United States v. Pruitt , 502 F.3d 1154 ( 2007 )

ORDER ON PETITION FOR REHEARING WITH SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

This matter is before the court on the appellant’s petition for panel rehearing, which also includes a request for en banc consideration. We also have a response from the government. Panel members Judge Holloway and Judge O’Brien have voted to grant the petition for panel rehearing for the limited purpose of correcting errors in the previously filed opinion. The panel petition is otherwise denied. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the decision filed herein on June 4, 2007, is withdrawn and the attached opinion is ordered filed in its place. Judge McConnell’s original concurring opinion is re-filed with the new opinion.

The petition, including the en banc suggestion, was circulated to all of the members of the court who are in regular active service. No judge called for a poll. Accordingly, the request for rehearing en banc is denied.

HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge.

Defendant-Appellant Terri Pruitt (Pruitt) pleaded guilty to distribution of five or more grams of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(l)(B)(viii). She appeals the sentence that the district court imposed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), and we AFFIRM.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Pruitt’s Criminal History and the Instant Offense

Pruitt is a 42-year-old woman with three prior convictions for selling illegal drugs and a criminal history spanning two decades.

In 1985, Pruitt completed a one-year diversion¹ for a DUI charge, filed under Kansas law. In 1987, Pruitt was arrested and charged with possession of methamphetamine and conspiracy to possess or sell cocaine, both felonies under Kansas law. R., Vol. IV, at 7; R. Vol. I, tab 20, at 1. Before Pruitt pleaded guilty to these offenses, she was convicted of aggravated failure to appear in court because she failed to appear as ordered by the court. R., Vol. IV, at 8. Pruitt ultimately pleaded guilty to these drug-related felonies, and she served four years on probation (until April 1991). Id. at 7.

Approximately eight months after she was released from probation, Pruitt was again arrested and charged with committing drug-related crimes, this time possession with intent to sell marijuana and possession of cocaine, felonies under Kansas law. Id. at 9. On this occasion, Pruitt brought her then-infant daughter to a drug transaction and was found in possession of 102.1 grams of marijuana, 10 plastic “baggies,” 13 syringes, a metal tin containing cocaine, a plastic spoon, various types of pills, a mirror, a razor blade, a set of scales, and $420. Id. But before the court could adjudicate her case, Pruitt was arrested and charged with another drug-related offense — sale of methamphetamine in violation of Kansas law. Id. at 10. Pruitt was convicted of all of these felonies and served' about four years in prison. Id. at 9-10; R., Vol. I, tab 20, at 1-2. She was paroled in 1996 and discharged from parole in 1998. R., Vol. IV, at 9.

Seven years later, Pruitt would again find herself charged with a drug-related crime. On April 27, 2005, the Government indicted Pruitt for knowingly and intentionally distributing five or more grams of methamphetamine. R., Vol. I, tab 1, at 1. On November 22, 2004, a confidential drug informant told a DEA Special Agent that Pruitt was involved in distributing multiple-ounce quantities of methamphetamine. R., Vol. IV, at 4; R., Vol. II, at 15. Based on this information, the Government decided to execute a controlled purchase of methamphetamine from Pruitt. R., Vol. IV, at 4; R., Vol. II, at 15.

On November 29, 2004, the informant and Pruitt arranged to meet at Pruitt’s residence and agreed that Pruitt would sell the informant one to two ounces of methamphetamine. R., Vol. IV, at 4; R., Vol. II, at 15. The informant arrived at Pruitt’s residence as planned, and Pruitt provided the informant with one ounce of methamphetamine in exchange for $1,350. R., Vol. IV, at 4-5; R„ Vol. II, at 15-16. The informant pressed Pruitt on when she would have more methamphetamine, to which she responded that she was working to procure another ounce. R., Vol. IV, at 4. The Government contended in Pruitt’s change-of-plea hearing that Pruitt and the informant also discussed conducting a future sale of two ounces of methamphetamine for $2,500. R., Vol. II, at 16. When the court asked Pruitt if “[she] did in fact do exactly what counsel for the government indicated,” Pruitt replied, “[y]es, sir, I did.” Id. The substance that Pruitt sold to the informant contained 29.4 net grams of 63% pure methamphetamine. R., Vol. IV, at 5; R., Vol. II, at 16.

After initially pleading not-guilty to the offense, Pruitt changed her mind and entered a guilty plea. See generally R., Vol. II (transcript of Pruitt’s change-of-plea hearing).

B. The Sentence Imposed

The district court sentenced Pruitt to 292 months’ imprisonment and 8 years’ supervised release, and levied a special assessment of $100. R., Vol. I, tab 36, at 2-7. The court also allowed Pruitt to receive correctional treatment that she desired and imposed restrictions consistent with those normally imposed on convicted felons, parts of the sentence that Pruitt does not challenge here. Id. The 292-month term of imprisonment is a within-Guidelines sentence that represents the lowest end of the applicable Guidelines range.

The district court first recognized that United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), rendered the Sentencing Guidelines advisory. R., Vol. Ill, at 21-22. The court explained that it was required to calculate Pruitt’s sentence under the Guidelines, but that it would consider the Guidelines range as one factor among other relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Id. at 22.

The court then addressed the sentence. Closely tracking the factors set forth in § 3553(a), the court considered the nature and circumstances of the offense; Pruitt’s history and characteristics; and the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, deter criminal conduct, and protect the public from further crimes of the Defendant. Id. at 23-27. See excerpts from the district court’s decision infra pp. 1160-62.

In essence, the district court stated that although it had authority to vary from the Guidelines range, no factors warranted doing so. Thus, the district court concluded that 292 months’ imprisonment is a reasonable sentence under the circumstances.

II. DISCUSSION

Pruitt argues that this court should not accord a presumption of reasonableness to a within-Guidelines sentence, nor should this court accord a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence within U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, the Guidelines’s career-offender provision. Further, Pruitt argues that the district court erred by failing to rule on whether Pruitt was entitled to a two-level reduction in offense level for acceptance of responsibility; by failing to adequately state its reasons for refusing to impose a below-Guidelines sentence; and by imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence of 292 months’ imprisonment.

A. Presumption of Reasonableness to a Within-Guidelines Sentence

We have expressly rejected Pruitt’s first argument that according a Guidelines-range sentence a presumption of reasonableness violates United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). In United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1055 (10th Cir.2006), we held that a sentence within the properly-calculated Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable, but subject to rebuttal in light of § 3553(a)’s other sentencing factors.

The Supreme Court in Rita v. United States, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007), held that it is consistent with Booker to accord a presumption of reasonableness to a within-Guidelines sentence, thus approving of our holding in Kristi. Thus, we will review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence using that presumption.

B. Presumption of Reasonableness to a U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 Sentence

Pruitt’s second argument reads like a recapitulation of her first argument: just as this court should not accord a presumption of reasonableness to a within-Guidelines sentence, she argues, this court should also decline to accord a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence within the Guidelines’s career-offender provision. We disagree. The logical extension of our holding in Kristi—that a within-Guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable—is that a sentence within the career-offender range, which is part of the Guidelines, is also presumptively reasonable.²

Pruitt attempts to distinguish Kristi by resorting to Sentencing Commission reports about, and her own criticisms of, the career-offender provision: Pruitt argues that a presumption-of-reasonableness standard is especially unwarranted when applying U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 because a sentence under § 4B1.1 might overstate the seriousness of a defendant’s record and create an excessive deterrent effect. Moreover, Pruitt asserts, the Sentencing Commission noted in a recent report that low-level drug traffickers have lower recidivism rates than career offenders with violent backgrounds. She also relies on another Sentencing Commission publication in which the commission noted that women have lower recidivism rates than men. According to Pruitt, these reports reveal that, in some cases, a sentence imposed under § 4B1.1 will conflict with the sentence that should be imposed in light of 18 U.S.C § 3553(a).

Pruitt fails to recognize that these examples and statements bear little to no correlation to her extensive criminal history. Thus, even if we were able to create the exception that Pruitt proposes, the facts here bear so little correlation to the problems identified in the Commission’s reports that we would need to disregard the case before us, and speculate about hypothetical cases and facts, before determining that creating the exception is a wise panacea to unreasonable sentences. We are unwilling to create such an important exception based on such speculation. Consistent with Kristi, we therefore will accord a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence within the Guidelines’s career-offender range.

C. Acceptance of Responsibility

A defendant is entitled to a two-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility if he or she clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his or her offense. U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(a)³ But even if the defendant clearly demonstrates that he or she has accepted responsibility for the offense, U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(b)⁴ permits the court to decrease the defendant’s offense by one additional level only upon the government’s motion or, when the government refuses to file a motion, if the sentencing court concludes that the refusal was “animated by an unconstitutional motive or not rationally related to a legitimate government end.” United States v. Moreno-Trevino, 432 F.3d 1181, 1186 (10th Cir.2005).

Pruitt did not allege before the district court that either circumstance is present here. The pre-sentence report, which Pruitt did not object to, put Pruitt on notice that the Government did not intend to file a motion under § 3E1.1. R., Yol. IV, at 6. Consistent with this intent, the Government never filed a § 3E1.1 motion. But instead of asserting that the Government’s refusal to do so was animated by an unconstitutional motive or not rationally related to a legitimate government end, Pruitt stated:

I know that you’re prepared to rule. There are, however, two things that I forgot to bring to the court’s attention which I need to do for the record. One is that the sentence of 292 to 365 months is without the third point for acceptance of responsibility.... The defendant would ask the court, if the court intends to sentence within the guideline range, to consider adjusting the sentence under Booker to reflect that since it is and has been in my experience the policy of the United States Attorney’s office to not move for the third point when one does not waive appeal.... I [also want the court to note that Pruitt] did offer ... to cooperate in this case, and that offer was declined.

R., Vol. Ill, at 20.

As before the district court, Pruitt has not asserted on appeal that the Government’s failure to file a § 3E1.1 motion was animated by an unconstitutional motive or not rationally related to a legitimate government end. Indeed, as in the district court, she has not directed us to any facts to satisfy these standards or cited any authority supporting her position. Instead, she claims that the district court failed to resolve this issue and then she moves on to the next section of her brief. See Aplt. Br. at 20.

Because there is no evidence that the Government improperly refused to file the motion, and because Pruitt did not make this argument before us or the district court, we have no authority to review the Government’s refusal to file a § 3E1.1 motion. See Moreno-Trevino, 432 F.3d at 1187.

D. Procedural Reasonableness: Explanation for the Sentence

The district court must consider the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) when imposing a sentence.⁵ Although the district court need not recite “any magic words to show us that it fulfilled its responsibility to be mindful of the factors that Congress has instructed it to consider,” we will not presume that the district court fulfilled its duty if the record provides no indication that it did so and no clear explanation of the sentence imposed. United States v. Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d 1109, 1115-16 (10th Cir.2006).

This does not suggest, however, that we subject the district court’s decision to the highest scrutiny. On the contrary, we recently held that “a specific discussion of Section 3553(a) factors is not required for sentences falling within the ranges suggested by the Guidelines.... ” United States v. Ruiz-Terrazas, 477 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir.2007). Instead, when the district court imposes a within-Guidelines sentence, the court must provide “only ‘a general statement noting the appropriate guideline range, and how it was calculated.’ ” Id. (further citation and internal quotation marks omitted). If the district court did so, “we will step in and find error when the record gives us reason to think that our ordinary (Lopez-Flores) presumption that the district court knew and applied the law is misplaced.” Id.

Pruitt quotes from the district court’s decision and refers us to United States v. Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir.2006), United States v. Carty, 453 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir.2006), and United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673 (7th Cir.2005), as illustrative of a district court’s failure to adequately consider § 3553(a)’s sentencing factors and other arguments for a below-Guidelines sentence. Specifically, Pruitt argues that the district court considered the bare fact that she had several prior convictions, but failed to substantively comment on her arguments for a lower sentence beyond merely stating that it considered the pre-sentence report and the Guidelines. Pruitt claims that she made several non-frivolous arguments supporting her request for a lower sentence: the career-offender provision is not an accurate predictor of recidivism; her two prior convictions that rendered her a career offender involved a small quantity of drugs; the convictions occurred within two months of each other; she served prison time for those convictions and successfully discharged her parole; she graduated from high school; she had no criminal convictions since 1992; she asked for and received in-patient drug counseling; she was released to a halfway house and then released early for good behavior; she was employed during the time of her release; and she did not test positive for drugs during her release.

We note, however, that the merits of these arguments are disputed. For example, although Pruitt asserts that her pretrial-release behavior in this case has been laudable, the Government and pre-sentence report note that Pruitt violated the terms of her release on two occasions — once by failing to advise her pretrial officer of an address change and once by marrying an individual who is under federal court supervision. R., Vol. I, tab 33, at 2; R., Vol. IV, at 3. Similarly, Pruitt characterizes her receipt of in-patient drug counseling as a mitigating factor, but the pre-sentence report reveals that her bond required her placement at a drug-counseling facility. R., Vol. IV, at 15. Moreover, Pruitt invokes a general but inapplicable proposition about recidivism. We have never required a district court to address frivolous arguments before imposing a criminal sentence. Indeed, when a defendant argues for a downward variance and the district court imposes a sentence at the low-end of the Guidelines range, this “may fairly be read as a functional rejection of [the defendant’s] arguments and a denial of his [or her] request for a below-Guidelines sentence.” Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d at 1115.

The district court here correctly analyzed the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, so we find no reason to reject the presumption that the district court knew and applied the law. See Ruiz-Terrazas, 471 F.3d at 1202. The court considered the nature and circumstances of the offense and the Defendant’s history and characteristics:

[w]hat was also clear to the court is that this in fact is the fourth time that you’ve been in front of a court for sentencing after having been convicted of selling illegal drugs.... If nothing else, this court would agree ... [that] like many people who come before this court, it seems that you’ve had several tragic events and circumstances take place in your life. Whether or not others were responsible for that, it’s clear that you believe that’s been the case early on as to what took place with you, how that affected you. At some point, though, the court would inform you that you became responsible for your actions, for your conduct as it related not only to your life but others, and as a result, it’s also clear that on different occasions you chose willingly or unwillingly, based on how you believed it took place, but the fact remains that you chose to violate the law, and as a result, there were consequences that took place. In effect, this court has an obligation to give you what it believes to be a reasonable sentence under the law, and the other reality is that this court gives reasonable sentences for people who have led unreasonable lives. It’s difficult for this court to try to imagine how a reasonable person in your circumstances would have continued to violate the law in the manner that — which you did under the circumstances in which you did. There is something to the argument that people only get so many chances....

R., Vol. Ill, at 23-24 (errors in original).

The court then considered the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment for the offense:

the court notes ... that in two of these prior cases [in which you were convicted of selling illegal drugs], the sentencing range included a possible maximum of 10 years. Since no mitigating factors were identified in the presentence report, a sentence which is equivalent to the low end of the advisory guideline range reflects the seriousness of the offense, promotes respect for the law and provides just punishment.

Id. at 26.

The court considered the need for the sentence imposed to adequately deter criminal conduct:

[t]here is something to the argument that people can only get so many chances, and at certain points, it appears that they’re not having any effect on the person, they’re continuing with the same conduct. The court questions whether or not these sentences [for your prior convictions] have actually been a deterrent to you in regards to you committing the crimes that you’ve committed over these number of years.... [A]gain, the court notes that this is your fourth conviction involving the sale of illegal drugs, and again, it appears that your previous sentences did not provide a sufficient deterrent against this type of conduct. ... Additionally, this term of supervision [imposed after Pruitt’s release] should help deter, hopefullyf,] any future criminal behavior by the defendant.

Id. at 24-27.

The court considered the need for the sentence imposed to protect the public from further crimes of the Defendant:

[a]t some point, though, the court would inform you that you became responsible for your actions, for your conduct as it related not only to your life but others.... The court doesn’t discount the fact that [292 months] is a harsh sentence for you. In reaching this determination, the court has considered ... [t]hat the length of the sentence should afford adequate deterrence and protect the public from further crimes of the defendant....

Id. at 24.

It is clear that the court considered this factor when noting that Pruitt has been before a court three prior times for selling illegal drugs, conduct that related to and affected others.

The court considered the need for the sentence imposed to provide Pruitt with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner: “Based on the information in the presen-tence report suggesting that you’ve experienced some traumatic events in your life, a condition of supervision allowing for participation in a mental health counseling program is appropriate.” Id. at 28.

Finally, the court described the substantive weight it accorded to a within-Guidelines sentence:

In reaching this determination [that a 292-month sentence is reasonable], the court has considered, number one, that the sentencing range developed from the application of the advisory guidelines incorporates a number of directives from congress to the sentencing commission concerning the sentencing of offenses, including the purposes of sentencing set forth at 18 U.S.C. Section 3553 A 2[sic], Therefore, a sentence imposed within the range determined by the guidelines may be given substantial weight in the determination of a just and reasonable sentence in accordance with the provisions of 18 United States Code Section 3553 A 2 A[sic] through C.

R., Vol. Ill, at 25.

These excerpts demonstrate that the district court thoroughly considered the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The district court acknowledged that Pruitt experienced tragic events in her life, but noted that her circumstances were not materially different from the circumstances presented by most other defendants in the criminal justice system — a conclusion to which the pre-sentence report assented. R., Vol. Ill, at 26; R., Vol. IV, at 20. The district court then addressed each sentencing factor in light of the facts presented.

As we explained in Ruiz-Termzas, a specific discussion of § 3553(a) factors is not required, but that does not mean that our precedent describes best practices. Ruiz-Terrazas, 477 F.3d at 1202. “Indeed, a more detailed sentencing explanation can often prove beneficial, even if it is not mandatory, helping to reduce confusion among the parties, facilitate and expedite judicial review, and provide guidance to practitioners and other defendants, enabling them to better predict the type of sentence that will be imposed in their cases.” Id.

We also add another important benefit to this list: to hold open to public scrutiny the judiciary’s reasoning behind depriving a person of a most fundamental right— liberty. In a system where the judiciary controls neither the sword nor the purse, as Hamilton described our circumstances in The Federalist No. 78, the courts must rely on the persuasiveness of their opinions to command respect. The “district court’s unique familiarity with the facts and circumstances of a case,” id. at 1201, especially qualify it for explaining why a defendant’s arguments do not militate against a particular sentence. Although we emphasize that our precedent does not impose this exacting duty of explanation, the district court satisfied it here.

Pruitt’s authorities do not require a different result. The commonality between all the cases that she cites is that “the [district] court stated no reasons for the sentence it imposed, other than first noting that it had reviewed the PSR’s factual findings and considered the Guidelines applications, and then citing [the defendant’s] offense conduct.” See Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d at 1115. Moreover, in the cases she cites, “[t]he record indicates that at no time during the sentencing hearing or when imposing the sentence did the district court refer to the § 3553(a) factors.” See id. See also Carty, 453 F.3d at 1221 (stating that “[t]he district court ... did not comment substantively on any of [the parties’ materials] in rendering its sentence. It did not discuss any of the goals and factors enumerated in § 3553(a) or how they might have impacted its determination with respect to [the defendant]. Rather, the district court simply adopted the PSR and imposed a sentence at the bottom of the Guideline range”); Cunningham, 429 F.3d at 676-77 (stating that “[t]he judge brushed aside [the defendant’s] argument” even though the defendant detailed a long history of psychiatric problems and provided evidence about his minimal role in the offense, but the court “gave substantial weight” to a “vague, belated, [and] unsubstantiated” argument put forth by the government and failed to state more about § 3553(a) factors than “given all of the factors that I have to adhere to ... [and the fact that you sold drugs to the informant on several occasions,] I’m going to sentence you to a 57-month sentence ... ”). As we have seen, however, the district court here thoroughly evaluated Pruitt’s conduct in light of potentially mitigating facts and each of § 3553(a)’s sentencing factors.

Pruitt does not challenge the district court’s calculation of the Guidelines range, and the district court adequately explained its reasons for imposing the sentence it did. Thus, we find no procedural error in the district court’s decision. See Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d at 1117 (distinguishing substantive and procedural components of reasonableness review).

E. Substantive Reasonableness of the Sentence

Although the district court sufficiently explained its reasons for imposing a 292-month sentence, we must ask whether the sentence is substantively reasonable. When reviewing a sentence for reasonableness, “we review factual findings for clear error and legal determinations de novo.” Kristi, 437 F.3d at 1054. We held in Kristi that “a sentence that is properly calculated under the Guidelines is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness. This is a deferential standard that either the defendant or the government may rebut by demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable when viewed against the other factors delineated in § 3553(a).” Id.

Pruitt attempts to trek this upward climb by claiming that courts have reduced criminal sentences when § 4B1.1 overstates a defendant’s criminal history, a defendant’s prior convictions were close in time, and a defendant poses a low-risk of re-offending. Thus, Pruitt argues that her sentence is unreasonable because two of her prior convictions were close in time, she has been employed and well-behaved since her release from prison, and she has a nonviolent history. She notes that if she were not a career offender, she would face a mandatory minimum of 10 years’ imprisonment, significantly lower than the 292-month sentence she received.

To be sure, this sentence might represent the outer-boundary of what would be reasonable in this case, despite the fact that 292 months’ imprisonment represents the bottom of the applicable range under the career-offender provision. Pruitt rightly identifies the fact that she has a nonviolent history, that two of her convictions were close in time, and that she has not been charged with possessing or selling exorbitant amounts of drugs. However, we are not persuaded by Pruitt’s attempt to minimize the seriousness of her lawlessness. It is clear that her prior sentences did not deter her criminal conduct. And whatever the surprise that Pruitt’s drug-related convictions in 1992 counted as felonies under Kansas law, it is impossible to deny that Pruitt’s present conviction is her fourth felony conviction for a drug-related offense.

Moreover, we give little credit to Pruitt’s blanket statements that women have lower recidivism rates than men and that low-level street dealers are unlikely to recidi-vate, as this conviction makes her a repeat-repeat-repeat-repeat offender (not counting her DUI charge, for which she was granted a one-year diversion). Partly for this reason, we are not persuaded by Pruitt’s generalizations about courts reducing sentences when the sentence overstates the defendant’s criminal history and when the defendant poses a low risk of re-offending. For example, Pruitt asks us to compare her case to United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019 (10th Cir.1991), United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir.2006), United States v. Reyes, 8 F.3d 1379 (9th Cir.1993), and United States v. Lawrence, 916 F.2d 553 (9th Cir.1990)— claiming that these cases demonstrate that her sentence is unreasonable.

We have performed this analysis, and we find Pruitt’s comparisons unpersuasive. In Bowser, which was decided before Kristi created the presumption-of-reasonableness standard, we affirmed a downward variance because the predicate felonies for invoking § 4B1.1 were two non-drug-related felonies that the defendant committed within months of each other when he was 20 years old. Bowser, 941 F.2d at 1023. Although “it [was] our conclusion that the [close proximity of the two felonies] would have been unsuitable as an isolated rationale for downward departure, the [district] court viewed the short time span in the context of the defendant’s age and the state court’s [decision to impose a concurrent sentence for] the two convictions,” an intersection of factors we called “unique.” Id. at 1024-25. After we recognized that a “deferential standard of review” applied and that “[t]he district court was in the best position to make a decision about the proper sentence for this defendant,” we held that “[a]ccording the district court the deference due it, we will not disturb this sentencing decision.” Id. at 1026.

The district court decision under review in Williams imposed a sentence below the Guidelines range because, in its view, “188 months in prison for selling $350 worth of cocaine is akin to the life sentence for the guy that stole a loaf of bread in California. To me, that ... does not promote respect for the law and is way out of proportion to the seriousness of the offense and to [the defendant’s] prior criminal conduct.” 435 F.3d at 1352-53. The defendant in Williams had been convicted once of possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver and once of carrying a concealed firearm, a conviction based on the defendant having been found with a handgun “at his feet.” Id. at 1355. The Eleventh Circuit upheld the sentence because “the district court correctly calculated the Guidelines range and gave specific, valid reasons for sentencing lower than the advisory range.” Id.

Comparably to Williams, Reyes affirmed a downward variance because the defendant had a criminal history that “uniformly involved ‘minor’ offenses.” 8 F.3d at 1386. Between 1984-1989, the defendant in Reyes was convicted for opiate use, possession with intent to sell six “baggies” of marijuana, attempted theft from a department store, obstructing a public officer, possession of drugs (including .45 grams of cocaine and .10 grams of heroin), and possessing and delivering $20-worth of cocaine. Id. at 1381.

Although Latorence also affirmed a downward variance, which the district court based in part on a psychiatrist’s testimony that the likelihood of recidivism was low, the Ninth Circuit noted that the government did not make an as-applied challenge to the district court’s variance— just its authority to impose the lower sentence in the first instance. 916 F.2d at 554, 555, 555 n. 5. So the circuit court of appeals never reviewed whether the extent of the variance was reasonable.

Pruitt’s authorities are easily distinguishable. Most of these decisions affirmed downward variances under a standard according deference to the district courts or, in the case of Latorence, did not review the extent of the variance at all. We neither have a psychiatrist’s (or anyone’s) particularized conclusion about recidivism, as in Lawrence, nor a situation where an immature college student with an otherwise clean record committed crimes on two occasions within two months, as in Bowser. And although the defendant in Reyes was convicted several times, the pre-sentence report here reveals that Pruitt has been convicted of just as many crimes, in more serious circumstances, over a longer time — highlighting her status as a career offender. For example, as noted above, Pruitt’s first run-in with the law occurred in 1985 when she received a one-year diversion after being charged with DUI; in 1989, Pruitt was convicted of possession of methamphetamine and conspiracy to possess or sell cocaine; in 1989 she was convicted of aggravated failure to appear in court; in 1992 she was convicted of possession with intent to sell marijuana and possession of cocaine after she brought her infant child to a drug transaction and was found to be in possession of 102.1 grams of marijuana, 10 plastic “baggies,” 13 syringes, a metal tin containing cocaine, a plastic spoon, various types of pills, a mirror, a razor blade, a set of scales, and $420; and in 1992, she was also convicted of selling methamphetamine. R., Vol. I, tab 20, at 1-2; R„ Vol. IV, at 7-11. Now she has been convicted of distributing methamphetamine.

Finally, unlike the defendant in Williams, who had one prior conviction for possessing drugs with the intent to sell and one separate firearm conviction, Pruitt faces a sentence for her fourth drug-related felony. The district court here properly recognized a significant need to deter Pruitt from continually violating the law, prevent her from selling illegal drugs, make the sentence reflect the seriousness of the offense, and promote respect for the law — which Pruitt has continually failed to exhibit. Thus, unlike in Williams, we are presented with a case where the district court gave specific, valid reasons for sentencing within the Guidelines. We cannot agree that imposing a harsh sentence for Pruitt’s fourth drug-related felony “is akin to the life sentence for the guy that stole a loaf of bread in California.” See Williams, 435 F.3d at 1352-53.

In sum, it is irrelevant that other courts have imposed lower sentences in circumstances that are absent here. Indeed, to continue the trend by granting Pruitt’s wish to serve a shorter sentence (she served probation for her first conviction and only four years for her next two felony convictions, despite the fact that she could have served up to 20 years’ imprisonment) would malign the district court’s reasonable view that we can promote respect for law and adequately punish Pruitt only by taking her lawlessness seriously and imposing a within-Guidelines sentence. It would also ignore the undisputable fact that current federal policy favors harsh sentencing for drug offenses.

Pruitt’s arguments also fail to appreciate the burden she must overcome to rebut the presumption of reasonableness that we accord to her sentence. A defendant must rebut the presumption of reasonableness by showing that the “sentence is unreasonable when viewed against the other factors delineated in § 3553(a).” Kristi, 437 F.3d at 1054.

The district court’s cogent analysis of the § 3553(a) factors underscores the reasonableness of Pruitt’s sentence. As noted above, the district court acknowledged that Pruitt experienced some tragic events in her life, but concluded that four convictions for selling illegal drugs was enough to justify a long prison sentence. Selling methamphetamine and illegal drugs is a serious offense that detrimentally impacts other people’s lives, including the innocent people put in jeopardy by the drug sale itself — like Pruitt’s then-infant daughter during a drug sale in 1992. When a defendant faces a sentence for her fourth drug-related conviction, it is reasonable to infer that she is not easily deterred from engaging in unlawful conduct. Recognizing these facts and others consistent with the § 3553(a) factors, the district court reasonably concluded that Pruitt deserved a sentence within the Guidelines range.

Pruitt has failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness accorded to her within-Guidelines sentence. Regardless, the sentence would be reasonable — even if marginally so — absent the presumption. Thus, we find no error in the district court’s decision to sentence Pruitt to 292 months’ imprisonment, and it is accordingly AFFIRMED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

1 . A diversion allows a qualifying defendant to avoid a DUI conviction if he or she stipulates to the police report’s accuracy and complies with certain restrictions for one year.

2 . Without explicitly addressing this issue and arguments like Pruitt's, this circuit and others have accorded a presumption of reasonableness to sentences falling within a career-offender range. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 2007 WL 666459 (10th Cir.2007) (unpublished) (applying a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence enhanced by a career-offender provision); United States v. Thomas, 183 Fed. Appx. 742 (10th Cir.2006) (unpublished) (same); United States v. Rockey, 449 F.3d 1099 (10th Cir.2006) (applying a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence enhanced by the Armed Career Criminal Act); United States v. Brumley, 2007 WL 79040 at *2 (6th Cir.2007) (unpublished) (stating that "although the sentence enhancement for [the defendant's] career offender status greatly increased his guideline range, a sentence within or below that range was presumptively reasonable”); United States v. Stark, 168 Fed. Appx. 738, 740 (7th Cir.2006) (unpublished) (assuming that a presumption of reasonableness applies to a sentence enhanced by a career-offender provision); United States v. Parker, 176 Fed. Appx. 358, 359-60 (4th Cir.2006) (unpublished) (according a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence enhanced by a career-offender provision); United States v. Gladney, 184 Fed. Appx. 586, 589 (8th Cir.2006) (unpublished) (stating that "we [are not] persuaded by [the defendant’s] argument that his borderline status as a career offender rendered a guidelines sentence unreasonable. The advisory guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable ... ”).

3 . U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(a) stales that "[i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense, decrease the offense level by 2 levels.”

4 . U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(b) provides that "[i]f the defendant qualifies for a decrease under subsection (a) ... and upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has assisted authorities in the investigation or prosecution of his own misconduct by timely notifying authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the government to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the government and the court to allocate their resources efficiently, decrease the offense level by 1 additional level.”

5 .This provision instructs district courts that, in addition to the Guidelines range and Sentencing Commission policy statements, “[a] court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider—

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant;

(2) the need for the sentence imposed—

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;

(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;

(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and

(D)to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;

(3)the kinds of sentences available;

(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and

(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.”

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).