Hilligoss v. Cross Companies ( 1975 )

MacLaughlin, Justice

(dissenting).

I dissent. In my judgment, a jury should decide the question of whether the criminal act of stealing personal property from plaintiff's apartment was an intervening, superseding cause sufficient to isolate defendant’s alleged negligence in allowing the posted notice to remain on plaintiff’s door for several days. I assume the principal purpose of changing the locks was for security purposes to prevent the very type of theft which occurred. I cannot agree that the subsequent theft, which is alleged to have occurred during the 4-day period that the door was posted with the notice that the lock had been changed, should, as a matter of law, be held to be an intervening, superseding cause which will relieve defendant of responsibility. It seems to me that under all of the circumstances of this case the fact of the illegal entrance into the apartment could very well be considered by a jury to be a foreseeable consequence of defendant’s alleged negligence and that its foreseeability is at the least, a question on which reasonable minds could differ.

I would remand the case for a jury trial on the question of whether there was negligence on the part of the defendant and whether that negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries. In determining the question of proximate cause, the jury would, of course, determine whether the illegal entry into the apartment was unforeseeable and therefore an intervening, superseding cause which isolates defendant’s negligence.

Peterson, Justice (dissenting).

I join in the dissent of Mr. Justice MacLaughlin.

Rogosheske, Justice (dissenting).

I also join in the dissent.

Mr. Justice Knutson took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.