Anderson v. City of Seattle , 78 Wash. 2d 201 ( 1970 )

Finley, J.

(concurring) — I agree with the result reached by the majority opinion. However, I am very dubious and must express serious misgivings regarding the breadth or scope of the statement of the majority that “[cjourts are not at liberty to speculate on legislative intent when the legislature itself has subsequently placed its own construction on prior enactments.” This, I strongly suggest, is an overstatement of a complex aspect of judicial-legislative interrelationships. An authentic interpretation by a subsequent session of the legislature is entitled to great weight. But subsequent legislative interpretation, like the initial legislation itself, normally may be given authoritative effect only prospectively. See J. Sutherland, 2 Statutory Construction § 3004 (3d ed. 1943). Traditionally and fundamentally the interpretation of the initial legislation remains a judicial function. In seeking the intent of the legislature, the judicial branch of government must ultimately be guided by the language used by those members of the legislature who passed the measure and not by an expression by a session, of different composition, which addressed the same subject 9 years later. See E. Freund, Legislative Regulation 178 (1932).

Determination of the meaning and legal effect of statutes enacted by the legislature, in an ultimate sense, is recognized traditionally as the function of the judicial branch. After the fact, legislative authentication relative to previous enactments is, in my judgment, extremely dubious.

Hunter, C. J., concurs with Finley, J.