In Re Estate of Walker ( 2006 )

REID, Associate Judge:

This case concerns the proper distribution of the proceeds of a savings account held jointly in the names of the decedent, Frances Walker (“Ms.Walker”), who died intestate, and appellant Stanley Stefan (“Mr.Stefan”), who is unrelated to Ms. Walker. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Eulse Cee Young, Jr. (“Mr. Young”), the decedent’s great nephew and personal representative of Ms. Walker’s estate, who claimed the proceeds of the account as an asset of the estate. We reverse the trial court’s ruling, and hold that on the facts of this case, summary judgment was not appropriate because the trier of fact must resolve genuine issues of material fact concerning the joint savings account. Therefore, we remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

The record before us, which includes Mr. Stefan’s verified complaint, depositions of Mr. Stefan and Mr. Young, and the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment with supporting documents, shows that on or about July 16, 1998, Ms. Walker and Mr. Stefan established a joint savings account at the Industrial Bank. Prior to creating the account, Ms. Walker contacted Rovenia Daniels, then the assistant branch manager at the Industrial Bank, where Ms. Walker, a domiciliary of the District of Columbia, had maintained a number of accounts through the years, including one with her great nephew, Mr. Young. Ms. Walker informed Ms. Daniels that she wanted to remove Mr. Young’s name from her account. Ms. Daniels advised that the account with Mr. Young would have to be closed and a new one opened because the bank “did not delete names from accounts.” Ms. Walker indicated that she would visit the bank “as soon as she could get ‘Stan’ [Mr. Stefan]” to take her there.

When Ms. Walker and Mr. Stefan, her close friend,² went to the bank a few days later, Ms. Walker stated her desire to close her joint account with Mr. Young and to open one jointly with Mr. Stefan. Initially Ms. Walker wanted Ms. Daniels’ name on the account, but Ms. Daniels explained that the addition of her name would be improper, since she was a bank employee. Ms. Daniels’ affidavit declares that Ms. Walker instructed her to “add Stan’s name because I don’t want [Mr. Young] to have one red cent.”³ During his deposition, Mr. Stefan confirmed that Ms. Walker told Ms. Daniels, “I don’t want [Mr. Young] to have one red cent.”

Ms. Walker established the account as an “either or” account, meaning that either Ms. Walker or Mr. Stefan had the authority to withdraw funds from the account, without the consent of the other. In her affidavit Ms. Daniels states: “I explained to Ms. Walker that opening the account as she instructed meant that Mr. Stefan could withdraw all of the money any time he wanted to, even if it was only ten minutes after the [bank signature] cards were filed. She said that was alright with her.” Ms. Daniels also stated: “Account No. 624 1336 was opened so that either Ms. Walker or Mr. Stefan could make withdrawals without the signature of the other person because they were both owners of the account and that is the way Ms. Walker wanted it to be.”

Mr. Stefan made no withdrawals from the account during Ms. Walker’s lifetime; nor did Ms. Walker. Mr. Young declared during his deposition that there was always “around $178,000, $184,000” in the account. He also testified that: “[I]f you look back over that account, you’ll see that she never withdrew from that account from the day she opened it when my grandmother’s name was on it, when my father’s name was on it, and my name was on it.” In addition, Mr. Young pointed out that Ms. Walker would cash her Social Security checks and keep “large amounts of cash on her,” which she apparently used for her everyday needs, and as “emergency money.” Mr. Stefan asserted that Ms. Walker “would accumulate Social Security checks.... ” He would then take her to the bank at her request where “she would cash them, put some money in the account, and retain the rest of the cash for herself.”

After Ms. Walker’s death on September 23, 1999, Mr. Stefan withdrew $8,633.91 from the account on October 4, 1999, to pay her funeral expenses, leaving a balance of $174,431.47. Subsequently, on November 22, 1999, without Mr. Stefan’s knowledge, Mr. Young’s attorney transferred the remaining savings account funds to an estate account, including interest in the amount of $597.95, for a total of $175,029.42.⁴

On June 20, 2000, Mr. Stefan filed suit against Ms. Walker’s estate seeking the proceeds of the joint savings account, and alleging that “[i]t was [d]ecedent’s expressed intent that the account would be for the benefit of Plaintiff upon her death.” The parties later filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

On July 18, 2001, the trial court granted Mr. Young’s summary judgment motion. The trial judge concluded that Mr. Stefan failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence “that the proceeds in the account were an inter vivos gift from the decedent.” The court declared, in part:

This record does not contain unambiguous proof of donative intent and contains no unambiguous proof of delivery of these funds to the plaintiff during the decedent’s lifetime.

... [I]t is obvious that the decedent ... was merely taking steps to shield her assets from [Mr. Young]. She was a layperson and she was elderly. She did not realize that adding the name of [Mr.] Stefan to the account had no real connection to preventing access to her account by [Mr. Young]. She did not understand that her nephew simply could not access her funds if his name was not on the account. If this was her objective, she only needed to remove her nephew’s name in order to accomplish her goal. Alternatively, she only might have wanted to send her nephew a demonstrative message, since she continued to use the account [as] she had done previously. In either event, her change in the titling of the account was only an act of personal convenience.

ANALYSIS

Mr. Stefan contends that the trial court drew erroneous conclusions concerning the elements of a valid inter vivos gift: delivery, donative intent, and absolute disposition. Mr. Young argues that “Mr. Stefan has failed to provide sufficient proof as to every essential element of gift in order for him to prevail.”⁵

Our standard of review of a summary judgment motion, which is de novo, see Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, 799 A.2d 381, 385 (D.C.2002), is a familiar one: “[T]he movant [ ] must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that [the movant] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Isaac v. First Nat’l Bank of Maryland, D.C., 647 A.2d 1159, 1160 (D.C.1994); see also Colbert v. Georgetown Univ., 641 A.2d 469, 472 (D.C.1994) (en banc). Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c) governing summary judgment motions specifies that: “The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Furthermore, “since the moving party carries the burden of proving no genuine issue of fact in dispute, ‘the material lodged in support of the motion must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party.’ ” Nader v. Toledano, 408 A.2d 31, 42 (D.C.1979) (citations omitted). “If the offered evidence and its inferences would permit the factfinder to hold for the nonmoving party under the appropriate burden of proof, the motion for summary judgment should be denied.” Id. (emphasis in original).

In addition, “[i]f ‘the case turns on controverted facts and the credibility of witnesses, the case is properly for the jury.’ ” National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. McDavitt, 804 A.2d 275, 280 (D.C.2002) (citing Corley v. BP Oil Corp., 402 A.2d 1258, 1263 (D.C.1979)) (quoting Aylor v. Intercounty Constr. Corp., 127 U.S.App. D.C. 151, 155, 381 F.2d 930, 934 (1967)); see also Uckele v. Jewett, 642 A.2d 119, 124 (D.C.1994) (“resolution of witnesses’ credibility is an issue left to a jury”); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, whe[n] he [or she] is ruling on a motion for summary judgment[.]”). “If the witness has an interest in the outcome of a case, and ... if evidence opposing [a] presumption is contradictory or reasonably subject to contradictory interpretations!,] the question becomes one for the trier of the facts.” Uckele, supra, 642 A.2d at 124 (quoting Davis, supra, 492 A.2d at 887) (other citation omitted) (emphasis in original).

Since the trial court granted Mr. Young’s motion for summary judgment, we review the record in the light most favorable to Mr. Stefan. But, we are mindful both that Mr. Stefan has the burden of establishing an inter vivos gift from Ms. Walker to him by clear and convincing evidence, and that there is a presumption that the joint account was one of convenience. As we reiterated in In re Estate of Delaney, 819 A.2d 968 (D.C.2003):

In the District of Columbia, “[w]here a party opens a joint account for [her] self and another without consideration, the account is presumed opened for the convenience of that party.” Davis v. Altmann, 492 A.2d [884,] 885 [(D.C.1985)]. See also Murray v. Gadsden, 91 U.S.App. D.C. 38, 44, 197 F.2d 194, 200 (1952), Edstrom v. Kuder, 351 A.2d 506, 509 n. 7 (D.C.1976). This convenience account presumption always applies where the funds were deposited by only one of the parties, even where the printed bank card signed by the parties recites a right of survivorship. Imirie [v. Imirie], 100 U.S.App. D.C. 371[, 372], 246 F.2d [652,] 653 [ (1957) ]. The presumption puts the person who is claiming that the account carried a right of survivorship in the position of claiming that the account funds were an inter vivos gift, and shifts the burden of proof to that person. Harrington v. Emmerman, 88 U.S.App. D.C. 23, 27, 186 F.2d 757, 761 (1950); Duggan [v. Keto ], 554 A.2d [1126,] 1134 [ (D.C.1989) ]; Davis v. Altmann, supra, 492 A.2d at 885. When the claim of an inter vivos gift comes after the alleged donor has died, the gift must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Uckele v. Jewett, 642 A.2d 119, 123 (D.C.1994); Duggan, supra, 554 A.2d at 1134; Estate of Presgrave v. Stephens, 529 A.2d 274, 280 (D.C.1987).

Id. at 990.

Mr. Stefan must establish by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Walker made a valid inter vivos gift to him.⁶ To do so, he must overcome the presumption that the joint bank account was created for Ms. Walker’s convenience; and must also satisfy “the requisites of a valid gift inter vivos[:] delivery, intention on the part of the donor to make a gift, and absolute disposition of the subject of the gift.” Presgrave, supra, 529 A.2d at 280 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The presumption is merely a judicial inference as to probable intent....” United States v. Taylor, 276 U.S.App. D.C. 84, 87, 867 F.2d 700, 703 (1989). It “is rebuttable[,] ... [and] may be overcome by showing that [Ms. Walker] intended to give [Mr. Stefan] a present interest in the [joint savings account] at the time she established the [account].” Richardson, supra, 522 A.2d at 1298 (citing Harrington, supra, 88 U.S.App. D.C. at 27, 186 F.2d at 761). In rebutting the presumption and showing intent, Mr. Stefan may rely upon reasonable inferences, in light of the applicable evidentiary standard, that are drawn from depositions and other documents. See Imirie, supra, 100 U.S.App. D.C. at 372, 246 F.2d at 653; see also Uckele, supra, 642 A.2d at 124.

In determining whether Mr. Stefan satisfied the element of donative intent, the trial court viewed the issue in the light most favorable to Mr. Young, rather than the opposing party, Mr. Stefan. The court interpreted Ms. Walker’s words, “add [Mr. Stefan’s] name because I don’t want [Mr. Young] to have one red cent,” to mean that Ms. Walker wanted a “convenience account,” an inference favorable to Mr. Young. As the court put it:

If [Ms. Walker] was disgruntled with her nephew, her motive for titling this account as a joint account was quite obviously a matter of her expressing her personal pique. This is a personal convenience in a very classic sense.

The trial court then focused on Mr. Young’s deposition testimony that his aunt believed he had “reneged” on a promise to let her “live with [him] for the rest of her life.” And, the court inferred that:

[Ms. Walker’s] good customer service type of relationship with [Ms. Daniels] strongly suggests that she was seeking the added assistance of a bank official who could help to safeguard her funds and who would be aware of her priority of eliminating the nephew’s access to her funds. This, too, is a sign of acting for the sake of personal convenience.

Furthermore, the court drew inferences from Ms. Walker’s status as a layperson and an elderly woman:

[Ms. Walker] was a layperson and she was elderly. She did not realize that adding the name of [Mr.] Stefan to the account had no real connection to preventing access to her account by [Mr. Young]. She did not understand that her nephew simply could not access her funds if his name was not on the account. If this was her objective, she only needed to remove her nephew’s name in order to accomplish her goal. Alternatively, she only might have wanted to send her nephew a demonstrative message, since she continued to use the account [as] she had done previously. In either event, her change in the titling of the account was only an act of personal convenience.

(Emphasis in original). Yet, nothing in the record on appeal indicates any lack of understanding on Ms. Walker’s part due to her lay status or her age.

By focusing upon Mr. Young’s statements about his aunt and drawing inferences concerning Ms. Walker’s intent that were unfavorable to Mr. Stefan, the court did not view the summary judgment documents “ ‘in the light most favorable to the opposing party.’ ” Nader, supra, 408 A.2d at 42. But, aspects of those documents could be read to infer that Ms. Walker intended to make a present gift to Mr. Stefan. While making inferences favorable to Mr. Young, even though he had not seen his aunt since returning her to the District from Louisiana around November 1998, the trial court ignored Mr. Stefan’s twenty-five year friendship with Ms. Walker and the non-monetary assistance he gave her. In addition, the trial court discounted favorable inferences that could be made regarding Ms. Walker’s decision to add Mr. Stefan’s name to her savings account and to remove that of Mr. Young. When Ms. Daniels advised Ms. Walker that if she entered into a joint savings account with Mr. Stefan, he “could withdraw all of the money any time he wanted to, even if [it] was only ten minutes after the cards were filed,” Ms. Walker replied that “that was alright with her.” In addition, the depositions of both Mr. Young and Mr. Stefan revealed that Ms. Walker had not withdrawn any money from the account since the funds were first placed there. As Mr. Young stated: “If you look back over that account, you’ll see she never withdrew from that account from the day she opened it when my grandmother’s name was on it, when my father’s name was on it, and my name was on it.” Mr. Stefan confirmed that from the time his name was placed on the account, Ms. Walker made no withdrawals. Given this information, and in light of the fact that the account was a savings account and not a checking account, a reasonable inference could be made that it was not a convenience account, even though Ms. Walker made some deposits when she cashed her accumulated Social Security checks.⁷ This inference is strengthened by the fact that Ms. Walker never asked Mr. Stefan to deposit any of her Social Security checks in the account but, instead, asked Mr. Stefan to take her to the bank where she personally cashed the checks, deposited some funds from them into the joint savings account and retained the rest of the cash for herself.

On this record inferences could be drawn to conclude, either that Ms. Walker intended to make a present gift of the savings account to Mr. Stefan, or as the trial court declared, that she intended merely to establish the account for her convenience. Both Mr. Young and Mr. Stefan obviously were interested in the disposition of the joint bank account funds. Mr. Young testified that the joint bank account contained “family” funds and that Ms. Walker intended for them to be distributed to family. Mr. Stefan asserted that Ms. Walker made a gift of the funds to him when she closed out the account with Mr. Young and opened an account with his [Mr. Stefan’s] name knowing that he could withdraw all of the funds at any time. “If the witness has an interest in the outcome of a case, and ... if evidence opposing [a] presumption is contradictory or reasonably subject to contradictory interpretations[,] the question becomes one for the trier of the facts.” Uckele, supra, 642 A.2d at 124 (quoting Davis, supra, 492 A.2d at 887) (other citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Moreover, this matter also involves the credibility of the witnesses, and resolution of credibility issues is within the province of the trier of the facts. See Kuder v. National Bank, 497 A.2d 1105, 1107 (D.C.1985) (“ ‘[T]he mere fact that the witness is interested in the result of the suit is deemed sufficient to require the credibility of his testimony to be submitted to the jury as a question of fact.’ ”) (quoting Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 628, 64 S.Ct. 724, 88 L.Ed. 967 (1944)). In short, a genuine issue of material fact exists here, as well as credibility issues, and hence, summary judgment was not appropriate. Isaac, supra, 647 A.2d at 1160; McDavitt, supra, 804 A.2d at 280; see also Mitchell v. Mitchell, 756 A.2d 179, 183 (R.I.2000) (“Where conflicting evidence of donative intent exists, the trier of fact — not the motion [judge] — should resolve the contested issue.”) (citation omitted); Blanchette v. Blanchette, 362 Mass. 518, 287 N.E.2d 459, 463 (1972) (“In cases of conflicting evidence we have required that the question of donative intent be submitted to the trier of fact.”) (citation omitted).

“Delivery” and “absolute disposition of the subject gift” are elements of a valid inter vivos gift which must be examined in light of our decision in Estate of Presgrave, supra, as well as the context of this particular case. Estate of Presgrave concerned a claim by the personal representative of the estate of Katie W. Presgrave that the proceeds of two certificates of deposit and a checking account, all held jointly in the names of Ms. Presgrave and her nephew, Robert J. Stephens, properly belonged to the estate and did not constitute inter vivos gifts. Mr. Stephens had a “close” relationship with his aunt. Id. at 275. A show cause order was issued concerning “why [Mr. Stephens] should not disclose and turn over to [the personal representative] all assets he had which belonged to the estate.” Id. After a show cause hearing during which Mr. Stephens testified and two witnesses corroborated his testimony, the trial court entered findings and conclusions favorable to Mr. Stephens. We affirmed the trial court’s disposition, concluding that the evidence presented by Mr. Stephens “clearly and convincingly supports the trial judge’s finding that the decedent intended to create a present interest and right of survivorship in [Mr.] Stephens, and that [he] had met his burden to show that the accounts belonged to him rather than the estate.” Id. at 280. Mr. “Stephens testified that his aunt intended the accounts to be jointly owned with a right of survivorship, and that she intended for him to be able to use the money during her lifetime, as well as to retain any remainder at her death.” Id. His aunt indicated that “[Mr. Stephens] had the right to use this money during her lifetime, ... [but] he did not use any of the money because he thought he did not need it and his aunt did.” Id.⁸

Implicitly, the majority in Presgrave recognized that the elements of “delivery” and “absolute disposition of the subject gift[s]” had to be considered within the context of that case. The same approach is appropriate here. “Delivery” may be actual or constructive with respect to a valid inter vivos gift. See Duggan, supra, 554 A.2d at 1135 (citation omitted). “The delivery required must be such as to vest the donee with control and dominion over the property, but this requirement must be tailored to suit the circumstances of the case.” In re Szabo, 10 N.Y.2d 94, 217 N.Y.S.2d 593, 176 N.E.2d 395, 396 (1961). “To effectuate a constructive delivery, the delivery must be as perfect as the circumstances reasonably permit.” Kallop v. McAllister, 678 A.2d 526, 531 (Del.1996) (citation omitted). Thus, “[i]f the donor has done all that normally could be done under the circumstances to put the intended donee in control of the personal property, there has been a delivery to that person.” RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) (SECOND), § 31.1, Comment (b), 1992 ed.

Here, Ms. Walker and Mr. Stefan executed signatory cards for the joint bank account. The account, as explained by Ms. Daniels in her affidavit, was an “either or” account, meaning that either Mr. Stefan or Ms. Walker could remove the funds, just as either Ms. Presgrave or Mr. Stephens could remove the subject funds in Estate of Presgrave during the donor’s lifetime. Ms. Daniels advised Ms. Walker that adding Mr. Stefan’s name to the account “meant that Mr. Stefan could withdraw all of the money any time he wanted to, even if it was only ten minutes after the [bank signature] cards were filed.” Ms. Walker’s response was that “that was alright with her,” reasonably could indicate her intent to deliver the funds in the account to Mr. Stefan and to give him immediate dominion and control over all those funds. Ms. Walker’s response reasonably could be interpreted as manifesting Ms. Walker’s clear recognition that Mr. Stefan could withdraw and walk away with all of the funds from the account at any time, just as Mr. Stephens could in Estate of Presgrave. The fact that Ms. Walker also could withdraw the funds at any time does not indicate necessarily that the delivery requirement has not been satisfied. Indeed, this may be an even stronger case for delivery and dominion and control than was Estate of Presgrave where Ms. Presgrave apparently continued to use funds placed in the accounts. Mr. Young testified that Ms. Walker never withdrew funds from the joint savings account through the years, from the day it was first opened, when it bore her grandmother’s name, and later, Mr. Young’s father’s name and Mr. Young’s name, in addition to her own. Thus, on the record in this case, Mr. Young was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law regarding the elements of “delivery” and “absolute disposition of the subject gift.”

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

2 . Mr. Stefan stated in his deposition that he had known Ms. Walker since 1973 or 1974, and had maintained continuing contact with her, even when she was not in the Washington, D.C. area.

3 . Ms. Walker, whose husband was deceased, lived for about one year in Louisiana with her nephew. When Mr. Young’s job assignment changed and he could no longer look after Ms. Walker, he apparently proposed a nursing home for her. Mr. Young stated in his deposition that his aunt "felt like in her heart that I had promised her, like my father had, that she could live with me for the rest of her life. And I had reneged on that by having to change my job status .... ” Because she did not wish to go into a nursing home, Ms. Walker returned to Washington, D.C. Mr. Stefan was the guarantor on her lease at the time of her death, and had shopped with her and assisted her with matters relating to banking. Mr. Young had not seen his aunt since around November 1998, when he accompanied her back to the District of Columbia after she declined to enter a nursing home in Louisiana.

4 . Around November 1999, Mr. Young attempted to obtain $53,000 from the joint savings account funds by writing a bank check to himself “for family purposes,” that is, for distribution to himself, his sister and his half brother. He maintained during his deposition that Ms. Walker told him, "this is a family account. This money stays within the family.” The bank stopped payment on the check, apparently because the account had been frozen by court order.

5 . Subsequent to the establishment of the joint account between Ms. Walker and Mr. Stefan, and after Ms. Walker’s death, the Council of the District of Columbia enacted legislation incorporating the Uniform Nonprobate Transfers on Death Act. Effective April 27, 2001, the Act became D.C. Law 13-292, D.C.Code § 19-602.01 et seq. (Supp.2004). Section 19-602.11(b) of that Act provides that: "During the lifetime of all parties, an account belongs to the parties in proportion to the net contribution of each to the sums on deposit, unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a different intent ...." However, § 19— 602.12(a) specifies that: "Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, on death of a party sums on deposit in a multiple-party account belong to the surviving party or parties ....” The legislative history of § 19-602.11 states in part: "The assumption that no present change of beneficial ownership is intended may be disproved by showing that a gift was intended.” COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Report on Bill 13-298, The "Omnibus Trusts and Estates Amendment Act of 2000,” November 16, 2000, at 45. And, the legislative history relating to § 19-602.12(a) specifies: "The effect of subsection (a) is to make an account payable to one or more of two or more parties to a survivorship arrangement unless a nonsurvivorship arrangement is specified in the terms of the account.” Id. at 46.

We discussed the impact of this new legislation extensively in In re Estate of Blake, 856 A.2d 1151 (D.C.2004), and remanded that case "for consideration of whether there is any reason why [the Uniform Nonprobate Transfers on Death Act should not be applied.]” Id at 1153. On remand in this case, the trial judge also should determine the retroactive impact, if any, of the Uniform Non-probate Transfers on Death Act.

6 . “Clear and convincing evidence is most easily defined as the evidentiary standard that lies somewhere between a preponderance of evidence and evidence probative beyond a reasonable doubt.” In re K. A., 484 A.2d 992, 995 (D.C.1984) (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979)). It “is such evidence as would 'produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’ ” Dawkins v. United States, 535 A.2d 1383, 1384 (D.C.1988) (citing District of Columbia v. Hudson, 404 A.2d 175, 179 (D.C.1979) (quoting In re Estate of Soeder, 7 Ohio App.2d 271, 220 N.E.2d 547 (1966))); see also In re Wells, 815 A.2d 771, 783-84 (D.C.2003) (citations omitted).

7 . One court has explained a convenience account as follows:

A "convenience account” is an account apparently held in some form of joint tenancy, where in fact the creator did not intend the other tenant to have any interest, present or future, but had some other intent in creating the account. An example of a convenience account is an account where the creator only wanted the other tenant to write checks at the creator’s direction, and not to have any share in the account during the creator's life or on the creator’s death.

In re Estate of Hazel Teall, 329 Ill.App.3d 83, 263 Ill.Dec. 364, 768 N.E.2d 124, 129 (2002) (citing In re Estate of Harms, 236 Ill.App.3d 630, 177 Ill.Dec. 256, 603 N.E.2d 37 (1992)).

8 . The dissenting judge in Estate of Presgrave considered "[t]he question of intent ... [to be] a close one," but did not advocate reversal and judgment in favor of the estate. Rather, she maintained that the case should be "remand[ed] for a full trial on the merits to establish legal title to the assets.” Id. at 284.