Brown v. Ricketts , 235 Ga. 29 ( 1975 )

Per curiam.

The sole issue in this habeas corpus appeal is whether petitioner was denied a direct appeal from his criminal conviction due to ineffective assistance of counsel.

The record shows that appellant, represented by appointed counsel, was tried by a jury in Chatham Superior Court and was convicted of robbery by intimidation on September 18, 1973. At his request, his attorney filed a motion for new trial on October 15,1973.

On November 27, 1973, while the motion for new trial was pending, appellant escaped from the county jail and remained on escape until January 5,1974. A hearing was held on the motion for new trial and it was denied on May 20, 1974.

On June 19, 1974, the last day on which an appeal could have been filed, the appellant again escaped and remained a fugitive until July 1,1974. He escaped a third time on July 16, 1974, but was recaptured the next day.

Appellant does not contend that he was unaware of his appellate rights. Indeed, on August 21, 1974, after being sent to Jackson Diagnostic Center, he contacted his attorney concerning the status of his robbery conviction and also wrote the Clerk of Chatham Superior Court requesting a transcript of his criminal trial in order to appeal his conviction pro se. He was informed by the clerk by letter dated August 27, 1974, that his attorney had notified that office that no appeal would be filed. By letter dated August 28,1974, appellant’s attorney informed him for the first time that the motion for new trial had been overruled. Counsel had previously written the trial court on July 25,1974, informing it of his decision not to appeal.

Submitted May 23, 1975 Decided September 11, 1975. Thomas M. West, James C. Bonner, Jr., for appellant.

Appellant’s appointed counsel testified in this habeas corpus proceeding that his decision not to appeal was based upon Brown v. Holland, 228 Ga. 628 (187 SE2d 246), and that such decision was made prior to Thornton v. Ault, 233 Ga. 172 (210 SE2d 683).

The habeas court concluded as a matter of law that none of appellant’s constitutional rights were violated, that he was not denied an appeal, and that under the rationale of Gravitt v. State, 221 Ga. 812 (147 SE2d 447), and Binns v. State, 229 Ga. 120 (189 SE2d 393), the questions raised by the motion for new trial were moot and any appeal would have been futile.

Counsel for appellant argues that the instant situation is distinguishable because in all of the prior Georgia cases dealing with appeals which have been dismissed on the basis of an escape, the dismissal was predicated upon a motion by the state supported by oath that the appellant had escaped, and the appellant had not been returned to custody by the time the case was dismissed. See, e.g., Blalock v. Corpe, 215 Ga. 61 (108 SE2d 715); Gravitt v. State, 221 Ga. 812, supra; Binns v. State, 229 Ga. 120, supra.

However, as the court below correctly concluded, the rationale of those decisions is applicable here. Appellant’s right to appeal terminated on June 19, 1974, when no notice of appeal was filed. Appellant escaped on that date. He therefore will not be heard to complain that he was denied effective assistance of counsel on appeal.

In Moore v. Caldwell, 231 Ga. 485 (1) (202 SE2d 425), this court held that "The denial of an appeal which results from the prisoner’s escape after conviction is not a ground for the grant of the writ of habeas corpus. [Cits.].”

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Nichols, C. J., and Hill, J., who concur specially and Ingram, J., who concurs in the judgment only. Andrew J. Ryan, Jr., District Attorney, William H. McAbee, II, Joseph D. Newman, Assistant District Attorneys, Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, Larry Evans, Lois F. Oakley, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.