Petry v. Spaulding Drywall ( 1990 )

BISTLINE, Justice,

dissenting.

The majority opinion’s interpretation of I.C. § 72-701 places Workers’ Compensation claimants in a Catch-22 from which there is no escape: If they wait until they are disabled from an accident before they file their claims, their claims will be barred because the statute of limitations has run; if they file when an accident happens, they will often be denied benefits because they are not yet disabled and are therefore ineligible for compensation. Such a result is manifestly unjust, especially in light of the fact that Workers’ Compensation is, by statute, a worker’s only remedy for an injury received at work. I.C. § 72-211. It is also unconstitutional as applied, because the vastly different treatment of remedies for injuries from accidents versus remedies for occupational diseases has no rational basis to support it. Earlier this term, the Court issued Cawley v. Idaho Nuclear Corp., 117 Idaho 34, 784 P.2d 890, which held that the time limits for notice and filing of a claim under I.C. § 72-448(2) did not begin to run until the claimant “first suffered incapacity, disability, or death” as a result of an occupational disease. 117 Idaho at 36, 784 P.2d at 892. This holding is consistent with the language of the statute. It also comports with common sense. To require otherwise would be to require an employee to file a claim for a disability before the employee knows that there is anything wrong upon which such a claim could be reasonably based.

Yet, in accident cases, this approach is precisely what is statutorily required and has been unquestioned by this Court. There appears to be no rational basis for this distinction in processing for claims based on diseases and those based on accidents. The statutory scheme is therefore suspect as violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.

Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part:

No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

When the alleged violation of equal protection involves fundamental rights or a suspect class of persons, it is to be evaluated using a strict scrutiny standard of review. If no suspect class or fundamental right is involved, the challenged legislative classification must still bear a rational relationship to the purpose the legislation was intended to serve in order to survive equal protection review. Since employees are not a suspect class and the right to receive workers’ compensation benefits has not yet been held to be a fundamental right, the latter standard of review applies to the case before us.

The logical starting point for a rational basis review is an inquiry into the legislative purpose behind the enactment of the statute. In the case of the Idaho Workers’ Compensation statutes such an inquiry is neither difficult nor novel. Idaho Code § 72-201 declares that “sure and certain relief for injured [workers] and their families and dependents is hereby provided regardless of questions of fault____” The Court has held that the workers’ compensation laws seek to serve “humane purposes” and that those laws should therefore receive “a broad and liberal construction.” In re Haynes, 95 Idaho 492, 496, 511 P.2d 309, 313 (1973), (quoting Smith v. Univ. of Idaho, 67 Idaho 22, 26, 170 P.2d 404, 406 (1946)). Therefore we must examine the distinction the statutes make between disabilities caused by accidents and those caused by disease — in light of these “humane purposes.”

Idaho Code § 72-448(1) provides that “notice of the manifestation of an occupational disease shall be given by the employee to the employer within sixty (60) days after the first manifestation thereof" and that “claim for disability or death shall be made within one (1) year after manifestation of the disease____” Thus, the time limitations begin to run, not when the employee is first exposed to the agent which causes the disease, but when the disabling disease which results from that exposure becomes evident.

In contrast, I.C. § 72-701 provides that “[n]o proceedings under this law shall be maintained ... unless a claim for compensation with respect thereto shall have been made within one (1) year after the date of the accident____” The majority in this case, following heretofore unchallenged Idaho precedent, holds that “[t]he one year statute of limitations is measured from the date of the accident, and not from the date that the injury is discovered or its severity understood.” 117 Idaho at 36, 784 P.2d at 892. Thus, even if the employee missed no work because of an accident and then, after a year had passed, became disabled as a direct result of the accident, the Workers’ Compensation claim is barred if it was not filed within the one-year period.

The statutes offer no rational explanation for this disparate treatment, nor can such an explanation be found by reference to external sources. Both accidental injuries and occupational diseases arise out of and in the scope of employment; both accidental injuries and occupational diseases can remain latent for a long period of time; both accidental injuries and occupational diseases can cause incapacity, disability, or death, for which the worker’s compensation laws should provide “sure and certain relief.” Yet, under virtually identical circumstances, i.e., where an incident or series of incidents at work cause an injury or disease which is not discovered until more than a year has passed since the incident, an occupational disease is compensable, but an accidental injury is not. Such a discrepancy does not satisfy the rational basis test required by the Equal Protection Clause, and is therefore subject to being ruled unconstitutional.