City of Albany v. Humber , 101 Ga. App. 276 ( 1960 )

Felton, Chief Judge,

concurring specially in the ruling .in Division 3 of the opinion.

Whatever may have been the law before the enactment of our new law providing for judgments notwithstanding verdicts, I am of the opinion, that the new law intends that a motion for a directed verdict may be made by a defendant who does not introduce any evidence but closes his case. The act of 1953 (Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dee. Sess., pp. 440, 444 et seq.), provides in part as follows: “Whenever a motion for a directed verdict, made at the close of all the evidence is denied, or for any reason is not granted, a party who has moved for a directed verdict, within 30 days after the reception of verdict, may move to have the verdict and any judgment entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his motion for directed verdict; . . .” One purpose in the enactment of this law was to end litigation and in my view the purpose was to end litigation in such a situation as is mentioned above, as well as others. Although the case is not exactly in point, the Supreme Court in Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Brackin, 215 Ga. 225 (109 S. E. 2d 782) held that the act above referred to effected a greater change in the old law than is suggested in this special concurrence. But for the old rulings by the Supreme Court on this question it would certainly seem logical, without the new law, that the party who subjects himself to the grant of a directed verdict against him would have a right to make such a motion in his own behalf.