Mitchell v. Wright ( 1946 )

HOLMES, Circuit Judge.

This is an action by appellant, suing in behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. It was brought against appellees for their refusal, solely on the ground of his race or color, to register him. He prayed for a declaratory judgment, a permanent injunction, and damages in the sum of five thousand dollars. On motion of the defendants, the court below dismissed the complaint in its entirety on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedy in the state courts of Alabama.

The motion to dismiss, as a matter of law, admitted all of the well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint. From these facts it appears in substance as follows: The plaintiff is a Negro over the age of twenty-one years; he resides in Macon County, Alabama; he is a citizen of that state and of the United States; he pays taxes on real property with an assessed valuation of over three hundred dollars; is able to read and write any provision in the federal Constitution; is not an idiot or an insane person; has never been convicted of a felony or other crime, and was on July 5, 1945, possessed of all of the qualifications and none of the disqualifications of registered voters in Alabama.

He executed and filed the written form furnished by the registrars to applicants for registration; as filled out by him, his application showed that he was qualified to register and vote, but the defendants refused to register him and others, when they applied for registration on the date aforesaid, solely on the ground of their race or color. This refusal was pursuant to the policy, custom, and usage of the defendants, acting under color of state authority, to deprive Negroes of the right to vote in Alabama. Since registration is a prerequisite to the right to vote in any election in Alabama, including the election, of federal officers, the action of the registrars did effectively deprive appellant of the right to vote.

The jurisdiction of the court below was invoked pursuant to several applicable statutes ¹ and constitutional provisions.² Pertinent authorities uphold appellant’s contention that the court below had jurisdiction to grant relief in this case,³ but we are urged to affirm the judgment under review on the ground that appellant’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedy in the state courts of Alabama ousted the jurisdiction of the federal court.

It is true that, under the laws of Alabama, any person denied registration has the right to appeal to the proper circuit court of the state, thence to the Supreme Court;⁴ but the remedy so provided is not deemed by us to be purely of an administrative nature; it is of the type of proceeding traditionally considered judicial. The aggrieved party may go into the state circuit court, which is a judicial court of general jurisdiction of law and equity, or into a court of like jurisdiction. A trial by jury is provided, and the court is required to charge the jury as to the qualifications of voters. The weight and effect of the evidence are for the determination of the jury. The reviewing court may enter final judgment, which shall entitle the petitioner to register as of the date of his application, but neither the circuit court nor the Supreme Court possesses the power to substitute its order for that of the registrars.⁵

The Alabama circuit court has no power to register the applicant, though when its jurisdiction is invoked it may find as a fact, and adjudicate as the law, that he is entitled to registration, and though it may issue an extraordinary writ commanding the registrar particularly to obey the law and to perform the specific ministerial act of registration. These things, and the use of juries, are quintessentially judicial; they are the indicia of a judicial court, not of an administrative board or office; the final judgment of such a court is res judicata. What was said in Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 59 S.Ct. 872, 83 L.Ed. 1281, with reference to the Oklahoma state procedure having all the indicia of a conventional judicial proceeding, applies to the Alabama remedy that is afforded to aggrieved applicants for registration; and we hold that appellant was authorized to institute this action without appealing to the state circuit court or any court of like jurisdiction.

We are also urged to affirm this judgment because the complaint averred only inferentially that the plaintiff was qualified to register, and did not allege that he had resided in the state at least two years, in the county one year, and in the precinct or ward three months immediately preceding the election at which he offered to vote. This would dispose of the case on a technicality of pleading, though the new rules "provide that all pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice.⁶ The court below did not put its decision on this ground.⁷ If it had, the plaintiff might have amended his complaint so as to obviate the point; and his attorneys now ask leave to amend if this cause is remanded for trial, which leave is required to be freely given when justice so requires.⁸

If the office of pleading is to inform the court and the parties of the facts in issue; the court, that it may declare the law; and the parties, that they may know what to meet by their proof:⁹ we think the wrong and injury for which redress is here sought sufficiently appear from the pleading.¹⁰ As in Lane v. Wilson, supra, the basis of this action is inequality of treatment under color of law. The fact that the law is fair upon its face is not a defense if it is administered in a discriminatory manner.¹¹

The judgment appealed from is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

1 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 31 and 43; 28 U.S.C.A. §41 (11) and (14).

2 Sections 2 and 4 of Article 1 and the 14th, 15th, and 17th Amendments to the Constitution ot the United States.

3 Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 35 S.Ct. 926, 59 L.Ed. 1340, L.R.A.1916A, 1124; Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 47 S.Ct. 446, 71 L.Ed. 759; Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 52 S.Ct. 484, 76 L.Ed. 984, 88 A.L.R. 458; Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 59 S.Ct. 872, 83 L.Ed. 1281; Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 64 S.Ct. 757, 88 L.Ed. 987, 151 A.L.R. 1110; Berry v. Davis, 8 Cir., 15 F.2d 488.

4 Section 35, Title 17, of the Alabama Code of 1940.

5 Cf. Bacon v. Rutland R. Co., 232 U.S. 134, 34 S.Ct. 283, 58 L.Ed. 538, where the court could affirm or reverse and remand, and the review was held judicial. Also compare Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210, 29 S.Ct. 67, 53 L.Ed. 150, where the court, if it reversed, was io substitute such order as in its opinion the commission should have made, and tho review was held legislative. See also City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Schnader, 291 U.S. 24, 54 S.Ct. 259, 78 L.Ed. 628, where the review was held to be judicial because the court could determine liability for the tax as well as all questions of valuation.

6 Rule 8(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c.

7 Mitchell v. Wright, D.C., 62 F.Supp. 580.

8 Rule 15(a) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

9 Hill v. Mendenhall, 21 Wall. 453, 88 U.S. 453, 22 L.Ed. 616.

10 Paragraphs 3, 6, 10, and 11 of the complaint are as follows:

“3. All parties to this action, both plaintiff and defendants are citizens of the United States and of the State of Alabama, and are residents and domiciled in said State.

“6. Plaintiff, William P. Mitchell, is colored, a person of African descent and Negro blood, is over the age of twenty-one years. He is a taxpayer of the State of Alabama, and pays tax on real property with an assessed valuation in excess of Three Hundred Dollars. Plaintiff alleges that he is able to read and write any passage of the United States Constitution, that he has never been adjudged guilty of felony or any crime and that he is not an idiot or insane. Plaintiff further alleges that by reason of the allegation herein above made, he was in all particulars on the 5th day of July, 1945, and still is possessed of the qualifications of an elector and as such was and is entitled to be registered as such elector.

“10. That on or about the 5th day of July, 1945, during the regular registration period while defendants, Mrs. George C. Wright and Virgil M. Guthrie, were acting as registrars of voters under the laws of Alabama in conducting the registration of persons qualified to register, plaintiff made application at the Macon County Court House, the place for registration of persons qualified to register, he filled out the regular form for registration, he produced two persons to vouch for him, as required by the board, he correctly answered such questions as were asked in proof of his qualifications, and was ready, willing and able to give any further information and evidence necessary to entitle him to be registered; that by reason of the said fact herein-before made, plaintiff was entitled to be registered as a voter. Plaintiff applied for registration in order to bo eligible to vote in future federal as well as state elections.

“11. Plaintiff further shows that during such registration period and on or about the 5th day of July, 1945, white persons presenting themselves for registration were not required to present persons to vouch for them, but were registered forthwith, whereas your petitioner solely because of his race and color was required to wait long hours before being permitted to file his application, was required to present persons to vouch for him, after which the said defendants denied plaintiff application and wrongfully refused and illegally failed to register plaintiff on said July 5, 1945, solely on account of his race, color and previous condition of servitude. Plaintiff further states that it has become the general habitual and systematic practice of said Board of Registrars, including these defendants, Mrs. George O. Wright and Virgil M. Guthrie, and their predecessors in office to refuse to register Negro residents of Macon County, including the plaintiff, William P. Mitchell.”

11 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220.