Rocci v. Ecole Secondaire MacDonald-cartier ( 2000 )

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

VERNIERO, J.

In this appeal we consider the application of the doctrine of presumed damages to a claim of defamation asserted by plaintiff, a teacher. The claim centers on a letter by defendant, also a teacher, in which defendant asserts that plaintiff behaved unprofessionally on a class trip. The Appellate Division affirmed the Law Division’s grant of summary judgment, holding that plaintiff did not establish a claim of defamation because she did not proffer proof of reputational or pecuniary harm. 323 N.J.Super. 18, 731 A.2d 1205 (1999).

We affirm but for reasons different from those expressed by the Appellate Division. We conclude that defendant’s letter, which concerns a teacher’s behavior around her students and was sent only to that teacher’s supervisor, requires heightened freespeeeh protections. In view of that conclusion, we hold that reputational or pecuniary harm may not be presumed in this case absent a showing of “actual malice” as that term is defined under New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 84 S.Ct. 710, 726, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, 706 (1964). Because plaintiff was unable to show such harm and has alleged no facts sufficient to demonstrate actual malice, the grant of summary judgment was appropriate in this case.

I.

Plaintiff Ana Rocci and defendant Edward Tilli are teachers who in 1995 took students on a trip to Spain. Rocci, a teacher at St. Joseph’s High School in Metuchen, accompanied twenty-three students from that school. She and the St. Joseph’s students joined Tilli, a teacher at École secondaire Maedonald-Cartier High School (École secondaire) of Ontario, Canada, and ten students from that school. Together, the group toured through Spain.

After the trip, on May 9, 1995, Tilli wrote a letter to the principal of St. Joseph’s High School, complaining that, among other things, Rocci had consumed seven bottles of wine on the plane and acted unprofessionally during the trip by keeping the students out late:

My name is Ed Tilli and I am a teacher at Macdonald Cartier High School____ In all my years of experience as a teacher and counsellor I have had to deal with very few problems in comparison with this years [sic] Spain experience.

As you may already know this years [sic] adventure was a joint canadian-american [sic] school trip. Our ten students of which [sic] eight girls and two boys teamed up with your twenty-three boys excluding the adults. As such, this experience would have benefited [sic] all students if it were not for the unfortunate lack of professionalism on the part of Mrs. A. Roeei. If I may I would now like to relate to you both our personal experiences with her as well as those of Javier Matiacci Rodriguez (the E.F. Tour Guide during the Spain visit).

Thursday, April 13

As related by the Tour Guide the [sic] and students, Mrs. Rocci had had seven bottles of wine on the flight from J.F.K. to Amsterdam. This was to set the tone for things to come. That very same evening fully aware that the next day we were to get up at 7:00 a.m. for the Madrid guided tour, Mrs. Rocci kept her students, with some of ours, out until 2:00 a.m. This would make it very difficult for the students to stay awake and remain focused that day.

Friday, April 14

On the way to Toledo, being overtired, the students did very little listening if any at all____

We were ... told by our E.F. Tour Guide that Mrs. Rocci (forgetting that we were all equal paying customers) felt that because she had the majority number of students that she could therefore make all decisions for both groups.

Once again, that evening your students were kept out until 2:30 a.m. while being fully aware of the 7:00 a.m. wake-up call and early departure to Segovia.

Monday, April 17

In the evening your students were forced out until 1:30 a.m. and were scheduled to get up and leave for Tangiers, Morocco at 4:30 a.m. As usual the students were very tired and had difficulties in enjoying Tangiers. (Information related by both students and Tour' Guide).

Plaintiff commenced an action for defamation against Tilli, École secondaire, tour guide Javier Matiacci Rodriguez, and ten unnamed defendants. Rodriguez and the unnamed defendants are not represented in this litigation. Additionally, although Rodriguez was identified as a defendant, plaintiffs complaint alleged no claims against Rodriguez. 323 N.J.Super. at 21 n. 1, 731 A.2d 1205.

In her complaint, plaintiff alleged the following damages: “loss of earnings and grievous mental injury in that she was exposed to the contempt and ridicule of her friends and acquaintances and was rendered outraged in mind, spirit and body, to the extent that she required prolonged medical treatment to restore her health.” However, at her deposition, plaintiff stated that she was neither fired nor suspended from her teaching position and that she did not suffer any economic damages. She further stated that after the letter arrived at her school she met with the principal and, using information provided by her colleagues and students, she proved the falsity of the statements to the principal. Although she attributed a digestive ailment to anxiety she experienced after receiving the letter, plaintiff stated that she did not incur medical expenses related to the alleged defamation. Finally, plaintiff testified that she was upset by students’ inquiries about the wine she allegedly drank on the airplane, but she acknowledged that she showed the letter from Tilli to the students in an effort to have them discredit Tilli’s accusations.

On motion by defendants Tilli and École secondaire, the Law Division granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. That court concluded that Tilli’s letter was not defamatory, and also noted that plaintiff had not alleged pecuniary damages. Although the Appellate Division acknowledged that the letter could be defamatory and concluded that plaintiffs European undertaking with her students did not implicate a public interest, 323 N.J.Super. at 22, 731 A.2d 1205, it affirmed the trial court’s disposition. Citing this Court’s decision in Sisler v. Gannett Co., 104 N.J. 256, 280, 291, 516 A.2d 1083 (1986), the panel held that to maintain a claim of defamation under New Jersey common law a plaintiff must prove that her reputation has been injured, that she suffered pecuniary loss, or that she suffered extreme emotional distress. 323 N.J.Super. at 23-24, 731 A.2d 1205. One member of the panel dissented. The dissenting member, relying on the doctrine of presumed damages, concluded that proof of actual harm is not a prerequisite to plaintiffs right to recover damages. Id. at 27, 731 A.2d 1205 (Lesemann, J.S.C., dissenting). Plaintiff appealed to this Court as of right pursuant to Rule 2:2-1(a)(2).

Following oral argument, we afforded the parties the opportunity to submit supplemental briefs concerning whether defendant Tilli’s letter implicated the public interest. In response, the parties, as well as the New Jersey Press Association as amicus curiae, submitted briefs in which they discussed that question. Defendants Tilli and École secondaire contend that because Tilli’s letter implicated the public interest, plaintiff could not presume damages and would have to prove actual malice to sustain her suit. In contrast, plaintiff argues that, although the letter implicated a matter of public concern, she should be permitted to present her case to the jury to demonstrate that defendants were motivated by malice.

II.

“The law of defamation embodies the important public policy that individuals should generally be free to enjoy their reputations unimpaired by false and defamatory attacks.” Swede v. Passaic Daily News, 30 N.J. 320, 331, 153 A.2d 36 (1959). The law, however, is not without its limits. Defamation-law principles must “achieve the proper balance between protecting reputation and protecting free speech.” Ward v. Zelikovsky, 136 N.J. 516, 528, 643 A.2d 972 (1994). In that regard, “speech on ‘matters of public concern’ ... is ‘at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection.’” Sisler, supra, 104 N.J. at 264-65, 516 A.2d 1083 (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-59, 105 S.Ct. 2939, 2945, 86 L.Ed.2d 593, 602 (1985)). The same is true under our State Constitution. Id. at 271-72, 516 A.2d 1083 (“[0]ur decisions, pronounced in the benevolent light of New Jersey’s constitutional commitment to free speech, have stressed the vigor with which New Jersey fosters and nurtures speech on matters of public concern.”).

In the same vein, speech related to matters of public concern “occupies the ‘highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values[.]’ ” Dun & Bradstreet, supra, 472 U.S. at 759, 105 S.Ct. at 2945, 86 L.Ed.2d at 602 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1689, 75 L.Ed.2d 708, 718 (1983)). Such speech “requires maximum protection.” Sisler, supra, 104 N.J. at 266, 516 A.2d 1083. Thus, when alleged defamatory remarks touch on a matter of public concern, “the interests of free speech justify, and fairness to individual reputation permits, application of a strict and high burden of proof to establish actionable defamation.” Id. at 275, 516 A.2d 1083. Within that context, a plaintiff asserting a defamation claim cannot rely on the doctrine of presumed damages absent a finding that the defendant published the statement “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” New York Times, supra, 376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. at 726, 11 L.Ed.2d at 706.

Applying those tenets here, we are satisfied that plaintiff may not rely on the doctrine of presumed damages. There is a strong public interest in the behavior of teachers, especially concerning their conduct with and around their students. DiCosala v. Kay, 91 N.J. 159, 180, 450 A.2d 508 (1982) (recognizing high degree of care required to be exercised toward children when adult’s employment involves contact with children); cf. Standridge v. Ramey, 323 N.J.Super. 538, 545, 733 A.2d 1197 (App.Div.1999) (“Performance of high school athletic teams is often a matter of substantial public interest within a community.”). Similarly, the Supreme Court of Connecticut has observed, “[unquestionably, members of society are profoundly interested in the qualifications and performance of the teachers who are responsible for educating and earing for the children in their classrooms.” Kelley v. Bonney, 221 Conn. 549, 606 A.2d 693, 710 (1992).

In her supplemental brief, plaintiff acknowledges that defendant’s letter implicates a matter of public concern. More specifically, she states that her “role was one as a fiduciary charged with the care of her students. On its face, the letter appears to concern itself with the students [sic] well being.” In view of that fiduciary role and the public interest, we believe that there must be free discourse, commentary, and criticism regarding a teacher’s professionalism and behavior during a school-sponsored event. That principle, which is at the heart of this case, tips the scale in favor of requiring plaintiff to allege more than mere embarrassment to survive summary judgment. Hence, although a private figure, plaintiff is required to allege and prove pecuniary or reputational harm.

Moreover, teachers are aware that they will be subject to evaluation by members of their school boards, administrators, peers, parents, and students. In re L.R., 321 N.J.Super. 444, 452, 729 A.2d 463 (App.Div.1999) (“The most obvious available measure to protect students from a teacher who poses a danger to their safety or welfare is for [Division of Youth and Family Services] to communicate its concerns and recommendations to the school district which employs the teacher.”). Accordingly, we must ensure that our jurisprudence does not act to chill complaints about a teacher’s behavior in the presence of students or similar matters involving the public interest. Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publ’g Co., 104 N.J. 125, 157, 516 A.2d 220 (1986) (“[T]he fear of [being sued for defamation] can inhibit comment on matters of public concern.”); cf. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 99 S.Ct. 693, 58 L.Ed.2d 619 (1979) (holding it improper to terminate teacher due to her complaints and criticism of school policies and practices communicated privately to principal; teacher’s complaints were protected by First Amendment); Kailin v. Rainwater, 226 Wis.2d 134, 593 N.W.2d 865 (Ct.App.1999) (explaining public interest in disclosure of principal’s records of misconduct outweighed principal’s privacy and reputational interests).

III.

This Court has previously determined that summary judgment is particularly appropriate for disposing of non-meritorious defamation suits. Costello v. Ocean County Observer, 136 N.J. 594, 605, 643 A.2d 1012 (1994); Sedore v. Recorder Publ’g Co., 315 N.J.Super. 137, 163, 716 A.2d 1196 (App.Div.1998) (urging “trial courts not to hesitate to employ summary judgment to expedite such litigation whenever appropriate”). New Jersey courts “have recognized that First Amendment values are compromised by long and costly litigation in defamation cases.” Sedore, supra, 315 N.J.Super. at 163, 716 A.2d 1196 (citing Kotlikoff v. The Community News, 89 N.J. 62, 67, 444 A.2d 1086 (1982); Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 89 N.J. 176, 196, 445 A.2d 376, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 907, 103 S.Ct. 211, 74 L.Ed.2d 169 (1982)). “By discouraging frivolous defamation actions, motions for summary judgment keep open lines of communication to the public on” matters of public concern. Dairy Stores, supra, 104 N.J. at 157, 516 A.2d 220.

In this case, plaintiff failed to allege any specific harm to her reputation; instead, she felt embarrassed each time her students teased her about drinking alcohol. She was also concerned that others would find out about the letter, stating “you know how kids are.” However, the students learned of the letter’s contents only after plaintiff herself distributed the letter to them. In contrast, defendant sent the letter directly and privately to plaintiffs principal. As stated at her deposition, plaintiffs only claim of harm is embarrassment caused by her own distribution of the letter. Although we do not diminish the sense of embarrassment asserted by plaintiff, plaintiff should not be able to recover for that embarrassment when she herself caused the material to be distributed.

Moreover, plaintiff incurred no medical expenses for her alleged health problems and did not miss any work due to her asserted ailments. Apparently, plaintiff did not go to a gastroenterologist regarding her claimed digestive problems until the day before her deposition, well after she asserted in her complaint that she required “prolonged medical treatment.” Likewise, plaintiff suffered no pecuniary harm — she did not lose her job, suffer any form of discipline, or miss any days of work. Plaintiff continued to be permitted to chaperone European trips and did not suffer any loss associated with any other job.

In view of the record, the trial court appropriately disposed of plaintiffs case on summary judgment. The alleged defamatory material involves a matter of public concern, which is at the heart of the First Amendment and thus requires enhanced protection. We do not believe that in such a setting a plaintiff should be able to survive a motion for summary judgment when she has failed to provide any evidence of harm beyond her embarrassment. Sisler, supra, 104 N.J. at 281, 516 A.2d 1083.

Lastly, in Costello, supra, 136 N.J. at 615, 643 A.2d 1012, we made clear that under the heightened actual-malice standard,

[plaintiffs ... must produce substantial evidence to survive a motion for summary judgment. Although courts construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party in a summary judgment motion, the “clear and convincing” standard in defamation action adds an additional weight to the plaintiffs’ usual “preponderance of the evidence” burden.

[Citation omitted.]

As noted, plaintiff has alleged insufficient facts in her complaint and deposition testimony to demonstrate that defendant Tilli knew that the information relayed to him by the tour guide and students was false, or that defendant otherwise acted with reckless disregard of the truth. Thus, “[ajpplying the actual-malice standard through the prism of summary judgment, we find that even when considering the evidence in the light most favorable to [plaintiff], a reasonable factfinder could not find ‘clear and convincing’ evidence of [defendant’s] actual malice.” Id. at 618, 643 A.2d 1012 (citation omitted).

IV.

In sum, we conclude that the alleged defamatory material was entitled to substantial First Amendment protection because it involved a matter of public concern — the welfare of children entrusted to the care of a teacher. On issues of public concern, heightened standards of free speech require that a plaintiff allege and prove pecuniary or reputational harm. Here, plaintiff failed to do so. Because defamation laws were created to balance the interests of reputation and free speech, plaintiffs failure to allege any reputational or pecuniary harm precludes her defamation claim.

We decide this case on our conclusion that the content of defendant’s letter implicated the public interest and that plaintiffs proofs fell short of the actual-malice standard. We reserve for a future ease the question whether the doctrine of presumed damages should apply to claims made by a private-figure plaintiff when no public interest is implicated. Similarly, in view of our conclusion that society’s interest in the content of the letter mandated that plaintiff proffer proof of reputational or pecuniary harm, we do not need to decide whether the letter represented a privileged communication.

As modified, the judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed.