Housing Authority of Sunnyside v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation District , 112 Wash. 2d 262 ( 1989 )

Durham, J.

The Housing Authority of Sunnyside, Washington (SHA) contends that RCW 35.82.210 exempts it from having to pay special assessments levied by its local irrigation district. We conclude, however, that the Legislature could not have so intended in these circumstances.

SHA first purchased property within the boundaries of the Sunnyside Valley Irrigation District (SVID) in 1974. SHA currently owns 12 parcels of property within the district, which carry appurtenant water rights that were created by contracts between the previous owners of SHA's properties and SVID's predecessors in interest. Under these contracts, SVID is obligated to maintain and operate the Sunnyside Canal and other water delivery works in order to provide water to landowners within the district, and SHA is obligated to pay special assessments levied to support the irrigation system.

Until 1984, SHA paid irrigation assessments on these parcels of land, even though it did not use water from that source.¹ The assessments totaled approximately $100 in 1974 and increased each year through 1984 when they amounted to approximately $500. The total assessments paid between 1974 and 1984 were over $2,500.

SHA initially refused to pay the 1984 assessments, basing its refusal on RCW 35.82.210, which exempts housing authorities from having to pay special assessments to political subdivisions of the state. When SVID commenced foreclosure proceedings, SHA paid the 1984 assessments under protest and filed the instant suit.

SHA's complaint sought a determination that its property was not subject to assessment and asked for reimbursement of the assessments it had paid to SVID since 1974. The trial court concluded that RCW 35.82.210 exempted SHA from the assessment obligation and granted summary judgment to SHA. The Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment, holding, in addition, that the statutory exemption for housing authority property did not unconstitutionally impair contracts and did not constitute a "taking" without compensation. Housing Auth. v. Sunnyside Vly. Irrig. Dist., 51 Wn. App. 387, 753 P.2d 1005 (1988). We granted review.

RCW 35.82.210 exempts housing authorities from special assessments that are imposed by political subdivisions of the state:

The property of an authority is declared to be public property used for essential public and governmental purposes and such property and an authority shall be exempt from all taxes and special assessments of the city, the county, the state or any political subdivision thereof: Provided, however, That in lieu of such taxes an authority may agree to make payments to the city or the county or any such political subdivision for improvements, services and facilities furnished by such city, county or political subdivision for the benefit of a housing project, but in no event shall such payments exceed the amount last levied as the annual tax of such city, county or political subdivision upon the property included in said project prior to the time of its acquisition by the authority.

(Italics ours.) RCW 35.82.210.²

The key terms of this provision are all met in the instant case. SHA is "an authority". See RCW 35.82.020(1), .030. Neither party challenges the Court of Appeals conclusion that an irrigation assessment is a "special assessment". See Sunnyside, at 389-90. Finally, under the following analysis, SVID qualifies as a "political subdivision" of the state: irrigation districts qualify as municipal corporations, at least in the broad sense of the term, see Haberman v. WPPSS, 109 Wn.2d 107, 170-71, 744 P.2d 1032, 750 P.2d 254 (1987); Roza Irrig. Dist. v. State, 80 Wn.2d 633, 637-40, 497 P.2d 166 (1972), and municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state. King Cy. Water Dist. 54 v. King Cy. Boundary Review Bd., 87 Wn.2d 536, 540, 554 P.2d 1060 (1976); Board Against Discrimination v. Board of Directors, 68 Wn.2d 262, 269, 412 P.2d 769 (1966). Accordingly, there is little doubt that RCW 35.82.210, standing by itself, would exempt SHA from its obligations to pay assessments to SVID.

SVID argues, however, that our analysis must also take into consideration Washington's statutes concerning the operation of irrigation districts. Generally, RCW 87.03 empowers irrigation districts to assess the lands within their boundaries in order to pay the district's bond and contractual obligations and to pay for the district's maintenance and upkeep. RCW 87.03.215, 87.03.240, 87.03.260. Under RCW 87.03.215, the duty of assessment attaches to all property within the district unless that property is "excluded" from a district by virtue of certain statutory procedures. RCW 87.03.645-.695.³ Under these procedures, a petition seeking exclusion must be submitted to the district's board of directors and a hearing must be held. RCW 87.03.660. If the district has bonds outstanding or has contractual obligations to a federal agency or the state, then the land cannot be excluded without the assent of these other entities. RCW 87.03.670. Additionally, if any person interested in the district files a written objection showing cause why the land should not be excluded, then the land cannot be excluded unless an election is held and a majority of the votes cast by the district's property owners favor the exclusion. RCW 87.03.675, 87.03.680.⁴

SVID contends that the exemption for housing authorities conflicts with the procedures discussed above for excluding land from an irrigation district. According to SVID, an exemption in this case would have the same effect as excluding the land from the district, yet the statutory procedures for doing so were not followed.

A court should attempt "to reconcile apparently conflicting statutes ... if this can be achieved without distortion of the language used." Tommy P. v. Board of Cy. Comm'rs, 97 Wn.2d 385, 391-92, 645 P.2d 697 (1982). SHA argues that these statutes can be reconciled because an exemption is different from an exclusion, in that the exemption lasts only as long as SHA uses the land for public purposes, while an exclusion is a permanent action. Therefore, under SHA's theory, the exclusion statutes are not triggered by the exemption for housing authorities, and the statutes do not conflict. This argument, however, was rejected for the most part in State ex rel. Clancy v. Columbia Irrig. Dist., 121 Wash. 79, 88, 208 P. 27 (1922), where this court stated that granting exemptions from irrigation assessment obligations would in effect nullify the provisions of the exclusion statutes. Moreover, although SHA characterizes its exemption as "temporary", lasting only so long as it uses the properties for public housing, the exemption is of a more permanent nature in that SHA has built public housing on these properties. Under these facts, the housing statute cannot be reconciled with the exclusion statutes.

Whenever two statutes irreconcilably conflict, a court must determine which statute the Legislature intended to prevail. See Rose v. Erickson, 106 Wn.2d 420, 424, 721 P.2d 969 (1986). As has been stated in a related context, the ultimate goal in construing ambiguous statutes is to give effect to the Legislature's intent. See Seven Gables Corp. v. MGM/UA Entertainment Co., 106 Wn.2d 1, 6, 721 P.2d 1 (1986).

The Court of Appeals resolved this issue by relying on the rule of statutory interpretation that the Legislature usually intends a specific statute to prevail over a more general statute, especially where the specific statute is more recently adopted. Sunny side, at 391-92 (citing Muije v. Department of Social & Health Servs., 97 Wn.2d 451, 453, 645 P.2d 1086 (1982)). We do not agree that the specific/ general rule of statutory interpretation applies in this case. The housing statute is more specific than the exclusion statutes in the sense that its provisions relate only to the property of housing authorities, while the exclusion statutes apply to all property in the district. However, the exclusion statutes are more specific in the sense that they apply only in the context of irrigation districts, while the housing statute applies to all assessments and taxes imposed by any number of local and statewide governmental and quasi-governmental bodies. Thus, we cannot say that either is necessarily more specific than the other.

Our attempt to discern legislative intent takes a different approach based upon a careful reading of the statutes themselves. We find it difficult to believe that the Legislature would have intended the housing statute to be applied at the expense of the protections so meticulously provided for in the exclusion statutes. The exclusion statutes state that land cannot be excluded without the approval of the holders of outstanding bonds issued by the district. RCW 87.03.670. The statutes extend similar veto powers to the governments of the state of Washington and the United States if the governments have contracts with the district. RCW 87.03.670.

Moreover, the exclusion statutes also extend protections to those who would hear the burden of paying the assessments that would otherwise have been charged against the excluded land: the other property owners in the district. See State ex rel. Clancy v. Columbia Irrig. Dist., supra at 84-87. If any property owner objects in writing and shows cause why a proposed exclusion should be denied, then the statutes provide only one way in which the land can be excluded: an election must be held and a majority of the votes cast by the district's property owners must approve the exclusion. RCW 87.03.675-.680.

These protections are as important as they are detailed. The financing of irrigation districts, so vital to the agricultural economy of the eastern portions of our state, could be greatly upset by a gradual whittling away of its real property base. Given the nature of these interests, we conclude that the Legislature could not have intended that the housing statute be given priority over the exclusion statutes. No doubt the Legislature also considered the purpose behind the housing statute to be important. See RCW 35.82.010. Nevertheless, this interest is protected in that the housing exemption should be applicable in contexts other than irrigation assessments.⁵

In view of our holding, we need not reach SVID's arguments that giving effect to the housing statute would unconstitutionally impair contracts and constitute a "taking" without compensation.

The trial court's summary judgment in favor of SHA is reversed.

Callow, C.J., and Utter, Brachtenbach, Dolliver, Pearson, Andersen, and Smith, JJ., concur.

1 Property in an irrigation district is subject to assessment even though the property owner does not use the district's water, as long as the land is irrigable and the water is available for its use. Otis Orchards Co. v. Otis Orchards Irrig. Dist. 1, 124 Wash. 510, 215 P. 23 (1923).

2 Because SHA obtains its water from its own sources rather than SVID's, the proviso in this statute is inapplicable.

3 RCW 87.03 creates other exceptions, as well, but none that are relevant to the present case. See, e.g., RCW 87.03.242 (exempting agricultural lands from special benefit assessments); RCW 87.03.750-.770 (excluding nonirrigable land when the State holds all outstanding bonds).

4 Although the statutes are phrased that the board "may" order an election if it receives a written objection, see RCW 87.03.675, the statutes do not provide any other manner in which the board may exclude the land than by holding the election described above.

5 We emphasize that the holding in this case is limited to the statutes currently at issue. As indicated above, we are aware of no reason why RCW 35.82.210 should not be applied in other contexts. Additionally, the irrigation statutes do not necessarily preclude the operation of other exemptions. For example, RCW 84.34.300-.380 create an exemption for farm and agricultural land from special benefit assessments. The irrigation statutes explicitly refer to this exemption, see RCW 87.03.242, implying strongly that the Legislature specifically intended this exemption to apply to irrigation assessments and to supersede the exclusion provisions. Of course, we have no similar indication of legislative intent in the present case.