Johnson v. Greenwood Mills, Inc. , 317 S.C. 248 ( 1994 )

Per Curiam:

This is a Workers’ Compensation case. The Full Commission (Commission) dismissed the claim of Eddie Mae Johnson (Claimant) against Greenwood Mills, Inc. on the ground that it was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Circuit Court reversed. We reverse the Circuit Court and reinstate the Order of the Commission.

Claimant, a long-time employee of Greenwood Mills, Inc. (Greenwood Mills), began having skin eruptions in the late 1970’s. After consulting the company doctor, she began treatment in 1983 from a local dermatologist, Dr. Henderson, who diagnosed the condition as atopic dermatitis and treated it accordingly. By 1986, Claimant’s condition had not improved, and she was referred to the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC). She was fired from her position at Greenwood Mills.

Claimant filed a Form 50 Workers’ Compensation claim in October 1986. The October 1986 Form 50 described Claimant’s injury as follows: “I was transferred from Mill #4 to Mill #5 in the weave room. The chemicals there caused the fungas [sic] on my skin.” In January 1987, Claimant was finally diagnosed with a rare, fatal skin cancer, mycosis fungoides.

Both the Claimant and Greenwood Mills agreed to submit the Workers’ Compensation claim to the single commissioner by way of depositions. Dr. Henderson’s deposition indicated that Claimant’s condition was unrelated to her employment.

Based upon this deposition, the single commissioner found that the Claimant’s condition was not an accidental injury, that she did not suffer from an occupational disease, and that her condition was not aggravated by her employment. This Order was not appealed.

Subsequent to that proceeding, in 1988, Claimant began treatment from Dr. Schiff at MUSC! In Dr. Schiffs opinion, the Claimant’s condition is most probably directly related to chemicals she was exposed to during her many years of employment with Greenwood Mills.

Based upon Dr. Schiffs opinion, Claimant filed a second Form 50 in 1990. The 1990 Form 50 described Claimant’s injury as follows: “Direct occupational exposure to carcinogens and other toxins resulting in chronic immune system stimulation and malignant proliferation.” The Full Commission dismissed her 1990 claim as barred by res judicata. Circuit Court reversed the Commission.

“Res judicata bars a subsequent suit by the same parties on the same issues.” Sub-Zero Freezer v. R.J. Clarkson Co., 308 S.C. 188, 190, 417 S.E. (2d) 569, 571 (1992). Res judicata is shown if (1) the identities of the parties is the same as a prior litigation; (2) the subject matter is the same as the prior litigation; and (3) there was a prior adjudication of the issue by a court of competent jurisdiction. Riedman Corporation v. Greenville Steel Structures, Inc., 308 S.C. 467, 468-69, 419 S.E. (2d) 217, 218 (1992).

Commissioner Tally’s Order dated July 7, 1987, provides in pertinent part:

3. The claimant did not sustain an injury by accident or an occupational disease while employed with Greenwood Mills.

4. The claimant has sustained a condition known as mycosis fungoides, which is not related to or aggravated by her employment.

Here, the parties and subject matter are the same as in the prior litigation, and a court of competent jurisdiction issued an Order which was not appealed. Although Claimant was unaware of the causal relationship between her disease and her employment at the time of the first adjudication, the issue was nonetheless litigated.

The Form 50, Application of Employee for Benefits and Request for Hearing, does not, as Claimant argues, distinguish between accident by injury and occupational disease. Further, there is no support for Circuit Court’s holding that the 1987 Order addressed only accidental injury. The Commission’s July 1987 Order clearly states the extent of Claimant’s injury and finds neither accident by injury nor occupational disease. Accordingly, the doctrine of res judicata now bars her subsequent claim for occupational disease.

The Order of the Circuit Court is reversed and Commission’s Order is reinstated.

Reversed.

Toal and Finney, JJ., dissenting in separate opinion.