Convention Center Referendum Committee v. District of Columbia Board of Elections & Ethics , 1981 D.C. App. LEXIS 378 ( 1981 )

FERREN, Associate Judge,

with whom KELLY and MACK, Associate Judges, concur:

This case presents questions of exceptional importance concerning both the legislative powers of the District of Columbia Council and the related right of the electorate to adopt legislation by initiative. We conclude that the initiative submitted to the Board of Elections and Ethics (the Board) by the Convention Center Referendum Committee (CCRC) to bar construction and operation of a convention center meets the threshold requirement of the Charter Amendments, D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § 1-181(a), that an initiative propose a “law.” The right of initiative, however, does not extend to all legislation the Council could enact. We further conclude that the CCRC initiative is barred by the Charter Amendments exception precluding initiatives for “laws appropriating funds,” id. — an exception reflected in the “Dixon Amendment,” id. § l-1116(k)(7), to the Initiative, Referendum, and Recall Procedures Act, id. §§ 1-1116 to -1119.3 (Initiative Procedures Act). Accordingly, we must affirm.

I. SUMMARY OF DECISION

For guidance, we offer a summary of our analysis. Part II, History of the Case, describes CCRC’s efforts to use the recently authorized right of initiative to halt the Convention Center project. In Part III, we address the question whether the CCRC initiative proposes a “law” and thus lies within the general scope of the initiative right granted by the Charter Amendments, D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § l-181(a).

In particular, in Part III.A., The Scope of the Initiative Power, we confirm the principle that, unless the statute defining the initiative right provides otherwise, the power of the electorate to enact a “law” by “initiative” is congruent with the right of the legislature (here, the Council) to adopt “legislative” measures. Next, in Part III.B., The Scope of the CCRC Initiative —as a prerequisite to determining whether the initiative here is wholly legislative in character — we analyze specifically what the electorate would accomplish. We conclude that the initiative would (1) repeal the substantive authorization for construction and operation of the Convention Center, see D.C.Code 1973, § 9-220(a); id. 1980 Supp., §§ 9-601 to -610, and (2) prohibit the expenditure of funds appropriated for construction and operation of the Center, as well as bar future budget requests for such appropriations. In Part III.C., The Powers of the Council, we conclude that in accordance with its powers under the Home Rule Act¹ (and subject .to congressional agreement), the Council could adopt legislation having the same effect as the CCRC initiative. Finally, in Part III.D., A Legislative Act — in response to a central argument by the District of Columbia and the concurring opinion of Chief Judge NEWMAN — we explain why such action by the Council is a legislative act and would not impinge on executive functions. Accordingly, because the District Council properly could adopt legislation with the same effect as the CCRC initiative and would not thereby infringe upon the executive functions of the Mayor, we conclude in Part III that The CCRC Initiative Proposes a “Law.”

In contrast with the Council, however, the electorate, by way of initiative, cannot enact every kind of law. In Part IV we conclude that the Charter Amendments exception to the initiative right precluding “laws appropriating funds,” D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § l-181(a), bars the CCRC initiative. Specifically, in Part IV.A., “Laws Appropriating Funds,” we conclude that this exception prohibits initiatives that either would fund a project or — as is true of CCRC’s initiative — would bar the expenditure of funds already requested or appropriated for a project. Concomitantly, the exception does not bar initiatives that would authorize (but not fund) a new project, repeal authorization for a project (but not rescind its current funding), or prohibit future budget requests. In Part IV.B., The “Dixon Amendment,” we conclude that the Initiative Procedures Act properly reflects the “laws appropriating funds” exception to the initiative right, and thus properly requires the Board and the courts to withhold from the ballot an initiative, such as CCRC’s, that proposes such a law.

In summary, because the CCRC initiative would not merely have a prospective effect, but would stop the expenditure of appropriated funds, it is beyond the scope of the initiative right. It cannot reach the ballot.

II. HISTORY OF THE CASE

The Convention Center project first reached official status when the Mayor proposed, and the Council included in a budget amendment act for Fiscal Year 1978, a request to Congress for an initial capital outlay of $27 million for an estimated $98.7 million project.² The Council had not passed, in support of this request, a substantive law specifically authorizing construction of the Convention Center; it apparently had relied solely on the general authorization for capital construction in D.C.Code 1973, § 9-220(a).³ Congress appropriated the $27 million in June 1978.⁴

In the meantime, the Charter Amendments Act granting District electors the rights of initiative, referendum, and recall had become effective on March 10, 1978. See D.C.Code 1980 Supp., §§ 1-181 to -195.⁵ That Act required the Council to pass implementing legislation by September 6, 1978. See id. § 1-187. The Council failed to meet this deadline. Convention Center Referendum Committee v. Board of Elections & Ethics, D.C.App., 399 A.2d 550, 551 (1979) (Convention Center I).

Nonetheless, in an effort to halt the movement toward a Convention Center, CCRC submitted its first initiative to the Board of Elections and Ethics in October 1978. See id. The. Board refused to accept the bill in the absence of implementing legislation. Id. CCRC filed suit in Superi- or Court in December 1978, seeking a declaration that the Charter Amendments are self-executing. Id. On February 28, 1979, this court held that they are not. See id. at 552-53.

On June 7,1979, the Council’s implementing legislation, the Initiative Procedures Act, went into effect. That Act exempted CCRC from certain procedural requirements, in order to allow CCRC to proceed without having to collect new signatures in support of its initiative. See D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § 1-1119.2. The Act also included the “Dixon Amendment,” which provided that the Board must refuse to accept any measure that is not a “proper subject for initiative” because (among other reasons) “the petition presented would negate or limit an act of the Council of the District of Columbia pursuant to [D.C.Code 1978 Supp.,] section 47-224,” which governs the budgetary process. D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § l-1116(k)(7).⁶

Following enactment of this implementing legislation, on June 13, 1979, CCRC made a second submission to the Board, presenting a proposed bill, a proposed short title, and petitions bearing a summary statement of the initiative bill and approximately 15,000 signatures.⁷ (This bill is reproduced in Appendix A and will be referred to as Initiative Measure No. 1.) On July 11, 1979, the Board again rejected the petitions, this time on the ground that the proposed bill intruded upon the budgetary process and thus presented an improper subject for an initiative by virtue of the “Dixon Amendment.”

CCRC immediately filed suit pursuant to D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § 1-1116(7)⁸ to challenge the Board’s action, primarily on the ground that the “Dixon Amendment” went beyond the limitations on the initiative right specified in the Charter Amendments. On July 31, 1979, the trial court denied CCRC’s motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment for appellees, upholding the validity of the “Dixon Amendment” at least insofar as it prohibits an initiative “to challenge acts appropriating current capital funds.” Convention Center Referendum Committee v. Board of Elections & Ethics, D.C.Super.Ct., Civ. No. 8368-79 (July 31, 1979) (Convention Center II). The court suggested in dictum that an initiative seeking only to prevent the Council from making future budget requests for capital appropriations would be valid.

Acting on this suggestion, CCRC made a third submission to the Board on August 1, 1979. It contained the same short title and summary as had the second submission on June 13; but this third package included a new bill, identical to the summary statement that appeared on the signed petitions. (This bill is reproduced in Appendix B and will be referred to as Initiative Measure No. 2.) CCRC asked the Board to construe this second bill to prevent the Council only from making future requests for Convention Center appropriations, in accordance with the Convention Center II dictum. On August 3,1979, before the Board ruled, CCRC filed a third suit in Superior Court, seeking both a declaration that its new bill was a “proper subject” for an initiative and an injunction ordering the Board to begin verifying CCRC’s petition.

On August 6, 1979, CCRC made a fourth filing with the Board, presenting a third draft of a proposed short title and initiative bill. The text of this bill was identical to that of Initiative Measure No. 2 and the summary statement on the signed petitions, with the addition of a definition section explicitly limiting the bill to the dictum of Convention Center II. (This bill is reproduced in Appendix C and will be referred to as Initiative Measure No. 3.)

Later the same day, the Board rejected both of CCRC’s requests to reinterpret its initiative to conform to Convention Center II. The trial court denied CCRC’s motion for a preliminary injunction the same afternoon. See Convention Center Referendum Committee v. Board of Elections & Ethics, D.C.Super.Ct., Civ. No. 9874-79 (August 6, 1979) (Convention Center III). In so ruling, the trial court held that Initiative Measure No. 2, like Initiative Measure No. 1, conflicted with the Charter Amendments, as implemented by the “Dixon Amendment,” and was therefore outside the scope of the initiative right. The court also declined to approve Initiative Measure No. 3. The court reasoned that to restrict the language of the initiative to future budget requests — either through judicial construction of Initiative Measure No. 2 or through the limiting definitions contained in Initiative Measure No. 3 — would distort the fair meaning of the bill, materially change the measure circulated by petition, and mislead the voters. On August 10, 1979, ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court denied CCRC’s motion and granted summary judgment for appellees.

CCRC filed timely notices of appeal from the trial court’s decisions of July 31, August 6, and August 10. See D.C.Code 1973, §§ 11 — 721(a)(1), (2)(A); D.C.App. R. 4 11(a). On appellants’ motion, this court consolidated these appeals. A majority of a division of this court affirmed the judgment in favor of appellees. Believing this case presents a matter of “exceptional importance,” D.C.App. R. 40(c)(2), we granted rehearing en banc.

During this litigation the Convention Center project has continued. In October 1979, in accordance with the Council’s request, Congress appropriated an additional $45 million in construction funds for the Center.⁹ In December 1980, Congress appropriated the final $26.7 million requested for Convention Center construction.¹⁰ In the meantime, as of October 31, 1980, the District had obligated $71.1 million of the $98.7 million Convention Center Construction budget.

Once construction had started, the District began to make plans for operation of the Center. In 1979 the Council adopted the Washington Convention Center Management Act. D.C.Code 1980 Supp., §§ 9-601 to -610.¹¹ The Council has requested a budget of $1.2 million for this program for Fiscal Year 1982.¹²

III. THE CCRC INITIATIVE PROPOSES A “LAW”

This case presents a series of questions of law. The first is whether the CCRC initiative proposes a “law” within the meaning of the Charter Amendments, D.C. Code 1980 Supp., § l-181(a). We conclude that it does.

A. The Scope of the Initiative Power

The Home Rule Act, see note 1 supra, originally contained no right of initiative, referendum, or recall. In 1978, the Charter Amendments Act, D.C. Code 1980 Supp., §§ 1-181 to -195, granted the electorate these long-recognized instruments of direct control of legislative decisions and decision-makers. See generally 5 E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations §§ 16.-48, .52-.53 (3d rev.ed. 1969 & Supp.1980).

The initiative provision enables electors, within prescribed limits, to propose “laws”:

The term “initiative” means the process by which the electors of the District of Columbia may propose laws (except laws appropriating funds) and present such proposed laws directly to the registered qualified electors of the District of Columbia for their approval or disapproval. [D.C.Code 1980 Supp., l-181(a).]

If the voters approve an initiative measure, it becomes “an act of the Council,” id § 1-185,¹³ and thus “law” through the channel designated for the particular type of act adopted. Id.; see id. 1978 Supp., § 1-147(c).¹⁴

The initiative power, therefore, is a “power of direct legislation” by the electorate. 5 E. McQuillin, supra § 16.49, at 200. In analyzing the scope of this right, we proceed from the widely accepted premise that, absent express or implied limitation, the power of the electorate to act by initiative is coextensive with the power of the legislature to adopt legislative measures. E.g., Simpson v. Hite, 36 Cal.2d 125, 129, 222 P.2d 225, 228 (1950) (en banc); State ex rel. Frank v. Salome, 167 Kan. 766, 774, 208 P.2d 198, 204 (1949); Whitehead v. H & C Development Corp., 204 Va. 144, 149, 129 S.E.2d 691, 695 (1963); Paget v, Logan, 78 Wash.2d 349, 356, 474 P.2d 247, 251-52 (1970) (en banc); Heider v. Common Council of Wauwatosa, 37 Wis.2d 466, 474, 155 N.W.2d 17, 21 (1967). See generally 5 E. McQuillin, supra §§ 16.54-.55.

Although acceptance of this principle is virtually universal, its application is difficult. The determination whether an action is “legislative” and hence subject to initiative depends substantially on both the particular governmental structure and the initiative measure under consideration. Whitehead, supra 204 Va. at 150,129 S.E.2d 695; see 5 E. McQuillin, supra §§ 16.-48-49, .54-57. We therefore turn to the facts of this case.¹⁵

B. The Scope of the CCRC Initiative

In order to determine whether the CCRC initiative proposes a “law,” we first must define the legal scope of the CCRC initiative.

1. The Significance of the Initiative Bill Itself

To ascertain the scope of an initiative, the Initiative Procedures Act directs attention to the initiative bill itself. This focus is not only sensible but also necessary. Because the initiative may establish a law, it must include a bill; thus, neither the Board nor the court truly can determine whether an initiative conforms to the limitations on the initiative right unless it scrutinizes the very bill that would become law.¹⁶

Under the Initiative Procedures Act, the proposer of an initiative or referendum first files with the Board of Elections and Ethics “the full text of the measure, a summary statement ..., and a short title .... ” D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § l-1116(a)(l). The Board then prepares “a true and impartial summary statement, ... a short title, .... and ... in proper legislative form, the proposed initiative or referendum measure .. .. ” Id. § l-1116(c)(l)-(3); see id. § 1-186. “Upon final establishment” of these three elements, Id. § l-1116(g); see id. §§ 1-186, -1116(d)-(f), the proposer circulates petitions for signature containing “the text of the official summary and short title of the measure .... ” Id. § l-1116(gX3); see id. §§ l-1116(h)-(j). Apparently, however, only after the proposer has submitted the signed petitions to the Board does the Board make a definitive determination as to the propriety of the subject matter (in contrast with the “proper legislative form”): “[T]he Board shall refuse to accept the petition if the Board finds that the measure presented is not a proper subject for initiative or referendum, whichever is applicable,” on any of the grounds specified in the statute. Id. § l-1116(k); see note 6 supra.¹⁷ Accordingly, (1) before the proposer circulates the petitions, the Board assures that the summary statement printed on the petitions accurately reflects the initiative bill, then (2) after the required number of petitions have been signed and presented, the Board conclusively examines the bill itself to determine the propriety of the subject matter for the ballot.¹⁸

The unique procedural posture of this case does not change this focus on the bill itself as the controlling statement of the initiative. As indicated in Part II supra, the Initiative Procedures Act does provide a narrow exception from certain procedural requirements for “any initiative petition,” such as CCRC’s, that was “circulated on or after October 1, 1978, and before June 7, 1979 ....” Id. § 1-1119.2. Thus, the Act specifically exempts the CCRC petitions from the requirement of “approval of a summary statement, short title, and legislative form for an initiative measure prior to the circulation and filing of such petitions . . . .” Id. § l-1119.2(c) (emphasis added); see id. § l-1116(c)-(f)!¹⁹ Unlike initiatives that will be proposed in the future, therefore, this case lacks the guarantee that the Board and the proposer will have negotiated a summary statement of the initiative bill before the proposer circulates the petitions to the community.

The Initiative Procedures Act, however, does not exempt CCRC’s petitions from the substantive “proper subject” requirement. See id. § 1 — 1116(k). In accordance with the procedural exemptions, the Act does provide that the Board may not refuse to accept CCRC’s petitions as presenting an improper subject on the ground that the petitions are “not in the proper form,” id. § l-1116(k)(2), or that “the time limitation” for circulation and submission “has expired.” Id. § l-1116(k)(3); see id. § 1-1119.2. Otherwise,. however, the statute treats CCRC’s petitions like any others submitted to the Board after the effective date of the Act. Accordingly, they must satisfy the “proper subject” inquiry under § 1-1116(k) by reference to the initiative bill itself.

2. The CCRC Initiative

We turn to the substance of the CCRC initiative. In the abstract, we can think of two ways in which opponents of the Convention Center could seek to stop the project. First, they could mount a substantive attack by attempting (a) to deauthorize construction of the Convention Center by amending (pro tanto repealing) the underlying substantive authorization for capital construction, D.C. Code 1973, § 9-220(a); see note 3 supra, to exclude the Convention Center, and (b) to prohibit its operation by repealing the substantive authorization for operation of the Center, D.C. Code 1980 Supp., §§ 9-601 to -610. See note 11 supra and accompanying text. Second, they could adopt a wholly fiscal strategy by seeking (a) to revoke appropriations for the project and (b) to force the Council to forbear from making future budget requests for the Center.

CCRC’s original initiative bill (Initiative Measure No. 1) contains both approaches— substantive and fiscal — toward stopping the Convention Center. The bill does not explicitly state that it amends the underlying substantive authorization for capital construction projects, D.C. Code 1973, § 9-220(a), or repeals substantive authorization for operation of the Center. See id. 1980 Supp., §§ 9-601 to -610. Section three of the bill, however, would have the effect of removing the substantive underpinnings of the Center: “After the effective date of this measure, the District of Columbia Government shall not construct or operate a Convention Center, or acquire land for that purpose.” This section would place a substantive limitation on the power of the District to undertake “[a] program of construction to meet the capital needs of the government of the District of Columbia,” D.C.Code 1973, § 9-220(a), and would prohibit operation of the Convention Center once it is built. See id. 1980 Supp., §§ 9-601 to -610. The repealer would take hold “after the effective date of this measure,” that is, once the measure had passed through the required popular and congressional channels.

Initiative Measure No. 1, moreover, would seek to revoke appropriations for the project. By proscribing further construction or operation of the Center after the “effective date” of the measure, section three prohibits the expenditure of any appropriated funds for the Center once the measure has traveled the designated popular and congressional route. Section four makes explicit the message that the District is to wind up the project as soon as possible, using appropriated funds to settle broken contracts, but making no additional expenditures unrelated to the termination process. See Appendix A. It follows that Initiative Measure No. 1 also would prevent the Council from making any new request for funds to construct or operate the Center.

In short, Initiative Measure No. 1 would remove both the substantive and financial underpinnings of the Convention Center and bring the project to an immediate end.

3. Postcirculation Revisions

After the trial court had held that Initiative Measure No. 1 was outside the permissible scope of an initiative, see Convention Center II, supra, CCRC attempted to sustain its effort by matching the signatures it had collected on the petitions with an initiative bill that would conform to the Convention Center II dictum authorizing a prospective freeze. CCRC presumably recognized that it could not use these signatures to legitimize the initiative if the bill deviated materially from what CCRC had circulated to the community. On the other hand, given the trial court’s decision, CCRC could not get the initiative on the ballot unless the measure had only a prospective effect. Thus, CCRC offered the Board two alternatives which it apparently hoped would satisfy these conflicting concerns.

First, CCRC submitted to the Board as an alternative bill the summary statement printed on its petitions (Initiative Measure No. 2). CCRC asked the Board to construe this new bill to prohibit only future budget requests for the Convention Center. Before the Board had ruled, CCRC submitted still another alternative bill (Initiative Measure No. 3), which incorporated Initiative Measure No. 2 and expressly confined its terms to the dictum of Convention Center II through the use of an additional, definitional section. The Board and the trial court subsequently rejected both attempts to reinterpret the initiative.

While we recognize that CCRC has had to work with a complicated and untried system to achieve a proper vehicle for a popular vote on the Convention Center, we agree with the trial court that if the Board had interpreted Initiative Measure No. 2, as requested, or accepted Initiative Measure No. 3, as written, its action would have been illegal.

In the first place, neither the Charter Amendments nor the Initiative Procedures Act expressly authorizes the proposers of an initiative, the Board, or the courts unilaterally to revise the substance of an initiative bill after circulation of petitions to the voters. The Charter Amendments provide that the Board “shall submit an initiative measure without alteration . . .. ” D.C. Code 1980 Supp., § 1-183. The Initiative Procedures Act interprets this provision to permit the Board to make technical, but not substantive, changes before circulation to assure “proper legislative form.” Id. § 1-1116(c)(3). This responsibility of the Board, as well as its duty to screen the bill for subject matter propriety after circulation of petitions, see id. § 1 — 1116(k); note 6 supra, may encourage the Board to give proposers some substantive guidance before circulation, at the time the Board approves the summary statement; but it does not give the Board authority to revise the substance of a bill after circulation, even on the request of the proposer. Nor does CCRC’s grandfather clause, see id. § 1-1119.2, give the Board the power (or CCRC the license) to revise the substance of CCRC’s initiative after petitions have been circulated. The plain language of § 1-1119.2, providing exemption from general procedures, supports no such broad interpretation.²⁰

In any event, it would be mischievous to read into the Charter Amendments and the Initiative Procedures Act a proposer’s right to change the terms of a measure between circulation of petitions and submission to the voters. A threshold level of popular support, as evidenced by signatures on petitions, is a prerequisite for a vote on an initiative. See id. §§ 1-182, l-1116(i). In most circumstances neither the proposer, the Board, nor the court could surmise with any confidence or accuracy that the petition-signers would have approved a different version of the initiative from the one summarized on the petitions.

Nor will it do to say that the electorate, in eventually voting on the initiative, could “cure” any error in perceiving the petition-signers’ intent. If the role of the petition-signers is to have meaning in the initiative process, the bill they signed to support, in contrast with one materially rewritten or redefined to meet a statutory or constitutional objection, must be the bill put to the voters, if one is put to the voters at all.²¹ Although our refusal to allow material alteration of a bill may lead to a harsh result for those who, in good faith, circulated petitions containing a bill that, in the end, cannot reach the ballot, it would be an even harsher result for the governmental process itself if we were to permit an initiative onto the ballot based on signatures which might not have been given for a materially altered bill. We must be able to say with conviction, based on the express terms of the initiative, what the petition-signers contemplated as acceptable.

In the case of a unitary capital project such as a convention center, we have no basis for knowing whether a person who signed a petition calling for a halt to the project in the current year also would support merely a prospective freeze, with the waste of public funds that would result from dismantling a project well under way.²² It may be true that petition-signers cannot, in any event, foretell with certainty the date when a capital project initiative might become effective. Moreover, we recognize that an upcoming vote on a prospective-only initiative might encourage administrators to make contingency plans for termination of the project, with the result that the actual impact might turn out to be somewhat more immediate than legally required. Nonetheless, there may be a substantial discrepancy between an initiative that would halt a project as soon as the people and Congress have spoken and one that would stop it only at the end of the latest fiscal year for which the Council has requested or Congress has appropriated funds.²³ There can be no assurance as to how administrators would deal with the problem under these different situations. Particularly, therefore, when we consider an initiative relating to an indivisible project, where timing of a stoppage is material to the cost-benefit assessment, there is no room for speculation whether the petition-signers would have been satisfied with a substantively different proposal.

Because an initiative, as circulated on petitions, cannot lawfully be changed in any material respect for submission to the voters, the Board and the trial court were correct in rejecting CCRC’s attempt to submit Initiative Measure No. 2 (as interpreted) and No. 3 (as written). Although Initiative Measure No. 2 was circulated on the petitions as the summary statement of the proposed measure, it was not susceptible to a “prospective only” interpretation. On its face it purported to prohibit expenditure of appropriated funds, as well as future budget requests. See Appendix B. In contrast, while initiative Measure No. 3 expressly called for only a prospective freeze on Convention Center funding, it was an impermissible, substantive revision of the original bill (Initiative Measure No. 1) summarized on the petitions.

In summary, in light of the scheme of the Initiative Procedures Act, the original intention of the proposers of the CCRC initiative, and the language reflecting that intention presented to the signers of the petitions, we conclude that the Board’s acceptance of either Initiative Measure No. 2 or Initiative Measure No. 3 would have been improper. Thus, we must address our consideration to the original bill, Initiative Measure No. 1, the legal effect of which would be (1) to deauthorize construction and operation of the Convention Center, and (2) to stop further expenditure of funds appropriated for construction or operation of the project, as well as to stop submission of future budget requests to Congress.

C. The Powers of the Council

Having defined the scope of the CCRC initiative,'we turn to the question whether the District Council itself lawfully could pass such a bill. We first examine the Council’s general powers under the Home Rule Act. We then consider the exception to those powers for the budgetary process, as well as other statutory limitations which appellees contend would prevent the Council from adopting an act like the CCRC initiative. Contrary to appellees’ position, we conclude that the Council through its substantive and fiscal powers, could so act.

1. Home Rule Powers

In establishing self-government for the District of Columbia, Congress wished “to the greatest extent possible, consistent with the constitutional mandate [to] relieve [itself] of the burden of legislating upon essentially local District matters.” D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § l-121(a); see District of Columbia v. Washington Home Ownership Council, Inc., D.C.App., 415 A.2d 1349, 1351 (1980) (en banc); McIntosh v. Washington, D.C.App., 395 A.2d 744, 753 (1978). Various members of Congress apparently had in mind different models for the new governmental structure, including a federal agency, a municipality, a state, a territory, and a city-state. See Newman & DePuy, Bringing Democracy to the Nation’s Last Colony: The District of Columbia Self-Government Act, 24 Am.U.L.Rev. 537, 556-69 (1975). Congress ultimately delegated to the District legislative control over most of its own affairs:

Except as provided in sections 1-126, 1-147, and 47-228, the legislative power of the District shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation within the District consistent with the Constitution of the United States and the provisions of this Act subject to all the restrictions and limitations imposed upon the States by the tenth section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States. [D.C. Code 1978 Supp., § 1-124.]

Congress vested this legislative power in the Council, see id § 1- 144(a),²⁴ but, in order to comply with its constitutional duties,²⁵ Congress retained a role in the legislative process. The Council’s ordinary legislation becomes effective only after a 30-legislative-day layover in Congress, and is subject to disapproval by concurrent resolution during that period. Id §§ l-144(e), -147(c)(1); see Washington Home Ownership Council, Inc., supra at 1351-52; Newman & DePuy, supra at 631-34; note 14 supra.²⁶

Although subject to congressional review, the Council’s powers of ordinary legislation are broad; they are limited only by specified exceptions and by the general requirement that legislation be consistent with the U.S. Constitution and the Home Rule Act. See Bishop v. District of Columbia, D.C.App., 411 A.2d 997, 999 (en banc), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966, 100 S.Ct. 2943, 64 L.Ed.2d 825 (1980); McIntosh, supra at 751-54. In this sense, the District resembles a full “home rule” city with general powers to govern local affairs except for express limitations, in contrast with a limited “home rule” city or a municipal corporation to which a state has granted only enumerated powers. See generally 2 E. McQuillin, supra §§ 9.01-.08b, 10.08-17. As a general rule, courts strictly construe the powers of municipal corporations, see id. §§ 10.18a-.24, whereas they liberally read the authority ' of full “home rule” cities. See id. § 10.25.²⁷ In construing the delegation of legislative power to the Council, however, this court must pay substantial attention to the unique nature of the District’s polity, see note 15 supra, always interpreting the Home Rule Act “with a central focus: the intent of Congress.” Washington Home Ownership Council, Inc., supra at 1351 (footnote omitted).

2. The Budgetary Exception

One exception to the general delegation of legislative authority concerns the budgetary process. D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § 47-228 provides in relevant part:

Nothing in this Act shall be construed as making any change in existing law, regulation, or basic procedure and practice relating to the respective roles of the Congress, the President, the Federal Office of Management and Budget, and the Comptroller General of the United States in the preparation, review, submission, examination, authorization, and appropriation of the total budget of the District of Columbia government. [Id. § 47-228(a).]

a. The Budgetary Process

The Home Rule Act establishes a unique and complex budgetary procedure for the District which, in broad outline, proceeds as follows: The Mayor initially proposes the budget and submits it to the Council. D.C. Code 1978 Supp., § 47-221(a). The Council then has fifty days in which to consider and “adopt” a District budget by “act.” Id. § 47-224. The Council then transmits this “budget request act” back to the Mayor, see id. § l-144(e), who has line-item veto power. See id. § l-144(f). The Council can override any such veto by a two-thirds vote. Id. The Mayor then submits the final budget request act to the President. Id. § 47-224.

After the federal Office of Management and Budget has reviewed the District budget, see 31 U.S.C. §§ 2, 16, 26 (1976), the President submits the final version to Congress. See id. § 11(a). After committee consideration, Congress passes and transmits to the President the annual D.C. Appropriations Act. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 1301-53 (1976); D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § 47-224. An appropriations item that lacks underlying substantive authorization may be subject to a point of order in the House of Representatives.²⁸

The annual Appropriations Act authorizes District officials to obligate and expend the revenues of the District for approved programs, see D.C.Code 1978 Supp. § 47-224, and also may authorize the Mayor to borrow funds to finance capital projects. See id. § 47-241 & note (“Interim Loan Authority”) (Home Rule Act, supra, tit. VII, § 723, as amended by Act of Oct. 13, 1977, Pub. L.No. 95-131, § 1, 91 Stat. 1155). Thus, although the Council authorizes programs and approves the District budget for transmission to the President, the Congress itself finally appropriates the funds. See generally Newman & DePuy, supra at 591-94.

The Home Rule Act also permits revisions of the District budget through essentially the same process as the original budget. “The Mayor from time to time may prepare and submit to the Council such proposed supplemental or deficiency budget recommendations as in his judgment are necessary on account of laws enacted after transmission of the budget or are otherwise in the public interest.” D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § 47-221(c); see 31 U.S.C. §§ 2, 22 (1976). If the Council adopts a supplemental budget request act, see D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § 47-224, the Mayor may approve it, see id. § l-144(e), or subject it to line-item veto, see id. § l-144(f) which the Council in turn may override. See id. The Mayor transmits the final version of the supplemental budget request act to the President. See id. § 47-224. The office of Management and Budget examines the act, see 31 U.S.C. §§ 24, 26 (1976), and the President then submits it to Congress. See id. § 11(g). Congress ultimately must approve any supplemental appropriations act. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 1301-53 (1976); D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § 47-224. Although the term “supplemental” implies a request for additional appropriations, the Council also may use such an act to request reductions in appropriations. See, e. g. Fiscal Year 1980 Supplemental Budget Request Act of 1980, Act 3-170, § 2, 27 D.C.Reg. 1368 (1980); Supplemental Appropriations & Rescission Act, 1980, Pub.L.No. 96-304, ch. IV, 94 Stat. 857, 866 (1980).

b. Deauthorization and Defunding

The question presented is whether, given this legislative structure, the Council can halt an ongoing capital project (1) by repealing or amending the underlying substantive authorization for the budget item after Congress has appropriated funds for it, or (2) simply by halting further expenditure of funds appropriated for the project (and, of course, declining to make future budget requests for it). We conclude that the Council, pursuant to its powers of ordinary legislation, can remove the substantive authorization for a funded project; but, to the extent Congress has appropriated funds for the project, the Council can halt further expenditure only through the more elaborate requirements of the budget process, even though the project has been formally deauthorized.²⁹

Under the Home Rule Act, the Council could begin by taking either a substantive or a fiscal approach to halting a project during the course of a fiscal year. The Council, for example, initially pould invoke its ordinary legislative power to repeal or amend the law that authorizes the project. See D.C.Code 1978 Supp., §§ 1-124, -144(a). The effect of such action would vary depending on the stage of the program. If the Council deauthorized a project before adopting a budget request act, the project presumably would go no further. If the Council acted after adoption of a budget request act but before congressional passage of an appropriations act, the absence of substantive authorizing legislation could leave the budget item subject to a point of order in the House of Representatives, see note 28 supra ;³⁰ otherwise, the congressional appropriations process would continue.

If the Council repealed the substantive authorization for a project after Congress had appropriated funds (or if the Council repealed it before the appropriation, without also repealing the budget request act in the absence of a point of order), the Council’s repealer alone would not halt the project; Congress would have to rescind the appropriation, in order to end the project during the current fiscal year. The structure of the Home Rule Act compels this view. In the ordinary legislative process, the role of Congress is passive: a deauthori-zation by the Council becomes effective through mere congressional acquiescence during the layover period. See D.C.Code 1978 Supp., §§ l-144(e), -147(c)(1). In the budget process, by contrast, Congress has retained a key role: appropriations for the District depend on an affirmative congressional act. See id. § 47-224. If we were to construe the Home Rule Act to permit deauthorizing legislation by the Council (even if it survived a 30-day congressional layover) to undercut the affirmative congressional approval reflected in the appropriation of funds for a project, we would undermine the role of Congress in the District’s governmental structure. We would be permitting the Council, improperly, to use a relatively easy legislative track to interdict a project which Congress has approved by taking a step beyond acquiescence in program authorization: the affirmative appropriation of funds. See id. § 47-228(a).

We conclude, therefore, that a substantive deauthorization by the Council can halt a funded project during the current fiscal year only if implemented by a supplemental budget request act followed by a congressional supplemental appropriations act rescinding or transferring appropriations for the deauthorized program. See 31 U.S.C. § 11(b) (1976); D.C.Code 1978 Supp., §§ 47-221(c), -224.³¹

There remains an obvious question: once Congress has appropriated funds, can the Council halt the project by using the budget process alone, rather than begin by repealing the underlying substantive authorization? We answer yes; the Council could adopt a supplemental budget request act seeking rescission or transfer of appropriations for the fiscal year. See 31 U.S.C. § 11(b) (1976); D.C.Code 1978 Supp., §§ 47-221(c), 224; note 31 supra.³² Use of the budget process to end a project would respect the role of Congress in the District’s fiscal affairs and thus comport with the Home Rule Act. See id. § 47-228(a).³³

In summary, consistent with the Home Rule Act, the Council could seek to halt an ongoing project during the current fiscal year (1) by repealing the substantive authorizing legislation, followed by a supplemental budget request act seeking rescission or transfer of appropriations; or (2) initially adopting a supplemental budget request act seeking rescission or transfer of appropriated funds. The question remains: Are such acts “legislative” acts that the electorate can adopt by initiative?

D. A Legislative Act

There is a corollary of the rule that the power of the electorate to act by initiative is coextensive with the legislative power: an initiative cannot extend to administrative matters. See 5 E. McQuillin, supra § 16.55. Although many courts have barred initiatives from the ballot on the ground that the act proposed is “administrative,” not “legislative,” we conclude that the CCRC initiative does not run afoul of this corollary.

The test of “legislative” and “administrative” matters that other jurisdictions most frequently have employed is “whether the proposition is one to make new law or to execute law already in existence.” 5 E. McQuillin, supra § 16.55, at 213 (footnote omitted).³⁴ Using this test, courts have invalidated initiatives that would meddle with the details of executing established policy.³⁵ Courts, however, have called initiatives “legislative” when they have addressed the basic policy question whether or not to undertake a capital project, even after the project has begun.³⁶ This jurisdiction also has recognized the “policy” basis of the distinction between legislative and administrative powers.³⁷ Contrary to ap-pellees’ view, we conclude that, in both its substantive and fiscal aspects, the CCRC initiative is “legislative.” It does not address merely administrative concerns or im-permissibly interfere with the execution of existing law.

First, the substantive effect of the CCRC initiative would be to amend the District’s general capital construction statute, D.C. Code 1973, § 9-220(a), removing authorization for the Convention Center, and also to. repeal the law providing for its operation. Id. 1980 Supp., §§ 9-601 to -610. See Part III.B.2 supra.³⁸ Appellees do not dispute that the Council or the voters can repeal or amend such authorizing legislation to stop a particular capital project before Congress has appropriated funds for it. Appellees contend, however, that once Congress has funded the project, any act of the Council or the electorate to halt the project intrudes into the administrative sphere. This argument implies that the general capital construction statute, D.C.Code 1973, § 9-220(a), already has created a specific, though unrevealed, Platonic Form of the District of Columbia which remains only to be discovered, brought to earth, and built — a group of ministerial, not policy, actions. This view of § 9-220(a) is untenable.

Section 9-220(a) does authorize “[a] program of construction to meet the capital needs” of the District government, id., and permits appropriations without additional authorization. Compare note 28 supra. But not all decisions pursuant to that broad authorization — including the basic decision whether or not to undertake a particular project — properly can be called “administrative.” The question whether or not to undertake each specific capital project involves serious consideration of its benefits and costs. A decision to build reflects a determination that the project will meet the needs of the government and the public. As appellees recognize, what those needs are, and what type of edifice the government requires to serve those needs, are policy issues.

Even after having made an initial decision to build, the Council has the power to reconsider and reverse that decision. See Part III.C.2.b. supra. Although the Mayor is the chief executive of the District, see D.C.Code 1978 Supp., §§ 1-162 to -163, and its financial administrator, see id. §§ 47-224 to -226, -241 & note, these duties depend on legislative authorization and funding of the programs to be administered. If the Council reconsiders the advisability of a project and determines to shut it down, that decision is as much a policy decision as the original go-ahead. See note 36 supra. It cannot be said to interfere with project administration or merely to affect the execution of a law as vague and broad as § 9-220(a).

As discussed in Part III.C.2.b. supra, however, the Council cannot halt a project in the course of a fiscal year solely by deau-thorizing it. Rather — either after deau-thorization or as the initial strategy — the Council must proceed through the budget process to rescind program funding. We therefore must address appellees’ — and Chief Judge NEWMAN’S — argument that even if deauthorization of a capital project is legislative, “a budget request ..., though labeled an ‘act,’ is clearly not a legislative action.” We disagree.

The Council’s budget request acts represent the formulation of a set of governmental priorities by the elected representatives of the public. The determination of the levels of funding to request from Congress for competing programs involves a myriad of policy decisions. The passage of the budget, therefore, is legislative action. See State ex rel. Keefe v. City of St. Petersburg, 106 Fla. 742, 761, 145 So. 175, 177 (1933) (en banc) (per curiam). But see Cuprowski v. City of Jersey City, 101 N.J.Super. 15, 27-28, 242 A.2d 873, 879-80 (Super.Ct.Law Div.), aff’d, 103 N.J.Super. 217, 247 A.2d 28 (Super.Ct.App.Div.1968) (per cu-riam).

Although it is true that the Council’s budget request acts are subject to review by the federal executive and funding by Congress, see Part III.C.2. supra; cf. note 34 supra, the unique structure of the District budgetary process does not render the Council’s role administrative. The District budgetary process involves two legislatures: the Council and Congress. The Council’s ordinary legislation is no less “legislative” because of the congressional layover required. See Part III.C.l. supra. Similarly, the Council’s adoption of a budget is a legislative act, albeit subject to review and revision in other quarters.

Most telling, however, are the Charter Amendments themselves. The grant of the initiative right contains an exception: the electorate may propose “laws,” but not “laws appropriating funds.” D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § l-181(a). The legislative history of this phrase shows that it encompasses both the Council’s budget request acts and Congress’ appropriations acts. See Part IV.A. infra. The statute itself thus indicates that a budget request act is a type of “law.”

In summary, the CCRC initiative represents an effort through both substantive and fiscal means to reverse the legislative policy determination that the District should build and operate a convention center. The fact that the initiative would affect budgetary decisions does not make it any less a legislative determination. It does not impinge on executive functions. Because the Council properly could pass an act having the same effects as the CCRC initiative, see Part III.C. supra, that initiative must be said to propose a “law” within the meaning of the Charter Amendments, D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § l-181(a).

IV. THE CCRC INITIATIVE PROPOSES A “LAW APPROPRIATING FUNDS”

Although the CCRC initiative does propose a “law,” we conclude that the initiative right does not extend to the subject matter of this measure. The Charter Amendments exception barring all initiatives for “laws appropriating funds,” D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § l-181(a) (reflected in the “Dixon Amendment” of the Initiative Procedures Act, id. § l-1116(k)(7)), precludes this initiative.

A. “Laws Appropriating Funds”

In addition to the requirement that an initiative propose a “law,” the Charter Amendments expressly create one exception to the initiative right. Electors may not propose “lav/s appropriating funds.” Id. § l-181(a). Appellants maintain that this exception applies only to affirmative acts of appropriation. Because the CCRC initiative seeks to “unappropriate” funds, this exception, they say, does not apply. Appellees disagree, contending that the exception is broader. They argue that it also bars any initiative, such as CCRC’s, that would stop the expenditure of appropriated funds.

Our task in construing the statute “ ‘is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent and to give legislative words their natural meaning.’” Citizens Association of Georgetown v. Zoning Commission of the District of Columbia, D.C.App., 392 A.2d 1027, 1032 (1978) (en banc) (quoting Rosenberg v. United States, D.C.App., 297 A.2d 763, 765 (1972) (citations omitted)). We begin this process of course with the language of the statute itself. Citizens Association of Georgetown, supra; March v. United States, 165 U.S.App.D.C. 267, 274, 506 F.2d 1306, 1313 (1974). We must read these words, however, in their legislative context. See Citizens Association of Georgetown, supra at 1033; March, supra at 274-75, 506 F.2d at 1313-14.

Because of the unique features of our home rule process, “laws appropriating funds” exception is ambiguous on its face. For example, although the Council has considerable legislative power, technically it does not enact “laws” but only (l)“acts” which become “laws” after congressional layover, see D.C.Code 1978 Supp., §§ 1-144 to -147; (2) “budget acts,” which are one step in a complex appropriations process, see id. § 47-224; (3) “resolutions,” see id. § l-146(a); and (4) “rules,” see id. § 1-144(c). Furthermore, although the Council requests funds, it is Congress, not the Council, that actually does the “appropriating.” See id. § 47-224. Finally — and of considerable significance — the Council must adopt a “budget act” and proceed through the same “appropriations” process whether it requests additional funds or seeks a reduction of funds already appropriated. See Part III.C.2. supra. There is no distinct “unap-propriations” process; nor would Congress pass a “supplemental unappropriations act.” Consequently, in common parlance under the Home Rule Act, “appropriations” may signify a positive or a negative act.

When we look beyond the inconclusive language of the “laws appropriating funds” exception to its legislative history, two impressions stand out. First, proponents of the exception described its effect in broad terms, covering the roles of both the Council and Congress in the District’s budgetary process. More specifically, in introducing the “laws appropriating funds” amendment to the original Charter Amendments bill, Council member Arrington Dixon said it “would place language in the Legislation that would prohibit initiative used against or as related to appropriated funds which go to tax levying or other forms of operating budget or appropriated fund actions.” (Emphasis added.) Similarly, during the congressional hearings on the Charter Amendments, District Delegate Walter E. Fauntroy explained, “House Concurrent Resolution 436 relates to initiative which is the process that allows electors to propose laws which will be voted on by them. This process of course excludes laws relating to the appropriation of funds.” (Emphasis added.)

Second, during lengthy discussion of the “laws appropriating funds” amendment, Council members worried that an unqualified initiative right would enable the electorate to interfere with the fiscal affairs of the District. In particular, members expressed their concern that the initiative right would permit citizens to establish a program for which the Council then could be required to seek funding, regardless of the fiscal impact. Proponents of the amendment responded by distinguishing sharply between the power to authorize a substantive program, which the initiative right would confer on citizens, and the power to authorize expenditures, which the amendment explicitly reserved to the Council and Congress. Council members Marion Barry and Arrington Dixon made this point most clearly:

MR. BARRY: ....

This Council can place legislation authorizing the establishment of entities. We established the Office of Latino Affairs. We have also put into our budgetary process that to put in that measure some $50,000.

My interpretation is that is authorizing legislation and it is not appropriating] legislation. That is, the Council in its budgetary process will decide to exclude the $5 million health center that the community had authorized us to build and operate, if during the budgetary process, the Council voted against it. That was my understanding in the Committee. That was my understanding from the staff, that authorizing legislation as we do but it wasn’t appropriating legislation.

MR. DIXON: It is correct on the initiative section. We passed it. The electorate can initiate a tax if they want to, but they cannot appropriate that money. They can initiate any measure they want to initiate but they cannot initiate the spending of that money. That is not in their power to do.

In summary, the Council’s deliberations show that the phrase “laws appropriating funds” encompasses both the Council’s budget request acts and Congress’ appropriations acts. The Council was particularly concerned, moreover, that the electorate not use the initiative to launch the appropriations process.

The Council, we note, did not specifically consider the converse situation presented in this case: an effort by the electorate to repeal or amend the substantive authorization for a funded project, to block the expenditure of previously appropriated funds, and to prevent future requests for appropriations. Nonetheless, in light of the Council’s substantial concern about the fiscal effects of initiatives, in view of the language used by proponents to describe the broad impact of the “laws appropriating funds” amendment, and, especially because the “appropriations” process is necessary to accomplish rescissions as well as affirmative acts of funding, we do not believe the Council’s failure to discuss the potential use of the initiative to halt a funded program is conclusive. We are bound to interpret the statute in the way most consonant with the overall intent of the legislature, even if the precise problem before the court was not expressly contemplated by the legislative body. See Breen v. District of Columbia, D.C.App., 400 A.2d 1058, 1061 (1979); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. C.A.B., 122 U.S.App.D.C. 375, 378-79, 354 F.2d 507, 510-11 (1965).

In construing the amendment, we must weigh two major public interest concerns of the Council reflected in the Charter Amendments — the electors’ right of initiative and responsible fiscal management — with a view to enhancing the value of each without undue intrusion on the other.

For perspective, it is interesting to note that, because of the significance and technicality of financial decisions, many states have excluded such matters from the initiative right either by express statutory exception or, indeed often, by judicial interpretation.³⁹ On the other hand, the initiative right should be liberally construed. 5 E. McQuillin, supra § 1651, at 203-04. Courts, in fact, have applied the liberal interpretation rule with vigor in both procedural⁴⁰ and substantive contexts.⁴¹ For example, in Glass v. Smith, 150 Tex. 632, 244 S.W.2d 645 (1951), the Texas Supreme Court stated in a well-considered opinion that it would impose on the initiative right only those limitations expressed in the law or “clear[ly] and compelling[ly]” implied. Id. at 637, 244 S.W.2d at 649.⁴²

We conclude that the public interests in the initiative right and in responsible fiscal management are each achievable to the maximum extent, as intended by the Council, by interpreting the “laws appropriating funds” exception to bar any initiative that would halt a project — to the extent funds have been requested or appropriated — but to leave within the scope of the initiative right the power to stop a project as of the end of the fiscal period for which funds have been requested or appropriated (or to stop it before the Council has requested funds). To use the Glass terminology, the Council’s expressed concern about interference with the financial affairs of government, coupled with the fact that the appropriations process is used to rescind as well as approve funding, “clear[ly] and compelling[ly]” implies that the “laws appropriating funds” exception should be read to prevent the electorate from interfering with accomplished fiscal acts of the Council and/or Congress. The Council’s clearly expressed concern, in adopting the Charter Amendments, that the initiative right received bifurcated treatment — distinguishing substantive authorizations from funding acts — indicates forcefully that the Charter Amendments do not sanction use of the initiative power to rescind the legislature’s established fiscal plans.

Accordingly, we conclude that the “laws appropriating funds” exception prevents the electorate from using the initiative to (1) adopt a budget request act or make some other affirmative effort to appropriate funds, or to (2) block the expenditure of funds requested or appropriated as of the effective date of the initiative act.

The Council’s fiscal concerns, however, do not compel the conclusion that the “laws appropriating funds” exception also should be read to preclude wholly prospective initiatives. A prospective funding freeze would not interfere with an adopted budget request act of the Council or an appropriations act of Congress; such an initiative would affect only future actions. Thus, it would not undermine the exercise powers of the Council and Congress to manage the financial affairs of the District. Furthermore, the Council’s clear contemplation that the electorate could use the initiative to repeal legislation, see note 38 supra, strongly indicates that its fiscal concerns were present-, not future-oriented.⁴³

Accordingly, we further conclude that the “laws appropriating funds” exception does not preclude initiatives (1) to establish substantive authorization for a new project (2) to repeal existing substantive authorization for a program (without rescinding its current funding) or (3) to prohibit future budget requests.

B. The “Dixon Amendment”

In rejecting the CCRC initiative, the Board relied on the “Dixon Amendment” to the Initiative Procedures Act, D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § l-1116(k)(7), which purportedly reflects the Charter Amendments exception to the initiative right for “laws appropriating funds,” id. § l-181(a). The trial court agreed that the CCRC initiative would “negate or limit” a budget request act of the Council. Id. § 1-1116(1). This is the specific decision brought to us for review.

As a preliminary matter, we must make clear that the “laws appropriating funds” exception constitutes an operative, substantive limitation on the initiative right. Although we stated in Convention Center I, supra, that the Charter Amendments are not self-executing, see id. at 552-53, that ruling held only that electors could not present initiative, referendum, or recall proposals until the Council established more specific procedures than the Charter Amendments themselves provided. See id. The decision did not hold that the substantive aspects of the Charter Amendments lack independent force. See Allison v. Washington County, 24 Or.App. 571, 576-80, 548 P.2d 188, 190-93 (1976) (en banc).

Although courts in other jurisdictions have excluded overly broad initiatives from the ballot even without specific statutory authorization, see note 17 supra, the Initiative Procedures Act specifically authorizes the Board, and if necessary the court, to withhold an initiative that is inconsistent with the Home Rule Act, including the Charter Amendments, or that would “negate or limit” a budget request act. See D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § l-1116(k)-(7). Because we conclude that the Dixon Amendment comports with the Charter Amendment limitations on the initiative right,⁴⁴ the reliance of the Board and the trial court on that provision was entirely proper.

The Council enacted the Initiative Procedures Act as the enabling statute required by the Charter Amendments. See id. § 1-187. During consideration of the implementing legislation, Council Chairman Arrington Dixon introduced the so-called “Dixon Amendment” to reflect the Charter Amendments’ limitations on both referendum and initiative rights. The provisions require the Board of Elections and Ethics to reject (as involving an improper subject) an initiative or referendum measure if “the petition presented would negate or limit an act of the Council of the District of Columbia pursuant to [D.C.Code 1978 Supp.,] section 47-224.” Id. § 1 — 1116(k)(7); see id. § 1-1116(1); note 6 supra. On the basis of this provision, the Board and the trial court blocked the CCRC initiative measures.

As implementing legislation, the Initiative Procedures Act is valid, of course, only insofar as it conforms to the underlying Charter Amendments. These amendments to the District Charter, Home Rule Act, supra note 1, tit. IV, §§ 401-95; see note 5 supra, are in the nature of constitutional provisions, see Washington Home Ownership Council, Inc., supra at 1369 (Mack, J., with Newman, C. J. & Pryor, J., dissenting); 2 E. McQuillin, supra § 9.03, at 623, and cannot be amended or contravened by ordinary legislation. See D.C.Code 1978 Supp., §§ 1-124, -125, -128(a); 2 E. McQuillin, supra § 9.25, at 703.

In our view, the “Dixon Amendment,” D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § l-1116(k)(7), propefly specifies certain limitations that the Charter Amendments place on the initiative right. See id. § l-181(a). In barring any initiative that “would negate or limit [a budget request] act of the Council,” D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § l-1116(k)(7), the “Dixon Amendment” manifestly prohibits only initiatives that would contravene an existing budget request act. It does not appear to proscribe initiatives with a prospective fiscal effect only.

The legislative history reinforces that reading. In introducing the amendment, Chairman Dixon himself explained that it would not prohibit initiatives with a future orientation:

I would also point out as a member of that committee and claiming in this discussion, I know personally the intent was not to talk about p[ro]spective limitations on review of possible proposed capital improvements or appropriation items. What we are speaking here, in the amendment that I offer, speaks about these items that have already been acted on by this Council and have gone through the appropriations process. That is what this amendment speaks to.

I am clear and sure that in the future there may be items that we may want to consider. This amendment is addressing those that have already started through the budget process and through the appropriations process. That is what we are speaking to.

The limitations specified by the “Dixon Amendment,” therefore, are — to the extent relevant here — congruent with those inherent in the underlying “laws appropriating funds” exception. The Board and the trial court, therefore, properly acted in reliance on that Amendment.

C. The Invalidity of the CCRC Initiative

Having established the substantive limitations on the initiative right, we turn to their application here. We agree with the decision of the Board and the trial court. We hold that the “Dixon Amendment,” D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § l-1116(k)(7), see id. § 1-1116(7), reflecting the “laws appropriating funds” exception to the initiative right, id. § l-181(a), prevents CCRC’s initiative from reaching the ballot.

As discussed in Part III.B.2 supra, the CCRC initiative (Initiative Measure No. 1) has both a substantive and a fiscal effect, as well as a present and a prospective effect. It would repeal the underlying substantive authorization for the construction and operation of the Convention Center. See D.C. Code 1973, § 9-220(a); id. 1980 Supp., §§ 9-601 to -610. It would bar further expenditure of appropriated funds and prevent future appropriations requests.

We have established in Part IV.A. supra that the “laws appropriating funds” exception permits initiatives with a prospective— but not a present — fiscal effect. Because the CCRC initiative would interdict the expenditure of currently appropriated funds, it is beyond the scope of the initiative power.

Furthermore, we have seen in Part IV.B., supra, that the Initiative Procedures Act, via the “Dixon Amendment,” specifically authorizes the Board and the courts to withhold from a popular vote an initiative that is too broad in this respect. On this basis we halt the CCRC initiative here.

V. CONCLUSION

In determining that the CCRC initiative proposes a “law,” we confirm that the electorate and the District Council share coextensive legislative powers to halt a capital project, except to the extent that the Charter Amendments provide otherwise. In further concluding, however, that the CCRC initiative proposes a “law appropriating funds,” and thus cannot lawfully be submitted to the voters, we confirm that the Charter Amendments bar the electorate from halting a capital project insofar — but only insofar — as the Council has requested and/or Congress has appropriated funds for it. To reiterate: the electorate cannot interfere, by way of initiative, with the legislatures’ established fiscal plans. Finally, in stressing that the proposers of an initiative, the Board of Elections and Ethics, and the courts cannot reinterpret the CCRC initiative to meet the Charter Amendments’ limitations, we underscore that the petition-signers’ intentions, as reflected in the initiative measure and its summary, must be strictly followed. If we were to permit the revised intentions of the proposers to modify, after the fact, the specified intentions of the voters who signed the petitions, we would either be distorting the initiative procedure (by permitting the proposers to speak for the others who signed) or subjecting that procedure to our own speculation about what petition-signers would want to do under changed circumstances. We cannot properly do so.

VI. POSTSCRIPT: RESPONSE TO DISSENT

By focusing almost entirely on an initiative “intended to stop construction of a building” that substantially was funded and underway before the initiative right became effective, post at 926,⁴⁵ our dissenting colleagues oversimplify this case and mislead the public. They altogether overlook the crucial difference between the budgetary process and ordinary legislation under the Home Rule Act; they ignore the fact that there are five governmental bodies whose roles and prerogatives must be taken into account; and they decline to acknowledge that there are other contexts, not involving construction of an already-funded capital project, for which our opinion must anticipate exercise of the initiative right. The truth is, this court today confirms significant authority in the people to seek, by way of initiative, to bar future funding of a District project or program. It is a great disservice to suggest otherwise.

The Home Rule Act and its Charter Amendments grant a measure of governmental authority to each of three legislatures (the electorate, the Council, and the Congress) and to each of two executives (the Mayor and the President). In this case, therefore, we have had to interpret a unique and complex governmental structure and apply it to a situation that the Council, the electorate, and the Congress foresaw dimly — if at all — when they approved the Charter Amendments. It is the rule of the judiciary, through careful reading of the statute and its legislative history, extrapolation from the basic statutory structure, and due sensitivity to all the interests and prerogatives involved, to determine to the best of our ability what the Charter Amendments mean. Absent careful regard for each governmental body there is a danger that this decision inadvertently could distort the way our local government was designed to function.

It is therefore important to stress, first, where the court agrees. Seven judges (represented by the plurality and dissenting opinions) appear to agree that congressional funding of a locally enacted program— whether a capital project or some other, ongoing activity — does not preclude the Council from changing its mind and seeking to halt the program through a “budget request act” asking Congress to rescind the appropriation. The fact that Congress already has appropriated funds for a local program, to be administered by the Mayor, does not tie the Council’s hands. We seven agree, therefore, that in seeking to halt a funded project, the Council would not im-permissibly interfere with the legislative prerogatives of the Congress or the executive functions of the Mayor. Ante at 902-911; post at 922.

Those of us who agree on this division of authority between Congress and Council, and Council and Mayor, do not agree, however, on the extent to which the electorate, by use of the initiative, can stand in the Council’s legislative shoes. All seven judges (indeed, all nine) do agree that the Charter Amendments’ exception barring initiatives for “laws appropriating funds” prohibits the electorate from attempting to fund an authorized program. Ante at 913-914; post at 926. All seven also would agree, on the other hand, that the Act at least permits the electorate to try to halt a project through an initiative to bar funding after current appropriations have expired. Ante at 913-915; see post at 927.⁴⁶ Seven of us, therefore, disagree only on the narrow question — determinative here— whether the electorate also properly can attempt to halt a project by passing an initiative to freeze funds that the Council already has requested or Congress appropriated. The dissenters say yes; we say no. Because the initiative at issue here attempts to reach funds already appropriated for the Convention Center, we conclude it cannot reach the ballot.⁴⁷

Our dissenting colleagues make one basic criticism of our analysis. They say that the “laws appropriating funds” exception to the initiative right should be construed simply as a bar against citizens initiating a “budget request act.” More specifically, they assert, “[t]he plurality avoids the plain meaning of [the] ‘laws appropriating funds’ ” exception to the initiative right. Post at 924. The court can resolve the question, they say, “[i]f we simply translate ‘laws appropriating funds’ as ‘budget request acts,’ ” so that the Home Rule Act clearly will “say[ ] only that the people may not, by initiative, themselves propose a budget request act." Post at 924 (emphasis in original). This solution is not as simple, let alone persuasive, as it may sound.

In the first place, despite their purported reliance on the “plain meaning” of the Home Rule Act language, even the dissenters cannot make sense of the phrase “laws appropriating funds” without sliding over the fundamental distinction between a “budget request” by the Council and an “appropriation” by Congress, then equating the initiative right here with initiatives under the simpler governmental structures of the states, and finally quoting at length from legislative history, in order to support their interpretation of “plain meaning.” The dissenters, just like all other members of the court, had to probe the Act, its history, and the case law for an answer.

Second, and more significantly, on the basis of “[a] thoroughgoing analysis” of legislative history, post at 925, the dissent concludes that “the ‘laws appropriating funds’ exception was designed ... to assure that the Council retained the ultimate fiscal responsibility.... The Council was insistent ... that those budgetary tasks should remain exclusively its own.” Post at 926 (emphasis in original). The dissent also acknowledges the legitimacy of those concerns. “The reasons for [the 'laws appropriating funds’] prohibition are sensible and obvious. The electorate should scarcely be permitted to function as surrogate comptrollers.” Post at 926. The dissent’s analysis accordingly reinforces our own conviction that the Charter Amendments to the Home Rule Act, reflecting concern about interference by the electorate in the appropriations process, cannot properly be interpreted to permit the electorate to undo accomplished fiscal acts of the Council and Congress. Ante at 911-914.

Third — and most telling — the dissenters are caught in a fatal inconsistency. They interpret the “laws appropriating funds” exception to mean that the electorate is forbidden to use the initiative only to seek funds for a project; thus, as the dissenters see it, the electorate is permitted to use the initiative to halt expenditure of funds already appropriated for a project. In drawing this line, however, the dissent fails to take account of a significant feature of the Home Rule Act: the process for making appropriations, beginning with a budget request act, is the very same process that also must be used to rescind them. Ante at 905-907. Therefore, if it is true — as the dissent acknowledges — that “the people may not, by initiative, themselves propose a budget request act," post at 924 (emphasis in original), then they may not, by initiative, propose a budget request act either to fund a program or to halt program funding in the course of a fiscal year. Ante at 913.

Moreover, in overlooking the necessary use of budget request (and appropriations) acts for rescinding as well as enacting appropriations, the dissent ignores the key role of Congress in the budget process. If, as the dissent suggests, the electorate, by initiative, could halt accomplished funding for a project at any time without going through the budget process, post at 926-927, the dissent apparently contemplates that mere ordinary legislation by the Council or an initiative by the electorate — subject only to a 30-day congressional layover — could undo appropriations and impound funds in the hands of the Mayor. This proposition, for which no authority is cited, clashes with the Home Rule Act requirements that Congress give affirmative approval in fiscal matters. Ante at 905-906.

In summary, the dissenters’ entire argument is built upon a false premise: that appropriated funds can be frozen without resort to the budgetary process. Not even the Council can do that. There is no basis whatsoever for concluding that the electorate has greater power than the Council. The fallacy of the dissenters’ position, therefore, is evident: they admit that the people, by initiative, cannot propose a budget request act; and yet they cannot get around the fact that this is the very type of act required to halt as well as seek appropriated funds. Indeed, we agree with the dissent: “The power to pass budget requests (and supplemental budget requests) and transmit them to Congress remains exclusively with the D.C. Council and the Mayor.” Post at 925.

To reiterate: we have concluded that the electorate, by initiative, can seek to deau-thorize and bar future funding of a District program or project. Thus, in the days ahead, if the electorate wishes to preclude a new operating program or to bring an existing one to a halt, it can initiate legislation to do so — as long as it does not interfere with already appropriated funds. Once the electorate learns of plans for a capital project, such as the Convention Center, moreover, it has the ability to initiate legislation to stop the project in a timely, cost-effective way before the District has broken ground. It is only the timing of events here that may obscure this central truth. Although this particular initiative fails because it seeks to interdict current funding for the Convention Center, one should not lose sight of the fact that the Council had requested the first appropriations for that project almost one year before the initiative right went into effect. If the initiative right had existed earlier, the effort to stop the Convention Center might have come to a different conclusion.

The outcome of this case, therefore, should not detract from the importance of the electorate’s legislative authority for the future. Nor should the urgency of the Convention Center initiative — using a new legislative process directed at a project already on the move — justify a judicial shortcut (which in effect the dissenters propose) to help the petitioners catch up with events. Too much in the long run is at stake.

Affirmed.

APPENDIX A: INITIATIVE MEASURE NO. 1

INITIATIVE MEASURE NO. _

Proposer: John J. Phelan

BY THE ELECTORS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

To prohibit the District of Columbia Government from using public funds to construct or operate a Convention Center designed primarily to house business conventions and trade shows.

BE IT ENACTED BY THE ELECTORS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, That this measure may be cited as the “Convention Center Initiative of 1979.”

Sec. 1. Findings and Purpose.

The electors of the District of Columbia find that the Convention Center, which has been proposed at a cost of approximately $100 million and which will be designed to house business conventions and trade shows, would benefit primarily hotels and other businesses in the District of Columbia. Because the present proposal is to finance the Convention Center primarily from public funds appropriated by Congress, derived from taxes, borrowed or otherwise acquired, the electors of the District of Columbia find that the construction of the Convention Center would not be in the best interests of the citizens of the District of Columbia, and therefore adopt this law to prohibit the construction of such a facility.

Sec. 2. Definition of Terms.

(a) “Convention Center” is defined to include the structure which has been designed primarily to house exhibits for business conventions and shows in the approximate area bounded by 11th Street, N.W., New York Avenue, N.W., 9th Street, N.W., and H Street, N.W.

(b) “District of Columbia Government” means City Council of the District of Columbia, Mayor of the District of Columbia, and any other District of Columbia instrumentality agent, employee, contractor, or employee of a contractor, who is authorized by law, including by contract, to spend public funds appropriated by Congress, derived by taxes, borrowed or otherwise acquired for public use by the governing officials of the District of Columbia, and to designate District of Columbia land for public or private use.

Sec. 3. Prohibition Against the Use of Public Funds for the Construction or Operation of a Convention Center.

After the effective date of this measure, the District of Columbia Government shall not construct or operate a Convention Center, or acquire land for that purpose.

Sec. 4. Provision for Disposition of Property Acquired for the Convention Center and for Termination of Pending Contracts.

As soon as practical after the effective date of this Act, the Mayor and City Council of the District of Columbia shall cancel all pending contracts for the construction of the Convention Center, paying whatever penalties or making whatever adjustments are required by law, shall terminate any ongoing proceedings to acquire land for the Convention Center, and shall devise a plan for the disposition of any land acquired for the construction of a Convention Center. Ninety days after the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter until all contracts had been terminated and all land dispositions have been made, the Mayor shall report to the Council and the public on the progress which has been made toward settling all Convention Center construction contracts and disposing of all land acquired for the construction of the Convention Center.

Sec. 5. Provision Making the Law Self-Executing.

This law constitutes a mandate of the public and shall be deemed to be self-executing.

Sec. 6. Severability Clause.

If any section or provision of this measure is held to be invalid, such invalidity shall not affect the remaining provisions.

Sec. 7. Effective Date.

This measure shall become effective in accordance with Section 5 of Public Law 95-526 § 1(3) amending the Initiative, Referendum, and Recall Charter Amendment Act of 1977 (D.C. Law 2-46), and section 602(c) of the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act.

APPENDIX B: INITIATIVE MEASURE NO. 2

Proposed Text,

INITIATIVE MEASURE NO_

CONVENTION CENTER INITIATIVE OF 1979

The Mayor and the Council of the District of Columbia shall not provide any further tax revenues or any other considerations from public funds, the Federal payment, incur any debt or provide public property, after the effective date of this law, to purchase land, construct and/or operate a convention/civic center.

APPENDIX C: INITIATIVE MEASURE NO. 3

Proposed Text — August 6, 1979

INITIATIVE MEASURE NO_:_

CONVENTION CENTER INITIATIVE OF 1979

The Mayor and the Council of the District of Columbia shall not provide any further tax revenues or any other considerations from public funds, the Federal payment, incur any debt or provide public property, after the effective date of this law, to purchase land, construct and/or operate a eon-vention/civic center.

Definitions:

(a) “Provide” shall mean:

(1) in the case of “tax revenues,” the “Federal payment,” and “other considerations from public funds,” funds in a future District budget, but shall not include District budgets approved by Congress prior to the effective date of this Act;

(2) in the case of “public property,” property acquired with funds authorized in a District budget approved by Congress after the effective date of this Act, but shall not prohibit the District from designating property for a convention/civic center if that property was acquired with funds authorized in a District budget approved by Congress prior to the effective date of this Act specifically for a convention/civic center.

(b) “Incur any debt” shall mean any authority in a future District budget to incur debt for a convention/civic center, but shall not prohibit the District from incurring debt for a convention/civic center to the extent authorized in a District budget approved by Congress prior to the effective date of this Act.

1 . District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973) (codified in scattered sections of D.C.Code 1978 Supp.), as amended (commonly known as the Home Rule Act).

2 . See Fiscal Year 1978 Budget Amendment Act, Act 2-36, tit. II, § 201, 23 D.C. Reg. 9699 (1977); District of Columbia Government, Budget Amendment Fiscal Year 1978, at CAP-1 to -5 (May 1977).

3 . D.C.Code 1973, § 9-220(a) provides:

A program of construction to meet capital needs of the government of the District of Columbia is hereby authorized. Such program shall include, without limitation, projects relating to activities to meet the needs of the public in the fields of education, health, welfare, public safety, recreation, and other general government activities.

4 .See District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-228, tit. II, 92 Stat. 281 (D.C. Appropriations Act, 1978).

5 . The District Charter comprises Title IV of the Home Rule Act, supra note 1. Title IV includes the provisions concerning the Council, the Mayor, the Judiciary, the District Budget and Financial Management, Borrowing, and Independent Agencies. The Charter may be amended only in accordance with the procedure specified in D.C.Code 1978 Supp., §§ 1-124, -125, -128(a).

6 . D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § 1 — 1116(k) provides:

Upon submission of an initiative or referendum petition by the proposer to the Board of Elections and Ethics, the Board shall refuse to accept the petition if the Board finds that the measure presented is not a proper subject for initiative or referendum, whichever is applicable, under the terms of title IV of the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, as amended, or upon any of the following grounds:

(1) the verified statement of contributions has not been filed pursuant to sections 1-1134 and 1-1136; or

(2) the petition is not in the proper form established in subsection (g) of this section; or

(3) the time limitation established in subsection (j) of this section within which the petition may be circulated and submitted to the Board has expired; or

(4) the petition on its face clearly bears an insufficient number of signatures; or

(5) the petition sheets do not have attached to them the statements of the circula-tors as provided in subsection (h) of this section; or

(6) the petition authorizes, or would have the effect of authorizing, discrimination prohibited under the Human Rights Act of 1977 (D.C.Code [1978 Supp.], sec. 6-2201 et seq.); or

(7) the petition presented would negate or limit an act of the Council of the District of Columbia pursuant to [D.C.Code 1978 Supp.] Section 47-224.

In the case of refusal to accept a petition, the Board shall endorse on the petition the words submitted but not accepted and the date, and retain the petition pending appeal. If none of the grounds for refusal exists, the Board shall accept the petition.

7 .It is not clear from the record whether CCRC had submitted precisely the same material, absent only signatures, to the Board in October 1978. Approximately 12,500 verified signatures would be required to qualify the initiative for the ballot.

8 . D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § 1-1116(7) provides:

If the Board of Elections and Ethics refuses to accept an initiative or referendum petition when submitted to it, the person or persons submitting such petition may apply, within ten (10) days after the Board’s refusal to accept such petition, to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia for a writ in the nature of mandamus to compel the Board to accept such petition. The Superior Court shall expedite the consideration of the matter. If the Superior Court determines that the issue presented by the petition is a proper subject for initiative or referendum, whichever is applicable, under the terms of title IV of the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, as amended, and that the petition is legal in form and apparently meets the requirement for signatures, both as to number and as toward distribution, prescribed in subsection (i) of this section, and was submitted within the time limitations established in subsection (j) of this section, and has attached to the petition the proper statements of the circula-tors prescribed in subsection (h) of this section, and does not authorize discrimination as prescribed in subsection (k)(6) of this section and would not negate or limit an act of the Council of the District of Columbia as prescribed in subsection (k)(7) of this section, it shall issue an order requiring the Board to accept the petition as of the date of submission for filing. Should the Superior Court hold in favor of the proposer, it shall award court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to the proposer.

9 . See District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-93, tit. II, 93 Stat. 713 (1979) (D.C. Appropriations Act, 1980); Fiscal Year 1980 Budget Request Act, Act 2-311, 25 D.C. Reg. 6094 (1978); 1 Government of the District of Columbia, Justifications for the FY 1980 Budget, at BD-CAP-1 (Feb.1979).

10 . See District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-530, 94 Stat. 3121 (1980) (D.C. Appropriations Act, 1981); Fiscal Year 1981 Budget Request Act, Act 3-134, 27 D.C. Reg. 119 (1979).

11 . After declaring the public interest in having a convention center and the related necessity of granting certain powers, see D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § 9-601, the statute establishes “as an independent agency of the District of Columbia government, the Convention Center Board of Directors (the ‘Board’).” Id. § 9-602(a). The statute gives the Board certain powers to enable it to operate the Convention Center. See id. § 9-603. The statute also establishes “a ‘Washington Convention Center Fund’ (‘the Fund’) to be operated as an enterprise fund,” id. § 9-605(a), to finance “the operation and management of the convention center.” Id. § 9-605(b). The statute explicitly “authorize[s] to be appropriated such funds as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this chapter.” Id. § 9-609.

12 .See Fiscal Year 1982 Budget Request Act, Act 3-294, 27 D.C. Reg. 5315, 5327 (1980).

13 . D.C.Code 1979 Supp., § 1-185 provides:

If a majority of the registered qualified electors voting in a referendum approve an act or adopt legislation by initiative, then the adopted initiative or the act approved by referendum shall be an act of the Council upon the certification of the vote on such initiative or act by the District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics, and such act shall become law subject to the provisions of section l-147(c).

14 . D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § l-147(c) provides:

(c)(1) Except acts of the Council which are submitted to the President in accordance with the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C: § 1 et seq.) any act which the Council determines according to section 1-146(a), should take effect immediately because of emergency circumstances, and acts proposing amendments to title IV of this Act, the Chairman of the Council shall transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the President of the Senate a copy of each act passed by the Council and signed by the Mayor, or vetoed by the Mayor and re-passed by two-thirds of the Council present and voting (and with respect to which the President has not sustained the Mayor’s veto), and every act passed by the Council and allowed to become effective by the May- or without his signature. Except as provided in paragraph (2), no such act shall take effect until the end of the 30-day period (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, and any day on which either House is not in session) beginning on the day such act is transmitted by the Chairman to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and then only if during such 30-day period both Houses of Congress do not adopt a concurrent resolution disapproving such act. The provisions of section 1-127, except subsections (d), (e), and (f) of such section, shall apply with respect to any concurrent resolution disapproving any act pursuant to this paragraph.

(2) In the case of any such act transmitted by the Chairman with respect to any Act codified in titles 22, 23, or 24, such act shall take effect at the end of the 30-day period beginning on the day such act is transmitted by the Chairman to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate only if during such 30-day period one House of Congress does not adopt a resolution disapproving such act. The provisions of section 1-127 relating to an expedited procedure for consideration of resolutions, shall apply to a simple resolution disapproving such act as specified in this paragraph.

15 .A careful focus on the initiative measure, as it relates to our governmental structure, is especially important because the District of Columbia is constitutionally unique. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 395, 93 S.Ct. 1670, 1675, 36 L.Ed.2d 342 (1973); National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 588, 69 S.Ct. 1173, 1176, 93 L.Ed. 1556 (1949) (plurality opinion); Hepburn v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch.) 445, 452, 2 L.Ed. 332 (1805). It has characteristics of a number of governmental entities. See generally Newman & DePuy, Bringing Democracy to the Nation’s Last Colony: The District of Columbia Self-Government Act, 24 Am. U.L. Rev. 537, 556-69 (1975). Therefore, despite the fact that home rule for the District and the initiative right for its electors have received only limited judicial interpretation, see District of Columbia v. Washington Home Ownership Council, Inc., D.C.App., 415 A.2d 1349 (1980) (en banc); Bishop v. District of Columbia, D.C.App., 411 A.2d 997 (en banc), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966, 100 S.Ct. 2943, 64 L.Ed.2d 825 (1980); Capitol Hill Restoration Society, Inc. v. Moore, D.C.App., 410 A.2d 184 (1979); Convention Center J., supra; McIntosh v. Washington, D.C.App., 395 A.2d 749 (1978), we must be cautious, in drawing on precedent from other jurisdictions, to test it against our own special context here.

16 . See Simpson v. Hite, supra 36 Cal.2d at 127, 222 P.2d at 226; Teachers Management & Investment Corp. v. City of Santa Cruz, 64 Cal.App.3d 438, 443, 134 Cal.Rptr. 523, 526-27 (1976); Duran v. Cassidy, 28 Cal.App.3d 574, 577-78 & n.l, 588 ex. 1, 104 Cal.Rptr. 793, 796-97 & n.1, 805 ex. 1 (1972); Mueller v. Brown, 221 Cal.App.2d 319, 323-24, 34 Cal.Rptr. 474, 476 (1963); People of City of Centralia v. City of Centralia, 1 Ill.App.2d 228, 230, 117 N.E.2d 410, 411 (1953); State ex rel. Frank, supra 167 Kan. at 769, 208 P.2d at 200-01; Hughes v. Bryan (In re initiative Petition Filed April 18, 1966), 425 P.2d 952, 953 (Okl.1967); Amalgamated Transit Union—Division 757 v. Yerkovich, 24 Or.App. 221, 224 n.2, 545 P.2d 1401, 1403 n.2 (1976); Whitehead, supra 204 Va. at 146-47, 129 S.E.2d at 693.

17 . Initiative and referendum provisions in some jurisdictions authorize no subject matter screening in advance of the popular vote. In such states a court nevertheless may enjoin the vote if the initiative or referendum is clearly outside the scope of the initiative or referendum right, see, e. g., Boucher v. Engstrom, 528 P.2d 456, 460 (Alaska 1974); Harnett v. Sacramento County, 195 Cal. 676, 683, 235 P. 445, 448 (1925); Amalgamated Transit Union—Division 757 v. Yerkovich, 24 Or.App. 221, 226, 545 P.2d 1401, 1404 n.7 (1976), or proposes a law that would be wholly illegal or unconstitutional. See, e. g., Otey v. Common Council, 281 F.Supp. 264, 275-79 (E.D.Wis.1968); Whitson v. Anchorage, 608 P.2d 759, 761-62 (Alaska 1980); Dade County v. Dade County League of Municipalities, 104 So.2d 512, 514-15 (Fla.1958); Rivergate Restaurant Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 369 So.2d 679, 682 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1979); State ex rel. Bussie v. Fant, 216 La. 58, 66, 43 So.2d 217, 219 (1949); State ex rel. Steen v. Murray, 144 Mont. 61, 68-69, 394 P.2d 761, 764-65 (1964) (per curiam). But see Ranjel v. City of Lansing, 417 F.2d 321, 324 (6th Cir.1969); Iman v. Bolin, 98 Ariz. 358, 364-65, 404 P.2d 705, 709 (1965) (en banc); Bowe v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, 247, 69 N.E.2d 115, 127 (1946); State ex rel. Althouse v. City of Madison, 79 Wis. 97, 110-19, 255 N.W.2d 449, 455-59 (1977).

18 . If the Board rejects an initiative, either before petitions are circulated or thereafter the proposer may sue to compel acceptance as CCRC has done. See D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § 1-1116(1); note 8 supra. Although that provision does not explicitly focus the court’s attention on the initiative bill we see no appropriate, alternative basis for determining the propriety of an initiative’s substantive scope. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.

19 . In addition, the Act exempts CCRC from obtaining Board approval of the petition forms in advance of circulation, see id. §§ 1-1116(h)(1), l-1119.2(a), and from circulating the petitions only after Board certification and then within 180 days of that approval. See id. §§ 1 — 1116(j)(l), (3), 1-1119.2(a). Other exceptions free the CCRC petitions from the requirements of the use of an assigned serial number, see id. §§ 1-1116(b), 1-1119.2(b), and printing in a prescribed form. See id. §§ 1-1116(g), 1-1119.2(d).

20 . Even this narrow grandfather clause encountered considerable opposition from Coun- - cil members who felt that the enabling statute should not, in effect, make the Charter Amendments self-executing by ratifying actions taken before the adoption of implementing legislation. Proponents in turn stressed the limited nature of the procedural exception. Council-member Betty Ann Kane explained:

[L]ooking at the sections that it [the amendment] would waive or modify, I think we all had to conclude that those were very minor and preliminary kinds of sections, and that the basic legislation itself, which would not be affected by this amendment, contains some very, very important procedural safeguards.

* * * * * *

I hope everyone will support this amendment. What it does away with is the possibility that the Board of Elections will reject petitions that thousands and thousands of citizens have signed because it doesn’t have an inch and a three-quarter margin at the top or 20 signatures on a page instead of ten. That’s the kind of formal requirements that, for this first period of putting this legislation into effect, will be weighed. But, the other kinds of safeguards are there.

21 . We do not reach the question whether, after circulation but prior to a popular vote, the Board or the court could sever (with or without a severability clause) improper sections of an initiative measure, and thus render it congruent with the permissible scope of the initiative power. Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 1218, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (court may sever unconstitutional sections of enacted statute if legislature likely would have passed law in any event). See generally, 2 C. Sands, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 44.01.20 (4th ed. 1973 & Supp. 1981). Although Initiative Measure No. 1 contains a severability clause, severance of improper provisions is impossible here, for both permissible and impermissible effects flow from the single operative sentence of section three. See Neal v. Still, 248 Ark. 1132, 1135, 455 S.W.2d 921, 923 (1970) (unconstitutionally vague portions of statute so “mutually connected and interwoven” in one sentence as to make severability impossible); State ex rel. Steen v. Murray, 144 Mont. 61, 66, 394 P.2d 761, 763-64 (1964) (per curiam) (same); Parts III.B.2. supra, IV.C. infra.

22 . A petitioner’s intentions with respect to halting construction of a unitary capital project, therefore, are likely to be more difficult to discern than intentions as to a street-paving program, for example, which the government can stop at any time without material liquidation costs and which, to the extent completed presumably would be a net gain to the community.

23 . For example, let us suppose that an initiative to halt a building project had passed at the popular election and, after the necessary congressional action, became effective today. If the initiative called for an immediate end to the project, all work on the project, at whatever stage it had reached, would stop today, and the government would wind it up. If, however, the initiative called only for a prospective freeze, the project legally would not end until October 1982, the first month for which the Council has not yet adopted a budget request act. More specifically, because the District budget feeds into the Congressional appropriations process, see 31 U.S.C. § 1321 (1976); Part III.C. infra, the Council must act on budgetary matters far in advance of the fiscal year under consideration. The budget request act for Fiscal Year 1982, which ends on September 30, 1982, became effective on November 25, 1980. See 31 U.S.C. § 1321 (1976); Fiscal Year 1982 Budget Request Act, Act 3-294, 27 D.C.Reg. 5315 (1980).

24 .D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § l-144(a) provides:

Subject to the limitations specified in sections 1-126, 1-127, 1-147, and 47-228, the legislative power granted to the District by this Act is vested in and shall be exercised by the Council in accordance with this Act. In addition, except as otherwise provided in this Act, all functions granted to or imposed upon, or vested in or transferred to the District of Columbia Council, as established by Reorganization Plan Number 3 of 1967 shall be carried out by the Council in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

Cf. id. § 1-162 (“The executive power of the District shall be vested in the Mayor .... ”); id. tit. 11 app. § 431(a) (“The judicial power of the District is vested in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.”).

25 . See D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § l-121(a). Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution provides in part: “The Congress shall have Power ... To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of Particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States .... ”

26 . Congress also reserved the power to approve amendments to the District Charter, see D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § l-125(b), and affirmatively to legislate for the District. See Washington Home Ownership Council, Inc., supra at 1352 n.9; D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § 1-126.

27 . See, e. g., City of Grass Valley v. Walkinshaw, 34 Cal.2d 595, 598-99, 212 P.2d 894, 896-97 (1949) (en banc); Hutchinson Human Relations Commission v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., 213 Kan. 308, 313-14, 517 P.2d 158, 162-63 (1973); Capitol Cable, Inc. v. City of Topeka, 209 Kan. 152, 159-60, 495 P.2d 885, 891-92 (1972); 1426 Woodward Avenue Corp. v. Wolff, 312 Mich. 352, 369-70, 20 N.W.2d 217, 222-23 (1945); Whelan v. New Jersey Power & Light Co., 45 N.J. 237, 251, 212 A.2d 136, 143 (1965); Greenberg v. City of Bradford, 432 Pa. 611, 616. 248 A.2d 51, 53-54 (1968).

28 . House Rule XXI, § 2 provides:

No appropriation shall be reported in any general appropriation bill, or be in order as an amendment thereto, for any expenditure not previously authorized by law, unless in continuation of appropriations for such public works and objects as are already in progress.

W. Brown, Constitution, Jefferson’s Manual and Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States Ninety-Sixth Congress, H.R. Doc.No. 95-403, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 525 (1979).

Similarly, Senate Rule XVI, § 1, prohibits amendments to appropriations bills that lack underlying substantive authorization:

All general appropriation bills should be referred to the Committee on Appropriations, and no amendments shall be received to any general appropriation bill the effect of which will be to increase an appropriation already contained in the bill, or to add a new item of appropriation unless it be made to carry out the provisions of some existing law, or treaty stipulation, or act, or resolution previously passed by the Senate during that session; or unless the same be moved by direction of a standing or select committee of the Senate, or proposed in pursuance of an estimate submitted in accordance with law.

Committee on Rules and Administration, United States Senate, Senate Manual, S.Doc.No.95-1, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1977).

29 . We recognize the possibility that legislation by the Council or an initiative by the electorate could infringe on the executive functions vested in the Mayor. See D.C.Code 1978 Supp., §§ 1-162 to -163, 47-226, -241. We conclude that this initiative does not present such a problem. See Part III.D. infra.

30 . Only the first appropriation for a capital project would be subject to challenge for lack of underlying substantive authorization. See note 28 supra.

31 . Pursuant to its authority to adopt supplemental budget requests acts, see D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § 47-224, the Council can add a request for rescission or transfer of appropriations for a deauthorized project to any supplemental budget request act proposed by the Mayor under id. § 47-221(c), which provides in part: “The Mayor from time to time may prepare and submit to the Council such proposed supplemental or deficiency budget recommendations as in his judgment are necessary on account of laws enacted after transmission of the budget or are otherwise in the public interest.”

Although § 47-221(c) gives the Mayor discretion to propose supplemental budget recommendations, we do not understand the statute to grant the Mayor exclusive authority to determine when a supplemental budget request act is necessary. Section 47-221(c) grants the Mayor, as the chief executive, the right to initiate such a proposal; but it does not give the Mayor authority to use the budgetary process to block the Council’s legislative program by refusing to facilitate funding adjustments at mid-year (other than by use of the veto, subject to override, once a supplemental budget request act has been adopted). To read such exclusive authority into § 47-221(c) would be contrary to the fundamental statutory framework giving the Council, not the Mayor, ultimate authority (subject to congressional review) over the District’s annual budget, as reflected in the first paragraph of § 47-221 (captioned “submission of annual budget”): “At such time as the Council may direct, the Mayor shah prepare and submit to the Council each year, and make available to the public, an annual budget for the District of Columbia government . ...” Id. § 47-221(a) (emphasis added). Paragraph (c) of § 47-221 is subordinate to this fundamental prerogative of the Council.

As an alternative to a supplemental appropriations act, Congress could consider a transfer of appropriations through a “reprogramming” proposal to the House and Senate Appropriations committees. See Reprogramming Policy Act of 1980, D.C.Law 3-222, 27 D.C.Reg. 3617 (1980) (to be codified at D.C.Code § 47-283); House Committee on Appropriations, Report Accompanying District of Columbia Appropriations Bill, 19_, H.R.Rep.No. 96-443, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1979); House Committee on Appropriations, Report Accompanying District of Columbia Appropriations Bill, 1972, H.R.Rep.No. 92-684, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1971); Senate Committee on Appropriations, Report Accompanying District of Columbia Appropriations Bill, 1972, S.Rep. No. 92-550, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1971).

32 . Similarly, if the Council adopted a budget request act including a particular item but had second thoughts before Congress had passed an appropriations act, the Council could enact a budget amendment revoking the request. See 31 U.S.C. § 11(g) (1976); D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § 47-224.

33 . No other provision of the Home Rule Act nor any federal statute precludes the Council from deauthorizing a capital project or attempting, through the budget process, to rescind financing for an authorized project after Congress has appropriated funds. The Home Rule Act does mandate that “[n]o amount may be obligated or expended by any officer or employee of the District of Columbia government unless such amount has been approved by Act of Congress, and then only according to such Act.” D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § 47-224. feut this statement does not mean that the District is irrevocably committed to spending appropriated funds. It simply means that the District may not incur obligations unless authorized by a congressional appropriations act.

Nor does the general federal statute concerning appropriations for the construction of public buildings prevent the Council from changing its mind about a project. Unlike other appropriations, which are available only for the fiscal year, 31 U.S.C. § 718 (1976), appropriations for capital projects remain available until completion.

All moneys appropriated for the construction of public buildings shall remain available until the completion of the work for which they are or may be, appropriated; and upon the final completion of each or any of said buildings, and the payment of all outstanding liabilities therefor, the balance or balances remaining shall be immediately covered into the Treasury. [31 U.S.C. § 682 (1976) (emphasis added).]

This statute is permissive, not mandatory. The continued availability of funds appropriated for construction of a public building falls far short of irrevocably requiring their expenditure.

The District of Columbia Appropriations Acts merely reiterate the rule of this general statute; they do not irrevocably mandate the expenditure of funds appropriated for capital projects. For example, the D.C. Appropriations Act, 978, approved June 5, 1978, provides:

Notwithstanding the foregoing, all authorizations for capital outlay projects, except those projects covered by the first sentence of section 23(a) of the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1968 (Public Law 90-195 approved August 23, 1968) for which funds are provided by this paragraph, shall expire on September 30, 1979, except authorizations for projects as to which funds have been obligated in whole or in part prior to such date. Upon expiration of any such project authorization the funds provided herein for such project shall lapse .... [D.C. Appropriations Act, 1978, supra, tit. 2.]

The D.C. Appropriations Acts of 1980 and 1981 contain the same provision, except the expenditure authorizations for capital projects included in those acts expire on September 30, 1981, and September 30, 1982, respectively. See D.C. Appropriations Act, 1981, supra; D.C.Appropriations Act, 1980, supra.

These appropriations acts expressly provide that the authorization for expenditure of appropriated funds shall lapse after the specified period if the District has obligated no funds for the project within that period; but if the District commences a project within that time, the authorization to spend the appropriated funds continues. These acts, however, do not preclude the Council from initiating an appropriations repealer.

34 .In this commonly cited passage, McQuillin offers two other tests of the legislative/administrative distinction. First, McQuillin notes that when a local governing body implements a state policy or participates in a national regulatory program, courts have held that the locality — as the deputy of the higher government — is engaged in an administrative function, and the electorate accordingly cannot interfere with it by initiative or referendum. See, e. g., Simpson, supra 36 Cal.2d at 133-34, 222 P.2d at 229-30; State ex rel. Nelson v. Butler, 145 Neb. 638, 646-47, 17 N.W.2d 683, 689-90 (1945); Hughes v. Bryan, (In re Initiative Petition Filed April 18, 1966), 425 P.2d 952, 954 (Okla.1967); Amalgamated Transit Union—Division 757 v. Yerkovich, 24 Or.App. 221, 227-28, 545 P.2d 1401, 1405 (1976). See generally 5 E. McQuillin, supra § 16.55, at 212-13 & n.98.

Even if we were to adopt this test, this prohibition would not apply here. Construction and operation of the Convention Center do not reflect a congressional policy for a District or national regulatory scheme which the District government is deputized to administer. Although Congress enacted the original version of the general authorization of capital construction, D.C.Code 1973, § 9-220(a), in 1958, see Act of June 6, 1958, Pub.L.No. 85-451, 72 Stat. 183, the Council now has power to repeal or amend that statute. See D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § 1-124. Similarly, the Council could repeal or amend its own recent statute authorizing operation of the Convention Center, id. 1980 Supp., §§ 9-601 to -610. See id. 1978 Supp., § 1-124. Although Congress retains power to legislate for the District and to override Council action, see id. §§ 1-126, -144(e), -147(c), that reserved power does not convert capital projects in the District into federal programs which the District administers as an agent of the Congress. The Home Rule Act manifests an intent precisely to the contrary. See id. § 1-121(a).

As a final test of the legislative/administrative dichotomy, McQuillin states: “Actions relating to subjects of a permanent and general character are usually regarded as legislative, and those providing for subjects of a temporary and special character are regarded as administrative.” 5 E. McQuillin, supra § 16.55, at 213. This distinction is of little help and it is relied upon infrequently. In any event, we hardly can regard the construction and operation of a $98.7 million convention center as “temporary.”

35 . See, e. g., Mueller v. Brown, 221 Cal.App.2d 319, 327, 34 Cal.Rptr. 474, 478 (1963) (initiative to preserve old courthouse and surrounding park interferes with execution of Board of Supervisors’ resolution approving construction of new courthouse on site); Whitehead, supra 204 Va. at 151, 129 S.E.2d at 696 (although establishment of city-owned water system is legislative decision, initiative to change expense factor in maintenance interferes with administration); Heider, supra 37 Wis.2d at 474-77, 155 N.W.2d at 21-22 (initiative to prohibit Council from approving capital expenditure for high school addition for three years and to prohibit tax levy for addition unless City Planning Commission adopts master plan interferes with execution of Council resolution, requested by Board of Education and approved by popular vote, authorizing issuance of bonds for school construction, and with Commission’s execution of statutory duty to adopt master plan).

36 . See, e. g., Teachers Management & Investment Corp. v. City of Santa Cruz, 64 Cal.App.3d 438, 447, 134 Cal.Rptr. 523, 529 (1976) (“decision of a city to build and operate a public structure is unquestionably legislative in nature” and, accordingly, is proper subject of initiative); Duran v. Cassidy, 28 Cal.App. 574, 582, 104 Cal.Rptr. 793, 799 (1972) (people have right to propose initiative halting development of golf course as part of city park even after construction of course has begun); Paget, supra 78 Wash.2d at 356, 474 P.2d at 251 (people have right to propose initiative vetoing County Commissioners’ selection of site for public stadium); cf. State ex rel. Ballantyne v. Leeman, 149 Neb. 847, 858, 32 N.W.2d 918, 923 (1948) (authorizing construction of municipal auditorium was act of legislation, but referendum on ordinance to assess property to be taken by eminent domain interferes with administration of project); Monahan v. Funk, 137 Or. 580, 587-88, 3 P.2d 778, 780-81 (1931) (referendum on ordinance to purchase site for incinerating plant interferes with administration of project, but electors could seek to repeal charter provision authorizing Council to issue bonds to finance plant construction). But see Ruano v. Spellman, 81 Wash.2d 820, 824, 505 P.2d 447, 450 (1973) (en banc) (in light of two prior popular votes on construction of public stadium, initiative to halt project impermissibly interferes with execution of firmly established decision to proceed).

37 . This jurisdiction has defined “legislative power” in the following terms:

The line between the exercise of legislative power and the exercise of other governmental powers ... is vague in borderline cases, but whatever the boundary of legislative power may be, it clearly includes an action which adopts a policy affecting the public generally and sets in motion the effectuation of that policy. If an action is merely by way of fact-finding in the course of effectuating a policy declared by the legislature, or is merely the formulation of rules and regulations for the purposes of such effectuation, the action is administrative. But if an action is the declaration and adoption of a policy and program by which affairs of general public concern are to be controlled, the action is a legislative act.

Woods v. Babcock, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 37, 39, 185 F.2d 508, 510 (1950) (footnotes omitted), vacated as moot sub nom. City of Los Angeles v. Woods, 340 U.S. 908, 909, 71 S.Ct. 294, 294, 95 L.Ed. 657 (1951) (per curiam).

38 . The initiative right conferred by the Charter Amendments, D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § 1-181(a), includes the right to repeal and amend existing legislation. The statute gives the electorate the right to propose “laws,” and the word “laws” includes both new legislation and the amendment and repeal of existing legislation. See 6 E. McQuillin, supra §§ 21.02, .10.

The legislative history of the charter amendments reinforces the generic meaning of this term. During the hearings of the Council Committee on Government Operations, the late • Councilmember Julius Hobson, the author of the original Charter Amendment bill, wondered whether “30 working days ... is enough time for a citizen to get a referendum on the ballot?” The Committee Clerk responded that the thirty-day time frame corresponded to the congressional layover period. See D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § l-147(c). He continued, “Should the citizens desire, basically, to reverse a decision of the Council which has already become law, they would then have the ability to initiate through the initiative process the same measure to the ballot.” Reflecting the same view, the Committee Report on the bill stated that the referendum right would attach only during the layover period; however, “[o]f course, the people could undertake to have an initiative item placed on the ballot which would have substantially the same impact.”

As this legislative history makes clear, the mere existence of a referendum right to approve or disapprove acts of the Council, see D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § 1 — 181(b), does not imply that the electorate cannot use the initiative to repeal or amend existing legislation. Rather than being mutually exclusive, the two processes of initiative and referendum overlap. See Klosterman v. Marsh, 180 Neb. 506, 511, 143 N.W.2d 744, 748 (1966).

Courts in many other jurisdictions have interpreted their initiative provisions as extending to the repeal of existing laws. See, e. g., Blotter v. Farrell, 42 Cal.2d 804, 811, 270 P.2d 481, 485 (1954) (en banc); Duran v. Cassidy, 28 Cal.App.3d 574, 582, 104 Cal.Rptr. 793, 799 (1972); St. Paul Citizens for Human Rights v. City Council, Minn., 289 N.W.2d 402, 405 (1979) (en banc); State ex rel. Boyer v. Grady, 201 Neb. 360, 366-67, 269 N.W.2d 73, 77 (1978); Dawson v. Tobin, 74 N.D. 713, 736-37, 24 N.W.2d 737, 748 (1946); State ex rel. Sharpe v. Hitt, 155 Ohio St. 529, 538-40, 99 N.E.2d 659, 664 (1951); Bachmann v. Goodwin, 121 W.Va. 303, 307, 3 S.E.2d 532, 533 (1939). But see Batten v. Hambley, 400 S.W.2d 683, 685 (Ky.1966); In re Initiative Petition No. 1 (Smith v. Melton), 465 P.2d 470, 472 (Okl.1970); Hughes v. Bryan (In re Initiative Petition Filed April 18, 1966), 425 P.2d 952, 954 (Okl.1967); Wyatt v. Clark, 299 P.2d 799, 802 (Okl.1956); Ruano v. Spellman, 81 Wash.2d 820, 824, 505 P.2d 447, 450 (1973) (en banc); Heider, supra 37 Wis.2d at 478, 155 N.W.2d at 24; Landt v. City of Wisconsin Dells, 30 Wis.2d 470, 476-80, 141 N.W.2d 245, 248-50 (1966).

39 . See, e. g., Thomas v. Bailey, 595 P.2d 1, 2, 8 (Alaska 1979) (exception to initiative right for “makpng] ... appropriations” prohibits initiative to distribute land for homesteading); State ex rel. Keefe, supra 106 Fla. at 756, 145 So. at 175 (city charter’s initiative and referendum rights do not extend to appropriations ordinances to carry out budget system); Rauh v. City of Hutchinson, 223 Kan. 514, 522, 575 P.2d 517, 522 (1978) (initiative and referendum rights do not permit popular vote on ordinances to carry out resolution authorizing bond issue); Cuprowski, supra 101 N.J.Super. at 28, 242 A.2d at 880 (in absence of clear mandate by legislature, appropriations and budget ordinances and resolutions are not subject to initiative or referendum); Heider, supra 37 Wis.2d at 480, 155 N.W.2d at 24 (initiative right does not extend to enactment of ordinance temporarily prohibiting expenditure of funds on high school addition); Whitehead, supra 204 Va. at 151, 129 S.E.2d at 696 (initiative right does not extend to calculation of expense factor in maintenance of public utility).

40 . See, e. g., Blotter v. Farrell, 42 Cal.2d 804, 809, 270 P.2d 481, 483-84 (1954) (en banc) (initiative proposers were entitled to file supplemental petitions containing additional signatures); State ex rel. Freeze v. Taylor, 90 Mont. 439, 446-47, 4 P.2d 479, 481-82 (1931) (petition-signers may use ditto mark to indicate address); State ex rel. Benham v. Cheever, 71 Wyo. 303, 311, 257 P.2d 337, 341 (1953) (when initiative statute contains no provision requiring city to verify signatures on petitions, petitions received in evidence without objection constitute prima facie evidence of sufficiency, which city may rebut with evidence of invalidity or inaccuracy).

41 . See, e. g., Barnes v. City of Miami, 47 So.2d 3, 6 (Fla.1950) (initiative right extends to question whether city should engage in public housing program under U.S. Housing Act); State ex rel Boyer v. Grady, 201 Neb. 360, 368-69, 269 N.W.2d 73, 78 (1978) (initiative right extends to repeal of sales tax ordinance); cf. Purser v. Ledbetter, 227 N.C. 1, 9, 40 S.E.2d 702, 709 (1946) (city treasurer may not spend proceeds of property tax for recreation because voters must approve levy of taxes for other than necessary government expenses). But see City of Lawrence v. McCardle, 214 Kan. 862, 870, 522 P.2d 420, 427 (1974) (rejecting liberal construction rule in favor of practicality test, holds initiative to equalize firefighters’ and police officers’ pay is outside scope of initiative right).

42 . The court accordingly permitted a popular vote on an initiative setting salary scales for the police and fire departments. See Glass v. Smith, supra 150 Tex. at 634-36, 244 S.W.2d at 647-48.

43 . A holding that the “laws appropriating funds” exception more broadly precludes an initiative to stop a program once the Council has requested a first round of funds for it would lead to the same result — at least with respect to the powers of the electorate — as that proposed in Chief Judge NEWMAN’S concurring opinion. We have rejected that position, see Part III.D. supra, and decline to bring it in through the back door by overextending the “laws appropriating funds” exception.

44 . We express no view as to whether the “Dixon Amendment” properly reflects the limitations on the referendum right, D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § 1-181(b).

45 . This court has held, in an opinion written by Judge GALLAGHER, that the Charter Amendments conferring the initiative right were not self-executing; they required implementing legislation. See Convention Center I, supra at 552-53.

46 . All nine members of the court agree that the electorate can seek to authorize — or deauthorize — a project or program by initiative (subject to congressional layover). Ante at 914; post at 920, 927. Although a deauthorization itself could have the effect of barring future budget requests and appropriations, and thus halting initial or further funding of a project, we have explained that deauthorization alone cannot stop expenditure of funds already appropriated. Only the separate budgetary process can achieve that result. Ante at 904-906; post at 920 n.* At no point do the dissenters discuss, let alone refute, this fundamental point.

47 . Our dissenting colleagues apparently agree that the proposed initiative would reach appropriated funds. Post at 926-927. They do not quarrel with our conclusion that the proposers, the Board of Elections, and the court cannot properly make postci'rculation revisions to give the initiative only a prospective effect. Ante at 900-902.