Byrd v. District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board ( 1972 )

PER CURIAM:

Petitioner seeks reversal of an order of the District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board (the Board) suspending him from “all officerships and/or directorships” and from “any active role in the management” of five corporations, restaurants and bars, licensed with the Board pending final disposition of criminal charges against petitioner in the United States District Court.

The Board’s action was taken pursuant to an order to show cause why the corporate appliications for renewal of retail Class “C” liquor licenses should not be denied on the grounds that petitioner, a principal officer in each of the corporations, failed to possess the “good moral character” required by the District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Act. D.C. Code 1967, § 25-115(a) 1 (Supp. IV, 1971). The show cause order alleged that petitioner at a specific date, time and public place carried a dangerous weapon and assaulted two persons, one of whom was wounded, with a .38 caliber revolver — the incident out of which the criminal charges grew. From substantial evidence in the record the Board found that petitioner “cannot be deemed generally fit for the trust in him reposed under section 14(a) 1 of the Act” (D.C.Code 1967, § 25-115(a)l (Supp. IV, 1971) and granted renewal of the licenses subject to the personal suspension of petitioner.

Petitioner makes three arguments.¹ First he contends that due process was denied him because the Board failed to find, pursuant to § 25-115(a)l, that he lacked “good moral character” as charged but instead pinned its decision on a finding that he was not “generally fit for the trust in him reposed”. The short answer to this contention is that, under the statute, the Board may deny renewal of a license on a finding of unfitness, a determination in which the applicant’s “moral character” plays an essential part, and, as appears from the record, petitioner contemplated and directed his defense in relation to the former element as well as the latter.²

Secondly petitioner contends' that the Board’s order was tainted by prejudice pointing mainly to the actions of one member of the Board. We are unable to find convincing support for petitioner’s assertion and believe he was accorded an abundantly fair opportunity to defend.

Lastly it is argued that the order is too vague to be enforceable. The order, suspending petitioner from any means of actively managing the five corporations, was sufficiently definite to apprise him of the particular conduct proscribed. Accordingly, the order of the Board is

Affirmed.

1 . A serious question, not raised here, is whether the Board had the authority to impose the sanction it did. See Press Liquors, Inc. v. Weakley, 115 U.S.App. D.C. 71, 73, 317 F.2d 135, 137 (1963).

2 . Minkoff v. Payne, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 123, 210 F.2d 689 (1953) makes clear that the same qualifications required for an original license apply to renewals.