Brown v. Trust Co. of Ga. , 230 Ga. 301 ( 1973 )

Nichols, Justice,

concurring in the judgment of affirmance, but not in all that is said in the opinion. In Doughty v. Futch, 219 Ga. 677 (135 SE2d 286), this court construed the effect of an Act of the General Assembly enacted in 1961 (Ga. L. 1961, p. 219). In 1966 and again in 1969, (Ga. L. 1966, p. 212; Ga. L. 1969, p. 927) the General Assembly re-enacted the identical language contained in the 1961 Act. In Todd v. State, 228 Ga. 746, 750 (187 SE2d 831), it was held: "... since this is a question of first impression before this court, the judicial construction already placed upon a similar statute of another State in effect at the time of the adoption of the Georgia Act is considered to accompany it and is treated as incorporated therein. Seaboard A. L. R. Co. v. Fountain, 173 Ga. 593 (2a) (160 SE 789); Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. v. Ga. Pub. Service Comm., 213 Ga. 418 (99 SE2d 225).”

Certainly if the construction placed upon a statute of another state by the courts of that state is considered to accompany the enactment of legislation by the General Assembly of Georgia, it cannot be gainsaid that the construction placed by this court upon language in a statute would not accompany the re-enactment of such statute in the same language later by the General Assembly of Georgia. The present case, however, is distinguishable from that in Doughty v. Futch, supra. Here, the testator, when looking at the four corners of the instrument, showed an intent to include as a niece the adopted child of his sister, who had been adopted before the will was executed, and for this reason I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.