Matthews v. Bucyrus-Erie Co. , 101 Idaho 657 ( 1980 )

DONALDSON, Chief Justice.

This appeal is brought by the Department of Employment and Bucyrus-Erie Company from an order of the Industrial Commission reversing a decision of the Department of Employment and finding claimant-respondent Kenneth D. Matthews eligible for unemployment benefits.

Claimant Matthews was employed by appellant Bucyrus-Erie Company (hereinafter, B-E) from December 1975 until August 23, 1977, when his employment was terminated by the company for allegedly obtaining a leave of absence under false pretenses. During the period of his employment at B-E, Matthews was absent from work or tardy arriving for work on several occasions due to a drinking problem and received an admonition for excessive absenteeism.

In June 1977, Matthews requested a leave of absence for approximately 30 days, based on personal reasons. Matthews wanted the leave so he could attempt to alleviate his drinking problem in a situation removed from the job-related stress he felt was aggravating the problem. However, not wanting to disclose his drinking to the company management for fear it might jeopardize his employment, he based his request only on “personal reasons” and it was denied.

Thereafter, the claimant became aware of a recently-created program whereby employees with drug or alcohol problems could obtain counseling and treatment. In an interoffice memorandum to all employees, the program was explained as follows:

“The Bucyrus-Erie Pocatello Plant Management is concerned about employees who have a problem controlling their intake of alcohol. We also see a need to educate and help any employee who uses other drugs as well as alcohol. To accomplish this, Management is establishing a confidential referral service and will provide related educational materials through the Employee Assistance Program.

Alcohol and drug abuse are illnesses which can be cured. Bucyrus-Erie is not responsible for any troubled employee, but will try to refer the individual to local specialists.

The doctor or agency to whom you are referred may prescribe intensive therapy. If so, you may request, in writing a thirty (30) day leave of absence.

. ” (emphasis added)

When claimant became aware of the new program, he discussed his problem with the company doctor and nurse, who referred him to the Pocatello Alcoholic Rehabilitation Center. Matthews was the first such referral under the program.

Claimant reported to the Center where he was seen by Miss Lynn Evans, a counselor. She testified that when she saw claimant, she felt it w.as necessary for him to obtain some sort of 'treatment, and they agreed he should attend the 28-day inpatient program at a facility in Gooding, Idaho. Claimant required a few days to collect his affairs before leaving, and was to contact Miss Evans again in a day or two. Miss Evans then filled out a “REPORT OF TREATMENT FACILITY” form as follows:

“Treatment Recommended: I feel that Ken Matthews should receive in-patient treatment at that Center in Gooding, Idaho and that a 30 day Medical leave is appropriate beginning . . . . Estimated length of treatment time: 28-35 days. Will employee accept treatment? Yes. Recommendation for Follow-up and by Whom: Counseling with Alcoholic Rehabilitation Center.”

At the bottom of the form was the statement “The above information may be submitted to my employer,” immediately beneath which claimant placed his signature.

Claimant returned the “REPORT OF TREATMENT FACILITY” form to the company medical department and filled out and signed a “REQUEST FOR LEAVE OF ABSENCE” form, citing as the reason for the request, “Medical; alcohol [sic] rehabilitation.” The request was approved and the company made arrangements for another employee to perform claimant’s duties during his absence.

Claimant thereafter contacted Miss Evans at the Rehabilitation Center and told her he had a fear of hospitals and needed a few more days to think about it. Claimant testified that instead of again contacting Miss Evans or entering the Center at Gooding, he “panicked” and “just started driving” with a friend in his car. They traveled to Alaska, returning a few days before the expiration of claimant’s 30-day leave of absence. Claimant returned to work, and continued for about two weeks. At that time it first came to the attention of company management that claimant had not undergone treatment at the Gooding facility and he was terminated for allegedly obtaining a leave of absence under false pretenses.

Claimant filed a claim with the Department of Employment for unemployment benefits. The department denied the claim, finding claimant ineligible for benefits because his unemployment was the result of a discharge for employee misconduct. Claimant then filed a Request for Redetermination which was granted, affirming the initial determination of ineligibility. Appeal was then taken to the Department of Employment Appeals Examiner, who again affirmed the denial of benefits. Claimant then appealed to the Industrial Commission, which reversed the finding of misconduct and held claimant eligible for unemployment benefits. Employer B-E and the Department of Employment now appeal from the decision of the Industrial Commission.

The ultimate conclusion of the Industrial Commission was

“[Claimant’s] actions arose out of his panic at the thought of entering a hospital. The result of this panic was his attempt to deal with his alcohol problem in his own way. This shows that the claimant did not willfully, intentionally, or deliberately disregard . . the standards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of his employees. He was therefore not guilty of misconduct as defined by the Supreme Court.” (emphasis added)

In ruling that claimant was not guilty of misconduct because he did not “willfully, intentionally or deliberately” disregard the standards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of his employees, the referee for the Industrial Commission misapplied the definition of misconduct laid down in Johns v. S. H. Kress & Co., 78 Idaho 544, 307 P.2d 217 (1957):

“While the term ‘discharged for misconduct’ as used in Sec. 72-1366(f), I.C. [now I.C. § 72-1366(e)] has been variously defined, we think the term should be interpreted as meaning willful, intentional disregard of the employer’s interest; a deliberate violation of the employer’s rules; or a disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of his employees.” 78 Idaho at 548, 307 P.2d at 219. (emphasis added)

This definition was recently reaffirmed as the law in Idaho in Jenkins v. Agri-Lines Corp., 100 Idaho 549, 602 P.2d 47 (1979).¹ There is no requirement in the Johns definition of misconduct that the claimant’s disregard of standards of behavior must be found to have been subjectively willful, intentional or deliberate. Rather, the test for misconduct in standard-of-behavior cases is (1) whether the employee’s conduct fell below the standard of behavior expected by the employer; and (2) whether the employer’s expectation was objectively reasonable in the particular case. The employee’s subjective state of mind is irrelevant.

Because the Industrial Commission erroneously interpreted the definition of misconduct as requiring a subjectively willful, intentional or deliberate disregard of the standards of behavior which appellant B-E had a right to expect of its employees, the decision of the Industrial Commission is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance herewith. Costs to appellant.

SHEPARD and BAKES, JJ., concur.

1 . In Jenkins, Justice Bistline opined in dissent that the misconduct issue in Johns, presented a mixed question of law and fact, and therefore the decision of the Industrial Commission could not be reversed on appeal if supported by competent and substantial evidence. Such is not the case here, as the question whether the Industrial Commission correctly interpreted our decision in Johns is purely a question of law.