Courtney v. Board of Trustees , 285 Md. 356 ( 1979 )

Davidson, J.,

dissenting:

My colleagues have determined that a majority of the Board of Trustees of the Maryland State Teachers’ Retirement System (Board) found as a fact that appellant Hugh J. Courtney’s disability was attributable to a pre-existing condition and, from that fact, concluded that his disability had not been caused by an accidental injury. My colleagues have further determined that there is substantial evidence to support the majority’s finding that the disability was attributable to a pre-existing condition. Accordingly, they have affirmed. If I were persuaded that a majority of the Board did find as a fact that the appellant’s disability was attributable to a pre-existing condition, I too would affirm. But, based on the record before me, I am unable to determine whether a majority of the Board made such a factual finding. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

The record here shows that on 17 March 1978, a document was issued, the relevant portions of which read as follows:

“DECISION OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES

The majority ... find that claimant’s nervous breakdown and mental disability are attributable to a pre-existing condition of paranoia-schizophrenia.

“Although the Board finds that the conditions under which Mr. Courtney worked contributed to his emotional distress, there is no evidence that he suffered an accidental injury of a character causing the mental condition of which he complains.

“Based upon the foregoing findings, the majority conclude that Mr. Courtney’s incapacity for duty is not the natural and proximate result of an accident occurring at some definite time and place while in the actual performance of duty. It is therefore ordered that Hugh J. Courtney be denied accidental disability benefits and that he be retired for ordinary disability. (Emphasis added.)

/§/_

David W. Hornbeck, Chairman

CONCURRING OPINION:

“We concur in the result reached above but are of the opinion that a mental disability which is not the result of a physical injury is not an accident within the meaning of Article 77, Section 191 (UA). Since Mr. Courtney offered no evidence indicating that his mental breakdown resulted from a physical injury occurring in the course of his employment, we would deny accidental disability as a matter of law. (Emphasis added.)

/s/_

Louis L. Goldstein, Vice-Chairman

/§/_

William S. James, Treasurer

DISSENTING OPINION:

“We dissent from the majority view. It is our opinion that the conditions under which claimant worked constituted an unusual condition of employment which caused an accident. We would award accidental disability benefits. (Emphasis added.)

/s/ _

Mary D. McNally, Trustee

/s/__,____

Peter A. Whittaker, Trustee”

The text of one section of the “Decision of the Board of Trustees” indicates that the “majority” found that the appellant’s disability was attributable to a pre-existing condition. That section, however, is signed not by a majority of the five-member board, but rather by only one member, Chairman Hornbeck. His assertion that the “majority” found as a fact that the appellant’s disability was attributable to a pre-existing condition does not, in this case, establish conclusively that the “majority” did make such a factual finding.

Here two of the Board members not only failed to sign the section of the decision signed by Chairman Hornbeck, but also, in a separate signed concurring opinion, contradicted Chairman Hornbeck’s assertion that they had found as a fact that the appellant’s disability was attributable to a pre-existing condition. The plain language of their concurring opinion establishes that they agreed with Chairman Horn-beck that the appellant should be denied accidental disability benefits but for a reason different from, and not in addition to, that expressed by the Chairman. That language also shows that the sole reason these concurring members concluded that the appellant’s disability had not been caused by an accident was their view that, as a matter of law, a mental disability which is not the result of a physical injury is not an accident. Under the present circumstances, the basis of the Board’s decision is unclear.

It is an elementary principle of administrative law that ordinarily a court cannot review an administrative agency’s action unless the grounds upon which that administrative agency acted are clearly disclosed and adequately sustained. In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, 94-95, 63 S. Ct. 454, 462-63 (1943), Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court, said:

“[T]he courts cannot exercise their duty of review unless they are advised of the considerations underlying the action under review. If the action rests upon an administrative determination — an exercise of judgment in an area which Congress has entrusted to the agency — of course it must not be set aside because the reviewing court might have made a different determination were it empowered to do so. But if the action is based upon a determination of law as to which the reviewing authority of the courts does come into play, an order may not stand if the agency has misconceived the law. In either event the orderly functioning of the process of review requires that the grounds upon which the administrative agency acted be clearly disclosed and adequately sustained. ‘The administrative process will best be vindicated by clarity in its exercise.’ Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 313 U.S. 177, 197, 61 S.Ct. 845, 853, 85 L.Ed. 1271, 133 A.L.R. 1217. What was said in that case is equally applicable here: ‘We do not intend to enter the province that belongs to the Board, nor do we do so. All we ask of the Board is to give clear indication that it has exercised the discretion with which Congress has empowered it. This is to affirm most emphatically the authority of the Board.’ In finding that the Commission’s order cannot be sustained, we are not imposing any trammels on its powers. We are not enforcing formal requirements. We are not suggesting that the Commission must justify its exercise of administrative discretion in any particular manner or with artistic refinement. We are not sticking in the bark of words. We merely hold that an administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its action can be sustained. (Emphasis added.)

“The cause should therefore be remanded to the Court of Appeals with directions to remand to the Commission for such further proceedings, not inconsistent with this opinion, as may be appropriate.” (Citation omitted.)

Here it is impossible to determine whether the Board’s conclusion that the appellant’s mental disability was not caused by an accidental injury rested upon an administrative finding of fact that the appellant’s disability was attributable to a pre-existing condition or was based upon a determination of law that a mental disability which is not the result of a physical injury is not an accident. Accordingly, pursuant to Maryland Rule 871, I would, for the purposes of justice, remand the case without affirmance or reversal, to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County with directions to remand to the Board for clarification of the basis of its decision. Redden v. Montgomery County, 270 Md. 668, 684-86, 313 A. 2d 481, 490-91 (1974).