Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings College of Law v. Martinez ( 2010 )


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  • (Slip Opinion)              OCTOBER TERM, 2009                                       1
    Syllabus
    NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
    being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
    The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
    prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
    See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 
    200 U.S. 321
    , 337.
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    Syllabus
    CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY CHAPTER OF THE
    UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, HASTINGS COLLEGE
    OF THE LAW, AKA HASTINGS CHRISTIAN FELLOW-
    SHIP v. MARTINEZ ET AL.
    CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
    THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    No. 08–1371. Argued April 19, 2010—Decided June 28, 2010
    Respondent Hastings College of the Law (Hastings), a school within the
    University of California public-school system, extends official recog
    nition to student groups through its “Registered Student Organiza
    tion” (RSO) program. Several benefits attend this school-approved
    status, including the use of school funds, facilities, and channels of
    communication, as well as Hastings’ name and logo. In exchange for
    recognition, RSOs must abide by certain conditions. Critical here, all
    RSOs must comply with the school’s Nondiscrimination Policy, which
    tracks state law barring discrimination on a number of bases, includ
    ing religion and sexual orientation. Hastings interprets this policy, as
    it relates to the RSO program, to mandate acceptance of all comers:
    RSOs must allow any student to participate, become a member, or
    seek leadership positions, regardless of her status or beliefs.
    At the beginning of the 2004–2005 academic year, the leaders of an
    existing Christian RSO formed petitioner Christian Legal Society
    (CLS) by affiliating with a national Christian association that char
    ters student chapters at law schools throughout the country. These
    chapters must adopt bylaws that, inter alia, require members and of
    ficers to sign a “Statement of Faith” and to conduct their lives in ac
    cord with prescribed principles. Among those tenets is the belief that
    sexual activity should not occur outside of marriage between a man
    and a woman. CLS interprets its bylaws to exclude from affiliation
    anyone who engages in “unrepentant homosexual conduct” or holds
    religious convictions different from those in the Statement of Faith.
    2       CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    Syllabus
    Hastings rejected CLS’s application for RSO status on the ground
    that the group’s bylaws did not comply with Hastings’ open-access
    policy because they excluded students based on religion and sexual
    orientation.
    CLS filed this suit for injunctive and declaratory relief under 
    42 U.S. C
    . §1983, alleging that Hastings’ refusal to grant the group
    RSO status violated its First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to
    free speech, expressive association, and free exercise of religion. On
    cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court ruled for
    Hastings. The court held that the all-comers condition on access to a
    limited public forum was both reasonable and viewpoint neutral, and
    therefore did not violate CLS’s right to free speech. Nor, in the
    court’s view, did Hastings impermissibly impair CLS’s right to ex
    pressive association: Hastings did not order CLS to admit any stu
    dent, nor did the school proscribe any speech; Hastings merely placed
    conditions on the use of school facilities and funds. The court also re
    jected CLS’s free exercise argument, stating that the Nondiscrimina
    tion Policy did not single out religious beliefs, but rather was neutral
    and of general applicability. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, ruling that
    the all-comers condition on RSO recognition was reasonable and
    viewpoint neutral.
    Held:
    1. The Court considers only whether a public institution’s condi
    tioning access to a student-organization forum on compliance with an
    all-comers policy violates the Constitution. CLS urges the Court to
    review, instead, the Nondiscrimination Policy as written—prohibiting
    discrimination on enumerated bases, including religion and sexual
    orientation. The policy’s written terms, CLS contends, target solely
    those groups that organize around religious beliefs or that disapprove
    of particular sexual behavior, and leave other associations free to
    limit membership to persons committed to the group’s ideology. This
    argument flatly contradicts the joint stipulation of facts the parties
    submitted at the summary-judgment stage, which specified: “Hast
    ings requires that [RSOs] allow any student to participate, . . . re
    gardless of [her] status or beliefs. For example, the Hastings Democ
    ratic Caucus cannot bar students holding Republican political beliefs
    . . . .” This Court has long recognized that parties are bound by, and
    cannot contradict, their stipulations. See, e.g., Board of Regents of
    Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 
    529 U.S. 217
    , 226. The Court
    therefore rejects CLS’s attempt to escape from the stipulation and
    shift its target to Hastings’ policy as written. Pp. 8–12.
    2. The all-comers policy is a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral condi
    tion on access to the RSO forum; it therefore does not transgress
    First Amendment limitations. Pp. 12–31.
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)                      3
    Syllabus
    (a) The Court’s limited public forum decisions supply the appro
    priate framework for assessing both CLS’s free-speech and expres
    sive-association claims; those decisions recognize that a governmen
    tal entity, in regulating property in its charge, may impose
    restrictions on speech that are reasonable in light of the purposes of
    the forum and viewpoint neutral, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visi
    tors of Univ. of Va., 
    515 U.S. 819
    , 829. CLS urges the Court to apply
    to its expressive-association claim a different line of cases—decisions
    in which the Court has rigorously reviewed restrictions on associa
    tional freedom in the context of public accommodations, e.g., Roberts
    v. United States Jaycees, 
    468 U.S. 609
    , 623. But, because CLS’s ex
    pressive-association and free-speech arguments merge—who speaks
    on its behalf, CLS reasons, colors what concept is conveyed—it makes
    little sense to treat the claims as discrete. Instead, three observa
    tions lead the Court to analyze CLS’s arguments under limited
    public-forum precedents.
    First, the same considerations that have led the Court to apply a
    less restrictive level of scrutiny to speech in limited public forums, as
    compared to other environments, apply with equal force to expressive
    association occurring in a limited public forum. Speech and expres
    sive-association rights are closely linked. See 
    id., at 622.
    When
    these intertwined rights arise in exactly the same context, it would
    be anomalous for a speech restriction to survive constitutional review
    under the limited-public-forum test only to be invalidated as an im
    permissible infringement of expressive association. Second, the strict
    scrutiny the Court has applied in some settings to laws that burden
    expressive association would, in practical effect, invalidate a defining
    characteristic of limited public forums—the State’s authority to “re
    serv[e] [them] for certain groups.” 
    Rosenberger, 515 U.S., at 829
    .
    Third, this case fits comfortably within the limited-public-forum
    category, for CLS may exclude any person for any reason if it forgoes
    the benefits of official recognition. The Court’s expressive-association
    decisions, in contrast, involved regulations that compelled a group to
    include unwanted members, with no choice to opt out. See, e.g., Boy
    Scouts of America v. Dale, 
    530 U.S. 640
    , 648. Application of the less
    restrictive limited-public-forum analysis better accounts for the fact
    that Hastings, through its RSO program, is dangling the carrot of
    subsidy, not wielding the stick of prohibition. Pp. 12–17.
    (b) In three cases, this Court held that public universities had
    unconstitutionally singled out student groups for disfavored treat
    ment because of their points of view. See Healy v. James, 
    408 U.S. 169
    ; Widmar v. Vincent, 
    454 U.S. 263
    ; and Rosenberger. Most re
    cently and comprehensively, in Rosenberger, the Court held that a
    university generally may not withhold benefits from student groups
    4       CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    Syllabus
    because of their religious outlook. “Once it has opened a limited
    [public] forum,” the Court emphasized, “the State must respect the
    lawful boundaries it has itself set.” 515 U. S, at 829. It may “not ex
    clude speech where its distinction is not reasonable in light of the
    purpose served by the forum, . . . nor may it discriminate against
    speech on the basis of . . . viewpoint.” 
    Ibid. Pp. 17–19. (c)
    Hastings’ all-comers policy is reasonable, taking into account
    the RSO forum’s function and “all the surrounding circumstances.”
    Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 
    473 U.S. 788
    ,
    809. Pp. 19–28.
    (1) The Court’s inquiry is shaped by the educational context in
    which it arises: “First Amendment rights must be analyzed in light of
    the special characteristics of the school environment.” 
    Widmar, 454 U.S., at 268
    , n. 5. This Court is the final arbiter of whether a public
    university has exceeded constitutional constraints. The Court has,
    however, cautioned courts to resist “substitut[ing] their own notions
    of sound educational policy for those of . . . school authorities,” for
    judges lack the on-the-ground expertise and experience of school ad
    ministrators. Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist.,
    Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 
    458 U.S. 176
    , 206. Because schools enjoy
    “a significant measure of authority over the type of officially recog
    nized activities in which their students participate,” Board of Ed. of
    Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 
    496 U.S. 226
    ,
    240, the Court approaches its task here mindful that Hastings’ deci
    sions about the character of its student-group program are due de
    cent respect. Pp. 19–21.
    (2) The justifications Hastings asserts in support of its all
    comers policy are reasonable in light of the RSO forum’s purposes.
    First, the policy ensures that the leadership, educational, and social
    opportunities afforded by RSOs are available to all students. RSOs
    are eligible for financial assistance drawn from mandatory student
    activity fees; the policy ensures that no Hastings student is forced to
    fund a group that would reject her as a member. Second, the policy
    helps Hastings police the written terms of its Nondiscrimination Pol
    icy without inquiring into an RSO’s motivation for membership re
    strictions. CLS’s proposal that Hastings permit exclusion because of
    belief but forbid discrimination due to status would impose on Hast
    ings the daunting task of trying to determine whether a student or
    ganization cloaked prohibited status exclusion in belief-based garb.
    Third, Hastings reasonably adheres to the view that its policy, to the
    extent it brings together individuals with diverse backgrounds and
    beliefs, encourages tolerance, cooperation, and learning among stu
    dents. Fourth, the policy incorporates state-law discrimination pro
    scriptions, thereby conveying Hastings’ decision to decline to subsi
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)                      5
    Syllabus
    dize conduct disapproved by the State. So long as a public school
    does not contravene constitutional limits, its choice to advance state
    law goals stands on firm footing. Pp. 21–24.
    (3) Hastings’ policy is all the more creditworthy in light of the
    “substantial alternative channels that remain open for [CLS-student]
    communication to take place.” Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educa
    tors’ Assn., 
    460 U.S. 37
    , 53. Hastings offered CLS access to school
    facilities to conduct meetings and the use of chalkboards and certain
    bulletin boards to advertise events. Although CLS could not take ad
    vantage of RSO-specific methods of communication, the advent of
    electronic media and social-networking sites lessens the importance
    of those channels. Private groups, such as fraternities and sororities,
    commonly maintain a presence at universities without official school
    affiliation. CLS was similarly situated: It hosted a variety of activi
    ties the year after Hastings denied it recognition, and the number of
    students attending those meetings and events doubled. “The variety
    and type of alternative modes of access present here,” in short, “com
    pare favorably with those in other [limited public] forum cases where
    [the Court has] upheld restrictions.” 
    Id., at 53–54.
    Pp. 24–25.
    (4) CLS’s arguments that the all-comers policy is not reason
    able are unavailing. CLS contends that there can be no diversity of
    viewpoints in a forum when groups are not permitted to form around
    viewpoints, but this argument confuses CLS’s preferred policy with
    constitutional limitation—the advisability of Hastings’ policy does
    not control its permissibility. A State’s restriction on access to a lim
    ited public forum, moreover, “need not be the most reasonable or the
    only reasonable limitation.” 
    Cornelius, 473 U.S., at 808
    . CLS’s con
    tention that Hastings’ policy will facilitate hostile takeovers of RSOs
    by student saboteurs bent on subverting a group’s mission is more
    hypothetical than real; there is no history or prospect of RSO
    hijackings at Hastings. Cf. National Endowment for Arts v. Finley,
    
    524 U.S. 569
    , 584. Finally, CLS’s assertion that Hastings lacks any
    legitimate interest in urging religious groups not to favor co
    religionists erroneously focuses on the benefits the group must forgo,
    while ignoring the interests of those it seeks to fence out. Hastings,
    caught in the crossfire between a group’s desire to exclude and stu
    dents’ demand for equal access, may reasonably draw a line in the
    sand permitting all organizations to express what they wish but no
    group to discriminate in membership. Pp. 25–28.
    (d) Hastings’ all-comers policy is viewpoint neutral. Pp. 28–31.
    (1) The policy draws no distinction between groups based on
    their message or perspective; its requirement that all student groups
    accept all comers is textbook viewpoint neutral. Pp. 28–29.
    (2) Conceding that the policy is nominally neutral, CLS asserts
    6       CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    Syllabus
    that it systematically—and impermissibly—burdens most heavily
    those groups whose viewpoints are out of favor with the campus
    mainstream. This argument fails because “[a] regulation that serves
    purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral,
    even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but
    not others.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 
    491 U.S. 781
    , 791. Hast
    ings’ requirement that RSOs accept all comers, the Court is satisfied,
    is “justified without reference to the content [or viewpoint] of the
    regulated speech.” 
    Id., at 791.
    It targets the act of rejecting would-be
    group members without reference to the reasons motivating that be
    havior. Pp. 29–31.
    3. Neither lower court addressed CLS’s argument that Hastings se
    lectively enforces its all-comers policy. This Court is not the proper
    forum to air the issue in the first instance. On remand, the Ninth
    Circuit may consider this argument if, and to the extent, it is pre
    served. Pp. 31–32.
    319 Fed. Appx. 645, affirmed and remanded.
    GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEVENS,
    KENNEDY, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., and KEN-
    NEDY, J., filed concurring opinions. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
    in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ., joined.
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)                              1
    Opinion of the Court
    NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
    preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
    notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash­
    ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
    that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    _________________
    No. 08–1371
    _________________
    CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY CHAPTER OF THE UNI-
    VERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, HASTINGS COLLEGE OF
    THE LAW, AKA HASTINGS CHRISTIAN FELLOW-
    SHIP, PETITIONER v. LEO P. MARTINEZ ET AL.
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
    APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    [June 28, 2010]
    JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.
    In a series of decisions, this Court has emphasized that
    the First Amendment generally precludes public universi­
    ties from denying student organizations access to school­
    sponsored forums because of the groups’ viewpoints. See
    Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 
    515 U.S. 819
    (1995); Widmar v. Vincent, 
    454 U.S. 263
    (1981);
    Healy v. James, 
    408 U.S. 169
    (1972). This case concerns a
    novel question regarding student activities at public uni­
    versities: May a public law school condition its official
    recognition of a student group—and the attendant use of
    school funds and facilities—on the organization’s agree­
    ment to open eligibility for membership and leadership to
    all students?
    In the view of petitioner Christian Legal Society (CLS),
    an accept-all-comers policy impairs its First Amendment
    rights to free speech, expressive association, and free
    exercise of religion by prompting it, on pain of relinquish­
    ing the advantages of recognition, to accept members who
    2    CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    Opinion of the Court
    do not share the organization’s core beliefs about religion
    and sexual orientation. From the perspective of respon­
    dent Hastings College of the Law (Hastings or the Law
    School), CLS seeks special dispensation from an across­
    the-board open-access requirement designed to further the
    reasonable educational purposes underpinning the school’s
    student-organization program.
    In accord with the District Court and the Court of Ap­
    peals, we reject CLS’s First Amendment challenge. Com­
    pliance with Hastings’ all-comers policy, we conclude, is a
    reasonable, viewpoint-neutral condition on access to the
    student-organization forum. In requiring CLS—in com­
    mon with all other student organizations—to choose be­
    tween welcoming all students and forgoing the benefits of
    official recognition, we hold, Hastings did not transgress
    constitutional limitations. CLS, it bears emphasis, seeks
    not parity with other organizations, but a preferential
    exemption from Hastings’ policy. The First Amendment
    shields CLS against state prohibition of the organization’s
    expressive activity, however exclusionary that activity
    may be. But CLS enjoys no constitutional right to state
    subvention of its selectivity.
    I
    Founded in 1878, Hastings was the first law school in
    the University of California public-school system. Like
    many institutions of higher education, Hastings encour­
    ages students to form extracurricular associations that
    “contribute to the Hastings community and experience.”
    App. 349. These groups offer students “opportunities to
    pursue academic and social interests outside of the class­
    room [to] further their education” and to help them “de­
    velo[p] leadership skills.” 
    Ibid. Through its “Registered
    Student Organization” (RSO)
    program, Hastings extends official recognition to student
    groups. Several benefits attend this school-approved
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)                   3
    Opinion of the Court
    status. RSOs are eligible to seek financial assistance from
    the Law School, which subsidizes their events using funds
    from a mandatory student-activity fee imposed on all
    students. 
    Id., at 217.
    RSOs may also use Law-School
    channels to communicate with students: They may place
    announcements in a weekly Office-of-Student-Services
    newsletter, advertise events on designated bulletin boards,
    send e-mails using a Hastings-organization address, and
    participate in an annual Student Organizations Fair
    designed to advance recruitment efforts. 
    Id., at 216–219.
    In addition, RSOs may apply for permission to use the
    Law School’s facilities for meetings and office space. 
    Id., at 218–219.
    Finally, Hastings allows officially recognized
    groups to use its name and logo. 
    Id., at 216.
       In exchange for these benefits, RSOs must abide by
    certain conditions. Only a “non-commercial organization
    whose membership is limited to Hastings students may
    become [an RSO].” App. to Pet. for Cert. 83a. A prospec­
    tive RSO must submit its bylaws to Hastings for approval,
    
    id., at 83a–84a;
    and if it intends to use the Law School’s
    name or logo, it must sign a license agreement, App. 219.
    Critical here, all RSOs must undertake to comply with
    Hastings’ “Policies and Regulations Applying to College
    Activities, Organizations and Students.” Ibid.1
    The Law School’s Policy on Nondiscrimination (Nondis­
    crimination Policy), which binds RSOs, states:
    “[Hastings] is committed to a policy against legally
    impermissible, arbitrary or unreasonable discrimina­
    tory practices. All groups, including administration,
    faculty, student governments, [Hastings]-owned stu­
    dent residence facilities and programs sponsored by
    [Hastings], are governed by this policy of nondis­
    ——————
    1 These policies and regulations address a wide range of matters, for
    example, alcoholic beverages at campus events, bake sales, and blood
    drives. App. 246.
    4     CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    Opinion of the Court
    crimination. [Hasting’s] policy on nondiscrimination
    is to comply fully with applicable law.
    “[Hastings] shall not discriminate unlawfully on the
    basis of race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry,
    disability, age, sex or sexual orientation. This nondis­
    crimination policy covers admission, access and
    treatment in Hastings-sponsored programs and activi­
    ties.” 
    Id., at 220.
       Hastings interprets the Nondiscrimination Policy, as it
    relates to the RSO program, to mandate acceptance of all
    comers: School-approved groups must “allow any student
    to participate, become a member, or seek leadership posi­
    tions in the organization, regardless of [her] status or
    beliefs.” 
    Id., at 221.2
    Other law schools have adopted
    similar all-comers policies. See, e.g., Georgetown Univer­
    sity Law Center, Office of Student Life: Student Organi
    zations, available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/
    StudentLife/StudentOrgs/NewGroup.htm (All Internet
    ——————
    2 “Th[is] policy,” Hastings clarifies, “does not foreclose neutral and
    generally applicable membership requirements unrelated to ‘status or
    beliefs.’ ” Brief for Hastings 5. So long as all students have the oppor
    tunity to participate on equal terms, RSOs may require them, inter alia,
    to pay dues, maintain good attendance, refrain from gross misconduct,
    or pass a skill-based test, such as the writing competitions adminis­
    tered by law journals. See 
    ibid. The dissent trumpets
    these neutral,
    generally applicable membership requirements, arguing that, in truth,
    Hastings has a “some-comers,” not an all-comers, policy. Post, at 2, 3,
    8–9, 10, 23–24, 32–33 (opinion of ALITO, J.). Hastings’ open-access
    policy, however, requires only that student organizations open eligibil­
    ity for membership and leadership regardless of a student’s status or
    beliefs; dues, attendance, skill measurements, and comparable uni­
    formly applied standards are fully compatible with the policy. The
    dissent makes much of Hastings’ observation that groups have imposed
    “even conduct requirements.” Post, at 9, 23–24. But the very example
    Hastings cites leaves no doubt that the Law School was referring to
    boilerplate good-behavior standards, e.g., “[m]embership may cease . . .
    if the member is found to be involved in gross misconduct,” App. 173
    (cited in Brief for Hastings 5).
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)                    5
    Opinion of the Court
    materials as visited June 24, 2010, and included in Clerk
    of Court’s case file) (Membership in registered groups
    must be “open to all students.”); Hofstra Law School Stu­
    dent Handbook 2009–2010, p. 49, available at http://
    law.hofstra.edu/pdf/StudentLife/StudentAffairs/Handbook/
    stuhb_handbook.pdf (“[Student] organizations are open to
    all students.”). From Hastings’ adoption of its Nondis­
    crimination Policy in 1990 until the events stirring this
    litigation, “no student organization at Hastings . . . ever
    sought an exemption from the Policy.” App. 221.
    In 2004, CLS became the first student group to do so.
    At the beginning of the academic year, the leaders of a
    predecessor Christian organization—which had been an
    RSO at Hastings for a decade—formed CLS by affiliating
    with the national Christian Legal Society (CLS-National).
    
    Id., at 222–223,
    225. CLS-National, an association of
    Christian lawyers and law students, charters student
    chapters at law schools throughout the country. 
    Id., at 225.
    CLS chapters must adopt bylaws that, inter alia,
    require members and officers to sign a “Statement of
    Faith” and to conduct their lives in accord with prescribed
    principles. 
    Id., at 225–226;
    App. to Pet. for Cert. 101a.3
    Among those tenets is the belief that sexual activity
    should not occur outside of marriage between a man and a
    woman; CLS thus interprets its bylaws to exclude from
    affiliation anyone who engages in “unrepentant homosex­
    ——————
    3 The  Statement of Faith provides:
    “Trusting in Jesus Christ as my Savior, I believe in:
    •	 One God, eternally existent in three persons, Father, Son and Holy
    Spirit.
    •	 God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth.
    •	 The Deity of our Lord, Jesus Christ, God’s only Son conceived of the
    Holy Spirit, born of the virgin Mary; His vicarious death for our sins
    through which we receive eternal life; His bodily resurrection and
    personal return.
    •	 The presence and power of the Holy Spirit in the work of regeneration.
    •	 The Bible as the inspired Word of God.” App. 226.
    6    CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    Opinion of the Court
    ual conduct.” App. 226. CLS also excludes students who
    hold religious convictions different from those in the
    Statement of Faith. 
    Id., at 227.
       On September 17, 2004, CLS submitted to Hastings an
    application for RSO status, accompanied by all required
    documents, including the set of bylaws mandated by CLS-
    National. 
    Id., at 227–228.
    Several days later, the Law
    School rejected the application; CLS’s bylaws, Hastings
    explained, did not comply with the Nondiscrimination
    Policy because CLS barred students based on religion and
    sexual orientation. 
    Id., at 228.
       CLS formally requested an exemption from the Nondis­
    crimination Policy, 
    id., at 281,
    but Hastings declined to
    grant one. “[T]o be one of our student-recognized organi­
    zations,” Hastings reiterated, “CLS must open its mem­
    bership to all students irrespective of their religious be­
    liefs or sexual orientation.” 
    Id., at 294.
    If CLS instead
    chose to operate outside the RSO program, Hastings
    stated, the school “would be pleased to provide [CLS] the
    use of Hastings facilities for its meetings and activities.”
    
    Ibid. CLS would also
    have access to chalkboards and
    generally available campus bulletin boards to announce its
    events. 
    Id., at 219,
    233. In other words, Hastings would
    do nothing to suppress CLS’s endeavors, but neither would
    it lend RSO-level support for them.
    Refusing to alter its bylaws, CLS did not obtain RSO
    status. It did, however, operate independently during the
    2004–2005 academic year. CLS held weekly Bible-study
    meetings and invited Hastings students to Good Friday
    and Easter Sunday church services. 
    Id., at 229.
    It also
    hosted a beach barbeque, Thanksgiving dinner, campus
    lecture on the Christian faith and the legal practice, sev­
    eral fellowship dinners, an end-of-year banquet, and other
    informal social activities. 
    Ibid. On October 22,
    2004, CLS filed suit against various
    Hastings officers and administrators under 
    42 U.S. C
    .
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)                 7
    Opinion of the Court
    §1983. Its complaint alleged that Hastings’ refusal to
    grant the organization RSO status violated CLS’s First
    and Fourteenth Amendment rights to free speech, expres­
    sive association, and free exercise of religion. The suit
    sought injunctive and declaratory relief.4
    On cross-motions for summary judgment, the U. S.
    District Court for the Northern District of California ruled
    in favor of Hastings. The Law School’s all-comers condi­
    tion on access to a limited public forum, the court held,
    was both reasonable and viewpoint neutral, and therefore
    did not violate CLS’s right to free speech. App. to Pet. for
    Cert. 27a–38a.
    Nor, in the District Court’s view, did the Law School
    impermissibly impair CLS’s right to expressive associa­
    tion. “Hastings is not directly ordering CLS to admit [any]
    studen[t],” the court observed, 
    id., at 42a;
    “[r]ather, Hast­
    ings has merely placed conditions on” the use of its facili­
    ties and funds, 
    ibid. “Hastings’ denial of
    official recogni­
    tion,” the court added, “was not a substantial impediment
    to CLS’s ability to meet and communicate as a group.” 
    Id., at 49a.
       The court also rejected CLS’s Free Exercise Clause
    argument.       “[T]he Nondiscrimination Policy does not
    target or single out religious beliefs,” the court noted;
    rather, the policy “is neutral and of general applicability.”
    
    Id., at 63a.
    “CLS may be motivated by its religious beliefs
    to exclude students based on their religion or sexual orien­
    tation,” the court explained, “but that does not convert the
    reason for Hastings’ [Nondiscrimination Policy] to be one
    that is religiously-based.” 
    Id., at 63a–64a.
       On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in an opinion that
    stated, in full:
    ——————
    4 The District Court allowed respondent Hastings Outlaw, an RSO
    committed to “combating discrimination based on sexual orientation,”
    
    id., at 97,
    to intervene in the suit, 
    id., at 104.
    8    CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    Opinion of the Court
    “The parties stipulate that Hastings imposes an
    open membership rule on all student groups—all
    groups must accept all comers as voting members
    even if those individuals disagree with the mission of
    the group. The conditions on recognition are therefore
    viewpoint neutral and reasonable. Truth v. Kent Sch.
    Dist., 
    542 F.3d 634
    , 649–50 (9th Cir. 2008).” Chris
    tian Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Kane, 319
    Fed. Appx. 645, 645–646 (CA9 2009).
    We granted certiorari, 558 U. S. ____ (2009), and now
    affirm the Ninth Circuit’s judgment.
    II
    Before considering the merits of CLS’s constitutional
    arguments, we must resolve a preliminary issue: CLS
    urges us to review the Nondiscrimination Policy as writ­
    ten—prohibiting discrimination on several enumerated
    bases, including religion and sexual orientation—and not
    as a requirement that all RSOs accept all comers. The
    written terms of the Nondiscrimination Policy, CLS con­
    tends, “targe[t] solely those groups whose beliefs are based
    on religion or that disapprove of a particular kind of sex­
    ual behavior,” and leave other associations free to limit
    membership and leadership to individuals committed to
    the group’s ideology. Brief for Petitioner 19 (internal
    quotation marks omitted). For example, “[a] political . . .
    group can insist that its leaders support its purposes and
    beliefs,” CLS alleges, but “a religious group cannot.” 
    Id., at 20.
      CLS’s assertion runs headlong into the stipulation of
    facts it jointly submitted with Hastings at the summary­
    judgment stage. In that filing, the parties specified:
    “Hastings requires that registered student organiza­
    tions allow any student to participate, become a mem­
    ber, or seek leadership positions in the organization,
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)                        9
    Opinion of the Court
    regardless of [her] status or beliefs. Thus, for exam­
    ple, the Hastings Democratic Caucus cannot bar stu­
    dents holding Republican political beliefs from becom­
    ing members or seeking leadership positions in the
    organization.” App. 221 (Joint Stipulation ¶18) (em­
    phasis added; citations omitted).5
    Under the District Court’s local rules, stipulated facts are
    deemed “undisputed.” Civil Local Rule 56–2 (ND Cal.
    2010). See also Pet. for Cert. 2 (“The material facts of this
    case are undisputed.”).6
    ——————
    5 In its briefs before the District Court and the Court of Appeals, CLS
    several times affirmed that Hastings imposes an all-comers rule on
    RSOs. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment
    and Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment in No.
    C 04 4484 JSW (ND Cal.), p. 4 (“Hastings interprets the [Nondiscrimi­
    nation Policy] such that student organizations must allow any student,
    regardless of their status or beliefs, to participate in the group’s activi­
    ties and meetings and to become voting members and leaders of the
    group.”); Brief for Appellant in No. 06–15956 (CA9), pp. 29–30 (“Hast­
    ings illustrates the application of the Nondiscrimination Policy by
    explaining that for the Hastings Democratic Caucus to gain recogni­
    tion, it must open its leadership and voting membership to Republi­
    cans.”). In a hearing before the District Court, CLS’s counsel reiterated
    that “it’s important to understand what Hastings’ policy is. According
    to . . . the stipulated facts, Hastings requires . . . that registered student
    organizations allow any student to participate, become a member or
    seek leadership positions in the organization regardless of their status
    or beliefs.” App. 438 (capitalization and internal quotation marks
    omitted). And at oral argument in this Court, counsel for CLS ac­
    knowledged that “the Court needs to reach the constitutionality of the
    all-comers policy as applied to CLS in this case.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 59
    (emphasis added). We repeat, in this regard, that Hastings’ all-comers
    policy is hardly novel. Other law schools have adopted similar re­
    quirements. 
    See supra, at 4
    –5; Brief for Association of American Law
    Schools as Amicus Curiae 20, n. 5.
    6 The dissent spills considerable ink attempting to create uncertainty
    about when the all-comers policy was adopted. See post, at 2, 3, 5, 6, 7,
    8, 10, 11. What counts, however, is the parties’ unqualified agreement
    that the all-comers policy currently governs. CLS’s suit, after all, seeks
    only declaratory and injunctive—that is, prospective—relief. See App.
    10    CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    Opinion of the Court
    Litigants, we have long recognized, “[a]re entitled to
    have [their] case tried upon the assumption that . . . facts,
    stipulated into the record, were established.” H. Hackfeld
    & Co. v. United States, 
    197 U.S. 442
    , 447 (1905).7 This
    entitlement is the bookend to a party’s undertaking to be
    bound by the factual stipulations it submits. See post, at
    10 (ALITO, J., dissenting) (agreeing that “the parties must
    be held to their Joint Stipulation”). As a leading legal
    reference summarizes:
    “[Factual stipulations are] binding and conclusive . . . ,
    and the facts stated are not subject to subsequent
    variation. So, the parties will not be permitted to
    deny the truth of the facts stated, . . . or to maintain a
    contention contrary to the agreed statement, . . . or to
    suggest, on appeal, that the facts were other than as
    stipulated or that any material fact was omitted. The
    burden is on the party seeking to recover to show his
    or her right from the facts actually stated.” 83
    C. J. S., Stipulations §93 (2000) (footnotes omitted).
    This Court has accordingly refused to consider a party’s
    argument that contradicted a joint “stipulation [entered]
    at the outset of th[e] litigation.” Board of Regents of Univ.
    of Wis. System v. Southworth, 
    529 U.S. 217
    , 226 (2000).
    ——————
    80 (First Amended Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
    Relief).
    7 Record evidence, moreover, corroborates the joint stipulation con­
    cerning Hastings’ all-comers policy. The Law School’s then-Chancellor
    and Dean testified, for example, that “in order to be a registered stu­
    dent organization you have to allow all of our students to be members
    and full participants if they want to.” App. 343. Hastings’ Director of
    Student Services confirmed that RSOs must “be open to all students”—
    “even to students who may disagree with [an RSO’s] purposes.” 
    Id., at 320
    (internal quotation marks omitted). See also 
    id., at 349
    (“Hastings
    interprets the Nondiscrimination Policy as requiring that student
    organizations wishing to register with Hastings allow any Hastings
    student to become a member and/or seek a leadership position in the
    organization.”).
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)                      11
    Opinion of the Court
    Time and again, the dissent races away from the facts to
    which CLS stipulated. See, e.g., post, at 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11,
    24.8 But factual stipulations are “formal concessions . . .
    that have the effect of withdrawing a fact from issue and
    dispensing wholly with the need for proof of the fact.
    Thus, a judicial admission . . . is conclusive in the case.” 2
    K. Broun, McCormick on Evidence §254, p. 181 (6th ed.
    2006) (footnote omitted). See also, e.g., Oscanyan v. Arms
    Co., 
    103 U.S. 261
    , 263 (1881) (“The power of the court to
    act in the disposition of a trial upon facts conceded by
    counsel is as plain as its power to act upon the evidence
    produced.”).9
    In light of the joint stipulation, both the District Court
    and the Ninth Circuit trained their attention on the con­
    stitutionality of the all-comers requirement, as described
    in the parties’ accord. See 319 Fed. Appx., at 645–646;
    App. to Pet. for Cert. 32a; 
    id., at 36a.
    We reject CLS’s
    unseemly attempt to escape from the stipulation and shift
    ——————
    8 In an effort to undermine the stipulation, the dissent emphasizes a
    sentence in Hastings’ answer to CLS’s first amended complaint which,
    the dissent contends, casts doubt on Hastings’ fidelity to its all-comers
    policy. See post, at 5–6, 11. In context, Hastings’ answer—which
    responded to CLS’s allegation that the Law School singles out religious
    groups for discriminatory treatment—is sensibly read to convey that
    Hastings’ policies and regulations apply to all groups equally. See App.
    79 (denying that the Nondiscrimination Policy imposes on religious
    organizations restraints that are not applied to political, social, and
    cultural groups). In any event, the parties’ joint stipulation supersedes
    the answer, to the extent of any conflict between the two filings. See
    Pepper & Tanner, Inc. v. Shamrock Broadcasting, Inc., 
    563 F.2d 391
    ,
    393 (CA9 1977) (Parties’ “stipulation of facts . . . superseded all prior
    pleadings and controlled the subsequent course of the action.”).
    9 The dissent indulges in make-believe when it suggests that we are
    making factual findings about Hastings’ all-comers policy. Post, at 1, 2.
    As CLS’s petition for certiorari stressed, “[t]he material facts of this case
    are undisputed.” Pet. for Cert. 2 (emphasis added). We take the facts
    as the joint stipulation describes them, 
    see supra, at 8
    –11; our decision
    respects, while the dissent ignores, the conclusive effect of the parties’
    accord.
    12    CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    Opinion of the Court
    its target to Hastings’ policy as written. This opinion,
    therefore, considers only whether conditioning access to a
    student-organization forum on compliance with an all­
    comers policy violates the Constitution.10
    III
    A
    In support of the argument that Hastings’ all-comers
    policy treads on its First Amendment rights to free speech
    and expressive association, CLS draws on two lines of
    decisions. First, in a progression of cases, this Court has
    employed forum analysis to determine when a governmen­
    tal entity, in regulating property in its charge, may place
    limitations on speech.11 Recognizing a State’s right “to
    preserve the property under its control for the use to
    which it is lawfully dedicated,” Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
    Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 
    473 U.S. 788
    , 800 (1985) (inter­
    ——————
    10 The dissent, in contrast, devotes considerable attention to CLS’s
    arguments about the Nondiscrimination Policy as written. Post, at 2, 3,
    5, 18–23. We decline to address these arguments, not because we agree
    with the dissent that the Nondiscrimination Policy is “plainly” uncon­
    stitutional, post, at 18, but because, as 
    noted, supra, at 8
    –12, that
    constitutional question is not properly presented.
    11 In conducting forum analysis, our decisions have sorted govern­
    ment property into three categories. First, in traditional public forums,
    such as public streets and parks, “any restriction based on the content
    of . . . speech must satisfy strict scrutiny, that is, the restriction must
    be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.”
    Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U. S. ___ (2009) (slip op., at 6).
    Second, governmental entities create designated public forums when
    “government property that has not traditionally been regarded as a
    public forum is intentionally opened up for that purpose”; speech
    restrictions in such a forum “are subject to the same strict scrutiny as
    restrictions in a traditional public forum.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 7).
    Third, governmental entities establish limited public forums by opening
    property “limited to use by certain groups or dedicated solely to the
    discussion of certain subjects.” 
    Ibid. As noted in
    text, “[i]n such a
    forum, a governmental entity may impose restrictions on speech that
    are reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.” 
    Ibid. Cite as: 561
    U. S. ____ (2010)                    13
    Opinion of the Court
    nal quotation marks omitted), the Court has permitted
    restrictions on access to a limited public forum, like the
    RSO program here, with this key caveat: Any access bar­
    rier must be reasonable and viewpoint neutral, e.g.,
    
    Rosenberger, 515 U.S., at 829
    . See also, e.g., Good News
    Club v. Milford Central School, 
    533 U.S. 98
    , 106–107
    (2001); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
    School Dist., 
    508 U.S. 384
    , 392–393 (1993); Perry Ed.
    Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 
    460 U.S. 37
    , 46
    (1983).12
    Second, as evidenced by another set of decisions, this
    Court has rigorously reviewed laws and regulations that
    constrain associational freedom. In the context of public
    accommodations, we have subjected restrictions on that
    freedom to close scrutiny; such restrictions are permitted
    only if they serve “compelling state interests” that are
    “unrelated to the suppression of ideas”—interests that
    cannot be advanced “through . . . significantly less restric­
    tive [means].” Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 
    468 U.S. 609
    , 623 (1984). See also, e.g., Boy Scouts of America v.
    Dale, 
    530 U.S. 640
    , 648 (2000). “Freedom of association,”
    we have recognized, “plainly presupposes a freedom not to
    associate.” 
    Roberts, 468 U.S., at 623
    . Insisting that an
    organization embrace unwelcome members, we have
    therefore concluded, “directly and immediately affects
    associational rights.” 
    Dale, 530 U.S., at 659
    .
    CLS would have us engage each line of cases independ­
    ently, but its expressive-association and free-speech ar­
    guments merge: Who speaks on its behalf, CLS reasons,
    colors what concept is conveyed. See Brief for Petitioner
    35 (expressive association in this case is “the functional
    ——————
    12 Our decisions make clear, and the parties agree, that Hastings,
    through its RSO program, established a limited public forum. See
    Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 
    515 U.S. 819
    , 829
    (1995); Tr. of Oral Arg. 24 (counsel for CLS); Brief for Petitioner 25–26;
    Brief for Hastings 27–28; Brief for Hastings Outlaw 27.
    14   CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    Opinion of the Court
    equivalent of speech itself”). It therefore makes little
    sense to treat CLS’s speech and association claims as
    discrete. See Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for
    Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 
    454 U.S. 290
    , 300 (1981). In­
    stead, three observations lead us to conclude that our
    limited-public-forum precedents supply the appropriate
    framework for assessing both CLS’s speech and associa­
    tion rights.
    First, the same considerations that have led us to apply
    a less restrictive level of scrutiny to speech in limited
    public forums as compared to other environments, 
    see supra, at 12
    –13, and n. 11, apply with equal force to ex­
    pressive association occurring in limited public forums. As
    just noted, speech and expressive-association rights are
    closely linked. See 
    Roberts, 468 U.S., at 622
    (Associa­
    tional freedom is “implicit in the right to engage in activi­
    ties protected by the First Amendment.”). When these
    intertwined rights arise in exactly the same context, it
    would be anomalous for a restriction on speech to survive
    constitutional review under our limited-public-forum test
    only to be invalidated as an impermissible infringement of
    expressive association. Accord Brief for State Universities
    and State University Systems as Amici Curiae 37–38.
    That result would be all the more anomalous in this case,
    for CLS suggests that its expressive-association claim
    plays a part auxiliary to speech’s starring role. See Brief
    for Petitioner 18.
    Second, and closely related, the strict scrutiny we have
    applied in some settings to laws that burden expressive
    association would, in practical effect, invalidate a defining
    characteristic of limited public forums—the State may
    “reserv[e] [them] for certain groups.” 
    Rosenberger, 515 U.S., at 829
    . See also Perry Ed. 
    Assn., 460 U.S., at 49
    (“Implicit in the concept” of a limited public forum is the
    State’s “right to make distinctions in access on the basis of
    . . . speaker identity.”); 
    Cornelius, 473 U.S., at 806
    (“[A]
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)                   15
    Opinion of the Court
    speaker may be excluded from” a limited public forum “if
    he is not a member of the class of speakers for whose
    especial benefit the forum was created.”).
    An example sharpens the tip of this point: Schools,
    including Hastings, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 83a, ordinar­
    ily, and without controversy, limit official student-group
    recognition to organizations comprising only students—
    even if those groups wish to associate with nonstudents.
    See, e.g., Volokh, Freedom of Expressive Association and
    Government Subsidies, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1919, 1940 (2006).
    The same ground rules must govern both speech and
    association challenges in the limited-public-forum context,
    lest strict scrutiny trump a public university’s ability to
    “confin[e] a [speech] forum to the limited and legitimate
    purposes for which it was created.” 
    Rosenberger, 515 U.S., at 829
    . See also 
    Healy, 408 U.S., at 189
    (“Associa­
    tional activities need not be tolerated where they infringe
    reasonable campus rules.”).
    Third, this case fits comfortably within the limited­
    public-forum category, for CLS, in seeking what is effec­
    tively a state subsidy, faces only indirect pressure to mod­
    ify its membership policies; CLS may exclude any person
    for any reason if it forgoes the benefits of official recogni­
    tion.13 The expressive-association precedents on which
    CLS relies, in contrast, involved regulations that com
    pelled a group to include unwanted members, with no
    choice to opt out. See, e.g., 
    Dale, 530 U.S., at 648
    (regula­
    tion “forc[ed] [the Boy Scouts] to accept members it [did]
    not desire” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Roberts,
    ——————
    13 The fact that a university “expends funds to encourage a diversity
    of views from private speakers,” this Court has held, does not justify it
    in “discriminat[ing] based on the viewpoint of private persons whose
    speech it facilitates.” 
    Rosenberger, 515 U.S., at 834
    . Applying limited­
    public-forum analysis (which itself prohibits viewpoint discrimination)
    to CLS’s expressive association claim, we emphasize, does not upset
    this principle.
    16    CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    Opinion of the 
    Court 468 U.S., at 623
    (“There can be no clearer example of
    an intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of
    an association than” forced inclusion of unwelcome
    participants.). 14
    In diverse contexts, our decisions have distinguished
    between policies that require action and those that with­
    hold benefits. See, e.g., Grove City College v. Bell, 
    465 U.S. 555
    , 575–576 (1984); Bob Jones Univ. v. United
    States, 
    461 U.S. 574
    , 602–604 (1983). Application of the
    less-restrictive limited-public-forum analysis better ac­
    counts for the fact that Hastings, through its RSO pro­
    gram, is dangling the carrot of subsidy, not wielding the
    stick of prohibition. Cf. Norwood v. Harrison, 
    413 U.S. 455
    , 463 (1973) (“That the Constitution may compel tol­
    eration of private discrimination in some circumstances
    does not mean that it requires state support for such
    discrimination.”).
    In sum, we are persuaded that our limited-public-forum
    precedents adequately respect both CLS’s speech and
    expressive-association rights, and fairly balance those
    rights against Hastings’ interests as property owner and
    educational institution. We turn to the merits of the
    ——————
    14 CLS also brackets with expressive-association precedents our deci­
    sion in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
    Boston, Inc., 
    515 U.S. 557
    (1995). There, a veterans group sponsoring
    a St. Patrick’s Day parade challenged a state law requiring it to allow
    gay individuals to march in the parade behind a banner celebrating
    their Irish heritage and sexual orientation. 
    Id., at 572.
    In evaluating
    that challenge, the Hurley Court focused on the veterans group’s
    interest in controlling the message conveyed by the organization. See
    
    id., at 573–581.
    Whether Hurley is best conceptualized as a speech or
    association case (or both), however, that precedent is of little help to
    CLS.      Hurley involved the application of a statewide public­
    accommodations law to the most traditional of public forums: the
    street. That context differs markedly from the limited public forum at
    issue here: a university’s application of an all-comers policy to its
    student-organization program.
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)                   17
    Opinion of the Court
    instant dispute, therefore, with the limited-public-forum
    decisions as our guide.
    B
    As earlier pointed 
    out, supra, at 1
    , 12–13, we do not
    write on a blank slate; we have three times before consid­
    ered clashes between public universities and student
    groups seeking official recognition or its attendant bene­
    fits. First, in Healy, a state college denied school affilia­
    tion to a student group that wished to form a local chapter
    of Students for a Democratic Society 
    (SDS). 408 U.S., at 170
    . Characterizing SDS’s mission as violent and disrup­
    tive, and finding the organization’s philosophy repugnant,
    the college completely banned the SDS chapter from cam­
    pus; in its effort to sever all channels of communication
    between students and the group, university officials went
    so far as to disband a meeting of SDS members in a cam­
    pus coffee shop. 
    Id., at 174–176.
    The college, we noted,
    could require “that a group seeking official recognition
    affirm in advance its willingness to adhere to reasonable
    campus law,” including “reasonable standards respecting
    conduct.” 
    Id., at 193.
    But a public educational institution
    exceeds constitutional bounds, we held, when it “restrict[s]
    speech or association simply because it finds the views
    expressed by [a] group to be abhorrent.” 
    Id., at 187–188.15
    ——————
    15 The dissent relies heavily on Healy, post, at 13–17, but its other­
    wise exhaustive account of the case elides the very fact the Healy Court
    identified as dispositive: The president of the college explicitly denied
    the student group official recognition because of the group’s viewpoint.
    See 408 U. S, at 187 (“The mere disagreement of the President with the
    group’s philosophy affords no reason to deny it recognition.”). In this
    case, in contrast, Hastings denied CLS recognition not because the
    school wanted to silence the “viewpoint that CLS sought to express
    through its membership requirements,” post, at 17, n. 2, but because
    CLS, insisting on preferential treatment, declined to comply with the
    open-access policy applicable to all RSOs, see R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 
    505 U.S. 377
    , 390 (1992) (“Where the [State] does not target conduct on the
    18    CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    Opinion of the Court
    We later relied on Healy in Widmar. In that case, a
    public university, in an effort to avoid state support for
    religion, had closed its facilities to a registered student
    group that sought to use university space for religious
    worship and 
    discussion. 454 U.S., at 264
    –265. “A univer­
    sity’s mission is education,” we observed, “and decisions of
    this Court have never denied a university’s authority to
    impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mis­
    sion upon the use of its campus and facilities.” 
    Id., at 268,
    n. 5. But because the university singled out religious
    organizations for disadvantageous treatment, we sub­
    jected the university’s regulation to strict scrutiny. 
    Id., at 269–270.
    The school’s interest “in maintaining strict
    separation of church and State,” we held, was not “suffi­
    ciently compelling to justify . . . [viewpoint] discrimination
    against . . . religious speech.” 
    Id., at 270,
    276 (internal
    quotation marks omitted).
    Most recently and comprehensively, in Rosenberger, we
    reiterated that a university generally may not withhold
    benefits from student groups because of their religious
    outlook. The officially recognized student group in Rosen
    berger was denied student-activity-fee funding to distrib­
    ——————
    basis of its expressive content, acts are not shielded from regulation
    merely because they express a discriminatory . . . philosophy.” (emphasis
    added)). As discussed infra, at 28–31, Hastings’ all-comers policy is
    paradigmatically viewpoint neutral. The dissent’s contention that “the
    identity of the student group” is the only “way of distinguishing Healy,”
    post, at 16, is thus untenable.
    The dissent’s description of Healy also omits the Healy Court’s
    observation that “[a] college administration may . . . requir[e] . . . that a
    group seeking official recognition affirm in advance its willingness to
    adhere to reasonable campus law. Such a requirement does not impose
    an impermissible condition on the students’ associational rights. . . . It
    merely constitutes an agreement to conform with reasonable standards
    respecting conduct. . . . [T]he benefits of participation in the internal
    life of the college community may be denied to any group that reserves
    the right to violate any valid campus rules with which it 
    disagrees.” 408 U.S., at 193
    –194.
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)           19
    Opinion of the Court
    ute a newspaper because the publication discussed issues
    from a Christian 
    perspective. 515 U.S., at 825
    –827. By
    “select[ing] for disfavored treatment those student journal­
    istic efforts with religious editorial viewpoints,” we held,
    the university had engaged in “viewpoint discrimination,
    which is presumed impermissible when directed against
    speech otherwise within the forum’s limitations.” 
    Id., at 831,
    830.
    In all three cases, we ruled that student groups had
    been unconstitutionally singled out because of their points
    of view. “Once it has opened a limited [public] forum,” we
    emphasized, “the State must respect the lawful bounda­
    ries it has itself set.” 
    Id., at 829.
    The constitutional con­
    straints on the boundaries the State may set bear repeti­
    tion here: “The State may not exclude speech where its
    distinction is not reasonable in light of the purpose served
    by the forum, . . . nor may it discriminate against speech
    on the basis of . . . viewpoint.” 
    Ibid. (internal quotation marks
    omitted).
    C
    We first consider whether Hastings’ policy is reasonable
    taking into account the RSO forum’s function and “all the
    surrounding circumstances.” 
    Cornelius, 473 U.S., at 809
    .
    1
    Our inquiry is shaped by the educational context in
    which it arises: “First Amendment rights,” we have ob­
    served, “must be analyzed in light of the special character­
    istics of the school environment.” 
    Widmar, 454 U.S., at 268
    , n. 5 (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court
    is the final arbiter of the question whether a public uni­
    versity has exceeded constitutional constraints, and we
    owe no deference to universities when we consider that
    question. Cf. Pell v. Procunier, 
    417 U.S. 817
    , 827 (1974)
    (“Courts cannot, of course, abdicate their constitutional
    20   CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    Opinion of the Court
    responsibility to delineate and protect fundamental liber­
    ties.”). Cognizant that judges lack the on-the-ground
    expertise and experience of school administrators, how­
    ever, we have cautioned courts in various contexts to
    resist “substitut[ing] their own notions of sound educa­
    tional policy for those of the school authorities which they
    review.” Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central School
    Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 
    458 U.S. 176
    , 206
    (1982). See also, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhl
    meier, 
    484 U.S. 260
    , 273 (1988) (noting our “oft-expressed
    view that the education of the Nation’s youth is primarily
    the responsibility of parents, teachers, and state and local
    school officials, and not of federal judges”); 
    Healy, 408 U.S., at 180
    (“[T]his Court has long recognized ‘the need
    for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States
    and of school officials, consistent with fundamental consti­
    tutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in
    the schools.’ ” (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
    Community School Dist., 
    393 U.S. 503
    , 507 (1969))).
    A college’s commission—and its concomitant license to
    choose among pedagogical approaches—is not confined to
    the classroom, for extracurricular programs are, today,
    essential parts of the educational process. See Board of
    Ed. of Independent School Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie
    Cty. v. Earls, 
    536 U.S. 822
    , 831, n. 4 (2002) (involvement
    in student groups is “a significant contributor to the
    breadth and quality of the educational experience” (inter­
    nal quotation marks omitted)). Schools, we have empha­
    sized, enjoy “a significant measure of authority over the
    type of officially recognized activities in which their stu­
    dents participate.” Board of Ed. of Westside Community
    Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 
    496 U.S. 226
    , 240 (1990).
    We therefore “approach our task with special caution,”
    
    Healy, 408 U.S., at 171
    , mindful that Hastings’ decisions
    about the character of its student-group program are due
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)                    21
    Opinion of the Court
    decent respect.16
    2
    With appropriate regard for school administrators’
    judgment, we review the justifications Hastings offers in
    defense of its all-comers requirement.17 First, the open­
    access policy “ensures that the leadership, educational,
    and social opportunities afforded by [RSOs] are available
    ——————
    16 The dissent mischaracterizes the nature of the respect we accord to
    Hastings. See post, at 1, 15–16, 27. As 
    noted supra, at 19
    –20, this
    Court, exercising its independent judgment, must “interpre[t] and
    appl[y] . . . the right to free speech.” Post, at 16. But determinations of
    what constitutes sound educational policy or what goals a student­
    organization forum ought to serve fall within the discretion of school
    administrators and educators. See, e.g., Board of Ed. of Hendrick
    Hudson Central School Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 
    458 U.S. 176
    ,
    206 (1982).
    17 Although the dissent maintains it is “content to address the consti­
    tutionality of Hastings’ actions under our limited public forum cases,”
    post, at 17, it resists the import of those cases at every turn. For
    example, although the dissent acknowledges that a university has the
    authority to set the boundaries of a limited public forum, post, at 17, 24,
    the dissent refuses to credit Hastings’ all-comers policy as one of those
    boundaries. See 
    ibid. (insisting that “Hastings’
    regulations . . . impose
    only two substantive limitations: A group . . . must have student
    members and must be non-commercial.”). In short, “the design of the
    RSO forum,” post, at 26, which the dissent discusses at length, post, at
    24–31, is of its own tailoring.
    Another example: The dissent pointedly observes that “[w]hile there
    can be no question that the State of California could not impose [an all­
    comers] restrictio[n] on all religious groups in the State, the Court now
    holds that Hastings, a state institution, may impose these very same
    requirements on students who wish to participate in a forum that is
    designed to foster the expression of diverse viewpoints.” Post, at 27. As
    
    noted supra, at 12
    –13, and n. 11, this difference reflects the lesser
    standard of scrutiny applicable to limited public forums compared to
    other forums. The dissent fights the distinction between state prohibi
    tion and state support, but its real quarrel is with our limited public
    forum doctrine, which recognizes that distinction. CLS, it bears repeti­
    tion, remains free to express whatever it will, but it cannot insist on an
    exemption from Hastings’ embracive all-comers policy.
    22    CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    Opinion of the Court
    to all students.” Brief for Hastings 32; see Brief for
    American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae 11.
    Just as “Hastings does not allow its professors to host
    classes open only to those students with a certain status or
    belief,” so the Law School may decide, reasonably in our
    view, “that the . . . educational experience is best promoted
    when all participants in the forum must provide equal
    access to all students.” Brief for Hastings 32. RSOs,
    we count it significant, are eligible for financial assist-
    ance drawn from mandatory student-activity fees, 
    see supra, at 3
    ; the all-comers policy ensures that no Hastings
    student is forced to fund a group that would reject her as a
    member.18
    Second, the all-comers requirement helps Hastings
    police the written terms of its Nondiscrimination Policy
    without inquiring into an RSO’s motivation for member­
    ship restrictions. To bring the RSO program within CLS’s
    view of the Constitution’s limits, CLS proposes that Hast­
    ings permit exclusion because of belief but forbid discrimi­
    nation due to status. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 18. But that
    proposal would impose on Hastings a daunting labor.
    How should the Law School go about determining whether
    a student organization cloaked prohibited status exclusion
    in belief-based garb? If a hypothetical Male-Superiority
    Club barred a female student from running for its presi­
    dency, for example, how could the Law School tell whether
    the group rejected her bid because of her sex or because,
    by seeking to lead the club, she manifested a lack of belief
    in its fundamental philosophy?
    This case itself is instructive in this regard. CLS con­
    tends that it does not exclude individuals because of sex­
    ——————
    18 CLS notes that its “activities—its Bible studies, speakers, and din­
    ners—are open to all students,” even if attendees are barred from
    membership and leadership. Reply Brief 20. Welcoming all comers as
    guests or auditors, however, is hardly equivalent to accepting all
    comers as full-fledged participants.
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)                 23
    Opinion of the Court
    ual orientation, but rather “on the basis of a conjunction of
    conduct and the belief that the conduct is not wrong.”
    Brief for Petitioner 35–36 (emphasis deleted). Our deci­
    sions have declined to distinguish between status and
    conduct in this context. See Lawrence v. Texas, 
    539 U.S. 558
    , 575 (2003) (“When homosexual conduct is made
    criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of
    itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to
    discrimination.” (emphasis added)); 
    id., at 583
    (O’Connor,
    J., concurring in judgment) (“While it is true that the law
    applies only to conduct, the conduct targeted by this law is
    conduct that is closely correlated with being homosexual.
    Under such circumstances, [the] law is targeted at more
    than conduct. It is instead directed toward gay persons as
    a class.”); cf. Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic,
    
    506 U.S. 263
    , 270 (1993) (“A tax on wearing yarmulkes is
    a tax on Jews.”). See also Brief for Lambda Legal Defense
    and Education Fund, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae 7–20.
    Third, the Law School reasonably adheres to the view
    that an all-comers policy, to the extent it brings together
    individuals with diverse backgrounds and beliefs, “encour­
    ages tolerance, cooperation, and learning among stu­
    dents.” App. 349.19 And if the policy sometimes produces
    discord, Hastings can rationally rank among RSO­
    program goals development of conflict-resolution skills,
    toleration, and readiness to find common ground.
    Fourth, Hastings’ policy, which incorporates—in fact,
    subsumes—state-law proscriptions on discrimination,
    conveys the Law School’s decision “to decline to subsidize
    with public monies and benefits conduct of which the
    ——————
    19 CLS’s predecessor organization, the Hastings Christian Fellowship
    (HCF), experienced these benefits first-hand when it welcomed an
    openly gay student as a member during the 2003–2004 academic year.
    That student, testified another HCF member, “was a joy to have” in the
    group and brought a unique perspective to Bible-study discussions. See
    App. 325, 327.
    24    CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    Opinion of the Court
    people of California disapprove.” Brief for Hastings 35;
    
    id., at 33–34
    (citing Cal. Educ. Code §66270 (prohibiting
    discrimination on various bases)). State law, of course,
    may not command that public universities take action
    impermissible under the First Amendment. But so long as
    a public university does not contravene constitutional
    limits, its choice to advance state-law goals through the
    school’s educational endeavors stands on firm footing.
    In sum, the several justifications Hastings asserts in
    support of its all-comers requirement are surely reason­
    able in light of the RSO forum’s purposes.20
    3
    The Law School’s policy is all the more creditworthy in
    view of the “substantial alternative channels that remain
    open for [CLS-student] communication to take place.”
    Perry Ed. 
    Assn., 460 U.S., at 53
    . If restrictions on access
    to a limited public forum are viewpoint discriminatory, the
    ability of a group to exist outside the forum would not cure
    the constitutional shortcoming. But when access barriers
    are viewpoint neutral, our decisions have counted it sig­
    nificant that other available avenues for the group to
    exercise its First Amendment rights lessen the burden
    created by those barriers. See ibid.; 
    Cornelius, 473 U.S., at 809
    ; Greer v. Spock, 
    424 U.S. 828
    , 839 (1976); 
    Pell, 417 U.S., at 827
    –828.
    In this case, Hastings offered CLS access to school facili­
    ties to conduct meetings and the use of chalkboards and
    generally available bulletin boards to advertise events.
    App. 232–233. Although CLS could not take advantage of
    RSO-specific methods of communication, 
    see supra, at 3
    ,
    the advent of electronic media and social-networking sites
    reduces the importance of those channels. See App. 114–
    ——————
    20 Although the Law School has offered multiple justifications for its
    all-comers policy, we do not suggest that each of them is necessary for
    the policy to survive constitutional review.
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)                    25
    Opinion of the Court
    115 (CLS maintained a Yahoo! message group to dissemi­
    nate information to students.); Christian Legal Society v.
    Walker, 
    453 F.3d 853
    , 874 (CA7 2006) (Wood, J., dissent­
    ing) (“Most universities and colleges, and most college­
    aged students, communicate through email, websites, and
    hosts like MySpace . . . . If CLS had its own website, any
    student at the school with access to Google—that is, all of
    them—could easily have found it.”). See also Brief for
    Associated Students of the University of California, Hast­
    ings College of Law as Amicus Curiae 14–18 (describing
    host of ways CLS could communicate with Hastings’ stu­
    dents outside official channels).
    Private groups, from fraternities and sororities to social
    clubs and secret societies, commonly maintain a presence
    at universities without official school affiliation.21 Based
    on the record before us, CLS was similarly situated: It
    hosted a variety of activities the year after Hastings de­
    nied it recognition, and the number of students attending
    those meetings and events doubled. App. 224, 229–230.
    “The variety and type of alternative modes of access pre­
    sent here,” in short, “compare favorably with those in
    other [limited public] forum cases where we have upheld
    restrictions on access.” Perry Ed. 
    Assn., 460 U.S., at 53
    –
    54. It is beyond dissenter’s license, we note again, 
    see supra, at 21
    , n. 17, constantly to maintain that nonrecog­
    nition of a student organization is equivalent to prohibit­
    ing its members from speaking.
    ——————
    21 See,  e.g., Baker, Despite Lack of University Recognition, Pi Kappa
    Theta Continues to Grow, The New Hampshire, Sept. 28, 2009, pp. 1, 5
    (unrecognized fraternity able to grow despite severed ties with the
    University of New Hampshire); Battey, Final Clubs Provide Controver­
    sial Social Outlet, Yale Daily News, Apr. 5, 2006, pp. 1, 4 (Harvard
    social clubs, known as “final clubs,” “play a large role in the experience
    of . . . students” even though “they became completely disassociated
    from the university in 1984”).
    26    CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    Opinion of the Court
    4
    CLS nevertheless deems Hastings’ all-comers policy
    “frankly absurd.” Brief for Petitioner 49. “There can be no
    diversity of viewpoints in a forum,” it asserts, “if groups
    are not permitted to form around viewpoints.” 
    Id., at 50;
    accord post, at 25 (ALITO, J., dissenting). This catchphrase
    confuses CLS’s preferred policy with constitutional limita­
    tion—the advisability of Hastings’ policy does not control
    its permissibility. See Wood v. Strickland, 
    420 U.S. 308
    ,
    326 (1975). Instead, we have repeatedly stressed that a
    State’s restriction on access to a limited public forum
    “need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable
    limitation.” 
    Cornelius, 473 U.S., at 808
    .22
    CLS also assails the reasonableness of the all-comers
    policy in light of the RSO forum’s function by forecasting
    that the policy will facilitate hostile takeovers; if organiza­
    tions must open their arms to all, CLS contends, saboteurs
    will infiltrate groups to subvert their mission and mes­
    sage. This supposition strikes us as more hypothetical
    than real. CLS points to no history or prospect of RSO­
    hijackings at Hastings. Cf. National Endowment for Arts
    v. Finley, 
    524 U.S. 569
    , 584 (1998) (“[W]e are reluctant
    . . . to invalidate legislation on the basis of its hypothetical
    application to situations not before the Court.” (internal
    quotation marks omitted)). Students tend to self-sort and
    presumably will not endeavor en masse to join—let alone
    ——————
    22 CLS’s concern, shared by the dissent, see post, at 25–26, that an
    all-comers policy will squelch diversity has not been borne out by
    Hastings’ experience. In the 2004–2005 academic year, approximately
    60 student organizations, representing a variety of interests, registered
    with Hastings, from the Clara Foltz Feminist Association, to the
    Environmental Law Society, to the Hastings Chinese Law and Culture
    Society. App. 215, 237–238. Three of these 60 registered groups had a
    religious orientation: Hastings Association of Muslim Law Students,
    Hastings Jewish Law Students Association, and Hastings Koinonia.
    
    Id., at 215–216.
                         Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)                    27
    Opinion of the Court
    seek leadership positions in—groups pursuing missions
    wholly at odds with their personal beliefs. And if a rogue
    student intent on sabotaging an organization’s objectives
    nevertheless attempted a takeover, the members of that
    group would not likely elect her as an officer.
    RSOs, moreover, in harmony with the all-comers policy,
    may condition eligibility for membership and leadership
    on attendance, the payment of dues, or other neutral
    requirements designed to ensure that students join be­
    cause of their commitment to a group’s vitality, not its
    demise. 
    See supra, at 4
    , n. 2. Several RSOs at Hastings
    limit their membership rolls and officer slates in just this
    way. See, e.g., App. 192 (members must “[p]ay their dues
    on a timely basis” and “attend meetings regularly”); 
    id., at 173
    (members must complete an application and pay dues;
    “[a]ny active member who misses a semester of regularly
    scheduled meetings shall be dropped from rolls”); App. to
    Pet. for Cert. 129a (“Only Hastings students who have
    held membership in this organization for a minimum of
    one semester shall be eligible to be an officer.”).23
    Hastings, furthermore, could reasonably expect more
    from its law students than the disruptive behavior CLS
    hypothesizes—and to build this expectation into its educa­
    tional approach. A reasonable policy need not anticipate
    and preemptively close off every opportunity for avoidance
    or manipulation. If students begin to exploit an all-comers
    policy by hijacking organizations to distort or destroy their
    missions, Hastings presumably would revisit and revise
    its policy. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 41 (counsel for Hastings);
    Brief for Hastings 38.
    Finally, CLS asserts (and the dissent repeats, post, at
    ——————
    23 As Hastings notes, other “checks [are also] in place” to prevent
    RSO-sabotage. Brief for Hastings 43, n. 16. “The [Law] School’s
    student code of conduct applies to RSO activities and, inter alia, prohib­
    its obstruction or disruption, disorderly conduct, and threats.” 
    Ibid. (internal quotation marks
    and brackets omitted).
    28    CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    Opinion of the Court
    29) that the Law School lacks any legitimate interest—let
    alone one reasonably related to the RSO forum’s pur­
    poses—in urging “religious groups not to favor co­
    religionists for purposes of their religious activities.” Brief
    for Petitioner 43; 
    id., at 50.
    CLS’s analytical error lies in
    focusing on the benefits it must forgo while ignoring the
    interests of those it seeks to fence out: Exclusion, after all,
    has two sides. Hastings, caught in the crossfire between a
    group’s desire to exclude and students’ demand for equal
    access, may reasonably draw a line in the sand permitting
    all organizations to express what they wish but no group
    to discriminate in membership.24
    D
    We next consider whether Hastings’ all-comers policy is
    viewpoint neutral.
    1
    Although this aspect of limited-public-forum analysis
    has been the constitutional sticking point in our prior
    decisions, as earlier 
    recounted, supra, at 17
    –19, we need
    not dwell on it here. It is, after all, hard to imagine a
    more viewpoint-neutral policy than one requiring all
    student groups to accept all comers. In contrast to Healy,
    Widmar, and Rosenberger, in which universities singled
    out organizations for disfavored treatment because of their
    ——————
    24 In arguing that the all-comers policy is not reasonable in light of
    the RSO forum’s purposes, the dissent notes that Title VII, which
    prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of religion, among
    other categories, provides an exception for religious associations. Post,
    at 28, n. 8. The question here, however, is not whether Hastings could,
    consistent with the Constitution, provide religious groups dispensation
    from the all-comers policy by permitting them to restrict membership to
    those who share their faith. It is instead whether Hastings must grant
    that exemption. This Court’s decision in Employment Div., Dept. of
    Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 
    494 U.S. 872
    , 878–882 (1990),
    unequivocally answers no to that latter question. See also infra, at 31,
    n. 27.
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)                    29
    Opinion of the Court
    points of view, Hastings’ all-comers requirement draws no
    distinction between groups based on their message or
    perspective. An all-comers condition on access to RSO
    status, in short, is textbook viewpoint neutral.25
    2
    Conceding that Hastings’ all-comers policy is “nominally
    neutral,” CLS attacks the regulation by pointing to its
    effect: The policy is vulnerable to constitutional assault,
    CLS contends, because “it systematically and predictably
    burdens most heavily those groups whose viewpoints are
    out of favor with the campus mainstream.” Brief for Peti­
    tioner 51; cf. post, at 1 (ALITO, J., dissenting) (charging
    that Hastings’ policy favors “political[ly] correc[t]” student
    expression). This argument stumbles from its first step
    because “[a] regulation that serves purposes unrelated to
    the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has
    an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not
    ——————
    25 Relying  exclusively on Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v.
    Southworth, 
    529 U.S. 217
    (2000), the dissent “would not be so quick to
    jump to th[e] conclusion” that the all-comers policy is viewpoint neu­
    tral. Post, at 31, and 31–32, n. 10. Careful consideration of South
    worth, however, reveals how desperate the dissent’s argument is. In
    Southworth, university students challenged a mandatory student­
    activity fee used to fund student groups. Finding the political and
    ideological speech of certain groups offensive, the student-challengers
    argued that imposition of the fee violated their First Amendment
    
    rights. 529 U.S., at 221
    . This Court upheld the university’s choice to
    subsidize groups whose expression some students found distasteful, but
    we admonished that the university could not “prefer some viewpoints to
    others” in the distribution of funds. 
    Id., at 233.
    We cautioned that the
    university’s referendum process, which allowed students to vote on
    whether a student organization would receive financial support, risked
    violation of this principle by allowing students to select groups to fund
    based on their viewpoints. 
    Id., at 235.
    In this case, in contrast, the all­
    comers policy governs all RSOs; Hastings does not pick and choose
    which organizations must comply with the policy on the basis of view­
    point. App. 221. Southworth accordingly provides no support for the
    dissent’s warped analysis.
    30   CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    Opinion of the Court
    others.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 
    491 U.S. 781
    , 791
    (1989). See also Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc.,
    
    512 U.S. 753
    , 763 (1994) (“[T]he fact that the injunction
    covered people with a particular viewpoint does not itself
    render the injunction content or viewpoint based.”).
    Even if a regulation has a differential impact on groups
    wishing to enforce exclusionary membership policies,
    “[w]here the [State] does not target conduct on the basis of
    its expressive content, acts are not shielded from regula­
    tion merely because they express a discriminatory idea or
    philosophy.” R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 
    505 U.S. 377
    , 390
    (1992). See also 
    Roberts, 468 U.S., at 623
    (State’s nondis­
    crimination law did not “distinguish between prohibited
    and permitted activity on the basis of viewpoint.”); Board
    of Directors of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 
    481 U.S. 537
    , 549 (1987) (same).
    Hastings’ requirement that student groups accept all
    comers, we are satisfied, “is justified without reference to
    the content [or viewpoint] of the regulated speech.” 
    Ward, 491 U.S., at 791
    (internal quotation marks and emphasis
    omitted). The Law School’s policy aims at the act of reject­
    ing would-be group members without reference to the
    reasons motivating that behavior: Hastings’ “desire to
    redress th[e] perceived harms” of exclusionary member­
    ship policies “provides an adequate explanation for its [all­
    comers condition] over and above mere disagreement with
    [any student group’s] beliefs or biases.” Wisconsin v.
    Mitchell, 
    508 U.S. 476
    , 488 (1993). CLS’s conduct—not
    its Christian perspective—is, from Hastings’ vantage
    point, what stands between the group and RSO status.
    “In the end,” as Hastings observes, “CLS is simply confus­
    ing its own viewpoint-based objections to . . . nondiscrimi­
    nation laws (which it is entitled to have and [to] voice)
    with viewpoint discrimination.” Brief for Hastings 31.26
    ——————
    26 Although   registered student groups must conform their conduct to
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)                    31
    Opinion of the Court
    Finding Hastings’ open-access condition on RSO status
    reasonable and viewpoint neutral, we reject CLS’ free­
    speech and expressive-association claims.27
    IV
    In its reply brief, CLS contends that “[t]he peculiarity,
    incoherence, and suspect history of the all-comers policy
    all point to pretext.” Reply Brief 23. Neither the District
    Court nor the Ninth Circuit addressed an argument that
    Hastings selectively enforces its all-comers policy, and this
    Court is not the proper forum to air the issue in the first
    instance.28 On remand, the Ninth Circuit may consider
    ——————
    the Law School’s regulation by dropping access barriers, they may
    express any viewpoint they wish—including a discriminatory one. Cf.
    Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 
    547 U.S. 47
    , 60 (2006) (“As a general matter, the Solomon Amendment
    regulates conduct, not speech. It affects what law schools must do—
    afford equal access to military recruiters—not what they may or may
    not say.”). Today’s decision thus continues this Court’s tradition of
    “protect[ing] the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’ ” Post,
    at 1 (ALITO, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Schwimmer, 
    279 U.S. 644
    , 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
    27 CLS briefly argues that Hastings’ all-comers condition violates the
    Free Exercise Clause. Brief for Petitioner 40–41. Our decision in
    Smith, 
    494 U.S. 872
    , forecloses that argument. In Smith, the Court
    held that the Free Exercise Clause does not inhibit enforcement of
    otherwise valid regulations of general application that incidentally
    burden religious conduct. 
    Id., at 878–882.
    In seeking an exemption
    from Hastings’ across-the-board all-comers policy, CLS, we repeat,
    seeks preferential, not equal, treatment; it therefore cannot moor its
    request for accommodation to the Free Exercise Clause.
    28 Finding the Ninth Circuit’s analysis cursory, the dissent repeatedly
    urges us to resolve the pretext question. See, e.g., post, at 2, 31–35, and
    17, n. 2. In doing so, the dissent forgets that “we are a court of review,
    not of first view.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 
    544 U.S. 709
    , 718, n. 7 (2005).
    When the lower courts have failed to address an argument that de­
    served their attention, our usual practice is to remand for further
    consideration, not to seize the opportunity to decide the question
    ourselves. That is especially true when we agree to review an issue on
    the understanding that “[t]he material facts . . . are undisputed,” as
    32    CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    Opinion of the Court
    CLS’s pretext argument if, and to the extent, it is
    preserved.29
    *     *   *
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Court of Ap­
    peals’ ruling that the all-comers policy is constitutional
    and remand the case for further proceedings consistent
    with this opinion.
    It is so ordered.
    ——————
    CLS’s petition for certiorari emphasized was the case here. Pet. for
    Cert. 2.
    29 The dissent’s pretext discussion presents a one-sided summary of
    the record evidence, post, at 31–34, an account depending in large part
    on impugning the veracity of a distinguished legal scholar and a well
    respected school administrator, post, at 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 24, 32, 34.
    See 
    also supra, at 10
    , n. 7.
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)            1
    STEVENS, J., concurring
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    _________________
    No. 08–1371
    _________________
    CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY CHAPTER OF THE UNI-
    VERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, HASTINGS COLLEGE OF
    THE LAW, AKA HASTINGS CHRISTIAN FELLOW-
    SHIP, PETITIONER v. LEO P. MARTINEZ ET AL.
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
    APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    [June 28, 2010]
    JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring.
    The Court correctly confines its discussion to the narrow
    issue presented by the record, see ante, at 8–12, and cor
    rectly upholds the all-comers policy. I join its opinion
    without reservation. Because the dissent has volunteered
    an argument that the school’s general Nondiscrimination
    Policy would be “plainly” unconstitutional if applied to this
    case, post, at 18 (opinion of ALITO, J.), a brief response
    is appropriate. In my view, both policies are plainly
    legitimate.
    The Hastings College of Law’s (Hastings) Nondiscrimi
    nation Policy contains boilerplate language used by insti
    tutions and workplaces across the country: It prohibits
    “unlawfu[l]” discrimination “on the basis of race, color,
    religion, national origin, ancestry, disability, age, sex or
    sexual orientation.” App. 220. Petitioner, the Hastings
    chapter of the Christian Legal Society (CLS), refused to
    comply. As the Court explains, ante, at 5–6, CLS was
    unwilling to admit members unless they affirmed their
    belief in certain Christian doctrines and refrained from
    “participation in or advocacy of a sexually immoral life
    style,” App. 146. CLS, in short, wanted to receive the
    school’s formal recognition—and the benefits that attend
    2     CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    STEVENS, J., concurring
    formal recognition—while continuing to exclude gay and
    non-Christian students (as well as, it seems, students who
    advocate for gay rights).
    In the dissent’s view, by refusing to grant CLS an ex
    emption from the Nondiscrimination Policy, Hastings
    violated CLS’s rights, for by proscribing unlawful dis
    crimination on the basis of religion, the policy discrimi
    nates unlawfully on the basis of religion. There are nu
    merous reasons why this counterintuitive theory is
    unsound. Although the First Amendment may protect
    CLS’s discriminatory practices off campus, it does not
    require a public university to validate or support them.
    As written, the Nondiscrimination Policy is content and
    viewpoint neutral. It does not reflect a judgment by school
    officials about the substance of any student group’s
    speech. Nor does it exclude any would-be groups on the
    basis of their convictions. Indeed, it does not regulate
    expression or belief at all. The policy is “directed at the
    organization’s activities rather than its philosophy,” Healy
    v. James, 
    408 U.S. 169
    , 188 (1972). Those who hold reli
    gious beliefs are not “singled out,” post, at 19 (ALITO, J.,
    dissenting); those who engage in discriminatory conduct
    based on someone else’s religious status and belief are
    singled out.1 Regardless of whether they are the product
    ——————
    1 The dissent appears to accept that Hastings may prohibit discrimi
    nation on the basis of religious status, though it rejects the notion that
    Hastings may do the same for religious belief. See, e.g., post, at 22, n. 5,
    28. If CLS sought to exclude a Muslim student in virtue of the fact that
    he “is” Muslim, the dissent suggests, there would be no problem in
    Hastings forbidding that. But if CLS sought to exclude the same
    student in virtue of the fact that he subscribes to the Muslim faith,
    Hastings must stand idly by. This proposition is not only unworkable
    in practice but also flawed in conception. A person’s religion often
    simultaneously constitutes or informs a status, an identity, a set of
    beliefs and practices, and much else besides. (So does sexual orienta
    tion for that matter, see ante, at 22–23, notwithstanding the dissent’s
    view that a rule excluding those who engage in “unrepentant homosex
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)                     3
    STEVENS, J., concurring
    of secular or spiritual feeling, hateful or benign motives,
    all acts of religious discrimination are equally covered.
    The discriminator’s beliefs are simply irrelevant. There is,
    moreover, no evidence that the policy was adopted because
    of any reason related to the particular views that religious
    individuals or groups might have, much less because of a
    desire to suppress or distort those views. The policy’s
    religion clause was plainly meant to promote, not to un
    dermine, religious freedom.
    To be sure, the policy may end up having greater conse
    quence for religious groups—whether and to what extent
    it will is far from clear ex ante—inasmuch as they are
    more likely than their secular counterparts to wish to
    exclude students of particular faiths. But there is likewise
    no evidence that the policy was intended to cause harm to
    religious groups, or that it has in practice caused signifi
    cant harm to their operations. And it is a basic tenet of
    First Amendment law that disparate impact does not, in
    itself, constitute viewpoint discrimination.2 The dissent
    ——————
    ual conduct,” App. 226, does not discriminate on the basis of status or
    identity, post, at 22–23.) Our First Amendment doctrine has never
    required university administrators to undertake the impossible task of
    separating out belief-based from status-based religious discrimination.
    2 See, e.g., Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 
    512 U.S. 753
    , 763
    (1994); R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 
    505 U.S. 377
    , 385 (1992); Board of Directors
    of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 
    481 U.S. 537
    , 549 (1987);
    Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 
    468 U.S. 609
    , 623, 628 (1984); cf.
    Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 
    494 U.S. 872
    , 878–879 (1990) (“We have never held that an individual’s religious
    beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohib
    iting conduct that the State is free to regulate”). Courts and commen
    tators have applied this insight to the exact situation posed by the
    Nondiscrimination Policy. See, e.g., Christian Legal Society v. Walker,
    
    453 F.3d 853
    , 866 (CA7 2006) (stating that “[t]here can be little doubt
    that” comparable nondiscrimination policy “is viewpoint neutral on its
    face”); Truth v. Kent School Dist., 
    542 F.3d 634
    , 649–650 (CA9 2008)
    (similar); Volokh, Freedom of Expressive Association and Government
    Subsidies, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1919, 1930–1938 (2006).
    4     CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    STEVENS, J., concurring
    has thus given no reason to be skeptical of the basic
    design, function, or rationale of the Nondiscrimination
    Policy.
    What the policy does reflect is a judgment that dis
    crimination by school officials or organizations on the
    basis of certain factors, such as race and religion, is less
    tolerable than discrimination on the basis of other factors.
    This approach may or may not be the wisest choice in the
    context of a Registered Student Organization (RSO) pro
    gram. But it is at least a reasonable choice. Academic
    administrators routinely employ antidiscrimination rules
    to promote tolerance, understanding, and respect, and to
    safeguard students from invidious forms of discrimination,
    including sexual orientation discrimination.3 Applied to
    the RSO context, these values can, in turn, advance nu
    merous pedagogical objectives.         See post, at 3–4
    (KENNEDY, J., concurring).
    It is critical, in evaluating CLS’s challenge to the Non
    discrimination Policy, to keep in mind that an RSO pro
    gram is a limited forum—the boundaries of which may be
    delimited by the proprietor. When a religious association,
    or a secular association, operates in a wholly public set
    ting, it must be allowed broad freedom to control its mem
    bership and its message, even if its decisions cause offense
    to outsiders. Profound constitutional problems would
    arise if the State of California tried to “demand that all
    Christian groups admit members who believe that Jesus
    ——————
    3 In a case about an antidiscrimination policy that, even if ill-advised,
    is explicitly directed at preventing religious discrimination, it is rather
    hard to swallow the dissent’s ominous closing remarks. See post, at 37
    (suggesting that today’s decision “point[s] a judicial dagger at the heart
    of” religious groups in the United States (internal quotation marks
    omitted)). Although the dissent is willing to see pernicious antireligi
    ous motives and implications where there are none, it does not seem
    troubled by the fact that religious sects, unfortunately, are not the only
    social groups who have been persecuted throughout history simply for
    being who they are.
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)           5
    STEVENS, J., concurring
    was merely human.” Post, at 27 (ALITO, J., dissenting).
    But the CLS chapter that brought this lawsuit does not
    want to be just a Christian group; it aspires to be a recog
    nized student organization. The Hastings College of Law
    is not a legislature. And no state actor has demanded that
    anyone do anything outside the confines of a discrete,
    voluntary academic program. Although it may be the case
    that to some “university students, the campus is their
    world,” post, at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted), it
    does not follow that the campus ought to be equated with
    the public square.
    The campus is, in fact, a world apart from the public
    square in numerous respects, and religious organizations,
    as well as all other organizations, must abide by certain
    norms of conduct when they enter an academic commu
    nity. Public universities serve a distinctive role in a mod
    ern democratic society. Like all specialized government
    entities, they must make countless decisions about how to
    allocate resources in pursuit of their role. Some of those
    decisions will be controversial; many will have differential
    effects across populations; virtually all will entail value
    judgments of some kind. As a general matter, courts
    should respect universities’ judgments and let them man
    age their own affairs.
    The RSO forum is no different. It is not an open com
    mons that Hastings happens to maintain. It is a mecha
    nism through which Hastings confers certain benefits and
    pursues certain aspects of its educational mission. Having
    exercised its discretion to establish an RSO program, a
    university must treat all participants evenhandedly. But
    the university need not remain neutral—indeed it could
    not remain neutral—in determining which goals the pro
    gram will serve and which rules are best suited to facili
    tate those goals. These are not legal questions but policy
    questions; they are not for the Court but for the university
    to make. When any given group refuses to comply with
    6    CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    STEVENS, J., concurring
    the rules, the RSO sponsor need not admit that group at
    the cost of undermining the program and the values re
    flected therein. On many levels, a university administra
    tor has a “greater interest in the content of student activi
    ties than the police chief has in the content of a soapbox
    oration.” Widmar v. Vincent, 
    454 U.S. 263
    , 280 (1981)
    (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment).
    In this case, petitioner excludes students who will not
    sign its Statement of Faith or who engage in “unrepentant
    homosexual conduct,” App. 226. The expressive associa
    tion argument it presses, however, is hardly limited to
    these facts. Other groups may exclude or mistreat Jews,
    blacks, and women—or those who do not share their con
    tempt for Jews, blacks, and women. A free society must
    tolerate such groups. It need not subsidize them, give
    them its official imprimatur, or grant them equal access to
    law school facilities.
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)            1
    KENNEDY, J., concurring
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    _________________
    No. 08–1371
    _________________
    CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY CHAPTER OF THE UNI-
    VERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, HASTINGS COLLEGE OF
    THE LAW, AKA HASTINGS CHRISTIAN FELLOW-
    SHIP, PETITIONER v. LEO P. MARTINEZ ET AL.
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
    APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    [June 28, 2010]
    JUSTICE KENNEDY, concurring.
    To be effective, a limited forum often will exclude some
    speakers based on their affiliation (e.g., student versus
    nonstudent) or based on the content of their speech, inter
    ests, and expertise (e.g., art professor not chosen as
    speaker for conference on public transit). When the gov
    ernment does exclude from a limited forum, however,
    other content-based judgments may be impermissible. For
    instance, an otherwise qualified and relevant speaker may
    not be excluded because of hostility to his or her views or
    beliefs. See Healy v. James, 
    408 U.S. 169
    , 187–188
    (1972).
    In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 
    515 U.S. 819
    (1995), the essential purpose of the limited
    forum was to facilitate the expression of differing views in
    the context of student publications. The forum was lim
    ited because it was confined: first, to student-run groups;
    and second, to publications. The forum was created in the
    long tradition of using newspapers and other publications
    to express differing views and also in the honored tradi
    tion of a university setting that stimulates the free ex
    change of ideas. See 
    id., at 835
    (“[I]n the University set
    ting, . . . the State acts against a background and tradition
    2    CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    KENNEDY, J., concurring
    of thought and experiment that is at the center of our
    intellectual and philosophic tradition”). These considera
    tions supported the Court’s conclusion that, under the
    First Amendment, a limited forum for student-run publi
    cations did not permit the exclusion of a paper for the
    reason that it was devoted to expressing religious views.
    Rosenberger is distinguishable from the instant case in
    various respects. Not least is that here the school policy in
    question is not content based either in its formulation or
    evident purpose; and were it shown to be otherwise, the
    case likely should have a different outcome. Here, the
    policy applies equally to all groups and views. And, given
    the stipulation of the parties, there is no basis for an
    allegation that the design or purpose of the rule was, by
    subterfuge, to discriminate based on viewpoint.
    An objection might be that the all-comers policy, even if
    not so designed or intended, in fact makes it difficult for
    certain groups to express their views in a manner essen
    tial to their message. A group that can limit membership
    to those who agree in full with its aims and purposes may
    be more effective in delivering its message or furthering
    its expressive objectives; and the Court has recognized
    that this interest can be protected against governmental
    interference or regulation. See Boy Scouts of America v.
    Dale, 
    530 U.S. 640
    (2000). By allowing like-minded stu
    dents to form groups around shared identities, a school
    creates room for self-expression and personal develop
    ment. See Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v.
    Southworth, 
    529 U.S. 217
    , 229 (2000) (“The University’s
    whole justification for [its student activity program] is
    that it springs from the initiative of the students, who
    alone give it purpose and content in the course of their
    extracurricular endeavors”).
    In the instant case, however, if the membership qualifi
    cation were enforced, it would contradict a legitimate
    purpose for having created the limited forum in the first
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)              3
    KENNEDY, J., concurring
    place. Many educational institutions, including respon
    dent Hastings College of Law, have recognized that the
    process of learning occurs both formally in a classroom
    setting and informally outside of it. See 
    id., at 233.
    Stu
    dents may be shaped as profoundly by their peers as by
    their teachers. Extracurricular activities, such as those in
    the Hastings “Registered Student Organization” program,
    facilitate interactions between students, enabling them to
    explore new points of view, to develop interests and tal
    ents, and to nurture a growing sense of self. See Board of
    Ed. of Independent School Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie
    Cty. v. Earls, 
    536 U.S. 822
    , 831, n. 4 (2002) (participation
    in extracurricular activities is “ ‘a significant contributor to
    the breadth and quality of the educational experience’ ”).
    The Hasting program is designed to allow all students to
    interact with their colleagues across a broad, seemingly
    unlimited range of ideas, views, and activities. See Re
    gents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 
    438 U.S. 265
    , 312, 313,
    n. 48 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (“[A] great deal of learn
    ing . . . occurs through interactions among students . . .
    who have a wide variety of interests, talents, and perspec
    tives; and who are able, directly or indirectly, to learn
    from their differences and to stimulate one another to
    reexamine even their most deeply held assumptions about
    themselves and their world” (alteration in original; inter
    nal quotation marks omitted)).
    Law students come from many backgrounds and have
    but three years to meet each other and develop their
    skills. They do so by participating in a community that
    teaches them how to create arguments in a convincing,
    rational, and respectful manner and to express doubt and
    disagreement in a professional way. A law school furthers
    these objectives by allowing broad diversity in registered
    student organizations. But these objectives may be better
    achieved if students can act cooperatively to learn from
    and teach each other through interactions in social and
    4    CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    KENNEDY, J., concurring
    intellectual contexts. A vibrant dialogue is not possible if
    students wall themselves off from opposing points of view.
    The school’s objectives thus might not be well served if,
    as a condition to membership or participation in a group,
    students were required to avow particular personal beliefs
    or to disclose private, off-campus behavior. Students
    whose views are in the minority at the school would likely
    fare worse in that regime. Indeed, were those sorts of
    requirements to become prevalent, it might undermine the
    principle that in a university community—and in a law
    school community specifically—speech is deemed persua
    sive based on its substance, not the identity of the
    speaker. The era of loyalty oaths is behind us. A school
    quite properly may conclude that allowing an oath or
    belief-affirming requirement, or an outside conduct re
    quirement, could be divisive for student relations and
    inconsistent with the basic concept that a view’s validity
    should be tested through free and open discussion. The
    school’s policy therefore represents a permissible effort to
    preserve the value of its forum.
    In addition to a circumstance, already noted, in which it
    could be demonstrated that a school has adopted or en
    forced its policy with the intent or purpose of discriminat
    ing or disadvantaging a group on account of its views,
    petitioner also would have a substantial case on the merits
    if it were shown that the all-comers policy was either
    designed or used to infiltrate the group or challenge its
    leadership in order to stifle its views. But that has not
    been shown to be so likely or self-evident as a matter of
    group dynamics in this setting that the Court can declare
    the school policy void without more facts; and if there were
    a showing that in a particular case the purpose or effect of
    the policy was to stifle speech or make it ineffective, that,
    too, would present a case different from the one before us.
    These observations are offered to support the analysis
    set forth in the opinion of the Court, which I join.
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)           1
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    _________________
    No. 08–1371
    _________________
    CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY CHAPTER OF THE UNI-
    VERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, HASTINGS COLLEGE OF
    THE LAW, AKA HASTINGS CHRISTIAN FELLOW-
    SHIP, PETITIONER v. LEO P. MARTINEZ ET AL.
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
    APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    [June 28, 2010]
    JUSTICE ALITO, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE
    SCALIA, and JUSTICE THOMAS join, dissenting.
    The proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence is
    that we protect the freedom to express “the thought that
    we hate.” United States v. Schwimmer, 
    279 U.S. 644
    ,
    654–655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Today’s decision
    rests on a very different principle: no freedom for expres
    sion that offends prevailing standards of political correct
    ness in our country’s institutions of higher learning.
    The Hastings College of the Law, a state institution,
    permits student organizations to register with the law
    school and severely burdens speech by unregistered
    groups. Hastings currently has more than 60 registered
    groups and, in all its history, has denied registration to
    exactly one: the Christian Legal Society (CLS). CLS
    claims that Hastings refused to register the group because
    the law school administration disapproves of the group’s
    viewpoint and thus violated the group’s free speech rights.
    Rejecting this argument, the Court finds that it has
    been Hastings’ policy for 20 years that all registered or
    ganizations must admit any student who wishes to join.
    Deferring broadly to the law school’s judgment about the
    permissible limits of student debate, the Court concludes
    2    CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    that this “accept-all-comers” policy, ante, at 1, is both
    viewpoint-neutral and consistent with Hastings’ pro
    claimed policy of fostering a diversity of viewpoints among
    registered student groups.
    The Court’s treatment of this case is deeply disappoint
    ing. The Court does not address the constitutionality of
    the very different policy that Hastings invoked when it
    denied CLS’s application for registration. Nor does the
    Court address the constitutionality of the policy that
    Hastings now purports to follow. And the Court ignores
    strong evidence that the accept-all-comers policy is not
    viewpoint neutral because it was announced as a pretext
    to justify viewpoint discrimination. Brushing aside incon
    venient precedent, the Court arms public educational
    institutions with a handy weapon for suppressing the
    speech of unpopular groups—groups to which, as Hastings
    candidly puts it, these institutions “do not wish to . . . lend
    their name[s].” Brief for Respondent Hastings College of
    Law 11; see also 
    id., at 35.
                                  I
    The Court provides a misleading portrayal of this case.
    As related by the Court, (1) Hastings, for the past 20
    years, has required any student group seeking registration
    to admit any student who wishes to join, ante, at 5; (2) the
    effects of Hastings’ refusal to register CLS have been of
    questionable importance, see ante, at 24–25; and (3) this
    case is about CLS’s desire to obtain “a state subsidy,” ante,
    at 15. I begin by correcting the picture.
    A
    The Court bases all of its analysis on the proposition
    that the relevant Hastings’ policy is the so-called accept
    all-comers policy. This frees the Court from the difficult
    task of defending the constitutionality of either the policy
    that Hastings actually—and repeatedly—invoked when it
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)           3
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    denied registration, i.e., the school’s written Nondiscrimi
    nation Policy, or the policy that Hastings belatedly un
    veiled when it filed its brief in this Court. Overwhelming
    evidence, however, shows that Hastings denied CLS’s
    application pursuant to the Nondiscrimination Policy and
    that the accept-all-comers policy was nowhere to be found
    until it was mentioned by a former dean in a deposition
    taken well after this case began.
    The events that gave rise to this litigation began in
    2004, when a small group of Hastings students sought to
    register a Hastings chapter of CLS, a national organiza
    tion of Christian lawyers and law students. All CLS
    members must sign a Statement of Faith affirming belief
    in fundamental Christian doctrines, including the belief
    that the Bible is “the inspired Word of God.” App. 226. In
    early 2004, the national organization adopted a resolution
    stating that “[i]n view of the clear dictates of Scripture,
    unrepentant participation in or advocacy of a sexually
    immoral lifestyle is inconsistent with an affirmation of the
    Statement of Faith, and consequently may be regarded by
    CLS as disqualifying such an individual from CLS mem
    bership.” 
    Id., at 146.
    The resolution made it clear that “a
    sexually immoral lifestyle,” in CLS’s view, includes engag
    ing in “acts of sexual conduct outside of God’s design for
    marriage between one man and one woman.” 
    Ibid. It was shortly
    after this resolution was passed that the Hastings
    chapter of CLS applied to register with the law school.
    Hastings sponsors an active program of “registered
    student organizations” (RSOs) pursuant to the law school’s
    avowed responsibility to “ensure an opportunity for the
    expression of a variety of viewpoints” and promote “the
    highest standards of . . . freedom of expression,” App. to
    Pet. for Cert. 82a, 74a. During the 2004–2005 school year,
    Hastings had more than 60 registered groups, including
    political groups (e.g., the Hastings Democratic Caucus and
    the Hastings Republicans), religious groups (e.g., the
    4    CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    Hastings Jewish Law Students Association and the Hast
    ings Association of Muslim Law Students), groups that
    promote social causes (e.g., both pro-choice and pro-life
    groups), groups organized around racial or ethnic identity
    (e.g., the Black Law Students Association, the Korean
    American Law Society, La Raza Law Students Associa
    tion, and the Middle Eastern Law Students Association),
    and groups that focus on gender or sexuality (e.g., the
    Clara Foltz Feminist Association and Students Raising
    Consciousness at Hastings). See App. 236–245; Brief for
    Petitioner 3–4.
    Not surprisingly many of these registered groups were
    and are dedicated to expressing a message. For example,
    Silenced Right, a pro-life group, taught that “all human
    life from the moment of conception until natural death is
    sacred and has inherent dignity,” 
    id., at 244,
    while Law
    Students for Choice aimed to “defend and expand repro
    ductive rights,” 
    id., at 243.
    The American Constitution
    Society sought “to counter . . . a narrow conservative vi
    sion” of American law,” 
    id., at 236,
    and the UC Hastings
    Student Animal Defense Fund aimed “at protecting the
    lives and advancing the interests of animals through the
    legal system,” 
    id., at 245.
       Groups that are granted registration are entitled to
    meet on university grounds and to access multiple chan
    nels for communicating with students and faculty—
    including posting messages on designated bulletin boards,
    sending mass e-mails to the student body, distributing
    material through the Student Information Center, and
    participating in the annual student organizations fair.
    App. to Pet. for Cert. 7a, 85a. They may also apply for
    limited travel funds, 
    id., at 7a,
    which appear to total about
    $4,000 to $5,000 per year, App. 217—or less than $85 per
    registered group. Most of the funds available to RSOs
    come from an annual student activity fee that every stu
    dent must pay. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 89a–93a.
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)            5
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    When CLS applied for registration, Judy Hansen Chap
    man, the Director of Hastings’ Office of Student Services,
    sent an e-mail to an officer of the chapter informing him
    that “CLS’s bylaws did not appear to be compliant” with
    the Hastings Nondiscrimination Policy, App. 228, 277, a
    written policy that provides in pertinent part that “[t]he
    University of California, Hastings College of the Law shall
    not discriminate unlawfully on the basis of race, color,
    religion, national origin, ancestry, disability, age, sex or
    sexual orientation,” 
    id., at 220.
    As far as the record re
    flects, Ms. Chapman made no mention of an accept-all
    applicants policy.
    A few days later, three officers of the chapter met with
    Ms. Chapman, and she reiterated that the CLS bylaws did
    not comply with “the religion and sexual orientation provi
    sions of the Nondiscrimination Policy and that they would
    need to be amended in order for CLS to become a regis
    tered student organization.” 
    Id., at 228.
    About a week
    later, Hastings sent CLS a letter to the same effect. 
    Id., at 228–229,
    293–295. On both of these occasions, it appears
    that not a word was said about an accept-all-comers
    policy.
    When CLS refused to change its membership require
    ments, Hastings denied its request for registration—thus
    making CLS the only student group whose application for
    registration has ever been rejected. Brief in Opposition 4.
    In October 2004, CLS brought this action under 
    42 U.S. C
    . §1983 against the law school’s dean and other
    school officials, claiming, among other things, that the law
    school, by enacting and enforcing the Nondiscrimination
    Policy, had violated CLS’s First Amendment right to
    freedom of speech. App. 78.
    In May 2005, Hastings filed an answer to CLS’s first
    amended complaint and made an admission that is signifi
    cant for present purposes. In its complaint, CLS had
    alleged that the Nondiscrimination Policy discriminates
    6    CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    against religious groups because it prohibits those groups
    “from selecting officers and members dedicated to a par
    ticular set of religious ideals or beliefs” but “permits politi
    cal, social and cultural student organizations to select
    officers and members dedicated to their organization’s
    ideals and beliefs.” 
    Id., at 79.
    In response, Hastings
    admitted that its Nondiscrimination Policy “permits politi
    cal, social, and cultural student organizations to select
    officers and members who are dedicated to a particular set
    of ideals or beliefs.” 
    Id., at 93.
    The Court states that
    “Hastings interprets the Nondiscrimination Policy, as it
    relates to the RSO program, to mandate acceptance of all
    comers.” Ante, at 4. But this admission in Hastings’
    answer shows that Hastings had not adopted this inter
    pretation when its answer was filed.
    Within a few months, however, Hastings’ position
    changed. In July 2005, Mary Kay Kane, then the dean of
    the law school, was deposed, and she stated: “It is my view
    that in order to be a registered student organization you
    have to allow all of our students to be members and full
    participants if they want to.” App. 343. In a declaration
    filed in October 2005, Ms. Chapman provided a more
    developed explanation, stating: “Hastings interprets the
    Nondiscrimination Policy as requiring that student or
    ganizations wishing to register with Hastings allow any
    Hastings student to become a member and/or seek a lead
    ership position in the organization.” 
    Id., at 349.
       Hastings claims that this accept-all-comers policy has
    existed since 1990 but points to no evidence that the policy
    was ever put in writing or brought to the attention of
    members of the law school community prior to the dean’s
    deposition. Indeed, Hastings has adduced no evidence of
    the policy’s existence before that date. And while Dean
    Kane and Ms. Chapman stated, well after this litigation
    had begun, that Hastings had such a policy, neither they
    nor any other Hastings official has ever stated in a deposi
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)            7
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    tion, affidavit, or declaration when this policy took effect.
    Hastings’ effort to portray the accept-all-comers policy
    as merely an interpretation of the Nondiscrimination
    Policy runs into obvious difficulties. First, the two policies
    are simply not the same: The Nondiscrimination Policy
    proscribes discrimination on a limited number of specified
    grounds, while the accept-all-comers policy outlaws all
    selectivity. Second, the Nondiscrimination Policy applies
    to everything that Hastings does, and the law school does
    not follow an accept-all-comers policy in activities such as
    admitting students and hiring faculty.
    In an effort to circumvent this problem, the Court writes
    that “Hastings interprets the Nondiscrimination Policy, as
    it relates to the RSO program, to mandate acceptance of all
    comers.” Ante, at 4 (emphasis added). This puts Hastings
    in the implausible position of maintaining that the Non
    discrimination Policy means one thing as applied to the
    RSO program and something quite different as applied to
    all of Hastings’ other activities. But the Nondiscrimina
    tion Policy by its terms applies fully to all components of
    the law school, “including administration [and] faculty.”
    App. 220.
    Third, the record is replete with evidence that, at least
    until Dean Kane unveiled the accept-all-comers policy in
    July 2005, Hastings routinely registered student groups
    with bylaws limiting membership and leadership positions
    to those who agreed with the groups’ viewpoints. For
    example, the bylaws of the Hastings Democratic Caucus
    provided that “any full-time student at Hastings may
    become a member of HDC so long as they do not exhibit a
    consistent disregard and lack of respect for the objective of
    the organization as stated in Article 3, Section 1.” App. to
    Pet. for Cert. 118a (emphasis added). The constitution of
    the Association of Trial Lawyers of America at Hastings
    provided that every member must “adhere to the objec
    tives of the Student Chapter as well as the mission of
    8    CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    ATLA.” 
    Id., at 110a.
    A student could become a member of
    the Vietnamese American Law Society so long as the
    student did not “exhibit a consistent disregard and lack of
    respect for the objective of the organization,” which cen
    ters on a “celebrat[ion] [of] Vietnamese culture.” 
    Id., at 146a–147a.
    Silenced Right limited voting membership to
    students who “are committed” to the group’s “mission” of
    “spread[ing] the pro-life message.” 
    Id., at 142a–143a.
    La
    Raza limited voting membership to “students of Raza
    background.” App. 192. Since Hastings requires any
    student group applying for registration to submit a copy of
    its bylaws, see 
    id., at 249–250,
    Hastings cannot claim that
    it was unaware of such provisions. And as noted, CLS was
    denied registration precisely because Ms. Chapman re
    viewed its bylaws and found them unacceptable.
    We are told that, when CLS pointed out these discrep
    ancies during this litigation, Hastings took action to en
    sure that student groups were in fact complying with the
    law school’s newly disclosed accept-all-comers policy. For
    example, Hastings asked La Raza to revise its bylaws to
    allow all students to become voting members. App. to Pet.
    for Cert. 66a. See also Brief for State of Michigan et al. as
    Amici Curiae 2, n. 1 (relating anecdotally that Hastings
    recently notified the Hastings Democrats that “to main
    tain the Club’s standing as a student organization,” it
    must “open its membership to all students, regardless of
    party affiliation”). These belated remedial efforts suggest,
    if anything, that Hastings had no accept-all-comers policy
    until this litigation was well under way.
    Finally, when Hastings filed its brief in this Court, its
    policy, which had already evolved from a policy prohibiting
    certain specified forms of discrimination into an accept-all
    comers policy, underwent yet another transformation.
    Now, Hastings claims that it does not really have an
    accept-all-comers policy; it has an accept-some-comers
    policy. Hastings’ current policy, we are told, “does not
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)                   9
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    foreclose neutral and generally applicable membership
    requirements unrelated to ‘status or beliefs.’ ” Brief for
    Respondent Hastings College of Law 5. Hastings’ brief
    goes on to note with seeming approval that some regis
    tered groups have imposed “even conduct requirements.”
    
    Ibid. Hastings, however, has
    not told us which “conduct
    requirements” are allowed and which are not—although
    presumably requirements regarding sexual conduct fall
    into the latter category.
    When this case was in the District Court, that court
    took care to address both the Nondiscrimination Policy
    and the accept-all-comers policy. See, e.g., App. to Pet. for
    Cert. 8a–9a, 16a–17a, 21a–24a, 26a, 27a, 32a, 44a, 63a.
    On appeal, however, a panel of the Ninth Circuit, like the
    Court today, totally ignored the Nondiscrimination Policy.
    CLS’s argument in the Ninth Circuit centered on the
    Nondiscrimination Policy, and CLS argued strenuously, as
    it had in the District Court, that prior to the former dean’s
    deposition, numerous groups had been permitted to re
    strict membership to students who shared the groups’
    views.1 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit disposed of CLS’s
    ——————
    1 CLS consistently argued in the courts below that Hastings had ap
    plied its registration policy in a discriminatory manner. See, e.g.,
    Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum
    in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment in No. C 04–4484–JSW
    (ND Cal.), pp. 6–7 (“Hastings allows other registered student organiza
    tions to require that their members and/or leaders agree with the
    organization’s beliefs and purposes”). CLS took pains to bring forward
    evidence to substantiate this claim. 
    See supra, at 7
    –8.
    CLS’s brief in the Court of Appeals reiterated its contention that
    Hastings had not required all RSOs to admit all student applicants.
    CLS’s brief stated that “Hastings allows other registered student
    organizations to require that their leaders and/or members agree with
    the organization’s beliefs and purposes.” Brief for Appellant in No. 06–
    15956 (CA9), pp. 14–15 (citing examples). See also 
    id., at 54–55
    (“Hast
    ings routinely recognizes student groups that limit membership or
    leadership on the basis of belief. . . . Hastings’ actual practice demon
    strates that the forum is not reserved to student organizations that do
    10    CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    appeal with a two-sentence, not-precedential opinion that
    solely addressed the accept-all-comers policy. Christian
    Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Kane, 319 Fed. Appx.
    645–646 (2009).
    Like the majority of this Court, the Ninth Circuit relied
    on the following Joint Stipulation, which the parties filed
    in December 2005, well after Dean Kane’s deposition:
    “Hastings requires that registered student organiza
    tions allow any student to participate, become a mem
    ber, or seek leadership positions in the organization,
    regardless of their status or beliefs.” App. 221.
    Citing the binding effect of stipulations, the majority
    sternly rejects what it terms “CLS’s unseemly attempt to
    escape from the stipulation and shift its target to [the
    Nondiscrimination Policy].” Ante, at 11–12.
    I agree that the parties must be held to their Joint
    Stipulation, but the terms of the stipulation should be
    respected. What was admitted in the Joint Stipulation
    filed in December 2005 is that Hastings had an accept-all
    comers policy. CLS did not stipulate that its application
    had been denied more than a year earlier pursuant to such
    a policy. On the contrary, the Joint Stipulation notes that
    the reason repeatedly given by Hasting at that time was
    that the CLS bylaws did not comply with the Nondis
    crimination Policy. See App. 228–229. Indeed, the parties
    did not even stipulate that the accept-all-comers policy
    existed in the fall of 2004. In addition, Hastings itself is
    now attempting to walk away from this stipulation by
    disclosing that its real policy is an accept-some-comers
    policy.
    ——————
    not discriminate on the basis of belief”). Responding to these argu
    ments, the law school remarked that CLS “repeatedly asserts that
    ‘Hastings routinely recognizes student groups that limit membership or
    leadership on the basis of belief.’ ” Brief for Appellees in No. 06–15956
    (CA9), p. 4.
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)          11
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    The majority’s insistence on the binding effect of stipu
    lations contrasts sharply with its failure to recognize the
    binding effect of a party’s admissions in an answer. See
    American Title Insurance Co. v. Lacelaw Corp., 
    861 F.2d 224
    , 226 (CA9 1988) (“Factual assertions in pleadings and
    pretrial orders, unless amended, are considered judicial
    admissions conclusively binding on the party who made
    them”); Bakersfield Westar Ambulance, Inc. v. Community
    First Bank, 
    123 F.3d 1243
    , 1248 (CA9 1997) (quoting
    
    Lacelaw, supra
    ). As noted above, Hastings admitted in its
    answer, which was filed prior to the former dean’s deposi
    tion, that at least as of that time, the law school did not
    follow an accept-all-comers policy and instead allowed
    “political, social, and cultural student organizations to
    select officers and members who are dedicated to a par
    ticular set of ideals or beliefs.” App. 93.
    B
    The Court also distorts the record with respect to the
    effect on CLS of Hastings’ decision to deny registration.
    The Court quotes a letter written by Hastings’ general
    counsel in which she stated that Hastings “ ‘would be
    pleased to provide [CLS] the use of Hastings facilities for
    its meetings and activities.’ ” Ante, at 6 (quoting App.
    294). Later in its opinion, the Court reiterates that “Hast
    ings offered CLS access to school facilities to conduct
    meetings,” ante, at 24, but the majority does not mention
    that this offer was subject to important qualifications. As
    Hastings’ attorney put it in the District Court, Hastings
    told CLS: “ ‘Hastings allows community groups to some
    degree to use its facilities, sometimes on a pay basis, I
    understand, if they’re available after priority is given to
    registered organizations’. We offered that.” App. 442.
    The Court also fails to mention what happened when
    CLS attempted to take advantage of Hastings’ offer. On
    August 19, 2005, the local CLS president sent an e-mail to
    12   CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    Ms. Chapman requesting permission to set up an “advice
    table” on a campus patio on August 23 and 24 so that
    members of CLS could speak with students at the begin
    ning of the fall semester. 
    Id., at 298.
    This request—
    merely to set up a table on a patio—could hardly have
    interfered with any other use of the law school’s premises
    or cost the school any money. But although the request
    was labeled “time sensitive,” ibid., Ms. Chapman did not
    respond until the dates in question had passed, and she
    then advised the student that all further inquiries should
    be made through CLS’s attorney. 
    Id., at 297–298.
       In September 2005, CLS tried again. Through counsel,
    CLS sought to reserve a room on campus for a guest
    speaker who was scheduled to appear on a specified date.
    
    Id., at 302–303.
    Noting Ms. Chapman’s tardy response on
    the prior occasion, the attorney asked to receive a re
    sponse before the scheduled date, but once again no an
    swer was given until after the date had passed. 
    Id., at 300.
       Other statements in the majority opinion make it seem
    as if the denial of registration did not hurt CLS at all. The
    Court notes that CLS was able to hold Bible-study meet
    ings and other events. Ante, at 6. And “[a]lthough CLS
    could not take advantage of RSO-specific methods of com
    munication,” the Court states, “the advent of electronic
    media and social-networking sites reduces the importance
    of those channels.” Ante, at 24.
    At the beginning of the 2005 school year, the Hastings
    CLS group had seven members, App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a,
    so there can be no suggestion that the group flourished.
    And since one of CLS’s principal claims is that it was
    subjected to discrimination based on its viewpoint, the
    majority’s emphasis on CLS’s ability to endure that dis
    crimination—by using private facilities and means of
    communication—is quite amazing.
    This Court does not customarily brush aside a claim of
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)           13
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    unlawful discrimination with the observation that the
    effects of the discrimination were really not so bad. We
    have never before taken the view that a little viewpoint
    discrimination is acceptable. Nor have we taken this
    approach in other discrimination cases.
    C
    Finally, I must comment on the majority’s emphasis on
    funding. According to the majority, CLS is “seeking what
    is effectively a state subsidy,” ante, at 15, and the question
    presented in this case centers on the “use of school funds,”
    ante, at 1. In fact, funding plays a very small role in this
    case. Most of what CLS sought and was denied—such as
    permission to set up a table on the law school patio—
    would have been virtually cost free. If every such activity
    is regarded as a matter of funding, the First Amendment
    rights of students at public universities will be at the
    mercy of the administration. As CLS notes, “[t]o univer
    sity students, the campus is their world. The right to
    meet on campus and use campus channels of communica
    tion is at least as important to university students as the
    right to gather on the town square and use local communi
    cation forums is to the citizen.” Reply Brief for Petitioner
    13.
    II
    To appreciate how far the Court has strayed, it is in
    structive to compare this case with Healy v. James, 
    408 U.S. 169
    (1972), our only First Amendment precedent
    involving a public college’s refusal to recognize a student
    group. The group in Healy was a local chapter of the
    Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). When the stu
    dents who applied for recognition of the chapter were
    asked by a college committee whether they would “ ‘re
    spond to issues of violence as other S.D.S. chapters have,’ ”
    their answer was that their “ ‘action would have to be
    14   CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    dependent upon each issue.’ ” 
    Id., at 172–173.
    They simi
    larly refused to provide a definitive answer when asked
    whether they would be willing to “use any means possible”
    to achieve their aims. 
    Id., at 173.
    The president of the
    college refused to allow the group to be recognized, con
    cluding that the philosophy of the SDS was “antithetical to
    the school’s policies” and that it was doubtful that the
    local chapter was independent of the national organiza
    tion, the “ ‘published aims and philosophy’ ” of which in
    cluded “ ‘disruption and violence.’ ” 
    Id., at 174–175,
    and
    n. 4.
    The effects of nonrecognition in Healy were largely the
    same as those present here. The SDS was denied the use
    of campus facilities, as well as access to the customary
    means used for communication among the members of the
    college community. 
    Id., at 176,
    181–182.
    The lower federal courts held that the First Amendment
    rights of the SDS chapter had not been violated, and when
    the case reached this Court, the college, much like today’s
    majority, sought to minimize the effects of nonrecognition,
    arguing that the SDS members “still may meet as a group
    off campus, that they still may distribute written material
    off campus, and that they still may meet together infor
    mally on campus . . . as individuals.” 
    Id., at 182–183.
       This Court took a different view. The Court held that
    the denial of recognition substantially burdened the stu
    dents’ right to freedom of association. After observing that
    “[t]he primary impediment to free association flowing from
    nonrecognition is the denial of use of campus facilities for
    meetings and other appropriate purposes,” 
    id., at 181,
    the
    Court continued:
    “Petitioners’ associational interests also were cir
    cumscribed by the denial of the use of campus bulletin
    boards and the school newspaper. If an organization
    is to remain a viable entity in a campus community in
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)           15
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    which new students enter on a regular basis, it must
    possess the means of communicating with these stu
    dents. Moreover, the organization’s ability to partici
    pate in the intellectual give and take of campus de
    bate, and to pursue its stated purposes, is limited by
    denial of access to the customary media for communi
    cating with the administration, faculty members, and
    other students. Such impediments cannot be viewed
    as insubstantial.” 
    Id., at 181–182.
       It is striking that all of these same burdens are now
    borne by CLS. CLS is prevented from using campus facili
    ties—unless at some future time Hastings chooses to
    provide a timely response to a CLS request and allow the
    group, as a favor or perhaps in exchange for a fee, to set
    up a table on the patio or to use a room that would other
    wise be unoccupied. And CLS, like the SDS in Healy, has
    been cut off from “the customary media for communicating
    with the administration, faculty members, and other
    students.” 
    Id., at 181–182.
       It is also telling that the Healy Court, unlike today’s
    majority, refused to defer to the college president’s judg
    ment regarding the compatibility of “sound educational
    policy” and free speech rights. The same deference argu
    ments that the majority now accepts were made in defense
    of the college president’s decision to deny recognition in
    Healy. Respondents in that case emphasized that the
    college president, not the courts, had the responsibility of
    administering the institution and that the courts should
    allow him “ ‘wide discretion . . . in determining what ac
    tions are most compatible with its educational objectives.’ ”
    Brief for Respondents in Healy v. James, O. T. 1971, No.
    71–452, pp. 7–8. A supporting amicus contended that
    college officials “must be allowed a very broad discretion in
    formulating and implementing policies.” Brief for Board of
    Trustees, California State Colleges 6. Another argued
    16   CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    that universities should be permitted to impose restric
    tions on speech that would not be tolerated elsewhere.
    Brief for American Association of Presidents of Independ
    ent Colleges and Universities 11–12.
    The Healy Court would have none of this. Unlike the
    Court today, the Healy Court emphatically rejected the
    proposition that “First Amendment protections should
    apply with less force on college campuses than in the
    community at 
    large.” 408 U.S., at 180
    . And on one key
    question after another—whether the local SDS chapter
    was independent of the national organization, whether the
    group posed a substantial threat of material disruption,
    and whether the students’ responses to the committee’s
    questions about violence and disruption signified a will
    ingness to engage in such activities—the Court drew
    its own conclusions, which differed from the college
    president’s.
    The Healy Court was true to the principle that when it
    comes to the interpretation and application of the right to
    free speech, we exercise our own independent judgment.
    We do not defer to Congress on such matters, see Sable
    Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 
    492 U.S. 115
    , 129
    (1989), and there is no reason why we should bow to uni
    versity administrators.
    In the end, I see only two possible distinctions between
    Healy and the present case. The first is that Healy did not
    involve any funding, but as I have noted, funding plays
    only a small part in this case. And if Healy would other
    wise prevent Hastings from refusing to register CLS, I see
    no good reason why the potential availability of funding
    should enable Hastings to deny all of the other rights that
    go with registration.
    This leaves just one way of distinguishing Healy: the
    identity of the student group. In Healy, the Court warned
    that the college president’s views regarding the philosophy
    of the SDS could not “justify the denial of First Amend
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)                   17
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    ment 
    rights.” 408 U.S., at 187
    . Here, too, disapproval of
    CLS cannot justify Hastings’ actions.2
    III
    The Court pays little attention to Healy and instead
    focuses solely on the question whether Hastings’ registra
    tion policy represents a permissible regulation in a limited
    public forum. While I think that Healy is largely control
    ling, I am content to address the constitutionality of Hast
    ings’ actions under our limited public forum cases, which
    lead to exactly the same conclusion.
    In this case, the forum consists of the RSO program.
    Once a public university opens a limited public forum, it
    “must respect the lawful boundaries it has itself set.”
    Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 
    515 U.S. 819
    , 829 (1995). The university “may not exclude
    speech where its distinction is not ‘reasonable in light of
    the purpose served by the forum.’ ” 
    Ibid. (quoting Corne lius
    v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 
    473 U.S. 788
    , 806 (1985)). And the university must maintain strict
    viewpoint neutrality. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis.
    System v. Southworth, 
    529 U.S. 217
    , 234 (2000); Rosen
    
    berger, supra, at 829
    .
    This requirement of viewpoint neutrality extends to the
    expression of religious viewpoints. In an unbroken line of
    decisions analyzing private religious speech in limited
    public forums, we have made it perfectly clear that
    “[r]eligion is [a] viewpoint from which ideas are conveyed.”
    ——————
    2 The Court attempts to distinguish Healy on the ground that there
    the college “explicitly denied the student group official recognition
    because of the group’s viewpoint.” Ante, at 17, n. 15. The same, how
    ever, is true here. CLS was denied recognition under the Nondiscrimi
    nation Policy because of the viewpoint that CLS sought to express
    through its membership requirements. 
    See supra, at 5
    ; infra, at 18–23.
    And there is strong evidence that Hastings abruptly shifted from the
    Nondiscrimination Policy to the accept-all-comers policy as a pretext for
    viewpoint discrimination. See infra, at 31–35.
    18    CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 
    533 U.S. 98
    ,
    112, and n. 4 (2001). See 
    Rosenberger, supra, at 831
    ;
    Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist.,
    
    508 U.S. 384
    , 393–394 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 
    454 U.S. 263
    , 277 (1981).
    We have applied this analysis in cases in which student
    speech was restricted because of the speaker’s religious
    viewpoint, and we have consistently concluded that such
    restrictions constitute viewpoint discrimination. E.g.,
    
    Rosenberger, supra, at 845
    –846; 
    Widmar, supra, at 267
    ,
    n. 5, 269, 277; see also Good News 
    Club, supra, at 106
    –
    107, 109–110; Lamb’s 
    Chapel, supra, at 392
    –393, 394. We
    have also stressed that the rules applicable in a limited
    public forum are particularly important in the university
    setting, where “the State acts against a background of
    tradition of thought and experiment that is at the center
    of our intellectual and philosophic tradition.” 
    Rosenberger, supra, at 835
    .
    IV
    Analyzed under this framework, Hastings’ refusal to
    register CLS pursuant to its Nondiscrimination Policy
    plainly fails.3 As previously noted, when Hastings refused
    ——————
    3 CLS sought a declaratory judgment that this policy is unconstitu
    tional and an injunction prohibiting its enforcement. See App. 80.
    Particularly in light of Hastings’ practice of changing its announced
    policies, these requests are not moot. It is well settled that the volun
    tary cessation of allegedly unlawful conduct does not moot a case in
    which the legality of that conduct is challenged. See City of Mesquite v.
    Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 
    455 U.S. 283
    , 289 (1982); see also Allee v.
    Medrano, 
    416 U.S. 802
    , 810–811 (1974); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 
    416 U.S. 312
    , 318 (1974) (per curiam). If the rule were otherwise, the
    courts would be compelled to leave “ ‘[t]he defendant . . . free to return
    to his old ways.’ ” United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export
    Assn., Inc., 
    393 U.S. 199
    , 203 (1968) (quoting United States v. W. T.
    Grant Co., 
    345 U.S. 629
    , 632 (1953)). Here, there is certainly a risk
    that Hastings will “return to [its] old ways,” and therefore CLS’s
    requests for declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the Non
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)                   19
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    to register CLS, it claimed that the CLS bylaws impermis
    sibly discriminated on the basis of religion and sexual
    orientation. As interpreted by Hastings and applied
    to CLS, both of these grounds constituted viewpoint
    discrimination.
    Religion. The First Amendment protects the right of
    “ ‘expressive association’ ”—that is, “the right to associate
    for the purpose of speaking.” Rumsfeld v. Forum for Aca
    demic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 
    547 U.S. 47
    , 68
    (2006) (quoting Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 
    530 U.S. 640
    , 644 (2000)). And the Court has recognized that “[t]he
    forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a group in
    fringes the group’s freedom of expressive association if the
    presence of that person affects in a significant way the
    group’s ability to advocate public or private viewpoints.”
    
    Dale, supra, at 648
    .
    With one important exception, the Hastings Nondis
    crimination Policy respected that right. As Hastings
    stated in its answer, the Nondiscrimination Policy “per
    mit[ted] political, social, and cultural student organiza
    tions to select officers and members who are dedicated to a
    particular set of ideals or beliefs.” App. 93. But the policy
    singled out one category of expressive associations for
    disfavored treatment: groups formed to express a religious
    message. Only religious groups were required to admit
    students who did not share their views. An environmen
    talist group was not required to admit students who re
    ——————
    discrimination Policy are not moot. If, as the Court assumes, the
    parties stipulated that the only relevant policy is the accept-all-comers
    policy, then the District Court should not have addressed the constitu
    tionality of the Nondiscrimination Policy. But the District Court
    approved both policies, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judg
    ment. That judgment remains binding on CLS, so it is only appropriate
    that CLS be permitted to challenge that determination now. The
    question of the constitutionality of the Nondiscrimination Policy falls
    comfortably within the question presented, and CLS raised that issue
    in its brief. See Brief for Petitioner 41–46.
    20   CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    jected global warming. An animal rights group was not
    obligated to accept students who supported the use of
    animals to test cosmetics. But CLS was required to admit
    avowed atheists. This was patent viewpoint discrimina
    tion. “By the very terms of the [Nondiscrimination Policy],
    the University . . . select[ed] for disfavored treatment
    those student [groups] with religious . . . viewpoints.”
    
    Rosenberger, 515 U.S., at 831
    . It is no wonder that the
    Court makes no attempt to defend the constitutionality of
    the Nondiscrimination Policy.
    Unlike the Court, JUSTICE STEVENS attempts a defense,
    contending that the Nondiscrimination Policy is viewpoint
    neutral. But his arguments are squarely contrary to
    established precedent.
    JUSTICE STEVENS first argues that the Nondiscrimina
    tion Policy is viewpoint neutral because it “does not regu
    late expression or belief at all” but instead regulates con
    duct. See ante, at 2 (concurring opinion). This Court has
    held, however, that the particular conduct at issue here
    constitutes a form of expression that is protected by the
    First Amendment. It is now well established that the
    First Amendment shields the right of a group to engage in
    expressive association by limiting membership to persons
    whose admission does not significantly interfere with the
    group’s ability to convey its views. See 
    Dale, supra, at 648
    ; Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 
    468 U.S. 609
    , 623
    (1984); see also New York State Club Assn., Inc. v. City of
    New York, 
    487 U.S. 1
    , 13 (1988) (acknowledging that an
    “association might be able to show that it is organized for
    specific expressive purposes and that it will not be able to
    advocate its desired viewpoints nearly as effectively if it
    cannot confine its membership to those who share the
    same sex, for example, or the same religion”); 
    Widmar, supra, at 268
    –269 (“[T]he First Amendment rights of
    speech and association extend to the campuses of state
    universities”). Indeed, the opinion of the Court, which
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)                      21
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    JUSTICE STEVENS joins, acknowledges this rule. See ante,
    at 13.
    JUSTICE STEVENS also maintains that the Nondiscrimi
    nation Policy is viewpoint neutral because it prohibits all
    groups, both religious and secular, from engaging in reli
    gious speech. See ante, at 3. This argument is also con
    trary to established law. In Rosenberger, the dissent,
    which JUSTICE STEVENS joined, made exactly this argu
    ment. 
    See 515 U.S., at 895
    –896 (opinion of Souter, J.).
    The Court disagreed, holding that a policy that treated
    secular speech more favorably than religious speech dis
    criminated on the basis of 
    viewpoint.4 515 U.S., at 831
    .
    The Court reaffirmed this holding in Good News 
    Club, 533 U.S., at 112
    , and n. 4.
    Here, the Nondiscrimination Policy permitted member
    ship requirements that expressed a secular viewpoint. See
    App. 93. (For example, the Hastings Democratic Caucus
    and the Hastings Republicans were allowed to exclude
    members who disagreed with their parties’ platforms.)
    But religious groups were not permitted to express a
    religious viewpoint by limiting membership to students
    who shared their religious viewpoints. Under established
    ——————
    4 In Rosenberger the university argued that the denial of student
    activity funding for all groups that sought to express a religious view
    point was “facially neutral.” See Brief for Respondents in Rosenberger
    v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., O. T. 1994, No. 94–329, p. 
    2; 515 U.S., at 824
    –825. The Rosenberger dissenters agreed that the univer
    sity’s policy did not constitute viewpoint discrimination because “it
    applie[d] to Muslim and Jewish and Buddhist advocacy as well as to
    Christian,” and it “applie[d] to agnostics and atheists as well as it does
    to deists and theists.” 
    Id., at 895–896
    (opinion of Souter, J.); cf. ante, at
    2–3 (opinion of STEVENS, J.) (asserting that under Hastings’ Nondis
    crimination Policy “all acts of religious discrimination” are prohibited
    (emphasis added)). But the Court flatly rejected this argument. 
    See 515 U.S., at 831
    (“Religion may be a vast area of inquiry, but it also
    provides, as it did here, a specific premise, a perspective, a standpoint
    from which a variety of subjects may be discussed and considered”).
    22    CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    precedent, this was viewpoint discrimination.5
    It bears emphasis that permitting religious groups to
    limit membership to those who share the groups’ beliefs
    would not have the effect of allowing other groups to dis
    criminate on the basis of religion. It would not mean, for
    example, that fraternities or sororities could exclude stu
    dents on that basis. As our cases have recognized, the
    right of expressive association permits a group to exclude
    an applicant for membership only if the admission of that
    person would “affec[t] in a significant way the group’s
    ability to advocate public or private viewpoints.” 
    Dale, 530 U.S., at 648
    . Groups that do not engage in expressive
    association have no such right. Similarly, groups that are
    dedicated to expressing a viewpoint on a secular topic (for
    example, a political or ideological viewpoint) would have
    no basis for limiting membership based on religion be
    cause the presence of members with diverse religious
    beliefs would have no effect on the group’s ability to ex
    press its views. But for religious groups, the situation is
    very different. This point was put well by a coalition of
    Muslim, Christian, Jewish, and Sikh groups: “Of course
    there is a strong interest in prohibiting religious discrimi
    nation where religion is irrelevant. But it is fundamen
    tally confused to apply a rule against religious discrimina
    tion to a religious association.” Brief for American Islamic
    Congress et al. as Amici Curiae 3.
    Sexual orientation. The Hastings Nondiscrimination
    Policy, as interpreted by the law school, also discriminated
    on the basis of viewpoint regarding sexual morality. CLS
    ——————
    5 It is not at all clear what JUSTICE STEVENS means when he refers to
    religious “status” as opposed to religious belief. See ante, at 2, n. 1.
    But if by religious status he means such things as the religion into
    which a person was born or the religion of a person’s ancestors, then
    prohibiting discrimination on such grounds would not involve viewpoint
    discrimination. Such immutable characteristics are quite different
    from viewpoint.
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)            23
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    has a particular viewpoint on this subject, namely, that
    sexual conduct outside marriage between a man and a
    woman is wrongful. Hastings would not allow CLS to
    express this viewpoint by limiting membership to persons
    willing to express a sincere agreement with CLS’s views.
    By contrast, nothing in the Nondiscrimination Policy
    prohibited a group from expressing a contrary viewpoint
    by limiting membership to persons willing to endorse
    that group’s beliefs. A Free Love Club could require mem
    bers to affirm that they reject the traditional view of sex
    ual morality to which CLS adheres. It is hard to see
    how this can be viewed as anything other than viewpoint
    discrimination.
    V
    Hastings’ current policy, as announced for the first time
    in the brief filed in this Court, fares no better than the
    policy that the law school invoked when CLS’s application
    was denied. According to Hastings’ brief, its new policy,
    contrary to the position taken by Hastings officials at an
    earlier point in this litigation, really does not require a
    student group to accept all comers. Now, Hastings ex
    plains, its policy allows “neutral and generally applicable
    membership requirements unrelated to ‘status or beliefs.’ ”
    Brief for Respondent Hastings College of Law 5. As ex
    amples of permissible membership requirements, Hast
    ings mentions academic standing, writing ability, “dues,
    attendance, and even conduct requirements.” 
    Ibid. (em phasis added).
      It seems doubtful that Hastings’ new policy permits
    registered groups to condition membership eligibility on
    whatever “conduct requirements” they may wish to im
    pose. If that is the school’s current policy, it is hard to see
    why CLS may not be registered, for what CLS demands is
    that members foreswear “unrepentant participation in or
    advocacy of a sexually immoral lifestyle.” App. 146. That
    24    CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    should qualify as a conduct requirement.
    If it does not, then what Hastings’ new policy must
    mean is that registered groups may impose some, but not
    all, conduct requirements. And if that is the case, it is
    incumbent on Hastings to explain which conduct require
    ments are acceptable, which are not, and why CLS’s re
    quirement is not allowed. Hastings has made no effort to
    provide such an explanation.6
    VI
    I come now to the version of Hastings’ policy that the
    Court has chosen to address. This is not the policy that
    Hastings invoked when CLS was denied registration. Nor
    is it the policy that Hastings now proclaims—and pre
    sumably implements. It is a policy that, as far as the
    record establishes, was in force only from the time when it
    was first disclosed by the former dean in July 2005 until
    Hastings filed its brief in this Court in March 2010. Why
    we should train our attention on this particular policy and
    not the other two is a puzzle. But in any event, it is clear
    that the accept-all-comers policy is not reasonable in light
    of the purpose of the RSO forum, and it is impossible to
    say on the present record that it is viewpoint neutral.
    A
    Once a state university opens a limited forum, it “must
    respect the lawful boundaries it has itself set.” Rosenber
    
    ger, 515 U.S., at 829
    . Hastings’ regulations on the regis
    tration of student groups impose only two substantive
    limitations: A group seeking registration must have stu
    dent members and must be non-commercial. App. to Pet.
    for Cert. 82a–83a, Hastings Board of Directors, Policies
    and Regulations Applying to College Activities, Organiza
    ——————
    6Nor does the Court clarify this point. Suggesting that any conduct
    requirement must relate to “gross misconduct,” ante, at 4, n. 2, is not
    helpful.
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)          25
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    tions and Students §34.10 (June 22, 1990) (hereinafter
    Hastings Regulations). Access to the forum is not limited
    to groups devoted to particular purposes. The regulations
    provide that a group applying for registration must submit
    an official document including “a statement of its purpose,”
    
    id., at 83a
    (Hastings Regulations §34.10.A.1 (emphasis
    added)), but the regulations make no attempt to define the
    limits of acceptable purposes. The regulations do not
    require a group seeking registration to show that it has a
    certain number of members or that its program is of inter
    est to any particular number of Hastings students. Nor do
    the regulations require that a group serve a need not met
    by existing groups.
    The regulations also make it clear that the registration
    program is not meant to stifle unpopular speech. They
    proclaim that “[i]t is the responsibility of the Dean to
    ensure an ongoing opportunity for the expression of a
    variety of viewpoints.” 
    Id., at 82a
    (Hastings Regulations
    §33.11). They also emphatically disclaim any endorse
    ment of or responsibility for views that student groups
    may express. 
    Id., at 85a
    (Hastings Regulations §34.10.D).
    Taken as a whole, the regulations plainly contemplate
    the creation of a forum within which Hastings students
    are free to form and obtain registration of essentially the
    same broad range of private groups that nonstudents may
    form off campus. That is precisely what the parties in this
    case stipulated: The RSO forum “seeks to promote a diver
    sity of viewpoints among registered student organizations,
    including viewpoints on religion and human sexuality.”
    App. 216 (emphasis added).
    The way in which the RSO forum actually developed
    corroborates this design. As noted, Hastings had more
    than 60 RSOs in 2004–2005, each with its own independ
    ently devised purpose. Some addressed serious social
    issues; others—for example, the wine appreciation and
    ultimate Frisbee clubs—were simply recreational. Some
    26   CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    organizations focused on a subject but did not claim to
    promote a particular viewpoint on that subject (for exam
    ple, the Association of Communications, Sports & Enter
    tainment Law); others were defined, not by subject, but by
    viewpoint. The forum did not have a single Party Politics
    Club; rather, it featured both the Hastings Democratic
    Caucus and the Hastings Republicans. There was no
    Reproductive Issues Club; the forum included separate
    pro-choice and pro-life organizations. Students did not see
    fit to create a Monotheistic Religions Club, but they have
    formed the Hastings Jewish Law Students Association
    and the Hastings Association of Muslim Law Students. In
    short, the RSO forum, true to its design, has allowed
    Hastings students to replicate on campus a broad array of
    private, independent, noncommercial organizations that is
    very similar to those that nonstudents have formed in the
    outside world.
    The accept-all-comers policy is antithetical to the design
    of the RSO forum for the same reason that a state-imposed
    accept-all-comers policy would violate the First Amend
    ment rights of private groups if applied off campus. As
    explained above, a group’s First Amendment right of
    expressive association is burdened by the “forced inclu
    sion” of members whose presence would “affec[t] in a
    significant way the group’s ability to advocate public or
    private viewpoints.” 
    Dale, 530 U.S., at 648
    . The Court
    has therefore held that the government may not compel a
    group that engages in “expressive association” to admit
    such a member unless the government has a compelling
    interest, “ ‘unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that
    cannot be achieved through means significantly less re
    strictive of associational freedoms.’ ” 
    Ibid. (quoting Rob erts,
    468 U. S., at 623).
    There can be no dispute that this standard would not
    permit a generally applicable law mandating that private
    religious groups admit members who do not share the
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)           27
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    groups’ beliefs. Religious groups like CLS obviously en
    gage in expressive association, and no legitimate state
    interest could override the powerful effect that an accept
    all-comers law would have on the ability of religious
    groups to express their views. The State of California
    surely could not demand that all Christian groups admit
    members who believe that Jesus was merely human.
    Jewish groups could not be required to admit anti-Semites
    and Holocaust deniers. Muslim groups could not be forced
    to admit persons who are viewed as slandering Islam.
    While there can be no question that the State of Califor
    nia could not impose such restrictions on all religious
    groups in the State, the Court now holds that Hastings, a
    state institution, may impose these very same require
    ments on students who wish to participate in a forum that
    is designed to foster the expression of diverse viewpoints.
    The Court lists four justifications offered by Hastings in
    defense of the accept-all-comers policy and, deferring to
    the school’s judgment, ante, at 21, the Court finds all those
    justifications satisfactory, ante, at 21–24. If we carry
    out our responsibility to exercise our own independent
    judgment, however, we must conclude that the justifica
    tions offered by Hastings and accepted by the Court are
    insufficient.
    The Court first says that the accept-all-comers policy is
    reasonable because it helps Hastings to ensure that “ ‘lead
    ership, educational, and social opportunities’ ” are afforded
    to all students. Ante, at 21–22 (quoting Brief for Respon
    dent Hastings College of Law 32). The RSO forum, how
    ever, is designed to achieve these laudable ends in a very
    different way—by permitting groups of students, no mat
    ter how small, to form the groups they want. In this way,
    the forum multiplies the opportunity for students to serve
    in leadership positions; it allows students to decide which
    educational opportunities they wish to pursue through
    participation in extracurricular activities; and it permits
    28    CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    them to create the “social opportunities” they desire by
    forming whatever groups they wish to create.
    Second, the Court approves the accept-all-comers policy
    because it is easier to enforce than the Nondiscrimination
    Policy that it replaced. It would be “a daunting labor,” the
    Court warns, for Hastings to try to determine whether
    a group excluded a member based on belief as opposed to
    status. Ante, at 22; see also ante, at 2–3, n. 1 (opinion
    of STEVENS, J.) (referring to the “impossible task of
    separating out belief-based from status-based religious
    discrimination”).
    This is a strange argument, since the Nondiscrimination
    Policy prohibits discrimination on substantially the same
    grounds as the antidiscrimination provisions of many
    States,7 including California, and except for the inclusion
    of the prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orien
    tation, the Nondiscrimination Policy also largely tracks
    federal antidiscrimination laws.8 Moreover, Hastings now
    willingly accepts greater burdens under its latest policy,
    which apparently requires the school to distinguish be
    tween certain “conduct requirements” that are allowed
    and others that are not. Nor is Hastings daunted by the
    labor of determining whether a club admissions exam
    legitimately tests knowledge or is a pretext for screening
    ——————
    7 See, e.g., Cal. Gov. Code Ann. §12940(a) (West 2005); N. J. Stat.
    Ann. §10:5–12(a) (West 2002); N. Y. Exec. Law Ann. §296(1)(a) (West
    2010).
    8 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
    42 U.S. C
    . §2000e et seq. (Title
    VII); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, as amended, 
    42 U.S. C
    .
    §2000d et seq. (Title VI); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
    1967, 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 
    29 U.S. C
    . §621 et seq.; Americans
    with Disabilities Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 337, 
    42 U.S. C
    . §12101 et seq.
    However, Title VII, which prohibits employment discrimination on the
    basis of religion, provides that religious associations and schools can
    hire on the basis of religion and that any employer can hire on the basis
    of religion if it is a bona fide occupational qualification. 
    42 U.S. C
    .
    §§2000e–1(a), 2000e–2(e).
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)          29
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    out students with disfavored beliefs. Asked at oral argu
    ment whether CLS could require applicants to pass a test
    on the Bible, Hastings’ attorney responded: “If it were
    truly an objective knowledge test, it would be okay.” Tr. of
    Oral Arg. 52. The long history of disputes about the
    meaning of Bible passages belies any suggestion that it
    would be an easy task to determine whether the grading of
    such a test was “objective.”
    Third, the Court argues that the accept-all-comers
    policy, by bringing together students with diverse views,
    encourages tolerance, cooperation, learning, and the de
    velopment of conflict-resolution skills. Ante, at 23. These
    are obviously commendable goals, but they are not un
    dermined by permitting a religious group to restrict mem
    bership to persons who share the group’s faith. Many
    religious groups impose such restrictions. See, e.g., Brief
    for Agudath Israel of America as Amicus Curiae 3
    (“[B]ased upon millennia-old Jewish laws and traditions,
    Orthodox Jewish institutions . . . regularly differentiate
    between Jews and non-Jews”). Such practices are not
    manifestations of “contempt” for members of other faiths.
    Cf. ante, at 6 (opinion of STEVENS, J.) (invoking groups
    that have “contempt for Jews, blacks, and women”). Nor
    do they thwart the objectives that Hastings endorses. Our
    country as a whole, no less than the Hastings College of
    Law, values tolerance, cooperation, learning, and the
    amicable resolution of conflicts. But we seek to achieve
    those goals through “[a] confident pluralism that conduces
    to civil peace and advances democratic consensus
    building,” not by abridging First Amendment rights. Brief
    for Gays and Lesbians for Individual Liberty as Amicus
    Curiae 35.
    Fourth, the Court observes that Hastings’ policy “incor
    porates—in fact, subsumes—state-law proscriptions on
    discrimination.” Ante, at 23. Because the First Amend
    ment obviously takes precedence over any state law, this
    30   CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    would not justify the Hastings policy even if it were true—
    but it is not. The only Hastings policy considered by the
    Court—the accept-all-comers policy—goes far beyond any
    California antidiscrimination law. Neither Hastings nor
    the Court claims that California law demands that state
    entities must accept all comers. Hastings itself certainly
    does not follow this policy in hiring or student admissions.
    Nor is it at all clear that California law requires Hast
    ings to deny registration to a religious group that limits
    membership to students who share the group’s religious
    beliefs. Hastings cites no California court decision or
    administrative authority addressing this question. In
    stead, Hastings points to a statute prohibiting discrimina
    tion on specified grounds, including religion or sexual
    orientation, “in any program or activity conducted by”
    certain postsecondary educational institutions. Cal. Educ.
    Code Ann. §66270 (West Supp. 2010) (emphasis added).
    Hastings, however, does not conduct the activities of the
    student groups it registers. Indeed, Hastings disclaims
    such responsibility, stating both in its regulations and its
    Handbook for Student Organizations that it “does not
    sponsor student organizations and therefore does not
    accept liability for activities of student organizations.”
    App. to Pet. for Cert. 85a (Hastings Regulations §34.10.D);
    App. 250. In addition, as CLS notes, another provision of
    California law specifically exempts “any funds that are
    used directly or indirectly for the benefit of student or
    ganizations” from a ban on state funding of private groups
    that discriminate on any of the grounds listed in §66270.
    See §92150 (West Supp. 2010).
    The authority to decide whether §66270 or any other
    provision of California law requires religious student
    groups at covered institutions to admit members who do
    not share the groups’ religious views is of course a ques
    tion of state law that we cannot resolve. The materials
    that have been brought to our attention, however, provide
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)                  31
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    little support for the majority’s suggested interpretation.
    In sum, Hastings’ accept-all-comers policy is not reason
    able in light of the stipulated purpose of the RSO forum: to
    promote a diversity of viewpoints “among”—not within—
    “registered student organizations.” App. 216 (emphasis
    added).9
    B
    The Court is also wrong in holding that the accept-all
    comers policy is viewpoint neutral. The Court proclaims
    that it would be “hard to imagine a more viewpoint
    neutral policy,” ante, at 28, but I would not be so quick to
    jump to this conclusion. Even if it is assumed that the
    policy is viewpoint neutral on its face,10 there is strong
    ——————
    9 Although we have held that the sponsor of a limited public forum
    “must respect the lawful boundaries it has itself set,” 
    Rosenberger, 515 U.S., at 829
    , the Court now says that, if the exclusion of a group is
    challenged, the sponsor can retroactively redraw the boundary lines in
    order to justify the exclusion. See ante, at 21, n. 17. This approach
    does not respect our prior holding.
    10 In Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 
    529 U.S. 217
    (2000), the Court considered a university rule permitting the
    “defund[ing]” of a registered student group through a student referen
    dum. See 
    id., at 224–225.
    “To the extent the referendum substitutes
    majority determinations for viewpoint neutrality,” the Court observed,
    “it would undermine the constitutional protection the [university’s
    registered student organization] program requires.” 
    Id., at 235.
    “The
    whole theory of viewpoint neutrality is that minority views are treated
    with the same respect as are majority views.” 
    Ibid. Hastings’ accept-all-comers policy
    bears a resemblance to the South
    wark referendum process. Both permit the majority to silence a disfa
    vored organization. There is force to CLS’s argument that “[a]llowing
    all students to join and lead any group, even when they disagree with
    it, is tantamount to establishing a majoritarian heckler’s veto” and
    “potentially turn[s] every group into an organ for the already-dominant
    opinion.” Brief for Petitioner 51.
    The Court attempts to distinguish Southworth as involving a funding
    mechanism for student groups that operated selectively, based on
    groups’ viewpoints. Ante, at 29, n. 25. But that mechanism—a student
    referendum process—placed all students at risk of “being required to
    32    CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    evidence in the record that the policy was announced as a
    pretext.
    The adoption of a facially neutral policy for the purpose
    of suppressing the expression of a particular viewpoint is
    viewpoint discrimination. See Crawford v. Board of Ed. of
    Los Angeles, 
    458 U.S. 527
    , 544 (1982) (“[A] law neutral on
    its face still may be unconstitutional if motivated by a
    discriminatory purpose”). A simple example illustrates
    this obvious point. Suppose that a hated student group at
    a state university has never been able to attract more than
    10 members. Suppose that the university administration,
    for the purpose of preventing that group from using the
    school grounds for meetings, adopts a new rule under
    which the use of its facilities is restricted to groups with
    more than 25 members. Although this rule would be
    neutral on its face, its adoption for a discriminatory reason
    would be illegal.
    Here, CLS has made a strong showing that Hastings’
    sudden adoption and selective application of its accept-all
    comers policy was a pretext for the law school’s unlawful
    denial of CLS’s registration application under the Nondis
    crimination Policy.
    Shifting policies. When Hastings denied CLS’s applica
    tion in the fall of 2004, the only policy mentioned was the
    Nondiscrimination Policy. In July 2005, the former dean
    suggested in a deposition that the law school actually
    followed the very different accept-all-comers policy. In
    March of this year, Hastings’ brief in this Court rolled out
    still a third policy. As is recognized in the employment
    discrimination context, where issues of pretext regularly
    arise, “[s]ubstantial changes over time in [an] employer’s
    ——————
    pay fees which are subsidies for speech they find objectionable, even
    offensive,” solely upon a majority vote of the student body. 
    See 529 U.S., at 230
    , 235. That is no different in principle than an accept-all
    comers policy that places all student organizations at risk of take-over
    by a majority that is hostile to a group’s viewpoint.
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)           33
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    proffered reason for its employment decision support a
    finding of pretext.” Kobrin v. University of Minnesota, 
    34 F.3d 698
    , 703 (CA8 1994); see also, e.g., Aragon v. Repub
    lic Silver State Disposal Inc., 
    292 F.3d 654
    , 661 (CA9
    2002); Cicero v. Borg-Warner Automotive, Inc., 
    280 F.3d 579
    , 592 (CA6 2001).
    Timing. The timing of Hastings’ revelation of its new
    policies closely tracks the law school’s litigation posture.
    When Hastings denied CLS registration, it cited only the
    Nondiscrimination Policy. Later, after CLS alleged that
    the Nondiscrimination Policy discriminated against reli
    gious groups, Hastings unveiled its accept-all-comers
    policy. Then, after we granted certiorari and CLS’s open
    ing brief challenged the constitutionality—and the plausi
    bility—of the accept-all-comers policy, Hastings disclosed
    a new policy. As is true in the employment context,
    “[w]hen the justification for an adverse . . . action changes
    during litigation, that inconsistency raises an issue
    whether the proffered reason truly motivated the defen
    dant’s decision.” 
    Cicero, supra, at 592
    .
    Lack of documentation. When an employer has a writ
    ten policy and then relies on a rule for which there is no
    written documentation, that deviation may support an
    inference of pretext. See, e.g., Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd.
    Partnership, 
    521 F.3d 1201
    , 1214 (CA9 2008); Rudin v.
    Lincoln Land Community College, 
    420 F.3d 712
    , 727 (CA7
    2005); Machinchick v. PB Power, Inc., 
    398 F.3d 345
    , 354,
    n. 29 (CA5 2005); Russell v. TG Missouri Corp., 
    340 F.3d 735
    , 746 (CA8 2003); Mohammed v. Callaway, 
    698 F.2d 395
    , 399–400, 401 (CA10 1983).
    Here, Hastings claims that it has had an accept-all
    comers policy since 1990, but it has not produced a single
    written document memorializing that policy. Nor has it
    cited a single occasion prior to the dean’s deposition when
    this putative policy was orally disclosed to either student
    groups interested in applying for registration or to the
    34    CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    Office of Student Services, which was charged with re
    viewing the bylaws of applicant groups to ensure that they
    were in compliance with the law school’s policies.
    Nonenforcement. Since it appears that no one was told
    about the accept-all-comers policy before July 2005, it is
    not surprising that the policy was not enforced. The re
    cord is replete with evidence that Hastings made no effort
    to enforce the all-comers policy until after it was pro
    claimed by the former dean. See, e.g., App. to Pet. for
    Cert. 118a (Hastings Democratic Caucus); 
    id., at 110a
    (Association of Trial Lawyers of America at Hastings); 
    id., at 146a–147a
    (Vietnamese American Law Society); 
    id., at 142a–143a
    (Silent Right); App. 192 (La Raza). See gener
    
    ally supra, at 7
    –8. If the record here is not sufficient to
    permit a finding of pretext, then the law of pretext is dead.
    The Court—understandably—sidesteps this issue. The
    Court states that the lower courts did not address the
    “argument that Hastings selectively enforces its all-comer
    policy,”11 that “this Court is not the proper forum to air the
    issue in the first instance,” and that “[o]n remand, the
    Ninth Circuit may consider CLS’s pretext argument if,
    and to the extent, it is preserved.” Ante, at 31–32.
    Because the Court affirms the entry of summary judg
    ment in favor of respondents, it is not clear how CLS will
    be able to ask the Ninth Circuit on remand to review its
    claim of pretext. And the argument that we should not
    ——————
    11 As  previously noted, CLS consistently argued in the courts below
    that Hastings had applied its registration policy in a discriminatory
    manner. 
    See supra, at 9
    –10, n. 1. The Court would ignore these
    arguments because counsel for CLS acknowledged below that Hastings
    has an all-comers policy. See ante, at 9, n. 5 (quoting examples). But
    as the Court itself acknowledges, counsel for CLS stated at oral argu
    ment in this Court that “the Court needs to . . . reach the constitution
    ality of the all-comers policy as applied to CLS in this case.” Tr. of Oral
    Arg. 59 (emphasis added); ante, at 9, n. 5. And as the record shows,
    CLS has never ceded its argument that Hastings applies its accept-all
    comers policy unequally.
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)          35
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    address this issue of pretext because the Ninth Circuit did
    not do so is hard to take, given that the Ninth Circuit
    barely addressed anything, disposing of this case in pre
    cisely two sentences.
    Neither of those two sentences addressed the “novel
    question,” ante, at 1, to which the bulk of this Court’s
    opinion is devoted, i.e., whether the accept-all-comers
    policy is reasonable in light of the purposes of the RSO
    forum and is viewpoint neutral, see ante, at 17–31. If it is
    appropriate for us to consider that issue, then the Ninth
    Circuit’s failure to address the issue of pretext should not
    stand in the way of review by this Court.
    C
    One final aspect of the Court’s decision warrants com
    ment. In response to the argument that the accept-all
    comers-policy would permit a small and unpopular group
    to be taken over by students who wish to silence its mes
    sage, the Court states that the policy would permit a
    registered group to impose membership requirements
    “designed to ensure that students join because of their
    commitment to a group’s vitality, not its demise.” Ante, at
    27. With this concession, the Court tacitly recognizes that
    Hastings does not really have an accept-all-comers pol
    icy—it has an accept-some-dissident-comers policy—and
    the line between members who merely seek to change a
    group’s message (who apparently must be admitted) and
    those who seek a group’s “demise” (who may be kept out)
    is hopelessly vague.
    Here is an example. Not all Christian denominations
    agree with CLS’s views on sexual morality and other
    matters. During a recent year, CLS had seven members.
    Suppose that 10 students who are members of denomina
    tions that disagree with CLS decided that CLS was mis
    representing true Christian doctrine. Suppose that these
    students joined CLS, elected officers who shared their
    36   CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
    HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    views, ended the group’s affiliation with the national
    organization, and changed the group’s message. The new
    leadership would likely proclaim that the group was “vi
    tal” but rectified, while CLS, I assume, would take the
    view that the old group had suffered its “demise.”
    Whether a change represents reform or transformation
    may depend very much on the eye of the beholder.
    JUSTICE KENNEDY takes a similarly mistaken tack. He
    contends that CLS “would have a substantial case on the
    merits if it were shown that the all-comers policy was . . .
    used to infiltrate the group or challenge its leadership in
    order to stifle its views,” ante, at 4 (concurring opinion),
    but he does not explain on what ground such a claim could
    succeed. The Court holds that the accept-all-comers policy
    is viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the pur
    poses of the RSO forum. How could those characteristics
    be altered by a change in the membership of one of the
    forum’s registered groups? No explanation is apparent.
    In the end, the Court refuses to acknowledge the conse
    quences of its holding. A true accept-all-comers policy
    permits small unpopular groups to be taken over by stu
    dents who wish to change the views that the group ex
    presses. Rules requiring that members attend meetings,
    pay dues, and behave politely, see ante, at 27, would not
    eliminate this threat.
    The possibility of such takeovers, however, is by no
    means the most important effect of the Court’s holding.
    There are religious groups that cannot in good conscience
    agree in their bylaws that they will admit persons who do
    not share their faith, and for these groups, the conse
    quence of an accept-all-comers policy is marginalization.
    See Brief for Evangelical Scholars (Officers and 24 Former
    Presidents of the Evangelical Theological Society) et al. as
    Amici Curiae 19 (affirmance in this case “will allow every
    public college and university in the United States to ex
    clude all evangelical Christian organizations”); Brief for
    Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)            37
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    Agudath Israel of America as Amicus Curiae 3, 8 (affir
    mance would “point a judicial dagger at the heart of the
    Orthodox Jewish community in the United States” and
    permit that community to be relegated to the status of “a
    second-class group”); Brief for Union of Orthodox Jewish
    Congregations of America as Amicus Curiae 3 (affirmance
    “could significantly affect the ability of [affiliated] student
    clubs and youth movements . . . to prescribe requirements
    for their membership and leaders based on religious be
    liefs and commitments”). This is where the Court’s deci
    sion leads.
    *    *    *
    I do not think it is an exaggeration to say that today’s
    decision is a serious setback for freedom of expression in
    this country. Our First Amendment reflects a “profound
    national commitment to the principle that debate on
    public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide
    open.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
    376 U.S. 254
    , 270
    (1964). Even if the United States is the only Nation that
    shares this commitment to the same extent, I would not
    change our law to conform to the international norm. I
    fear that the Court’s decision marks a turn in that direc
    tion. Even those who find CLS’s views objectionable
    should be concerned about the way the group has been
    treated—by Hastings, the Court of Appeals, and now this
    Court. I can only hope that this decision will turn out to
    be an aberration.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 08-1371

Judges: Ginsburg, Stevens, Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, Alito, Roberts, Scalia, Thomas

Filed Date: 6/28/2010

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024

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