Strawn v. Campbell , 226 Ark. 449 ( 1956 )

Lee Seamstee, Chief Justice.

The appellants, as taxpayers, filed this suit in the Pulaski Chancery Court, First Division, to enjoin the County Judge and others from proceeding under the provisions of Act 351 of the 1949 Acts of the General Assembly of Arkansas. The appellees filed a general demurrer to the complaint and it was sustained by the trial court. The appellants have appealed.

On October 3, 1955, the assessor of Pulaski County, a majority of the members of the Equalization Board of Pulaski County, a majority of the members of each municipal council within Pulaski County, and a majority of the members of each school board within Pulaski County, acting under the provisions of said Act 351, petitioned the Pulaski County Court to employ professional appraisers for the purpose of appraising all real and personal property within the county, said appraisal to be furnished to the tax assessor as an aid in assessing said property for ad valorem taxes.

On November 10, 1955, a hearing was had on said petition, after publication of a notice of said hearing as provided by the act, at which time the County Court found that there was a need for the employment of professional appraisers to appraise all real and personal property within Pulaski County, and that the interest and welfare of the public would be promoted thereby. It was ordered that three property owners of Pulaski County named in the court’s order, enter into negotiations for the employment of qualified appraisers to appraise all real and personal property within the county for a sum certain, the terms and conditions of the contract to be stated in writing, signed by the contracting parties, and submitted to the County Court for final approval. The aforesaid order was amended by an order of December 29, 1955, designated as an order nunc pro tunc, in which the County Court directed the persons named in the original order to negotiate a contract for the appraisal of real estate only.

In compliance with the order of the County Court, the property owners named in said order proceeded to negotiate a contract with E. T. Wilkins and Associates providing for the appraisal of all the real estate in Pulaski County, which contract was approved by the County Court on February 2, 1956.

For reversal, the appellants cite the following points: (1) Act 351 of the Acts of the General Assembly of 1949 is in contravention of Section 28, Article 7, of the State Constitution, in that it inhibits the expenditure of county taxes by the County Court unless approved by a majority of the members of the city councils and a majority of the members of the school boards in the area affected; (2) said Act is in the contravention of Amendment 40 of the State Constitution; in that it authorizes the use of school funds for purposes other than “the maintenance of schools, the erection and equipment of school buildings and the retirement of existing indebtedness” as limited in said Constitutional Amendment; (3) the order of the County Court is in excess of the court’s jurisdiction in that the petition asked for the appraisal of “real and personal” property, whereas the court ordered the appraisal of real property only; and, (4) said Act 351 constitutes an unlawful delegation of authority.

In regard to appellants’ first point, Act 351 does not compel the County Court to employ professional appraisers, nor does it prevent the court from employing professional appraisers. The exclusive original jurisdiction remains in the court to determine whether to employ said appraisers. This act simply sets up the machinery whereby a petition may be addressed to the discretion of the County Court to employ appraisers. If the court finds that there is a real need to employ professional appraisers, then it appoints a committee of property owners to negotiate a contract. That contract is not effective until it is approved by the County Court. If for any reason at all the court is dissatisfied with the terms of the contract, it may refuse to approve it.

The respective taxing units are required to approve the contract due to the fact that they share proportionately the expenses of the appraisal. The contract is without effect until approved by the County Court; since under the Constitution and laws the County Court has exclusive original jurisdiction in all matters relating to county taxes and the disbursement of money for county purposes. If the taxing units refuse to approve the contract, the County Court could employ the same appraisers. The only difference is that under these circumstances the county would have to pay the costs of the appraisal without contribution by the several taxing units. Section 28, Article 7, Constitution; Sec. 22-601 Ark. Stats., 1947; State Use of Prairie County v. E. F. Leathem and Company, 170 Ark. 1004, 282 S. W. 367.

Section 5 of the Act provides:

“Claims for costs of publication incurred and for appraisal services in accordance with the terms of the appraisal contract shall be filed with the clerk of the court as other claims against the county are filed, and .the county court shall promptly examine each such •claim, and if it finds same to be correct, enter an order directing the county clerk to issue a warrant upon the county treasury, payable from the general fund of the county, for the amount so found to be due.”

It can be readily seen that the County Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the expenditure of county funds in this instance.

The appellants’ second contention is to the effect that Act 351 contravenes Amendment No. 40 to the State Constitution in that the expenditure here contemplated would not be for (1) maintenance of schools, (2) the erection and equipment of school buildings, nor (3) the retirement of existing indebtedness. This amendment does not pertain to the assessment of property, nor does it prohibit the payment out of school funds such taxing unit’s pro rata share of the cost of assessing and collecting taxes.

Section 5, Article 16 of the State Constitution provides “All property subject to taxation shall be taxed according to its value, that value to be ascertained in such manner as the General Assembly shall direct, making the same equal and uniform throughout the State. No one species of property from which a tax may be collected shall be taxed higher than another.”

Section 46, Article 7 of the State Constitution provides that: “The qualified electors of each county shall elect one sheriff, who shall be ex-officio collector of taxes, unless otherwise provided by law; one assessor, one coroner, one treasurer, who shall be ex-officio treasurer of the common school fund of the county, and one county surveyor, for the term of two years, with such duties as are now or may be prescribed by law. Provided, that no per centum shall ever be paid to assess sors upon the valuation or assessment of property by them. ’ ’

The General Assembly has provided by Section 12-806, Ark. Stats. Anno., 1947, that: “It is hereby declared to be the policy of the state and local governments of Arkansas that from and after July 1, 1947, the State and every county, municipality, school district and other taxing unit,' excepting only special improvement districts to which the county assessor is not required by law to render service, receiving ad valorem or other tax funds collected by county collectors shall contribute funds for the payment of the salaries and the necessary expenses incurred in the performance of their official duties, of the county assessors and their deputies.

“For the purpose of carrying out the foregoing policy, the amount so to be contributed annually by each of said taxing units shall be in the proportion that the total of such taxes collected for the benefit of each such taxing unit bears to the total of such taxes collected for the benefit of all such taxing units. Provided, however, that the pro rata contribution of such salaries and expenses of any such taxing unit which receives taxes collected for the purpose of meeting debt service requirements of its issued and outstanding bonds shall be charged to and paid out of the said taxing unit’s general fund, and not to or out of any special fund it may maintain for such purpose, nor in such other manner as will diminish the amount necessary to meet such debt service requirements.”

The General Assembly has also provided by law that the several taxing units shall pay their pro rata share of the costs of the salaries of the county collectors and the county treasurers. In the case of Terry, County Judge v. Thornton, 207 Ark. 1019, 183 S. W. 2d 787, this court said, “Certainly the school fund should not be made to bear more than its just proportion of the salaries of the Collector and Treasurer” — thus requiring the schools, along with the other various taxing units, to pay their just proportion of the cost of collecting and disbursing tax funds. See also County Board of Education v. Austin, 169 Ark. 436, 276 S. W. 2.

The State Constitution clearly gives the General Assembly the authority to require the schools to pay their pro rata share of the costs of assessing property, a portion of which may be applied to the expenses of employing professional appraisers. This is a valid exercise of legislative power and is not prohibited by Amendment No. 40 to the State Constitution. The office of tax assessor must form a part of any valuation scheme erected by tbe General Assembly, but tbe General Assembly may, from time to time, prescribe tbe duties of that office and adopt sucb methods as may be deemed expedient to ascertain tbe values of taxable property. See Hutton v. King, 134 Ark. 463, 205 S. W. 296.

Since tbe school district bad assumed tbe obligation of paying its pro rata share of tbe cost of tbe appraisal, it was not improper for it to make an advancement to tbe Pulaski County General Fund, to be deducted from any amount found due tbe district to tbe Pulaski County General Fund in 1957.

Tbe appellants next contend that tbe order of tbe County Court is in excess of tbe court’s jurisdiction in that tbe petition asked for the appraisal of “real and personal” property, whereas tbe court ordered tbe appraisal of real property only. This point has no merit and has been settled by some of our earlier cases. Evans v. Perciful, 5 Ark. 424; Estes v. Martin, 34 Ark. 410. This court has held that once a court obtains jurisdiction of tbe parties and tbe subject matter, it has tbe right to decide every question arising in tbe case.

In tbe instant case, tbe appellants have made a collateral attack upon tbe order of tbe county court. A county court acting within tbe powers conferred by tbe Constitution and statutes is a court of superior jurisdiction, and, where by statute special powers have been conferred and sucb special powers exercised judicially, its judgment cannot be impeached collaterally except for want of jurisdiction or errors apparent on its face. Stumpff v. Louann Provision Co., 173 Ark. 192, 292 S. W. 106; Bragg v. Thompson, 177 Ark. 870, 9 S. W. 2d 24; State ex rel, Attorney General v. Kent, and State ex rel, Attorney General v. Wilson, 181 Ark. 683, 27 S. W. 2d 106. In the instant case, tbe County Court bad jurisdiction of tbe parties and tbe subject matter and tbe court’s order is valid on its face, therefore it is good on collateral attack.

The appellants’ last point is based on the contention that the provisions of Act 351 constitutes an unlawful delegation of authority. Section 1 of. the act specifically provides that the appraisal shall be “for the purpose of making such appraisal available to the county assessor as an aid to such assessor in making his appraisals or assessments for ad valorem tax purposes.” This provision is not an unlawful delegation of authority — it can only make the appraisal available as an aid to the assessor. The assessor makes the final assessment under the act.

Finding no error, the decree is affirmed.

Justice Geoege Eose Smith not participating. Justice Ed F. McFaddiN dissents.