Ruiz v. Employment Division ( 1987 )

YOUNG, J.,

dissenting.

I dissent. We have exceeded our authority to remand under ORS 183.482(8)(b)(B), because EAB has complied with ORS 183.470(2).

The majority holds that EAB failed to address petitioner’s contention that his job had become unsuitable because his new duties were so stressful that they seriously affected his physical and emotional health. I am at a loss to determine how EAB can more adequately address that contention.

EAB explicitly rejected petitioner’s contention that his job had changed substantially, finding instead that the changes were minor. EAB further explained that petitioner’s decision to leave his job voluntarily was not the decision “of a reasonable and prudent person of normal sensitivity using ordinary common sense, but rather resulted from his exaggerated perspective of the difference in approach to disconnect work.” The only contention that EAB even arguably failed to address is that petitioner left his job for “good cause” because he suffered physical and emotional stress as a result of his abnormal sensibilities. That contention, however, is patently without merit. OAR 471-30-038(4) defines “good cause” as:

“[S]uch that a reasonable and prudent person of normal sensitivity, exercising ordinary common sense, would leave work. The reason must be of such gravity that the individual has no reasonable alternative but to leave work.”

There is nothing more that EAB can or should do on remand. See Peterson, C. J., dissenting in Hertel v. Employment Division, 302 Or 456, 457, 730 P2d 35 (1986).

I would affirm the order disqualifying petitioner for benefits under ORS 657.176(2) (c).