Gospel Army v. City of Los Angeles ( 1945 )

TRAYNOR, J.

Certain ordinances of the City of Los Angeles regulate transactions in secondhand goods and solicitations for charitable purposes. Plaintiff, an incorporated religious organization, brought this suit to enjoin the enforcement of these ordinances as applied to it on the ground they abridged its religious liberty in violation of the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of California. The trial court found that plaintiff is ‘‘ engaged exclusively in the promulgation, by literature and word of mouth, of its religious beliefs, by and through its auxiliaries, and in the procuring of donations in the form of money and articles of value in the prosecution and furtherance of its religious activities.” It enjoined defendants from “further interference and threatened acts, which would in any way prevent the free exercise of the religious liberty and freedom of worship of the said Plaintiff.” Defendants appeal.

The finding of the trial court must be viewed in the light of the evidence, which is undisputed. Religious services at plaintiff’s mission are conducted by a minister ordained by it whose compensation depends entirely on solicited contributions. Plaintiff engages in missionary work, distributes the New Testament and religious tracts free to the public, and gives assistance to those in need. It collects salvage from the public to obtain funds to propagate its religious doctrines and to provide aid to the poor. Some of the salvage is sold in a secondhand goods store operated by plaintiff; some, such as clothing, is distributed to the poor; goods not suitable for further use go directly to a salvage mill. The salvage is collected by plaintiff’s “industrial solicitors” in four of plaintiff’s trucks. The money received from the sale of secondhand goods in plaintiff’s store is used to meet the cost of operating the store, including the compensation paid to the manager and the solicitors. Whatever remains is paid into plaintiff’s treasury. Ninety per cent of the money received for the mill material goes to the drivers of the trucks; the remainder is turned over to the manager of the store for plaintiff’s treasury.

Other employees of plaintiff solicit money from the public. Solicitors make the object of their mission known by showing to prospective donors a printed card stating that “the bearer whose signature is hereon attached for identification is duly authorized to solicit money, food, clothing or any other useful articles that will help the Gospel Army to carry on their religious home missionary and evangelical work among the poor and under-privileged.” About fifty per cent of the funds raised is absorbed by the cost of soliciting, including the compensation of the solicitors, which is paid on a percentage basis. The funds remaining are used to pay the cost of furnishing tracts and religious literature free to the public and to supply food, lodging, clothing and car fare to the poor.

Section 24.01 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code defines a “junk dealer” as “a person having a fixed place of business in this City who goes from house to house or from place to place, gathering, collecting, buying, selling or otherwise dealing in any old rags, sacks, bottles, cans, paper, metal or other articles commonly known as junk.” A “secondhand dealer” is “a person engaging in, conducting, managing, or carrying on the business of buying, selling or otherwise dealing in secondhand goods, wares or merchandise.” Junk dealers and secondhand dealers must obtain a permit to engage in business from defendant city’s Board of Police Commissioners. The following “Requisites of Permits” are set forth in subsection (c) of Section 24.01: “ (1) Persons desiring to obtain a permit to conduct, manage or deal in any business mentioned in subsection ‘a’ of this Section shall file an application in writing with the Board specifying by street and number the place where such business is proposed to be conducted or carried on; junk collectors having no fixed place of business shall specify in such application their residence by street number. The application shall be signed by the applicant and shall contain his residence address. (2) Before receiving an application for any permit the Board shall require the payment of such fees as are hereafter specified. (3) Upon receipt of such application the Board shall cause to be investigated the business of the applicant and location at which applicant proposes to engage in business as specified in said application. Thereafter the Board may issue a permit to the applicant which shall be effective for the remaining portion of the current year. (4) Persons operating under the provisions of this Section shall be required to secure an annual renewal of such permit commencing January 1st of the succeeding year in which such permit was granted. (5) No person holding a permit to conduct, manage, carry on or deal in any business mentioned in subsection ‘a’ of this Section shall buy, sell or otherwise deal in secondhand jewelry, precious stones, precious metals (including old gold), watches or other similar secondhand merchandise without first applying for and receiving a special permit therefor from the Board in the manner provided in this Section for securing ordinary permits.” The fees prescribed are set forth in subsection (d): “ (1) Applications for permits other than provided for in this subsection shall pay the sum provided in Section 22.10; (2) Applications for special permits, the sum of $50.00; (3) Applications for annual permit renewal, the sum of $25.00; (4) Applications for changing location of place of business for which a permit has been granted, the sum of $10.00; (5) Change of ownership, the sum of $10.00, to be applicable only in cases where the new owner is already operating under a permit issued pursuant to provisions of this Section.” Subsection (e) provides: “(1) The Board shall not grant any permit provided for in this Section to persons who fail, refuse or neglect to comply with the laws and ordinances relating to and regulating the business for which such permit is sought. (2) Persons applying for or obtaining permits under the provisions of this Section shall comply with the provisions of this Section.” Subsection (f) provides for the revocation of permits; “Any permit issued under the provisions of this Section may be revoked or suspended upon the grounds provided for in this Section: (1) ... If persons holding permits under the provisions of this Section shall violate any of the provisions of this Section or any provisions of any other ordinance, or any law relating to or regulating any such business, or shall conduct or carry on such business in an unlawful manner, the Board, in addition to any other penalties provided by this Code, shall revoke such permit issued to such person; (2) . . . Permits granted pursuant to this Section shall be revoked only in the manner provided in Section 22.02 of this Code; (3) ... No permit shall be granted to any person to conduct, manage, carry on or deal in any business mentioned in subsection ‘a’ of this Section whose permit has been revoked by the Board until six (6) months have elapsed after such revocation. ’ ’ Holders of permits must keep a complete record of all goods purchased or received by them, which is open to inspection by any member of the police department. They must also file with the Chief of Police daily reports on prescribed forms of the goods purchased or received during the preceding day, describing the article and specifying the hour of the day when it was acquired, the name and address of the party from whom it was acquired, the height, age, sex, complexion, and other characteristics of that person. The hours of business are prescribed. Secondhand dealers must keep the articles received by them 21 days before selling them. The period prescribed for junk dealers is three days. With respect to certain articles classed as scrap, junk dealers are exempted from the provisions requiring the keeping of records, the filing of reports, and the keeping of articles for three days. There are comparable exemptions for secondhand dealers. If a claim is made that property in the hands of the holder of a permit is stolen, the board, in the event no court action is pending, may determine whether or not the property was stolen from the claimant and order its return if it was. If such an order is disobeyed, the board may revoke the permit. The foregoing provisions are reasonable, and the standards prescribed are adequate. (In re Holmes, 187 Cal. 640, 646 [203 P. 398]; Co-operative Junk Co. v. Board of Police Commissioners, 38 Cal.App. 676, 679 [177 P. 308]; Zemansky v. Board of Police Commissioners, 61 Cal.App.2d 450, 453-455 [143 P.2d 361] ; see 30 A.L.R. 1427; 88 A.L.R. 970, 972; 7 Cal.Jur. 10-yr.Supp. 366; 33 Am.Jur. 336-339, 355; 47 Am.Jur. 555.)

Regulation of the business of junk dealers and secondhand dealers is designed to protect the public interest by preventing such dealers from becoming outlets for stolen goods. No question arises as to the constitutionality of such regulation when the business regulated is not carried on by a religious organization. (Lewis v. Quinn, 217 Cal. 410, 413 [19 P.2d 236]; In re Holmes, supra; Co-operative Junk Co. v. Board of Police Commissioners, supra; Zemansky v. Board of Police Commissioners, supra; see 30 A.L.R. 1427; 88 A.L.R. 970, 972; 7 Cal.Jut. 10-yr.Supp. 366; 33 Am.Jur. 336-339, 355; 47 Am.Jur. 554.) Business carried on by a religious organization cannot be differentiated, for the reasons set forth below with respect to the validity of the regulation of plaintiff’s solicitation of funds for charity.

Sections 44.01 to 44.19 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code regulate solicitations of funds for charity. The term “charitable” includes “Philanthropic, social service, benevolent, patriotic, either actual or purported.” The term “contribution” includes “alms, food, clothing, money, property or donations.under the guise of a loan of money or property.” (§ 44.01.) Certain provisions, applicable to solicitors of charitable contributions in general, are designed primarily to secure information that will assist the public in judging the nature and worthiness of the cause for which the solicitation is made and to insure the presentation of such information to prospective donors. We find nothing unduly burdensome or unreasonable in any of' these provisions. Section 44.05, which is quoted in the margin^*, requires any person who solicits for any charitable purpose to file with the Department of Social Service a notice of intention to solicit ten days before the solicitation. This notice must contain, among other things, information regarding the purpose, character, method, and estimated expenses of the solicitation, the need for the contribution to be solicited, the proposed use of the solicited funds, the amount that will remain available for charitable purposes over expenses, the amount received from solicitations in the preceding calendar year, the expenses of such solicitations, and the amount that remained available for charitable purposes. The department may investigate the statements in the notice of intention. (§44.03 (a).) Information cards setting forth the facts in the notice of intention and such other facts as in the opinion of the Board of Social Service Commissioners will be of assistance to the public in determining the nature and worthiness of the solicitation (Section 44.06 quoted in the margin^†) are issued by the Department of Social Services for four cents per card. (§ 44.03(e).) The information cards, which are in effect permits to solicit, are issued automatically upon the filing of the required information and the payment of the four cents for each card. The department is given no authority to withhold such cards when these requirements are met, and we cannot assume that it will abuse its authority in order to withhold them. As this court said in In re Holmes, 187 Cal. 640, 647 [203 P. 398], quoting from In re Flaherty, 105 Cal. 558, 562 [38 P. 981, 27 L.R.A. 529] and Gaylord v. City of Pasadena, 175 Cal. 433, 437 [166 P. 348] : “ ‘Laws are not made upon the theory of the total depravity of those who are elected to administer them; and the presumption is that municipal officers will not use these small powers villainously or for purposes of oppression or mischief. ’ If this petitioner had applied for a permit under the requirement of the section of the charter above quoted, and been either whimsically or arbitrarily refused such permit, he might then, as is shown in Gaylord v. City of Pasadena, supra, have had recourse to the courts for relief from such unjust and arbitrary action.”

Each solicitor must exhibit an information card to the prospective donor and must not make any misstatements. A solicitor must also carry written authorization from the association that he represents. The board may recall the cards and amend them if it receives additional information showing that any statements thereon are incorrect. The board may not disallow a proposed solicitation but it may investigate the statements in the notice of intention and the methods of making or conducting the solicitation; it may inspect the records of the person in charge of the solicitation and the association for whom it is made, and it may give such publicity to its findings as it deems best to reach the general public and persons interested. The association for whom the solicitation is made must maintain an accounting system recording the entry of all donations and disbursements. (§ 44.08.)

More restrictive provisions are applicable to promoters. A promoter is “any person who for pecuniary compensation or consideration received, or to be received, solicits or is engaged in the business of or holds himself out to the public as engaged in the business of soliciting contributions for or on behalf of any other person or any charitable association, corporation or institution, or conducts, manages or carries on . . . any drive pr compaign for any such purpose; provided, however, that pecuniary compensation or consideration as used herein, shall include, but shall not be limited to, participation on a percentage basis in any fund solicited, or raised, for or on behalf of any other person, firm, association or corporation; provided, further, that no person who is a bona fide paid officer or employee of a social service agency endorsed by the Board of Social Service Commissioners, shall be considered a promoter within the meaning of this article.” (§44.01.) The conditions that a social agency must meet to be endorsed by the Social Service Commission and the standards that govern the commission are set forth in a separate ordinance, the relevant part of which is quoted in the margin.^* In our opinion the classification effected by this ordinance is reasonable and the standards provided are adequate.

A promoter must apply for a promoter’s license. The application must set forth the applicant’s qualifications and show that he is of good character and reputation. Persons working as solicitors for compensation under the promoter must be registered as solicitors. The board grants a promoter’s license if it is satisfied that the applicant is of good character and reputation, is equal to the financial responsibility incident to the proposed solicitation and intends to conduct his business as promoter fairly and honestly. Similarly, before registering a solicitor, the board must be satisfied of his good character and reputation. A license fee of $25 is required for a promoter’s license. A promoter must also file a $2,000 bond with the board to insure contributors against loss through theft. Solicitors must file a $500 bond and pay a registration fee of $1.00. The board may revoke a promoter’s license, after a hearing, for any “unfair, unjust, inequitable or fraudulent” act of a promoter or his employees, or agents in making a solicitation or conducting the business of promoter. Any ground that would have led to denial of the license is also ground for its revocation.

Solicitations upon premises owned or occupied by the association upon whose behalf the solicitation is made, and the soliciting of funds solely from members of the soliciting association are not subject to the provisions concerning promoters and solicitors or to certain other regulatory provisions of the ordinance. ‘ ‘ Solicitations made solely for evangelical missionary or religious purposes” are also exempted. If, however, they are conducted in such a manner as in the opinion of the board may give the persons solicited or the public the impression that the purpose of the solicitation is in whole or in part charitable, the board may investigate the matter and give such publicity to its findings as it may deem best to advise the public of the facts. (§44.16.)

Plaintiff contends that since the practice of charity and the solicitation of funds for that purpose are part of its religious duties, the ordinances regulating the solicitation of charitable contributions cannot apply to plaintiff’s solicitations without abridging its religious liberty in violation of the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of California.

Religious liberty “embraces two concepts,—freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.” (Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 [60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 128 A.L.R. 1352.] The constitutional guarantee protects the profession of a religious belief by word of mouth or in writing, the dissemination of the doctrines of a religious organization by preaching from the pulpits or other methods of evangelism, or the right to refuse to state beliefs against the dictates of one’s conscience. (Murdoch v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 109 [63 S.Ct. 870, 891, 87 L.Ed. 1292, 146 A.L.R. 81]; West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 [63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628, 147 A.L.R. 674].) “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion, or force citizens to confess by word of mouth or act their faith therein.” (West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 [63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed, 1628, 147 A.L.R, 674].) It does not follow, however, that religious organizations enjoy unlimited freedom in carrying on all activities related to their religious program. As the United States Supreme Court declared in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 109-110 [63 S.Ct. 870, 891, 87 L.Ed. 1292, 146 A.L.R. 81] : “we do not intimate or suggest . . . that any conduct can be made a religious rite and by the zeal of the practitioners swept into the First Amendment. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161-167, 25 L.Ed. 244, and Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 10 S.Ct. 299, 33 L.Ed. 637, denied any such claim to the practice of polygamy and bigamy. Other claims may well arise which deserve the same fate. We only hold that spreading one’s religious beliefs or preaching the Gospel through distribution of religious literature and through personal visitations is an age-old type of evangelism with as high a claim to constitutional protection as the more orthodox types.”

Many activities prompted by religious motives can hardly be differentiated from secular activities. If the applicability of government regulation turned on the religious motivation of activities, plausible motivations would multiply and in the end vitiate any regulation. “Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses. . . . Where a restriction of the use of highways ... is designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right which in other circumstances would be entitled to protection. . One would not be justified in ignoring the familiar red traffic light because he thought it his religious duty to disobey the municipal command or sought by that means to direct public attention to an announcement of his opinions.” (Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 [61 S.Ct. 762, 85 L.Ed. 1049, 133 A.L.R. 1396].) In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 [64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645], it was contended that religious liberty was abridged by the application of a statute regulating child labor to a guardian who permitted her minor ward to distribute religious literature on the streets at night. In vindicating the state’s power to regulate in this way the dissemination of religious beliefs, the court declared: “The parent's conflict with the state over control of the child and his training is serious enough when only secular matters are concerned. It becomes the more so when an element of religious conviction enters. Against these sacred private interests, basic in a democracy, stand the interests of society to protect the welfare of children, and the state’s assertion of authority to that end, made here in a manner conceded valid if only secular things were involved. The last is no mere corporate concern of official authority. It is the interest of youth itself, and of the whole community, that children be both safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for growing into free and independent well-developed men and citizens. Between contrary pulls of such weight, the safest and most objective recourse is to the lines already marked out, not precisely but for guides, in narrowing the no man’s land where this battle has gone on . . .'the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest, as against a claim of religious liberty. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 25 L.Ed, 244; Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333,10 S.Ct. 299, 33 L.Ed. 637. And neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation. Acting to guard the general interests in youth’s well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent’s control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child’s labor and in many other ways. Its authority is not nullified merely because the parent grounds his claim to control the child’s course of conduct on religion or conscience. . . . It is sufficient to show what indeed appellant hardly disputes, that the state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child’s welfare; and that this includes, to some extent, matters of conscience and religious conviction.”

Activities characteristic of the secular life of the community may properly be a concern of the community even though they are carried on by a religious organization. (See, Prince V. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 [64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645]; United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 [64 S.Ct. 882, 88 L.Ed 1148]; Murdock V. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 109 [63 S.Ct. 870, 891, 87 L.Ed. 1292, 146 A.L.R 81]; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 [62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031]; Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 [61 S.Ct. 762, 85 L.Ed. 1049, 133 A.L.R. 1396]; Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 [10 S.Ct. 299, 33 L.Ed. 637]; In re Dart, 172 Cal. 47, 56 [155 P. 63, Ann.Cas. 1917D 1127, L.R.A. 1916D 905]; Chrisman v. Culinary Workers’ etc., 46 Cal.App.2d 129, 132 [115 P.2d 553]; People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201 [68 N.E. 243, 98 Am.St.Rep. 666, 63 L.R.A. 187]; City of St. Louis v. Hellscher, 295 Mo. 293 [242 S.W. 652]; Commonwealth v. Childs, 299 Mass. 367 [12 N.E.2d 814]; Commonwealth v. Green, 268 Mass. 585 [168 N.E. 101]; Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 375 [19 N.E. 224, 12 Am.St.Rep. 566, 2 L.R.A. 142]; State v. White, 64 N.H. 48 [5 A. 828]; Stull v. Reber, 215 Pa. 156 [64 A. 419, 7 Ann.Cas. 415]; Matter of Frazee, 63 Mich. 396, 405 [30 N.W. 72, 6 Am.St.Rep. 310]; State v. Chenoweth, 163 Ind. 94, 99 [71 N.E. 197]; see, also, Zollman, Religious Liberty in the American Law, 17 Mich.L.Rev. 355, 456.) Religious organizations engage in various activities such as founding colonies, operating libraries, schools, wineries, hospitals, farms, industrial and other commercial enterprises. Conceivably they may engage in virtually any worldly activity, but it does not follow that they may do so as specially privileged groups, free of the regulations that others must observe. If they were giv'en such freedom, the direct consequence of their activities would be a diminution of the state’s power to protect the public health and safety and the general welfare. With that power so easily diminished there would soon cease to be that separation of church and state underlying the constitutional concept of religious liberty. (See Evans v. Selma Union High School Dist., 193 Cal. 54 [222 P. 801, 31 A.L.R. 1121]; Knowlton v. Baumhover, 182 Iowa 691 [166 N.W. 202, 5 A.L.R. 841]; People ex rel. Ring v. Board of Education, 245 Ill. 334 [92 N.E. 251, 19 Ann.Cas. 220, 29 L.R.A.N.S. 442]; Board of Education of Cincinnati v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211 [13 Am.Rep. 233]; Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379 [61 Am.Dec. 256].)

There is no doubt that plaintiff, like many religious organizations, regards the practice of charity as a religious duty. It is not exclusively a religious activity, however; many charitable activities spring from sources in the everyday life of the community unrelated to religion. The state itself has an active responsibility for the welfare of the poor, the aged, the sick, the unemployed, and the orphaned. There is a public interest in regulating the solicitation of funds for these purposes. The very worthiness of such purposes creates a risk that the charitable impulses of people may be taken advantage of by solicitors who would collect funds under false pretenses or retain for themselves an undue percentage of what they collected. Fraud in the solicitation of charitable contributions can be most effectively controlled by measures such as the regulation in question requiring the presentation of information to enable the public to determine the nature and worthiness of the purpose for which the solicitation is made, and requiring proof of the good character and reputation of paid solicitors. In the words of Mr. Justice Shaw, speaking for a majority of the court in In re Dart, 172 Cal. 47, 56 [155 P. 63, Ann.Cas. 1917D 1127, L.R.A. 1916D 905]: “The occupation of soliciting contributions to charitable purposes is clearly so far subject to the police power, that it may be regulated by laws or ordinances providing for a reasonable supervision over the persons engaged therein, and for the application and use of the contributions received to the purposes intended, in order to prevent unscrupulous persons from obtaining money, or other things, under the pretense that they were to be applied to charity, and to prevent the wrongful diversion of such funds to other uses, or to secure them against waste. Measures reasonably tending to secure these ends are unquestionably valid.” (See cases collected in. 57 A.L.R. 516, 128 A.L.R. 1361.)

The religious organization in Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, on which plaintiff relies, solicited funds, not for charitable purposes but for its own support. Under the statute there involved it was allowed to engage in such solicitation only if the licensing officer determined that its cause was a religious one and issued a certificate to that effect. It was held that the vesting of this power in an administrative official amounted to “censorship of religion as the means of determining its right to survive” since under the statute the official’s judgment was decisive as to what constituted a religious cause. The ordinance involved in the present case specifically exempts solicitations for religious purposes only; its object is to regulate all solicitations for charitable purposes. • The Board of Social Service Commissioners has no authority to appraise the nature or worthiness of a religious cause. In the Cantwell case the court recognized that even the solicitation of funds for the support of a religious organization is subject to reasonable regulation: “The general regulation, in the public interest, of solicitation, which does not involve any religious test and does not unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of funds, is not open to any constitutional objection, even though the collection be for a religious purpose. Such regulation would not constitute a prohibited previous restraint on the free exercise of religion or interpose an inadmissible obstacle to its exercise.” (310 U.S. 296, 305.)

Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 [65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430], cited in support of plaintiff’s contentions, “does not involve the solicitation of funds or property.” (65 S.Ct. 315, 324.) The court there held that a state could not constitutionally require a paid union organizer to register with the Secretary of State before making a public speech inviting a nonunion worker specifically and nonunion workers in the audience generally to join the union. “We think a requirement that one must register before he undertakes to make a public speech to enlist support for a lawful movement is quite incompatible with the requirements of the First Amendment.” (65 S.Ct. 315, 327.) The court was careful, however, to distinguish eases in which the speaker solicits funds from the public: “Once the speaker goes further, however, and engages in conduct which amounts to more than the right of free discussion comprehends, as when he undertakes the collection of funds or securing subscriptions, he enters a realm where a reasonable registration or identification requirement may be imposed. In that context such solicitation would be quite different from the solicitation involved here. It would be free speech plus conduct akin to the activities which were present, and which it was said the State might regulate, in Schneider v. Irvington, supra, 308 U.S. 147, 84 L.Ed 155, 60 S.Ct. 146, and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 60 S.Ct. 900,128 A.L.R. 1352, both supra. That however must be done and the restriction applied, in such manner as not to intrude upon the rights of free speech and free assembly. In this case the separation was not maintained. ’ ’ In his concurring opinion in Thomas v. Collins Mr. Justice Jackson gives the following reasons for these variations in state power: “This wider range of power over pursuit of a calling than over speech-making is due to the different effects which the two have on interests which the state is empowered to protect. The modern state owes and attempts to perform a duty to protect the public from those who seek for one purpose or another to obtain its money. When one does so through the practice of a calling, the state may have an interest in shielding the public against the untrustworthy, the incompetent, or the irresponsible, or against unauthorized representation of agency. A usual method of performing this function is through a licensing system.

“But it cannot be the duty, because it is not the right, of the state to protect the public against false doctrine. The very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority from assuming a guardianship of the public mind through regulating the press, speech, and religion. In this field every person must be his own watchman for truth, because the forefathers did not trust any government to separate the true from the false for us. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628, 147 A.L.R. 674. Nor would I. Very many are the interests which the state may protect against the practice of an occupation, very few are those it may assume to protect against the practice of propagandizing by speech or press. These are thereby left great range of freedom.”

The requirement that promoters and the solicitors working under them submit proof of their good character and reputation does not discriminate against plaintiff or other religious organizations or censor their religious beliefs, nor does the regulation vest arbitrary power in the administrative board in authorizing it to withhold a license if it is not satisfied that the applicant is of good character and reputation. Such a requirement is common in statutes regulating admission to professions and occupations involving duties of a fiduciary character. (In re Stepsay, 15 Cal.2d 71 [98 P.2d 489]; Spears v. State Bar, 211 Cal. 183 [294 P. 697, 72 A.L.R. 923]; Leach v. Daughtery, 73 Cal.App. 83 [238 P. 160]; Riley v. Chambers, 181 Cal. 589, 593 [185 P. 855, 8 A.L.R. 418]; Ex parte McManus, 151 Cal. 331 [90 P. 702]; Ex parte Whitley, 144 Cal. 167 [77 P. 879, 1 Ann.Cas. 13]; Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183, 187 [20 S.Ct. 633, 44 L.Ed. 725]; Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 425 [47 S.Ct. 122, 71 L.Ed. 331]; New York ex rel. Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552 [26 S.Ct. 144, 50 L.Ed. 305]; Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165 [43 S.Ct. 303, 67 L.Ed. 590]; see, also, 12 A.L.R. 1435, 1450; 54 A.L.R. 1104, 1112; 92 A.L.R. 400, 415; Rottschaefer, Constitutional Law, pp. 466-482.) The filing of a bond is also a common requirement in the regulation of occupations or activities involving the handling of entrusted funds. (Palmer v. Continental Casualty Co., 205 Cal. 34, 35 [269 P. 638]; Clark v. Patterson, 213 Cal. 4 [300 P. 967, 75 A.L.R. 1124]; Gundling v. Chicago, supra; People of the State of New York v. Perretta, 253 N.Y. 305 [171 N.E. 72, 84 A.L.R. 636] ; see 33 Am.Jur., Licenses, sec. 54; 87 A.L.R. 145; 95 A.L.R. 1224; 103 A.L.R. 405; 120 A.L.R. 950.) The license fee is a reasonable one, covering the expenses of investigations and administration.

The board has no discretion to withhold a license if the applicant’s good character and reputation and his financial responsibility are established and the required bond is filed. The board is not free to deny licenses, but must act reasonably in the light of the evidence presented. (Riley v. Chambers, 181 Cal. 589, 595 [185 P. 855, 8 A.L.R. 418]; In re Holmes, 187 Cal. 640, 647 [203 P. 398]; Tarpey v. McClure, 190 Cal. 593, 600 [213 P. 983]; Bank of Italy v. Johnson, 200 Cal. 1, 32 [251 P. 784]; People v. Globe Grain and Mill Co., 211 Cal. 121, 125 [294 P. 3]; Cranford v. Jordan, 7 Cal.2d 465, 467 [61 P.2d 45]; Leach v. Daugherty, 73 Cal.App. 83 [238 P. 160]; Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 554 [37 S.Ct. 217, 61 L.Ed. 480]; Graves v. Minnesota, supra, p. 428; Douglas v. Noble, supra, p. 170; New York ex rel. Lieberman v. Van De Carr, supra; Plymouth Coal Co. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531, 545 [34 S.Ct. 359, 58 L.Ed. 713]; Minnesota v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 277 [60 S.Ct. 523, 84 L.Ed. 744, 126 A.L.R. 530]; Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 434, 435 [64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834].)

The provision empowering the board to revoke a license in case of unfair, unjust, inequitable or fraudulent practices of solicitation is neither vague nor uncertain and affords no possibility for the censorship of religious beliefs. In Agnew v. Daugherty, 189 Cal. 446, 448-449 [209 P. 34], this court upheld a similar provision in the Corporate Securities Act making the granting of a permit dependent on the commissioner’s finding that the “proposed plan of business ... is not unfair, unjust or inequitable” and that the methods to be used to dispose of securities “are. not such as, in his opinion, will work a fraud upon the purchaser thereof.” (See, also, People v. Kuder, 93 Cal.App. 42 [269 P. 198, 630]; People v. Stewart, 115 Cal.App. 681, 689 [2 P.2d 195]; Yakus v. United States, supra, pp. 426-427 and cases there cited.)

It is contended that since the trial court found that plaintiff is engaged exclusively in religious activities, the Charities and Relief Ordinance is rendered inapplicable to plaintiff’s solicitations because of its provision that it-“shall not be applicable to solicitations made solely for evangelical, missionary or religious purposes.” There is no conflict in the evidence, however, as to what plaintiff’s activities are. The issue presented is one of law, namely, whether the charitable purposes for which plaintiff solicits funds are exclusively religious purposes within the meaning of the ordinance. The trial court erroneously concluded that because plaintiff solicits funds for charitable purposes as part of its religious program its solicitations are solely for religious purposes within the meaning of the ordinance. The ordinance specifically differentiates charitable from religious purposes. No person may solicit “any contribution for any charitable purpose” without complying with the requirements of the ordinance. The ordinance does not exempt solicitations for charitable purposes undertaken by religious organizations. Solicitations for charitable purposes, namely, for “philanthropic, social service, benevolent, patriotic” purposes, are subject to regulation whether or not they are undertaken by a religious organization. The intention to maintain a sharp differentiation between charitable and religious purposes is apparent in the provision that if a solicitation for religious purposes is likely to give the public the impression that funds are sought for charity, the board shall “investigate the matter of such solicitation and give publicity to its findings thereon in such manner as it may deem best to advise the public of the facts of the case.” The solicitation of funds to provide food, shelter, and clothing for those in distress is clearly for a charitable purpose and is therefore regulated by the ordinance. Plaintiff admittedly solicits funds for the purpose of giving relief to persons in distress. Since this purpose is charitable within the meaning of the ordinance, plaintiff’s solicitations for that purpose are subject to the ordinance.

The judgment is reversed.

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Spence, J., concurred.

* “No person shall solicit, nor shall any officers or member of any association authorize any person to solicit, any contribution for any charitable purpose unless, within the fiscal year of the City in which such solicitation is made and at least within ten (10) days prior to the beginning of such solicitation, there shall have been filed with the Department, on a form furnished by said Department, by such person or association upon whose behalf the solicitation is made, written Notice of Intention to solicit such contribution, which notice shall contain complete information as follows:

“ (a) The purpose of the solicitation and use of the contribution to be solicited;

“(b) A specific statement, supported by reasons and, if available, figures, showing the need for the contribution proposed to be solicited;

“(c) The character of such solicitation and how it will be made or conducted;

“(d) The expenses of the solicitation, including salaries and other items, if any, regardless of from what funds such expenses are payable;

‘ ‘ (e) What portion of the contributions collected as a result of the solicitation will remain available for application to the specific purposes declared in the Notice of Intention as the object of the solicitation;

“(f) A specific statement of all contributions collected or received by such person or association within the calendar year immediately preceding the filing of such Notice of Intention. The expenditure or use made of such contributions, together with the names and addresses of all persons or associations receiving salaries, wages, compensation, commissions or emoluments from such contributions, and the respective amounts thereof;

‘ ‘ (g) The names and addresses of the officers and directors of any such association for which the solicitation is proposed to be-made;

' ‘ (h) A copy of the resolution, if any, of any such association authorizing such solicitation, certified to as a true and correct copy of the original of such resolution by the officer of such association having charge of the records thereof;

“ (i) A statement that the signers of such Notice have read and are familiar with the provisions of this Article and will require all solicitors engaged in such solicitation to read and be familiar with all sections of this Article prior to making any such solicitation.”

† "There shall be filed with the Department with such Notice of Intention a statement of any agreement made with any agent, solicitor, promoter, manager or conductor of such solicitation, together with a copy of each agreement which may be in writing. Within twenty-four hours after any change in any such agreement or the making of any new or further agreement, a true copy of such change or agreement, if in writing, or if not, written details thereof shall be filed with the Department. Whenever, in the opinion of the Board, the Notice, of Intention filed with the Department does not disclose sufficient information for the public concerning the facts hereinabove required to be stated in such Notice or concerning the person or association making such solicitation or on whose behalf such solicitation is made, then, upon the request of said Department, there shall be filed, in writing, within forty-eight (48) hours after such request, such additional information as may be required by said Board upon the foregoing subjects. Provided, however, that the Board, for good cause, may extend the time for filing such additional information. The Notice of Intention and such additional information, if requested, shall be signed by such person intending to make such solicitation, or if by or on any association, by at least two officers of such association and shall be open to the inspection of the public.”

* “See. 2. Said Commission shall have power:

“1. To investigate, when requested or permitted, by the officers or persons in charge thereof all charitable or philanthropic corporations or associations dependent upon public appeal or general solicitations for support, and submit quarterly, in writing, the result of such investigation to the Council.

“2. To endorse such of said charitable corporations or associations as shall apply to said Commission for endorsement and prove to the Commission that they have complied with the following provisions, namely:

‘ ‘ (a) That the title to any real property in the City of Los Angeles owned by such charitable corporation or association is vested in the name of said charity, if it be a corporation, or else in the name or names of a responsible trustee, or trustees under a declaration of trust or other written instrument, setting forth the rights of such charitable corporation or association therein, and recorded in the records of the County Recorder of Los Angeles County.

‘ ‘ (b) That the declared purpose for which such a corporation or association is organized are charitable or philanthropic, and not for the pecuniary profit of the members or associates thereof or any of them.

‘ (e) That for three months prior to its endorsement said charitable corporation or association has faithfully complied with the following provisions with reference to its accounts, namely: All funds received by it and all disbursements made by it, have been entered upon the books of its treasurer or other financial officer, receipts have been given or tendered for all money or other property donated to it, whenever required by law or ordinance; all expenditures other than petty cash to a reasonable amount have been made by checks signed by at least two officers of such corporation or association; that the bank book of such association or corporation has been balanced and reconciled with the books of account at reasonable intervals.

‘ ‘ (d) That no moneys of said corporation or association are on loan directly of indirectly to any officer, director, trustee or employee thereof, and that the corporation or association for a period of three months prior to its endorsement has not invested any moneys constituting part of its permanent endowment funds except in securities legal as investments for savings banks within the State of California., and has not paid out more than 15% of any amounts collected by solicitation within the City of Los Angeles for expenses of solicitation, and has not diverted funds donated to it from any source to .purposes other than those for which they were donated.

“Provided, however, that the provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to any loan or investment that has been made prior to the passage of this ordinance.

‘‘ (e) That the work for which such corporation or association has been organized has been faithfully performed.

‘' (f) That the by-laws and other written rules and regulations of such corporation or association define the powers and duties of the officers of such corporation or association, and that a copy of the Articles of Incorporation of said charity, if it be a corporation, and a copy of the By-Laws and other written rules and regulations of such corporation or association have been filed with the Social Service Commission.

‘ ‘ (g) That within three months prior to its endorsement such a corporation or association has not violated any law or ordinance applicable to it.

‘ ‘ (h) That the officers and employees of such corporation or association are persons of good moral character and reputation and that the corporation or association has exercised reasonable care in selecting persons of good moral character and reasonable experience as solicitors for its funds.

“Said Commission shall issue said endorsement to any such corporation or association as shall comply with the aforesaid requirements. Said endorsement shall be valid for such time as shall be fixed by the Commission but not exceeding one year from date of its issuance.

“Said Commission shall report to the Council upon request by it the name of any corporation or association which is endorsed or has been refused endorsement by it, with a general statement of the reasons for its refusal.

“Said Commission shall also have power to request any endorsed corporation or association to make application for a new endorsement at or after the end of each fiscal year or at an earlier period if the Commission shall deem such requirement advisable, and if said corporation or association shall not so do its endorsement shall be withdrawn. ’ ’