Renner v. State , 260 Ga. 515 ( 1990 )

Clarke, Chief Justice,

dissenting.

I concur with the majority except as to Division 3 (a). To this division, I respectfully dissent.

In my view, the evidence in this case fails to support a charge on flight even under the present law.

Decided November 7, 1990. Notte & Bianco, Guy J. Notte, for appellant. Robert F. Mumford, District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Mary H. Hines, for appellee.

Black’s Law Dictionary defines flight thusly:

“The evading of the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing one’s self in order to avoid arrest or detention, or the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings, regardless of whether one leaves jurisdiction.”

I believe this Court should apply that definition in this case and hold that a charge on flight is not adjusted to the evidence unless the evidence demonstrates “evading the course of justice” by voluntary withdrawal to avoid arrest or detention, or continued concealment. In my view, evidence of any travel which fails to demonstrate an intent to conceal one’s self from the authorities falls short of that which is required for a charge on flight even under existing law.

Here, Renner told his employer, his friend and his friend’s parents where he was going. He then proceeded to go there. He ran but he did not hide.

The jury should not have been charged on flight.

I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Smith joins in this dissent.