McGrue v. Brownfield , 202 Va. 418 ( 1961 )

Spratley, J.,

dissenting:

I find no difficulty in disagreeing with the conclusion of the majority.. It seems to me that a fair evaluation of all the evidence presents a transaction which would trouble one of good conscience when he tries to sleep at night.

Here, we have a Negro woman, 80-odd years of age, who had been suffering from heart disease, diseased liver and blood vessels from ten to fifteen years, senile, and sick in bed, as the grantor in a deed, which conveyed all her real estate valued at $5,000.00 to the wife of a man to whom she was indebted for a sum less than $500.00.

We have the evidence of a qualified physician, who had attended her for fifteen years before her death in the month following the execution of the deed. He lived across the street from her, had “quite often” visited her during that period, and ministered to her needs. He saw her on August 3rd and again on August 7th, the day after the deed was signed. He testified that because of a progressive physical and mental deterioration, she sometimes acted like a grown person and other times like a child; and that from June, 1958, until her death she was incapable of carrying on normal business or engaging in a good general conversation.

We have the evidence of the pastor of her church, who visited her twice a week, who said that from June, 1958, she was very feeble and just like a child, willing to do anything she was asked to do.

We have the testimony of Ruth Walker, who lived across the street from Mrs. Bradley, had known her all her life, and had visited her every day for the two years preceding her death; that Mrs. Bradley was getting worse all the time; that during the three months prior to August 6th, 1958, she was in the “baby stage;” and that because of the condition of her health and mind, she was incapable of transacting any business in the month of August, 1958.

We may disregard the evidence of Mrs. Bradley’s son, 66 years of age, because of his limited intelligence, except to note that when Brownfield came to get her to sign the deed, she was in bed and so sick and feeble that she had to be held up and her hand guided to make her signature.

Other witnesses confirm the fact that she was in bed, and Brownfield said that she was lying prone when she made her signature. The deed presented as an exhibit shows her signature as a mere “scrawl.”

On the other hand, the husband of the grantee, a general contractor for more than fifteen years, said that Mrs. Bradley, whom he had seen only a limited number of times, fully comprehended the situation when she signed the deed. He is supported by J. S. Hudson, his attorney, the notary who acknowledged the grantor’s signature, who had seen Mrs. Bradley only on August 6th, 1958.

It will be noted that after Mrs. Bradley had earlier refused to sign a deed, Brownfield again went to her home, found her sick in bed, and without money to pay on her notes; that helpless and weak, she suggested that she reserve a life estate in the property for herself, her son, and Emma McGrue; that he pay her funeral expenses; that Brownfield refused, except as to the reservation of a life estate for her and her son; that he was amply secured for the debt to him, which did not become fully due until 1959; and that Brownfield insisted upon the transaction whereby his 'wife got two buildings, a 6-story house and the 3-story house with the benefit of the repairs thereon, represented by the debt to him, and more than four acres of land on a primary State Highway near the Town of Culpeper, a transaction which yielded ten times the amount of the debt, payable to him. •

The evidence of the three witnesses who had full opportunity over the years to observe that Mrs. Bradley had a great weakness of mind, arising from age and illness, and the manifest fact that the consideration given for her property was grossly inadequate force the conclusion that she was imposed upon or unduly influenced to execute the deed. Fishburne v. Ferguson, 84 Va. 87, 110, 4 S. E. 575; Bibby v. Thomas, 165 Va. 248, 253, 182 S. E. 226; Cook v. Hayden, 183 Va. 203, 223, 31 S. E. 2d 625, and cf. Jackson v. Seymour, 193 Va. 735, 741, 71 S. E. 2d 181.

The contention that there was a serious cloud on the title of the property because of the supposed existence of grantor’s husband, who had not been seen or heard of for years, and the reservation of the two life estates, is tenuous and mere shadow boxing. One life estate terminated in about six weeks and the other was limited to a building to be selected by the grantee.

“It is fundamental that, notwithstanding the weight due a commissioner’s report and the respect which is accorded his findings, neither the trial court nor this court should avoid the duty of weighing the evidence when its sufficiency is fairly challenged. * * *” Gilmer v. Brown, 186 Va. 630, 642, 44 S. E. 2d 16; Hoffecker v. Hoffecker, 200 Va. 119, 124, 104 S.E. 2d 771.

When upon a fair and full review of the evidence according to correct principles of law it appears that the weight is contrary to the findings of the commissioner, it is the duty of the chancellor and this Court to disapprove the conclusion of the commissioner. Leckie v. Lynchburg Trust, etc., Bank, 191 Va. 360, 364, 60 S. E. 2d 923.

The chancellor does not delegate his judicial function to a commissioner in chancery. The commissioner is appointed for the purpose of assisting the chancellor and not to supplant or replace him. It is the duty of the chancellor to confirm or reject the commissioner’s report according to the view which he entertains of the law and the evidence. Section 8-250, Code 1950. Raiford v. Raiford, 193 Va. 221, 229, 230, 68 S. E. 2d 888.

Mr. Justice Snead, in Hoffecker v. Hoffecker, 200 Va., supra, at page 125, said:

“Thus it is manifest our duty is to evaluate the evidence under a correct application of the law to determine whether or not it supports the findings of the commissioner or the conclusions of the chancellor.”

When we do this the answer seems clear. The transaction shocks my sense of justice and fair play.

Upon the foregoing principles, long established, I would hold the deed of August 6, 1958, invalid; and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings in conformity with the above views.

Chief Justice John W. Eggleston joins in this dissent.