Atlanta Journal & Atlanta Constitution v. Long , 259 Ga. 23 ( 1989 )

Bell, Justice.

In a previous interlocutory appeal in this civil suit we reversed an order of the superior court that prevented public access to certain pre-judgment records in the case. Atlanta Journal & Constitution v. Long, 258 Ga. 410 (369 SE2d 755) (1988). The issue that we examine in this appeal is whether the trial court was authorized to reconsider on remand the question of public access to the records. For the reasons that we will set forth in this opinion, we hold that under the facts of this case the trial court was not authorized to reconsider the issue of public access.

In the previous appeal we considered whether the superior court had correctly applied Uniform Superior Court Rule (USCR) 21,¹ 253 Ga. 801, 832 (eff. July 1, 1985), when the court prohibited public access to the records. After reviewing all the evidence, we reversed on the ground that the trial court had incorrectly applied Rule 21. Specifically, we held that the requirement to overcome the presumptive public right of access — that the harm otherwise resulting to the party seeking to seal the records must clearly outweigh the public interest — had not been fulfilled.

On remand the trial court vacated the order that had been the subject of the appeal. However, the court also reconsidered the question of closure, after which it entered supplementary findings and conclusions and issued another order of closure. This new order sealed from public access “all pleadings and discovery, either pretrial or post-trial, for the duration of the records’ existence.” At the time the court issued the order, the parties to the access proceedings had not presented any new pleadings or evidence on the question of access.

The Atlanta Journal and Constitution, movants for access and appellants in the previous appeal, then filed the present appeal, in which they contend that the trial court lacked authority to issue the new closure order after receiving the remittitur from this court. We agree with their contention. Our reasons are as follow.

1. We base our analysis of this issue on the language of USCR 21.5, which provides that:

Upon notice to all parties of record and after hearing, an order limiting access may be reviewed and amended by the court entering such order or by the Supreme Court at any time on its own motion or upon the motion of any person for good cause.

As we interpret this rule, it grants a superior court the discretion to reconsider an interlocutory closure order at any time for good cause,² as long as this court has not yet reviewed that order. However, once this court has issued a decision reviewing the trial court’s order, see USCR 21.4,³ the grounds for reviewing and amending the order become strictly limited. In this respect the order of the trial court is no different from any other interlocutory order; once an appellate court has reviewed the order and issued an opinion on it, the appellate decision becomes binding precedent that cannot be reopened by the trial court absent a change in the evidentiary posture of the case, see, e.g., Yaeger v. Stith Equipment Co., 185 Ga. App. 315 (364 SE2d 48) (1987); Modern Roofing & Metal Works v. Owen, 174 Ga. App. 875 (1) (332 SE2d 14) (1985).

This restriction on reopening appellate decisions is mandated by the Georgia Constitution, which provides that “[t]he decisions of the Supreme Court shall bind all other courts as precedents.” 1983 Ga. Const. Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. VI. The rule is also required by the Georgia Code, which states that “any ruling by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals in a case shall be binding in all subsequent proceedings in that case in the lower court. . . .” OCGA § 9-11-60 (h).

2. In the instant case, the record has not been augmented on the issue of access to records since we considered the first appeal. We therefore hold that the superior court erred by reconsidering the question of closure and by issuing the new order in which it again sealed records in the case. Accordingly, we hereby reverse that order, and remand this case to the superior court. Upon receipt of the remittitur the trial court shall make the records in this case available to the public.

Judgment reversed with directions.

All the Justices concur, except Marshall, C. J., and Smith, J., who dissent.

1 USCR 21 provides that “[a]ll court records are public and are to be available for public inspection unless public access is limited by law or by the procedure set forth [in USCR 21].”

2 We interpret the phrase “for good cause” in Rule 21.5 as applying to a sua sponte motion as well as to a motion by “any person.”

3 Rule 21.4 states: “A copy of the order limiting access shall be transmitted to and subject to review by the Supreme Court.”