdsong and Pope, JJ., concur. Sognier, J., concurs in judgment only. Benham and Beasley, JJ., dissent.