Seaboard Coast Line Railroad v. Smith ( 1974 )

Pannell, Judge,

concurring specially.

I concur in the judgment of reversal but cannot concur in the ruling in Division 1(b) of the opinion. When the issue came up before the trial judge during the qualification of the jurors as to whether they should be qualified by eliminating the employees of the defendant railroad company, and counsel for the parties were called to the bench and counsel for the plaintiff contended that employees were qualified jurors and counsel for the defendant railroad company, as he had a right to do, insisted that employees were disqualified, and the trial court did not qualify the jurors as to any being employees of the railroad company, counsel for the railroad had done all the law required him to do. It was not up to him to object after the qualification procedure was completed by the trial judge, nor was it necessary that he use the word "object” during the colloquy between the trial judge and the attorneys for the parties. Counsel for the defendant railroad’s action, in abiding by the decision of the court, does not constitute a waiver of the objections he made before such ruling. I know of no law in this state that requires this to be done under these circumstances, nor has any been cited by the majority opinion.

Iam authorized to state that Presiding Judge Hall, and Judges Deen and Clark, concur in this concurrence.