Titelman v. Stedman , 277 Ga. 460 ( 2003 )

Carley, Justice.

After Ms. Wendy J. Titelman lost custody of her two daughters to their father, she and others presented to the Juvenile Court of Cobb County for filing a petition for adjudication of deprivation. Appellants subsequently filed a petition for mandamus in superior court, alleging that Judge Juanita Stedman (Appellee) refused to allow filing of the deprivation petition or to sign any order or provide any other written documentation of the denial of filing. The superior court dismissed the petition for mandamus, finding that such relief was not appropriate. Appellants appeal from this order.

Under the Civil Practice Act (CPA), “[e]xcept when otherwise specifically provided by statute, all judgments shall be signed by the judge and filed with the clerk.” OCGA § 9-11-58 (a). This portion of the statute was adopted verbatim in Uniform Juvenile Court Rule 17.1. See English v. Milby, 233 Ga. 7, 9-10 (1) (209 SE2d 603) (1974) (sections of the CPA may be adopted for the juvenile courts). Very similar language is also found in the Appellate Practice Act (APA): “The filing with the clerk of a judgment, signed by the judge, constitutes the entry of a judgment within the meaning of” the APA. OCGA § 5-6-31. Under the case law, “[i]t is best to think of three requirements. The adjudication must be reduced to (1) writing, then (2) signed by the judge and finally, (3) filed with the clerk of the court.” Gregory, Ga. Civil Practice § 7-4, p. 574 (2d ed. 1997). “ ‘ “What the judge orally declares is no judgment until it has been put in writing and entered as such.” ’ [Cit.]” State v. Sullivan, 237 Ga. App. 677, 678 (516 SE2d 539) (1999) (involving “[t]he oral declaration of [a] juvenile judge”).

Furthermore, “[t]he filing with the clerk of a judgment, signed by the judge, constitutes the entry of the judgment, and, unless the court otherwise directs, no judgment shall be effective for any purpose until the entry of the same. . . .” OCGA § 9-11-58 (b). See also Uniform Juvenile Court Rule 17.1. “ ‘ “[U]ntil an order is signed by the judge (and is filed) it is ineffective for any purpose.” (Cit.)’ [Cit.]” State v. Sullivan, supra at 678. Therefore, this Court has held that, under the CPA, “[t]here can be no appeal from an oral announcement that a judgment will be rendered, since no judgment is effective until it is signed by the judge and filed with the clerk. [Cit.]” Crowell v. State, 234 Ga. 313 (215 SE2d 685) (1975). This rule is also compelled by force of the APA:

Under [that] Act the well established rule that “what the judge orally declares is no judgment until it has been put in writing and entered as such,” is still of force, and both a written judgment and its entry by filing the writing with the clerk are essential prerequisites to an appeal. [Cits.]

Boynton v. Reeves, 226 Ga. 202, 203 (173 SE2d 702) (1970). Accordingly, “ ‘(i)t is elementary that an oral order is not final nor appealable until and unless it is reduced to writing, signed by the judge, and filed with the clerk.’ [Cits.]” (Emphasis supplied.) Smith v. State, 242 Ga. App. 459 (530 SE2d 223) (2000). Continued adherence to this rule is supported and mandated not only by statutes and cases, but by the rationale underlying it: “ ‘ “In the absence of a judgment in writing no question for decision is presented to the appellate court. (Cits.)”’ [Cit.]”Bishop v. State, 176 Ga. App. 357, 358 (335 SE2d 742) (1985). See also Seabolt v. Seabolt, 220 Ga. 181 (1) (137 SE2d 642) (1964). That rationale applies equally whether a trial court precludes further legal proceedings by ruling on the merits of a proceeding filed in that court or by denying the filing of a petition or other pleading.

OCGA § 9-11-58 (a) and Uniform Juvenile Court Rule 17.1 mandate that the trial judge, in the absence of an explicit statutory exception, sign “all judgments. . . .” Indeed, in an appeal purportedly from an oral ruling, this Court remanded the case and required the trial court to enter a written judgment, without prejudice to the right to file a subsequent appeal. Crowell v. State, supra. Thus, trial courts have a clear legal duty to enter all of their judgments, including those which deny the filing of an initial pleading.

Because the trial court’s entry of a written order denying filing is an appealable judicial act, mandamus is not an available means of reviewing the propriety of that ruling. Barber Fertilizer Co. v. Chason, 265 Ga. 497 (458 SE2d 631) (1995). See also Grier v. Peed, 276 Ga. 521, 522 (578 SE2d 861) (2003); Smith & Wesson Corp. v. City of Atlanta, 273 Ga. 431, 433-434 (1) (543 SE2d 16) (2001). However, mandamus is an available remedy for a trial court’s failure to carry out an administrative act, “when ‘the law has prescribed and defined the duty to be performed with such precision and certainty as to leave no room for the exercise of judgment or discretion.’ [Cit.]” Henderson v. McVay, 269 Ga. 7-8 (1) (494 SE2d 653) (1998). OCGA § 9-11-58 (a), Uniform Juvenile Court Rule 17.1, and applicable case law do not leave a trial court any room to exercise its discretion by orally announcing a judgment, but declining to enter it. Furthermore, where a trial judge refuses to permit the filing of a petition and fails to perform her clear legal duty to enter a written order, an appeal is not possible. In that circumstance, therefore, mandamus is appropriate, not to review the propriety of the denial of filing, but to compel the trial court to enter a written order from which an appeal can be taken. Compare Grier v. Peed, supra at 521.

In their petition for mandamus, Appellants did not only assert that the denial of filing of the deprivation petition was erroneous. They also complained of Appellee’s refusal to sign any order or to provide any other written documentation of the denial of filing, and prayed that a writ of mandamus be issued ordering her to dispose of the deprivation petition according to law and to grant all other proper relief. Under these allegations, relief is available to Appellants in the form of an order that requires Appellee either (1) to sign and file with the clerk a written order denying filing of the deprivation petition, or (2) to permit the petition to be filed and proceed according to law. Therefore, the superior court erred in dismissing the petition for mandamus.

Judgment reversed.

Sears, P. J., Thompson, J., and Chief Judge Hugh W. Stone and Judge Bensonetta Tipton Lane, concur. Fletcher, C. J., and Benham, J., dissent. Hunstein, J., disqualified. Hines, J., not participating.