Taylor v. State , 279 Ga. 706 ( 2005 )

BENHAM, Justice,

concurring.

I join the majority’s affirmance of appellant’s convictions for felony murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. I also agree with the majority that a party may exercise peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors based on limited educational and work experience. See Johnson v. State, 266 Ga. 775 (4) (470 SE2d 637) (1996); Trice v. State, 266 Ga. 102 (2) (464 SE2d 205) (1995). However, I am unwilling to condone the striking of a potential juror because she is described as seeming “odd” or because he “demonstrated a lack of seriousness for the judicial process,” without being made aware of the facts from which either conclusion is drawn. Because I recognize that a trial court’s decision with regard to challenged peremptory strikes is entitled to great deference by a reviewing court, I urge trial courts faced with “the practical difficulty of ferreting out discrimination in selections discretionary by nature and choices subject to myriad legitimate influences,” (Miller-El v. Dretke, _ U. S. _ (125 SC 2317, 2324, 162 LE2d 196) (2005)), to remember that “the exercise of a peremptory challenge must not be based on either the race of the juror or the racial stereotypes held by the party.” Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U. S. 42 (112 SC 2348, 120 LE2d 33) (1992). As the United States Supreme Court recently reminded us in Miller-El v. Dretke, supra, 125 SC at 2324, “the very integrity of the courts is jeopardized when a prosecutor’s discrimination ‘invites cynicism respecting the jury’s neutrality’ [cit.], and undermines public confidence in adjudication.”

Decided October 3, 2005. Patricia A. Chandler, for appellant. Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Bettieanne C. Hart, Marc A. Mallon, Assistant District Attorneys, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Robin J. Leigh, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.