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Lewis, Chief Justice (dissenting) :
I respectfully dissent.
I agree with the majority opinion that plaintiff’s (appellant’s) motion “was for a directed verdict as to- the liability of defendant (respondent) submitting only the question of the amount of damages to the jury.” I further agree with the majority “that the act of negligence on the part of defendant was proven as a matter of law.” It is uncontradicted that this act of negligence caused the collision between the vehicles and any damages sustained by appellant.
The trial judge refused to direct a verdict in appellant’s favor on the issue of liability. Since the negligent act of respondent was the proximate cause of the collision, appellant was entitled to have the jury instructed that respondent was liable for any damages sustained and that the issue of damages was the only one with which they were concerned. As this record stands, it is impossible for us to determine whether the jury decided in respondent’s favor because they concluded (1) that there was no liability or (2), as the majority now surmises, no damages were sustained.
*153 The failure of the trial judge to grant appellant’s motion for a directed verdict was prejudicial error, entitling appellant to a new trial.I would reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial.
Gregory, J., concurs.
Document Info
Docket Number: 20159
Citation Numbers: 221 S.E.2d 865, 266 S.C. 149, 1976 S.C. LEXIS 319
Judges: Rhodes, Littlejohn, Ness, Lewis, Gregory
Filed Date: 1/28/1976
Precedential Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/14/2024