-
SIBLEY, Circuit Judge (dissenting).
The judgment about to be entered, in my opinion, misconstrues and misapplies the Fair Labor Standards Act, and visits on the appellants most unjustly a heavy pecuniary penalty; and if followed in other cases and by other courts will cause great confusion in the iron and coal mining industries at a time when the country can least afford confusion.
The Act does not define “work time” or even “work”. It may apply to each and every industry. What would be work in one industry may not be in another. It seems to me that a man is at work, for the purposes of the Act, when he is doing what he is hired to do. It may involve mental or physical effort, or it may consist in simple presence. It all depends on the contract of hiring. The Act did not intend to upset and nullify the wage contracts of force in the various industries. It simply fixed minimum wages for work done under them, and maximum hours. Of course contracts yield to the Act on these points, but they still control as to the work to be done, and the way it is to be done, and as to the scale of pay if not less than the minimum fixed by the Act. These things are left to bargaining, and especially to collective bargaining under the principles of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq.
No question is older in such bargaining than the question whether “travel time” is to be included in “work time”. The worker has always thought he ought not to lose all of the time necessary to go to and from his place of work; the employer has thought he ought not to pay for time that produces no work results. The dispute has been resolved in various ways in employment contracts for pay estimated by the hour. Plumbers demand and get pay from the time they leave their place of business to go to a job until they return. Railroad trainmen get pay from the time they report for duty, no matter what delay may occur in the starting of the train. Railway track-men also are paid from the hour of their assembly at the section point, though they may ride their motor car for miles before doing any track work. On the other hand carpenters, masons, and most artisans and laborers are paid for work only after they take up their tools on the job. As to coal and iron ore miners, traditionally they have been paid according to production, but their modern contracts have always included an express agreement as to their work time, and that agreement has excluded from work time the travel time in reaching the coal seam or ore bed, which were agreed to be the place of work. This is true of the
*324 collective bargains made by strong unions throughout the Appalachian region, as it is true of the bargains under which the miners in this case have worked.1 Their work time is agreed to be that spent at the ore bed. The employers’ arrangement to get them to that place reliably and safely is primarily for the benefit of the miner and is not work for the employer, according to these agreements. The discomforts and dangers of the trip, as well as the loss of time, are all considered in fixing the rate of pay for the work of extracting the ore, and the pay scales here involved are far above the minimum fixed by the Act. The miner’s work is hard and dangerous, but his pay is supposed to compensate for all this. If it would be better to include travel time in work time, it ought to be done by a new bargain in which rates of pay are also reviewed. If the change is to be by a special statute (some western States have such statutes), it will operate justly in futuro, and not by unexpected penalty, as here.There is nothing in the Act to outlaw agreements that travel time in getting to or from the agreed place of work is not work time. This is true though the employer may organize a means of transportation and make rules for its use. The agreements here that work time includes only time at the face of the ore bed are not illegal. Digging out the ore is what the miners agree to do-, and for that they are paid. Getting their tools together and riding or walking to the agreed place of work is not, by force of any law, work done for the mine owner. No one, I suppose, would say that if a group of miners who had spent an hour riding to work decided of their own will not to dig any ore and spent another hour riding back, they had done any work for which they should be paid by force of the Act.
Though these miners are paid according to their production of ore, they may not under the Act be employed, that is, “suffered or permitted to work”, longer than the maximum hours per week without increased pay. These mines provide against that by fixing the hours at which they admit the miners and require them to leave, and especially by limiting the hours during which power is furnished for their drills. Section 7 of the Act has not been violated in this case unless the travel time is counted as work time, contrary to the contracts of employment and contrary to the expectations of those concerned for the past four years. Identical provisions in the employment contracts of the coal miners were decided by the Administrator to be good under the Act, and his conclusion was published, and thought applicable to the contracts here involved, until recently another position was taken as to iron mines.
It is now proposed to assess against these appellants as back pay for overtime an estimated quarter of a million dollars, to be doubled by way of penalty, to compensate the miners for their time in going to and from their place of work, in the face of their agreements that this time was not in their work time. They are to get three times as much per hour for riding and walking to and from the work they were
*325 hired to do, as they get for doing the work itself. The injustice of it to me is shocking.If the decision stands and is followed, chaotic conditions will ensue, and this is good ground to believe that Congress intended no such thing. If for travel time triple back pay is due by these mines, it is due by all the iron mines having similar wage agreements. Many will go broke, or have to cease operations, causing a loss of jobs to their men. The new mines are not deep, and travel time is negligible, but one of the mines here involved is old and extensive, and the travel time is about one and a half hours per day. This is nearly a quarter of the present work day of seven hours. If that time is to be unproductive, but as costly as the production time, this mine can hardly survive. The wage scales for each mine everywhere will have to be renegotiated to adjust business for the future to the new conditions, with the risk of discontents and strikes.
The decision will have to be applied also to the coal mines. Coal and iron ore occur in similar beds, and are mined in the same general way. In both, the old mines have the same difficulties. The collective agreements made by strong unions throughout the Appalachian country all contain the provision as to worktime we are now dealing with. When the Administrator first proposed to contend for what this court is about to do, it was the unions who objected most cogently, and successfully. The letter of the Legal Director of United Mine Workers of America
2 to the Administrator which appears in this record is a very strong argument against the invalidating of the agreements. That argument prevailed then. It ought to prevail now, for it applies as exactly to the iron ore workers as it did to the coal miners. The chaos predicted for the latter will come to both if the Act is so interpreted as to invalidate all these agreements.On Sept. IS, 1933, the President approved a code for the Bituminous Coal Industry under the National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 Stat. 195, which provided: “Seven hours of labor shall constitute a day’s work and this means seven hours of work at the usual working places for all classes of labor exclusive of the lunch period, whether they be paid on the day, or the tonnage, or other piece work basis.”
The Appalachian agreement, which was and is the basis of the Union contracts with the eastern coal mines contains the provision: “Seven hours of labor shall constitute a day’s work. The seven hour day means seven hours work in the mines at the usual working places for all classes of labor, exclusive of the lunch period, whether they be paid by the day or be paid on the tonnage basis.”
Under these contracts “the usual working place” for miners has been universally understood to mean the face of the coal seam, and “travel time” to reach the seam is not “work time”. The contracts and the practice have been of this sort since the eight hour day was established in 1898.
The contract between appellant Tennessee Coal and Iron Company and the union of its miners signed in October, 1938, See. 4, defined a day’s work as eight hours, and a week’s work as forty hours. “The eight hour day means eight hours of work in or about the mines at the usual working places for all classes of labor, exclusive of the lunch period, whether they be paid by the day or paid on the tonnage basis.” As in coal mining, the usual working place of the miner has always been the face of the ore bed. The other appellants had more or less formal contracts to the same effect. Travel time has never been paid or expected under any of them.
Letter of Earl E. Houck to Philip B. Fleming, Administrator, dated July 9, 1940. That letter states, among other things: “Travel time was never considered as a part of the agreement or obligation of the employer to pay for in this industry, nor as hours worked by the employees, and this has been the case since the eight-hour day was established in the industry — April 1, 1898. It is urged that any ruling requiring such a change in the custom, tradition, and contract provision so as to change the work day from ‘seven hours’ work in the mines at the usual working places to any new standard for the measurement of time worked, and to the adjustment of wage rates made necessary thereby, would create so much confusion in the bituminous industry as to result in complete chaos, and would probably result in a complete stoppage of work at practically all of the coal mines in the United States.”
Document Info
Docket Number: 10278
Citation Numbers: 135 F.2d 320, 1943 U.S. App. LEXIS 3270
Judges: Sibley, Holmes, McCord
Filed Date: 3/16/1943
Precedential Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024