State of Ga. v. Alford , 264 Ga. 243 ( 1994 )

Fletcher, Justice.

On November 18, 1991, the State filed an in rem complaint for forfeiture pursuant to OCGA § 16-13-49 seeking the forfeiture of certain property belonging to Rickey and Sarah Alford.¹ Sarah Alford was served with the summons and complaint on November 20, 1991, and filed a two paragraph response denying all allegations of the complaint except that portion describing the property sought to be forfeited. Subsequently, she amended her answer to include citations to the “innocent owner” provisions of § 16-13-49 (e).²

On September 14, 1992, the State filed a motion to dismiss Sarah Alford’s amended answer because it did not satisfy the special pleading requirements of § 16-13-49 (o) (3). At the hearing on the State’s motion, Alford moved to dismiss the complaint because the State failed to hold a hearing on the issue of forfeiture within 60 days of the service of the complaint as required by § 16-13-49 (o) (5). The court granted the State’s motion to dismiss Alford’s amended answer as insufficient and denied her motion to dismiss the complaint. In Alford v. State of Ga., 208 Ga. App. 595 (431 SE2d 393) (1993), the Court of Appeals reversed both the dismissal of Alford’s amended answer and the denial of her motion to dismiss the complaint. We granted certiorari to determine whether the requirement in § 16-13-49 (o) (5) regarding the time for hearings in forfeiture proceedings is mandatory or directory.

1. Shortly after certiorari was granted in this action, this court decided State v. Henderson, 263 Ga. 508 (436 SE2d 209) (1993), in which we held that if an answer is filed the language of § 16-13-49 (o) (5) mandated a hearing within 60 days after service of the complaint unless the hearing is continued for good cause. We, therefore, affirm that portion of the Court of Appeals’ opinion that is consistent with Henderson.

2. Unlike Henderson, however, we find it necessary in this action to address the additional issue of whether the running of the 60-day period is dependent upon the filing of any answer by a claimant or upon the filing of a “sufficient” answer.³ The State contends that the trial court correctly denied Alford’s motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to hold a timely hearing because Alford’s amended answer is insufficient under § 16-13-49 (o) (3) to invoke the 60-day requirement. Alford argues that her amended answer is a pleading governed not by § 16-13-49 (o) (3) but by the Civil Practice Act and, therefore, is sufficient to commence the running of the 60-day period if it puts the State on notice of her claim. Accordingly, she takes the position, as did the Court of Appeals, that the State was required to hold a hearing within the 60 days, avoid the necessity for the hearing by filing a timely motion to strike the answer, or obtain a continuance. We hold the 60-day time period does not commence to run until the filing of a sufficient answer, as determined by the requirements of § 16-13-49 (o) (3), and reverse.

(a) It is well established that the legislature may impose pleading requirements in special statutory proceedings in addition to those found in the Civil Practice Act and in such cases, the sufficiency of a pleading must be judged in light of the specific statutory requirements. Dorsey v. Dept. of Transp., 248 Ga. 34 (279 SE2d 707) (1981); Bragg v. Bragg, 225 Ga. 494, 495 (170 SE2d 29) (1969). OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (3) requires that an answer stating a claim to property subject to forfeiture satisfy not only the general pleading rules applicable to all civil actions, but must also specifically set forth the following:

(A) The caption of the proceedings as set forth in the complaint and the name of the claimant;

(B) The address at which the claimant will accept mail;

(C) The nature and extent of the claimant’s interest in the property;

(D) The date, identity of transferor, and circumstances of the claimant’s acquisition of the interest in the property;

(E) The specific provision of [§ 16-13-49] relied on in asserting that the property is not subject to forfeiture;

(F) All essential facts supporting each assertion; and

(G) The precise relief sought.

Alford’s amended answer is devoid of legal or factual allegations in support of her standing to assert a claim to the property and the nature and extent of her interest in the property and she merely cites to the innocent owner provision of § 16-13-49 without asserting facts in support of her alleged innocent ownership. Thus, her amended answer fails to comply with subsections (C), (D), and (F) of the specific pleading requirements of § 16-13-49 (o) (3).⁴

(b) Because Alford’s amended answer is insufficient, we further hold that the court properly denied Alford’s motion to dismiss the State’s complaint as the 60-day requirement of § 16-13-49 (o) (5) is dependent upon the filing of an answer in strict compliance with the special pleading requirements of § 16-13-49 (o) (3). OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (5) states, “[i]f an answer is filed, a hearing must be held within 60 days after service of the complaint unless continued for good cause and must be held by the court without a jury.” Only when construed to require a claimant to file a legally sufficient answer is this provision consistent with the legislative intent in enacting § 16-13-49, to provide for the prompt disposition of property subject to forfeiture and protect the interests of innocent property owners, State of Ga. v. Jackson, 197 Ga. App. 619, 621 (1) (399 SE2d 88) (1990); see generally Hollowell v. Jove, 247 Ga. 678 (279 SE2d 430) (1981) (when construing a statute the court first must ascertain the legislative intent and then construe the law to implement that intent). To hold otherwise would place upon the State the burden of conducting discovery to determine not only the claimant’s standing and interest in the property but also that of any other interested party. This result would be contrary to the burden placed upon a claimant to make specific legal and factual assertions in support of and ultimately to prove these required elements of innocent ownership. See § 16-13-49 (o) (3); Jackson, 197 Ga. App. at 623.

3. Although ordinarily we would hold that the court properly dismissed Alford’s amended answer as insufficient, under these circumstances such a result would be unfair. See Lutz v. Foran, 262 Ga. 819, 824 (427 SE2d 248) (1993). When Alford filed her answer and amended answer, neither this court nor the Court of Appeals had interpreted § 16-13-49 (o) (5) to require the filing of an answer in compliance with the strict pleading requirements of § 16-13-49 (o) (3). Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part with direction that the case be remanded so that Alford may be granted a reasonable time in which to file a second amended answer in compliance with § 16-13-49 (o) (3).

Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded with direction.

All the Justices concur, except Benham, P. J., and Sears-Collins, J., who concur specially.

1 Law enforcement officers conducted a legal search of the Alfords’ mobile home on August 15, 1991, during which they seized 12.9 grams of cocaine, $150 in cash, and a handgun. In the State’s Complaint for Forfeiture, the State sought the forfeiture of these seized items, the Alfords’ mobile home, and the land on which it was located.

2 Mr. Alford pled guilty to criminal charges under the Georgia Controlled Substances Act and on September 8, 1992, filed a waiver of all right, title, and ownership in the property sought to be forfeited. Mrs. Alford was not indicted for any offense.

3 It was unnecessary to address this issue in Henderson because the Court of Appeals had not done so in its opinion. Nevertheless, we specifically noted that “the 60-day requirement is conditioned on the filing of a timely and sufficient answer.” Henderson, supra at 509, n. 2.

4 Alford conceded at oral argument that her amended answer was insufficient under the specific pleading requirements of § 16-13-49 (o) (3).