Kennedy v. Bateman , 217 Ga. 458 ( 1961 )

Grice, Justice.

Did the evidence authorize cancellation of the release involved here? Other questions are raised but, as we view the case, are not necessary for decision.

An action for personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident was brought in the Superior Court of Tift County, Georgia; by Mrs. Elbe Mae Bateman against Morrison -Kennedy and C.. II. Pless, individually and trading as Kennedy-Pless Company.; After the defendants filed a special plea and an answer, both pleading that the plaintiff had, for a consideration, executed in their favor a release exonerating them from any liability to her due to the accident, the plaintiff amended her petition, alleging mutual mistake of fact. Included in her amended petition, were allegations that she signed a release in favor of the defendants as to the accident under the belief that her injuries were not serious or permanent; and that, upon later learning the extent .-and seriousness of the injuries, she tendered back to the defendants the check .given to her and her husband as consideration for the release. Her prayers included cancellation of the release and damages.

Responding to the prayers of the petition, the jury’s verdict included: cancellation of the release and a sum for damages. Thereupon, the defendants made a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict upon the ground that the evidence did not. authorize the jury to find in favor of cancellation of the release..' The defendants also filed a motion for new trial, which was amended to include seven special grounds relating to the charge of the court, and to its rulings upon the admission of evidence. The trial judge denied both motions.

The release, signed the day following the accident, recited, among' other things, that the plaintiff and her husband, for $1,520.54 acknowledged to have been received, released the defendants "of and from any and all- claims, demands, rights and causes of action, of whatsoever kind or nature arising from or by reason.of any and all known and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen bodily and personal injuries, loss and damage to property, 'and the consequences thereof, resulting and to result, from a wreck which happened on or about the 18th day of July, 1957, at or- near Tifton, Georgia. . .” (Emphasis supplied.) It also recited that “we further state that we have carefully read the foregoing release and know the contents thereof, and we sign the same as our own free acts.” Plaintiff’s and her husband’s signatures appear, along.with the names of two witnesses, and a separate acknowledgment before a notary public.

The evidence as to the execution of this release is without any suggestion whatever of mental incapacity, duress, or fraud which would void such a document. The most that is charged by the plaintiff is that she, the physician who attended her, and the defendant’s agent were laboring under a mutual mistake as to the seriousness and permanency of her injuries.

It is not necessary to review all of the evidence • surrounding the accident, medical treatment of the plaintiff, negotiations culminating in the signing of the release, and subsequent diagnosis and treatment of the plaintiff’s injuries by a different physician. . We also deem it unnecessary to determine whether there was mutual mistake of fact warranting cancellation or whether there was mere ignorance of fact so as to deny it. The terms of the release itself are decisive.

The situation at bar is governed by such decisions as James v. Tarpley, 209 Ga. 421 (73 SE2d 188), where the plaintiff had, by written release, settled her claim for personal injuries, but later sought cancellation of the release upon the ground that’the parties were laboring under a mutual mistake of fact as to the extent of the injuries which she had sustained. Speaking for -this court, Mr. Justice Hawkins said (Headnote 1): “. . . In "this case there is no allegation of fraud, misrepresentation/ misplaced confidence, undue infiuence; or other act that might cause the contract to be set aside [citations]. The injured party did not have to sign the contract of release. If the parties to the contract intended that it should only compensate and relieve from liability for damage to an automobile and a laceration on the head of the plaintiff, then they should have so stated in the writing. They did not do this, but, on the contrary, clearly anticipated that other injuries might show up later when they recited in the release that the defendants were being released and forever discharged ‘from all . . . suits . . . claims and demands whatsoever ... as a result of or growing out of any and all injuries both to persons and . . . damages to property resulting or to result or which might result’ from the accident [citations].”

The ruling quoted above is in accord with the rule existing generally. “Parties may preclude recovery for all- injuries, whether known or unknown, if it is their intention at the time to do so. . . ■ If a person releases his claim for damages for injuries, ignorant of the facts which may affect such injuries; and meaning to waive all inquiry thereinto and investigation thereof, any mistake with reference thereto is not a mistake in a legal sense. The great weight of authority supports the doctrine that a release of a claim for personal injuries cannot be avoided merely because the injuries have proved more serious than the releasor, at the time of executing the release, believed them to be, or because the releasor made a bad bargain on account of a wrong estimate of the damages which would accrue.” 45 Am. Jur. 684, 685, Release, § 19.

Also, “A release may be avoided where the releasor can show that it was executed by mutual mistake . . . unless it further appears that the parties intended that claims for all injuries, whether known or unknown at the time of the execution of the release, be relinquished.” 76 C.J.S. 645, Release, § 25.

Here, the contract of release, executed by the plaintiff and her husband in favor of the defendants, specifically- included “any and all claims, demands, rights and causes of action, of whatsoever kind or nature arising from or by reason of any and all known and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen bodily and -personal injuries . . . and the consequences thereof, resulting and to result.... , .” Therefore, the plaintiff cannot, upon learning that her injuries are more severe than she originally believed them .to- be, obtain cancellation of this release on the ground of mutual mistake.

In view of the foregoing, the evidence did not authorize the jury to cancel the release.

Since this ruling disposes of the case, we deem it unnecessary to consider the grounds contained in the defendants’ motion for a new trial.

Direction is given that, when the remittitur from this court reaches the trial court, the verdict for the plaintiff be vacated and final judgment be entered in favor of the defendants in accordance with their motion.

Judgment reversed with direction.

All the Justices concur, except Head, P. J., and Mobley, J., who dissent.