Salt Lake City v. Hanson , 19 Utah 2d 32 ( 1967 )

CROCKETT, Chief Justice.

Salt Lake City seeks an' adjudication that an order of Defendant District Judge dismissing seven cases on a’ppeál from 'the City Court of Salt Lake City to the District Court was improper. The City contends that his act was arbitrary and an abuse of judicial power which is remediable under Rule 65B(b) (2), U.R.C.P.¹

The defendants in the cases mentioned had been charged with violating various Salt Lake City ordinances upon complaints made before a city judge by an officer having information about the alleged offenses, but not by the officer who made the arrest. The signing by both the complainant and the city judge was by stamped signatures. The orders of dismissal contain no statement of the reason for dismissal.

The objections to the complaints in question which have been suggested as reasons for the dismissal are: (1) the stamped signatures ; and (2) that the complaint was not signed by the arresting officer who knows the facts.

Type of Signature Required

In regard to a signature, it is the intent rather than the form of the act that is important. While one’s signature is usually made by writing his name, the same purpose can be accomplished by placing any writing, indicia or symbol which the signer chooses to adopt and use as his signature and by which it may be proved: e. g., by finger or thumb prints, by a cross or other mark, or by any type of mechanically reproduced or stamped facsimile of his signature, as effectively as by his own handwriting.²

Who Must Sign Complaint

The procedure for initiating a misdemeanor case is by filing a complaint before a magistrate who issues a warrant of arrest (Sec. 77-12-1, U.C.A.1953); or by the making of an arrest without a warrant if the offense is committed or attempted in the officer’s presence (Sec. 77-13-3 [1], U.C.A.1953). Whichever procedure is used initially the requirements that the complainant appear before a magistrate (Sec. 77-11-2, U.C.A.1953) and that the complainant be examined under oath (Sec. 77-11-3, U.C.A.1953) are the same. No complaint is made on this appeal that this latter was not done.

The argument on behalf of the defendant judge is that inasmuch as Sec. 77-13-3(1) provides for arrest without a warrant only when the misdemeanor is committed or attempted in the officer’s presence, it follows that only the arresting officer has authority to sign the complaint. The answer to this is that the section just referred to is dealing with the subject of making arrests and not with the filing of complaints, whereas the subject of filing complaints is dealt with in Sec. 77-11-2, U.C.A., which provides:

Every person who has reason to believe that a crime or public offense has been committed must make complaint against such person before some magistrate having authority to make inquiry of the same. (Emphasis added.)

We can see no reason for believing that this statute refers only to felonies as has been urged. It speaks of crimes and public offenses plainly and unequivocally without making any differentiation, which undoubtedly would have been made had that been the intent. Anyone having any acquaintance with the practical operation of law enforcement will appreciate the impracticability of requiring the witness signing the complaint to know all of the facts of the crime. Even in minor crimes it often happens that various aspects thereof must be proved by several different witnesses. The legislative enactment wisely and appropriately requires only that a person having “reason to believe” that a crime or public offense has been committed must sign the complaint.³

Failure to State Reasons

The City also complains of the arbitrariness and impropriety of the defendant judge’s dismissal of the cases in question without stating any reason therefor. Attention is called to Sec. 77-51-4, U.C.A.1953, which provides that when a criminal action is dismissed, “ * * * [t]he reasons for the dismissal must be set forth in an order entered upon the minutes.” Because of the nature of criminal proceedings, and because they are in the interests of and for the protection of the public, there is a sound basis in public policy for requiring the judge who assumes the serious responsibility of dismissing a case to set forth his reasons for doing so in order that all may know what invokes the court’s discretion and whether its action is justified.⁴

We conclude that the court erred in dismissing the seven cases in question. We therefore comply with the request in his memorandum submitted to this court: “If I am wrong, kindly reverse me.” In conformity with this request, the order of dismissal is therefore “kindly” reversed. No costs awarded.

TUCKETT, J., concurs.

1 . Rule 65B(b) (2), U.R.C.P., 'provides that “Appropriate relief may be granted: * * * (2) Where an inferior tribunal * * * has exceeded its jurisdictions or abused its discretion; * * This is comparable to the common law writ of certiorari, used to correct an abuse of judicial power. See also Page v. Commercial National Bank of Salt Lake City, 38 Utah 440, 112 P. 816 (1911).

2 . See McGrady v. Munsey Trust Co., 32 A.2d 106 (D.C.Mun.App.1943); State ex rel. Independent School Dist. No. One v. Williamson, 352 P.2d 394 (Okla.1960); Maricopa County v. Osborn, 60 Ariz. 290, 136 P.2d 270 (1943); 80 C.J.S. Signatures §§ 7, 9.

3 . For cases so holding under similar statutes see State v. Morris, 98 N.H. 517, 103 A.2d 913 (1954); see also State v. Diggins, 92 R.I. 341, 168 A.2d 469 (1961).

4 . For a good statement concerning the court's duty under similar statute to justify such an action, see People v. Winters, 171 Cal.App.2d Supp. 876, 342 P.2d 538 (1959); see also People v. Gonzales, 235 Cal.App.2d Supp. 887, 46 Cal.Rptr. 301 (1965); and People v. Shaffer, 182 Cal. App.2d 39, 5 Cal.Rptr. 844 (1960).