Madera Police Officers Assn. v. City of Madera , 36 Cal. 3d 403 ( 1984 )

KLAUS, J.

I concur fully in the result, but respectfully submit that the court’s analysis is needlessly complicated. Given a reasonably sane employer, the two-step analysis is 50 percent illusory: is it conceivable that employer-imposed restrictions on conduct during Code 7 time are not “primarily directed toward the fulfillment of the employer’s requirements and policies?”¹ Discussions about the identity of the beneficiary of these restrictions obscure the only real question which, in this case, is quite simple: did the limitations placed by the city on Code 7 time so restrict the officers’ ability to engage in private pursuits that the time was, in effect, on-duty time with permission to eat a meal—hardly more than a coffee break? Clearly, that question must be answered in the affirmative.

Ertola, J.,^* concurred.

1 It is true that the two-step analysis was also used in Los Angeles Fire & Protective League v. City of Los Angeles (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 67, 76 [99 Cal.Rptr. 908]. A quick glance at that decision reveals the doubtful relevance of the first step to the question under consideration in that case as well as here: the decisions relied on are Garzoli v. Workmen’s Comp. App. Bd. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 502 [86 Cal.Rptr. 1, 467 P.2d 833] and Guest v. Workmen’s Comp. App. Bd. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 670 [87 Cal.Rptr. 193, 470 P.2d 1], In each case it was held that workers’ compensation was not barred by the going and coming rule—in Garzoli because the employee was riding a motorcycle to work as, in effect, required by his job, in Guest because he was on a special errand. In neither case was there an issue as to whether at the time of the accident in question the employee was on duty for pay purposes.

* Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.