Nikas v. Oxford , 103 Ga. App. 721 ( 1961 )

Felton, Chief Judge, and Jordan, Judge,

dissenting. Whatever may be the right of an administrative officer to review a decision which he has made and to materially alter the findings and judgment which he has made (see Annotation 73 A. L. R. 2d 939), in this case the last order, which made a material alteration in the original finding of the Commissioner, was issued on August 8, I9601. By this order the Commissioner changed the penalty in part from an indefinite suspension of the appellant’s license to a revocation of the license. We are of the opinion that this was the final material order in the case and that the time for filing an appeal began on August 8, 1960, and the licensee’s right to such appeal had expired before the order of September 6th was issued. The order following the one revoking the license simply provided an extension of four days for the revocation to become effective. This last change was not a material change; it benefited the licensee; it dealt in no way with the evidence on which the order of revocation was based. It simply amounted to a supersedeas of the order of August 8th. The finality of the order of August 8, 1960, was not contingent upon anything that the licensee might or might not do in the future. Such orders as the last order related only to the enforcement of the order and did not have the effect of changing the date of the order on August 8th, or of extending the time prescribed by law within which an appeal could be taken. Cohen v. Brown, 35 Ga. App. 508 (134 S. E. 119); Booth v. State, 131 Ga. 750, 756, 757 (63 S. E. 502); Capital City Tobacco Co. v. Anderson, 138 Ga. 667 (75 S. E. 1040); Massachusetts Bonding &c. Co. v. Realty Trust Co., 139 Ga. 180, 185 (77 S. E. 86); Cooper v. Reeves, 161 Ga. 232, 233 (131 S. E. 63); Dugas v. Dugas, 201 Ga. 190 (39 S. E. 2d 658).