Sealey v. Grine , 115 N.C. App. 343 ( 1994 )

Judge McCrodden

concurring.

Realizing that our Court is bound by the decisions of other panels, In the Matter of Appeal from Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989), I am constrained to concur in the result. I am concerned, however, that the definition of “costs,” which this Court has interpreted to include deposition expenses, Dixon, Odom & Co. v. Sledge, 59 N.C. App. 280, 286, 296 S.E.2d 512, 516 (1982), and which we use today, could make refiling cases prohibitive for plaintiffs who have taken voluntary dismissals. I cannot believe that the General Assembly, in enacting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 41(d) (1990), intended to place such a barrier to litigation. Indeed, the language of the statute (plaintiff “shall be taxed with the costs”) connotes an automatic ex mero motu action by the trial court in assessing costs normally associated with civil litigation, i.e., as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-305(d) (1989). By my reading, that statute does not include deposition costs or other costs of discovery.