Swartz v. World Publishing Co. , 57 Wash. 2d 213 ( 1960 )

Hill, J.

The issue presented on this appeal is whether a certain news story is capable of a defamatory meaning. Plaintiff alleged a libel from the defendant’s publication of the following article:

“Moses Lake — Donald Swartz, 30, Moses Lake, electrician, was arrested at 2:20 a.m. Saturday by Sgt Kelly Rogers and Officer Dave Penn of the Moses Lake police on a drunk and disorderly charge.

“Sgt Kelly says investigation of the incident brought about the signing of a complaint by a 62-year-old Moses Lake woman charging Swartz with third degree assault and attempted robbery. Police say there have been four reports in recent weeks of attempted assault and robbery of elderly women in Moses Lake.

“Swartz was released after posting $1000 bond.”

Each statement in the news story, taken separately, is now conceded to be true.

In the complaint (paragraph IV) it was charged,

“That said publication was false and defamatory in the following respect:

“1. That in fact the plaintiff Donald Swartz was never at any time charged with attempted robbery.

“2. That the statement in said publication to the effect that there have been four reports in recent weeks of attempted assault and robbery of elderly women in Moses Lake, infers and imputes these assaults and robberies to the plaintiff Donald Swartz and that said inference and imputation is false and malicious.”

No special damages were asked, but general damages in the sum of fifty thousand dollars were alleged.

It was stipulated at the beginning of the trial that the allegation in (1), supra, might be stricken from the complaint, it being conceded that the plaintiff had been charged with attempted robbery.

The trial court concluded, when that allegation was stricken, the complaint did not state a cause of action, and entered an order of dismissal. The plaintiff appeals.

The applicable rule, as it appears in the Restatement of Torts, was recently quoted in Purvis v. Bremer’s, Inc. (1959), 54 Wn. (2d) 743, 344 P. (2d) 705,

“‘(1) The court determines whether a communication is capable of a defamatory meaning.

“ ‘ (2) The jury determines whether a communication, capable of a defamatory meaning, was so understood by its recipient.’ ” 3 Restatement, Torts, 304, § 614.

See, also, MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co. (1959), 52 Cal. (2d) 536, 546, 343 P. (2d) 36.

No reasonable person, reading the news story in the Wenatchee Daily World, could conclude therefrom that the defendant was imputing the reported attempted assaults on and robberies of elderly women to the plaintiff. This clearly comes within the category of cases where the communication is not capable of a defamatory meaning; and the trial court properly dismissed the action. See Blende v. Hearst Publications (1939), 200 Wash. 426, 93 P. (2d) 733; McClure v. Review Publishing Co. (1905), 38 Wash. 160, 80 Pac. 303.

Judgment of dismissal affirmed.

Weaver, C. J., Mallery, Ott, Foster, and Hunter, JJ., concur.