Sexton v. Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct , 297 Ark. 154 ( 1988 )

Tom Glaze, Justice,

dissenting. My disagreement with the majority lies largely with how this court should deal with defects found in the court’s rules that regulate proceedings concerning professional conduct of attorneys. In the proceeding now before us, it has become evident that some rather critical procedures have been omitted from this court’s rules, and one of them involves the failure to provide for an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct.¹ Rather than immediately promulgating a rule to provide for an appeal, the majority seems to suggest a right of appeal is provided already because the court previously allowed such an appeal in Walker v. Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct, 275 Ark. 158, 628 S.W.2d 552 (1982). In Walker, no one raised the issue now before us, and I respectfully suggest the court is in error when it attempts to remedy this serious defect or void in the rules by judicial fiat.

The majority’s decision to provide, by case opinion, for an appeal in these matters leads it to establish still another rule by the same means. The majority further decides that the appellant may not exercise his right of appeal in piecemeal fashion. Again, there is no mention in the court’s rules as to when an attorney can appeal because, as previously mentioned, there is no rule providing for an appeal. Actually, the court, by its opinion, has adopted a rule (position) similar to that provided in Ark. R. of App. P. 2, which requires a final order before an appeal can be taken.

In my view, this court should simply acknowledge the procedural voids that exist in its rules and promulgate rules to eliminate those problems. At the same time, the court should stay the proceedings in this case and decide those issues raised by the appellant. The appellant and the Committee could certainly use the guidance this court could afford them by the court’s proper consideration and resolution of the legal issues raised here. Those unresolved issues will inevitably hover over the hearing now scheduled on December 3, 1988.

For the foregoing reasons, I would grant appellant’s appeal and order a temporary stay of the proceedings below, so this court could fully resolve those questions raised in this cause.

Purtle, J., joins this dissent.

1 Rule 8 provides for an appeal, but that appellate procedure is available only when the Committee elects to file a complaint against an attorney in chancery or circuit court. When that procedure is employed, either the Committee or the attorney may appeal the trial court’s decision.