People v. Aguilar , 35 Cal. 3d 785 ( 1984 )

RICHARDSON, J.^*

I respectfully dissent. Under the circumstances of this case, reversal is not warranted, because defendant has shown neither prejudice nor denial of any constitutional right arising from the procedures utilized by the trial court. The trial court appointed an interpreter for defendant at trial. However, we have not been supplied with any record of the proceedings leading to the appointment so we do not know the basis upon which the request was granted. None of the interesting sociological data provided in footnote 5 (ante, p. 791) is part of the record before us nor is it in any way tied to defendant. What is included in the record amply demonstrates that defendant had sufficient knowledge of the English language to have enabled him to communicate effectively with counsel during the time that the interpreter was being used to interpret for the two prosecution witnesses.

After defendant’s arrest, he was questioned by Officer Terry. Both the questions put and the answers given were entirely in English. The officer testified at trial that defendant had no difficulty in speaking English and that defendant told him he understood that language well, although defendant’s spoken English was “broken. ” Terry took a statement from defendant in question and answer form during an interview conducted entirely in English. The officer then read the statement to defendant, again in English, and simultaneously recorded his reading and defendant’s oral concurrence with the written version of the interview. Finally, defendant signed and dated each page of the written transcription of the interview.

Next, at the time of defendant’s arraignment, the record shows that without the use of any interpreter, defendant requested appointment of counsel, entered a plea, and readily answered all questions posed by the court. I also find it significant that the probation report submitted to the court for sentencing purposes revealed that defendant was born in the United States, had an eighth grade education in American schools, and served in the United States military services until his honorable discharge.

Finally, the record of the sentencing proceeding recites that “Defendant stated that he understands what the Court is saying and does not request an interpreter.” Defendant then personally and readily responded in English to questions from the court regarding his right to appeal and his obligation to file a notice of appeal on his own behalf should his attorney not do so.

The California Constitution declares that “A person unable to understand English who is charged with a crime has a right to an interpreter throughout the proceedings.” (Art. I, § 14.) Defendant here selectively utilized the services of an interpreter and the record reflects that in those instances where he functioned without such services he was able to understand and to make himself understood in the English language. The appointment of an interpreter was a laudatory safeguard to assure the highest comprehension by defendant during the trial. However, in view of defendant’s demonstrated understanding of English and the lack of any specific assertion that he unsuccessfully attempted to communicate with counsel, a reversal of his conviction is not required. There is no indication in this record that defendant was unable to hear and understand the questions or answers during the relevant examinations, or that he asked to speak to counsel and was unable to do so, or that he requested repetition of any testimony, or that, in any other manner, he felt constrained, isolated, or asea in “a babble of voices” while the interpreter translated for the witnesses. Article I, section 14, is violated only when interpreters are denied “a person unable to understand English.”

Moreover, I think it is arguable that defendant, through his counsel, knowingly waived his right to the services of a second interpreter during the period in which the first interpreter assisted the witnesses.

In summary, defendant has not demonstrated that he was denied any constitutional rights by the procedures followed here. I would affirm the judgment of conviction.

Mosk, J., concurred.

Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied May 24, 1984. Mosk, J., and Lucas, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

* Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.