Steelman-Duff, Inc. v. Dept. of Transp. , 323 Or. 220 ( 1996 )

DURHAM, J.,

concurring.

I agree with the majority’s conclusion that petitioner is a “successful party in a suit brought under this section,” within the meaning of ORS 279.067(4). However, in my view, no plausible ambiguity in the statute requires an exposition of its legislative history or a resort to court-created maxims of construction to divine the legislature’s probable intention.

The majority concludes that ORS 279.067(4) is ambiguous in two respects. The first is the phrase “a suit brought under this section.” I disagree. No reasonable doubt exists that this action is a suit brought under ORS 279.067. Neither the parties nor the Court of Appeals suggests that the meaning of the phrase is disputed or unclear. The majority’s effort to discover an ambiguity in that phrase is unpersuasive.

The second source of ambiguity, according to the majority, is the term “successful.” However, by prevailing, Compton was a “successful” party under any familiar definition of that term. The majority apparently agrees with that conclusion, because it holds, eventually, that Compton was “ ‘successful’ as that term ordinarily is understood.” 323 Or at 235-36.

The statute’s key terms, and their context, make the legislature’s intention clear. Therefore, our interpretive task is complete without an examination of legislative history or other secondary sources of legislative intent. Under our methodology, “we proceed no further.” See McIntire v. Forbes, 322 Or 426, 429, 909 P2d 846 (1996) (so holding); PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 611, 859 P2d 1143 (1993) (if a statute’s text and context make the legislature’s intent clear, “further inquiry is unnecessary”).

I would terminate our inquiry with an examination of the best evidence of the legislature’s intention: the statute’s words.

Fadeley and Unis, JJ., join in this concurring opinion.